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THE POST-1960S DEVELOPMENT OF URBAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE PRODUCTION OF 
NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL RACIAL JUSTICE ACTIVISM 
James Evans Morone 
Adolph Reed Jr. 
This dissertation traces the historical development of neighborhood-level civic, economic, and 
political institutions since the 1960s, and shows that these institutions limit possibilities for 
contemporary grassroots organizing around economic issues.  Using secondary and archival 
data, the first section of the project examines sequences of institutional development in urban 
neighborhoods, showing that interactions between racial justice movements, local and federal 
programs, philanthropy, and changing economic conditions, produced a field of neighborhood-
based organizations committed to pro-capitalist—and later distinctively neoliberal—forms of 
development, and which construct these projects in militant discourses on racial empowerment 
and identity.  Using ethnographic, social network, and textual analysis, the second section of the 
dissertation shows how 1) these institutions encourage neighborhood residents to develop 
ideological commitments to and material investments in neoliberal modes of economic and 
social practice in distressed urban neighborhoods; 2) that the wide diffusion of these 
commitments and investments impedes efforts to organize residents around progressive 
economic projects.  The project also shows that, in neighborhoods with large concentrations of 
recently arrived immigrants, neighborhood institutions are less likely to be incorporated into 
neoliberal regimes, and more likely to be shaped by alternative ideologies, imported through 
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transnational activist networks.  These findings elucidate the politics of economic policy, 
suggesting that neighborhood-based institutions reproduce commitments to neoliberalism, 
supporting the political resilience of neoliberal regimes.   On the other hand, the findings also 
suggest oppositional cultures may flourish at the neighborhood level, insofar as neighborhood 
institutions are incompletely incorporated into neoliberal regimes.  Finally, the findings support 
the theoretical arguments that the urban neighborhood is a crucial site of identity and interest 
formation, and that neighborhood-level community development organizations are key sites of 
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CHAPTER 1.  Introduction:  Renewed Conflict Over Inequality, and 
the Potential of Community Organizing 
 
In recent years, progressive and socialist formations at the urban, state, and national 
scales have attempted to advance policy agendas in part by organizing grassroots support in 
lower-class neighborhoods.  Despite the importance of this organizing to contestation over 
economic policy, we know little about the terrain for organizing—the characteristics of 
neighborhoods and their populations which create barriers to and opportunities for this 
organizing.  This dissertation elucidates the terrain for grassroots organizing around 
neoliberalization and related economic issues in lower-class Black and Latinx neighborhoods of 
U.S. cities by examining the historical development of neighborhood institutions and cultures, 
and conducting ethnographic research on contemporary neighborhood organizing.   
I present three sets of empirical findings: 
• First, I find that neighborhood institutions developing since the late 1960s, largely products 
of neoliberalization at the federal level, have shaped the terrain for organizing in three 
ways:  1)they have incorporated large swaths of neighborhood populations into distributive 
relationships with neoliberal regimes; 2)most recently, they have increased grassroots 
participation in the neoliberal real estate redevelopment industry; 3)relatedly, they have 
produced discourses on racial interest and on social problems which support market-based 
community development and apolitical self-help, and deemphasize state or corporate 
responsibility for economic conditions, and diffused these understandings among 
neighborhood residents. 
• Second, I show that these institutional developments are less likely to have occurred in 
“point-of-entry” neighborhoods, defined by large populations of foreign-born and first-
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generation U.S. born people.  The mechanisms which incorporate populations into 
neoliberal distributive relationships, and those populations’ neoliberal-compatible 
conceptions of interest and of social problems, developed over decades.  The incorporation 
of recently arrived populations into similar distributive relationships depends on contingent 
interventions by political elites.  Recently arrived populations are more likely to view 
collective interests and social problems through discourses developed in their country of 
origin or in international activist networks. 
• Third, the growth of left formations at the urban and national scales also shapes the terrain 
for organizing in some neighborhoods.  Most importantly, this growth entails the expansion 
of populations of activists committed to progressive and socialist visions.  These activists are 
distributed among neighborhoods as consumers of residential space, concentrating in 
gentrifying neighborhoods.  These activists may lead community organizing projects in their 
neighborhoods of residence. 
These findings elucidate the politics of neoliberalism and related economic issues, 
including divestment, displacement, and economic inequality more generally.  The first set of 
findings describe powerful barriers to organizing against neoliberalization in many 
neighborhoods, indicating the political resilience of neoliberalism.  However, the second and 
third finding suggest that certain types of neighborhoods may be more conducive to organizing 
popular support for progressive or socialist projects. 
The findings also inform theoretical conversations about grassroots organizing and 
social movement formation.  First, the findings reaffirm older work which sees neighborhoods as 
key sites of identity and preference formation.  The findings depart, however, from recent work 
on the role of neighborhoods in shaping political possibilities, within the subfields of racial and 
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ethnic politics and social movement studies.  Second, I show that the terrain for neighborhood 
organizing is shaped by political developments at the urban, national, and even global levels.  
The institutional developments which created the terrain for contemporary organizing were 
driven by federal policy, national trends in the practices of philanthropic foundations, global 
economic restructuring, and other supra-local factors.  Relatedly, I argue that the neighborhood, 
and especially the institutions through which populations participate in market-based 
community development, are crucial sites of neoliberal subject formation. 
Finally, I found what could be described as a circular relationship between political 
developments at larger scales of the polity and the terrain for neighborhood organizing:  
neoliberalization has created neighborhood conditions which impede organizing against 
neoliberalism.  Similarly, the growth of the left at the urban and national scales has created 
neighborhood environments more favorable to organizing. 
The remainder of this chapter will introduce my research question and theoretical 
framework, and place the question in historical context.  I will first review contemporary 
conflicts over economic policy, describing the neoliberal policies dominant since the 1970s, and 
the emergent progressive and socialist formations challenging them.  I will show that those 
emerging formations see neighborhood organizing as a key strategy, motivating the 
dissertation’s central question about the terrain for organizing.  The chapter will close with an 
overview of subsequent chapters. 
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1. Contemporary Conflict Over Economic Issues:  Neoliberalization and 
Resurgent Progressivism and Socialism  
The context for this study is the renewed contention over poverty, economic inequality, 
and related economic issues in recent years.  Since the 1970s, political coalitions committed to 
neoliberalism have dominated both major political parties, and governments at the state and 
local levels, implementing neoliberal policies and institutional reforms at all levels.  Emerging 
progressive and socialist formations, operating in U.S. cities and in the national Democratic 
Party, are attempting to advance an agenda of economic redistribution and democratic control 
of certain economic processes.  In some cases, these formations have begun to seriously 
contend for institutional power.  I will present a cursory review of neoliberalization and the 
emergent progressive and socialist formations. 
Neoliberalization at the federal and urban levels  
Neoliberalism can refer to the body of ideas elaborated by Post-War conservative 
economists; to agendas for public policy, institutional reform, and public and corporate practice 
elaborated and implemented since the mid-1970s, based on those ideas; and to the array of 
social practices and habits of thought encouraged by those policies and programs.  I will focus 
on the second level, describing neoliberal policy agendas implemented at the federal and urban 
scales. 
Neoliberalization at the federal level 
At the federal level, neoliberal policies were implemented in several policy areas, 
beginning in the 1970s.  I will briefly discuss the federal response to global economic 
restructuring and economic recession, and the subsequent application of neoliberal ideas to 
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other policy areas including urban policy, welfare and social provision, education, and labor 
relations. 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, neoliberal ideas informed the federal government’s 
response to the economic restructuring and decline of formerly industrialized regions, which 
had started in the late 1960s.  Policymakers in both parties in Congress and in presidential 
administrations’ since Gerald Ford’s oriented policy in multiple areas to accelerating this 
restructuring.1  Policymakers repeatedly rejected proposals to bolster declining industrial 
sectors and industrial regions, whether through bailouts of cities, national reinvestment 
programs, or industrial policies (such as subsidies, trade protections, or collective planning).2  
Fiscal and corporate policy were also revised to accelerate capital mobility, including tax breaks 
or reduced tax rates for corporate relocations, acquisitions, and mergers, reduced penalties on 
foreign profits, and reduced taxes on income from investments. 3  The federal stance toward 
declining regions of the country was captured by President Reagan’s enjoinder to residents to 
‘‘vote with their feet’’ and seek work elsewhere. 
Daniel Rodgers (2011) and Daniel Stedman Jones (2012) each describe the adoption of 
neoliberal ideas in other aspects of economic policy since the mid-1970s.  On the basis of 
neoliberal ideas, federal policy and practice in the areas of “antitrust judgments, liability law, 
and most dramatically, regulatory policy,” were reoriented around the categories of “cost and 
 
1 Policymakers believed that market-driven decline of industries or regions was inevitable, and would lead ultimately to renewed 
growth, as resources were reallocated to their most productive uses (Weaver, 2015; O’Connor, 1999: 108, 111-12).  This was based 
on a more fundamental belief that, in the words of the President’s National Urban Policy Report in 1982, created by the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, “the private market is more efficient than federal program administrators in allocating dollars” 
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1982:  14; quoted in Weaver, 2015:  29).  Political pressures included the 
intense unpopularity of increased government spending or intervention in the economy by the mid-1970s (recognized by politicians) 
(Neuman, 2014; Biles, 2011) and lobbying by big business (Prasad, 2010). 
2 President Ford rejected bailouts to Detroit, and underwrote a bailout of New York City under stringent conditions of repayment 
(Biles, 2011:  212).  President Carter also rejected HUD’s proposal for $20 billion in new urban spending (Neuman, 2014:  284-5).  In 
the early 1980s, Congress repeatedly rejected proposed policies to retain industry in the U.S. through a mix of subsidies, trade 
protections, and collective planning (Graham, 1992:  158-60). 
3 Tax breaks for new construction and relocation were significantly increased in the Revenue Act of 1978 and Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of 1981 (Biles, 2011; Weaver, 2015: 35).  Abu-Lughod (1999:  280) notes the reduction of taxes on repatriated profits.  For 
federal policies abetting mergers and acquisitions, see Orhangazi, 2008 
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efficiency” and the premise of “highly idealized markets.”4  The same analytical frameworks 
were applied to labor markets and labor relations, producing federal policies, bureaucratic 
rulings, and corporate practices designed to enhance managerial control of labor relations and 
creating flexible and disciplined labor markets.5  By the 1990s, neoliberal ideas had been applied 
to areas “such as law, regulation, the family, welfare, and sex, that had previously been 
considered outside the realm of markets.”6  Book length studies describe neoliberal federal 
policy reforms in urban policy,7 education,8 welfare,9 and public housing,10 among others.   
Neoliberalization at the urban level 
At the urban level, neoliberalization can be seen as a set of strategies for economic 
growth, fiscal solvency, and governance, oriented to the post-1970s conditions of intensified 
capital mobility, economic restructuring, investment of surplus capital in urban bonds and real 
estate, and decreased federal aid for cities.   Scholars agree that urban governments enacted 
different versions and combinations of neoliberal reforms, in different mixes with other 
programs, but that these general growth strategies were widely adopted since the 1970s. 
By the early 1970s, urban policymakers faced a new policymaking context, defined by 
economic restructuring and declining federal support.  As industry deconcentrated and 
globalized, formerly industrialized cities in the North and Midwest lost large shares of their 
 
4 Rodgers, 2011:  56.  Jones similarly describes the application of neo-liberal premises and neoclassical methods to questions of 
“railroad regulation, income tax, monetary reform, agricultural subsidies, public housing, labor law, and social security legislation” 
(Jones, 2012:  118). 
5 For federal efforts to reassert managerial control and break labor unions, see McCartin (2000); for federal practices designed to 
create flexible labor markets, see Weinbaum, 2004.  
6 Jones, 2012:  112. 
7 Weaver, 2015; Sites, 2003. 
8 Lippman, 2011. 
9 Soss et al, 2011. 
10 Arena, 2012. 
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employment base.11  The loss of industry diminished cities’ tax bases—a development 
compounded by continuing departure of upper- and middle-class residents (chasing departing 
jobs and fleeing racial integration), and by increased service burdens of federal offloading of 
welfare responsibilities and the in-migration of relatively poor residents.  Beginning with the 
Ford administration, the federal government cut federal aid to cities significantly, worsening 
fiscal crises and pushing many cities to the brink of bankruptcy.12 
Economic restructuring and federal policy also portended new opportunities for urban 
growth.  Spurred in part by the aforementioned federal fiscal and corporate policies, the 
advanced service sectors of the economy grew during these years, creating an opportunity for 
deindustrializing cities to repurpose as “corporate centers.”13  With few profitable outlets for 
surplus capital and incented by federal tax breaks on investment in commercial real estate, 
investors in the U.S. and globally increasingly purchased urban real estate, and to a lesser 
extent, municipal debt.14 
In this context, policymakers in most large cities oriented policy toward attracting firms 
in the advanced service sectors of the economy and investment, as well as tourism.  The agenda 
included fiscal austerity (i.e., low taxes and limited social spending), deregulation, and limits on 
popular participation in governance to maintain a “business- and investor-friendly climate;” 
public support for rent-intensifying redevelopment, to create spaces attractive to mobile firms 
 
11 Representing well trends among older, industrialized cities, Chicago lost approximately 267,000 industrial jobs between 1967 and 
1982, about 48% (Abu-Lughod, 1999:  323).  New York City lost approximately 750,000 manufacturing jobs between 1950 and 1990 
(Stein, 2019:  45).   
12 The Ford administration cut funding for Community Development Block Grants and revenue sharing, the two programs providing 
the majority of federal aid to localities.  Between 1980 and 1987, the federal government reduced spending on community 
development programs alone from an estimated $2.6 billion to $1.1 billion (Weir, 1999:  145).  In total, from 1980 to 1990, “federal 
grants to cities were cut by 42 percent, the equivalent of $46 billion in constant 2012 dollars” (Weaver, 2015:  30). 
13 Sassen, 2005:  29.  Sassen and Harvey (1989) note that of advanced corporate service firms tend to locate in dense clusters, 
facilitate highly efficient and interactive production systems,” sharing information, and enjoying reduced transaction costs among 
each other (quotation from Harvey, 1989:  8). 
14 The absence of profitable outlets had to do with the declining returns on investment in manufacturing since the late 1960s and 
the volatility of global financial markets.  The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 also created tax advantages for investment in 
specifically in commercial real-estate projects (Leitner, 1990; Sites, 2003:  43). 
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and residents; the extensive use of public resources as subsidies for firms and real estate 
development projects; “opening new spaces to accumulation,” by privatizing and commoditizing 
public goods and public services; and new forms of governance which insulate financial and 
fiscal decision-making from political pressures and institutionalize collaboration between the 
city and investors and developers, respectively.15 
Neoliberal regimes have fostered a public-private real estate redevelopment industry.  
The creation of spaces and amenities oriented toward high-end consumers is intended to attract 
corporate service firms and retain their employees as city residents (and thus taxpayers).  Real 
estate development is a source of revenue which does not impinge on the business climate 
through taxes.16  To drive real estate redevelopment, the city provides public funds and logistical 
support to the real estate development industry, incorporating them into urban planning.17 
Scholars usually define urban neoliberalism to include additional institutional reform 
agendas, implementing market structures and firm styles of governance in public institutions.  
These reforms are inspired by the same pro-market, anti-bureaucratic ideas that drove 
neoliberalization at the federal level and informed urban responses, and are often motivated by 
the same, ever-present concern with inter-local competition for mobile capital.  Cities have 
adopted neoliberal reforms of public education, transportation, parks and recreation, and other 
systems. 
 
15 On removal of fiscal decisions from politics, see Brenner and Theodore (2002) and Hackworth (2012); on institutionalized 
collaboration between city government and investors, see Weber (2015) and Farmer and Poulos (2019); on institutionalized 
collaboration between the city and real estate development industry, see Sites, 2003:  45. 
16 Real estate transfer fees and rising property values (and thus property taxes) “allow the municipality to sustain low tax rates, 
attain favorable bond ratings, and increase borrowing for expensive infrastructure schemes” (Weber, 2015:  146).  Thus, “property-
led development becomes one of the few tools available for enhancing revenues” (Weaver, 2015:  17). 
17 Stein, 2019; Leitner, 1990:  147. 
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Challenging Neoliberalism:  Emerging Progressive and Socialist Formations  
In recent years, several formations have attempted to advance progressive and socialist 
economic agendas, explicitly rejecting neoliberal policies and their justifications.  These are not, 
as in the past, episodic reactions to particular policies or arrangements, or particular 
developments, but sustained efforts to build political power through coalition, labor organizing, 
and community organizing.  These formations are rooted in various ideologies, and encompass 
many forms of organization, including grassroots mass membership organizations, local 
coalitions of labor unions and community-based organizations, and tendencies within the 
Democratic Party.  While a comprehensive description of this field of formations is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, I will briefly describe key formations.  
Perhaps the most remarked-upon development is the growth since 2015 of the 
progressive and socialist wing of the Democratic Party.  Institutionally, this is reflected by the 
rapid growth of the party’s Progressive Caucus in the House of Representatives, now the 
chamber’s second largest with 96 members (founded in 1994 with 6).  An infrastructure to 
support progressive and socialist elected officials and candidates, in the form of new political 
action committees (focused on fundraising, campaign consulting, and voter mobilization) and 
national grassroots lobbying organizations, has also developed, as a counterweight to the 
centrist-dominated Democratic National Committee.18  The progressive resurgence in the party 
is also reflected in the embrace by party leaders and contenders for the party’s 2020 
presidential nomination of socialist and/or progressive policies, including large expansions of 
public services (including Medicare for All, free college tuition) government involvement in the 
 
18 Perhaps most notably, Justice Democrats is attempting to function as an alternative to the Democratic National Committee, 
coordinating primary challenges to conservative and moderate Democrats, and raising funds.  Another notable group is Our 
Revolution, a national network built by staff and supporters of Bernie Sanders’ campaign, and functioning as a pro-Sanders 
SuperPAC and grassroots lobbying group.  Other new political action groups conducting fundraising and shallow network-building on 
behalf of left-leaning Democrats are Indivisible, Brand New Congress, and Swing Left. 
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economy (including large scale public investment in conversion to renewable energy sources), 
democratization of the economic system (including guaranteed worker membership on 
corporate boards), bans on corporate campaign contributions, public employment programs, 
and progressive revenue policies (taxes on wealth, inheritance, financial transactions). 
Several left-leaning grassroots organizations have formed since 2016.  Journalists 
speculate that the rapid growth of these organizations is fueled by interest in socialism driven by 
Bernie Sanders’ and Alexandra Occasion-Cortez’s campaigns; painful economic experiences 
during and since the 2008 recession; concern with what they view as the extremism of Trump 
campaign and administration; and disillusionment with liberalism and the Democratic Party for 
its inability to compellingly address the latter issues.19  Amidst ideological diversity, these groups 
support some version of the redistributive programs backed by Sanders, AOC, and other left-
leaning Democrats, and work on some combination of electoral and issue campaigns and 
grassroots base-building (with a few preferring grassroots service provision). 
The largest of these mass membership organizations is Democratic Socialists of America 
(DSA), whose national membership spiked from about 6,000 in 2015 to over 60,000 in 2019, 
distributed among approximately 300 local chapters.  Though DSA has no official ideology, most 
of the official caucuses, and most members, embrace a broad and ambitious redistributive 
program, including policies like Medicare For All, free college tuition, and a Green New Deal.  
Most chapters support socialist candidates for office at all levels (in many cases endorsing and 
campaigning for candidates), and socialist issue campaigns.20  DSA’s caucuses do have differing 
 
19 Blanc, 2019; Heywood, 2019; Economist staff, 2019. 
20 32 DSA-endorsed candidates won election in 2017 and 43 in 2018 (Democratic Socialists of America, 2017).  A few chapters have 
run their own candidates (Henwood, 2019). 
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visions of democratic control of the economy, and over the relationship of capitalist economic 
structures with forms of oppression based on ascribed identities, among other issues.21 
Smaller membership organizations have formed in many cities.  For example, Reclaim 
Philadelphia was formed in 2016 by staff and volunteers of Sanders’ 2016 campaign, and have 
participated in a range of local and state electoral campaigns and in local issue coalitions.22  
Under the rubric of “transforming the Democratic party,” they have recruited and backed 
ideologically aligned people for positions within Philadelphia’s Democratic party.  Similarly, the 
People’s Lobby in Chicago, a mass membership group rooted in religious, student, and racial 
justice organizations, has expanded rapidly since 2014, collecting people activated by 
movements in Chicago and by the Sanders campaign.  It also works on electoral and issue 
campaigns.23 
Scholars note that, in the last decade, an increasing number of unions have pursued 
broad progressive policy agendas through sustained coalition with allies in other sectors and 
grassroots organizing—a practice alternately called “community unionism,” “social movement 
unionism,” or “fusionism.”  Some recent worker organizing drives have relied on mobilization of 
community support and advanced public policy goals beyond those directly related to workplace 
issues.24  Unions have also participated in issue campaigns and coalitions at the state and local 
level (often providing most of the money and grassroots mobilizing capacity).25  In a few cities, 
 
21 Henwood, 2019; Blanc, 2019; Heyward, 2019. 
22 For example, Reclaim Philadelphia has participated in the “Our Cities Our Schools” coalition to reestablish local governance of 
Philadelphia public schools, and to end Philadelphia’s tax abatement for real estate development.  Reclaim also lobbied City Council 
to divest from Wells Fargo, and was part of the citywide Coalition for a Just District Attorney (Reclaim Philadelphia website:  
https://www.reclaimphiladelphia.org/, accessed 9/8/19. 
23 This and previous sentence, Reclaim Chicago website:  https://www.reclaimchicago.org/.   Accessed 9/7/19.  
24 Although these tactics were refined in the 1990s (Milkman, 2002), they were used more recently in several campaigns, most 
notably the SEIU-backed Fight for $15 campaign, organizing fast food workers.  SEIU locals have also launched campaigns to organize 
workers at “big box stores,” supermarkets, car washes, etc. (Turner, 2014:  107).  
25 For example, the National Nurses United’s Main Street Campaign is building coalitions to advocate for financial transactions tax.  
SEIU launched its Fight for a Fair Economy, an attempt to build community-labor coalitions to support progressive revenue policies, a 
living wage, and other progressive economic policies in cities around the country. 
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unions and allies have built third parties or other institutional bases for sustained attempts to 
win institutional power at the state and local levels.26 
Organizations associated with the Movement for Black Lives may be included in this 
overview insofar as they also advance progressive and socialist economic agendas, in addition to 
their agendas on policing and criminal punishment, issues related to identity, and other non-
economic issues.  This wave includes national groups with memberships in local chapters, such 
as the Black Lives Matter Network and Black Youth Project 100, and myriad membership groups 
based in single locations.27   These organizations have different analyses of economic issues and 
visions of economic justice.28  Some explicitly reject capitalism as inherently exploitative of labor 
and call for non-capitalistic forms of political economy.29  Others do not criticize capitalism per 
se, but demand large-scale, universal redistribution (including universal health care, free college 
tuition, expanded public investment in public primary and secondary schools, a right to a living 
wage job, etc.) and democratization of the economy, asserting state and corporate 
responsibility for broadly defined economic well-being.30  Most of these groups also call for 
additional redistribution along racial lines, as reparations for identity-based economic injustices 
(although implicitly asserting forms of state and corporate responsibility for economic 
conditions that are compatible with socialism but not capitalism).31 
 
26 Notable examples include the Stamford Organizing Project in Stamford, CT (MacAlevey, Chapter 2; Fine, 2000); the Working 
Families Party in New York City; and United Working Families in Chicago, formed by SEIU Health Care Illinois and Indiana, the 
Chicago Teachers Union, and progressive community-based organizations. 
27 For a partial list of organizations associated with the Black Lives Matter movement, see https://policy.m4bl.org/about/ 
28 This review does not include groups and tendencies associated with BLM with more moderate economic programs. 
29 Ransby, 2018.  Ransby and Denvir, 2019. 
30 This includes a right to health care, a right to a fully funded education (including post-secondary) education, a right to job, and a 
guaranteed basic income.  These groups offer an interesting issue frame, constructing economic deprivation as “state violence.” 
31 These are compatible with socialism insofar as they imply state and corporate responsibility for economic investment and 
provision. 
see public and private “disinvestment of blighted communities” as an injustice warranting reparations.  Others do not critique 
capitalism itself, but argue that undoing centuries of identity-based economic discrimination requires large-scale redistribution of 
wealth and economic power (i.e., control of capital and possibly governing power of firms), resembling a social democratic program.  
This is an attempt to redress with they call “racial capitalism,” an economic system based on hyper-exploitation and expropriation of 
racial minorities (and most would include gender).  This involves more than reparations (or compensation).  They argue that every 
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2.  Neighborhood Organizing and Economic Contention 
The residential neighborhood in theory and historical practice 
Residential neighborhoods are one key site of contemporary contention over economic 
policy.  Theorists have shown that structural features of urban neighborhoods make them 
potential sites for grassroots mobilizations and grassroots organizing.  More recent work has 
shown how specific conditions of neoliberal capitalism have exacerbated problems experienced 
in residential and non-workplace contexts, creating new potentials for grassroots mobilization 
and grassroots organizing around contemporary economic issues in those contexts.  In line with 
these theories, all of the aforementioned organizations with progressive and socialist economic 
programs are attempting to advance their visions in part by grassroots organizing in residential 
neighborhoods. 
One line of scholarship holds that the structure of urban neighborhoods makes them an 
important site for the formation of collective consciousness and collective political action, in 
general.  Engles, Katznelson, and other theorists observe that capitalist development and 
capitalist housing markets produce neighborhoods that are densely populated and 
“homogenous in both the Marxist and Weberian sense of class” (although in the U.S., racial 
segregation produced multi-class, Black neighborhoods, a fact discussed later).32  This density 
and homogeneity make urban neighborhoods potentially important terrain for political 
contention.  Katznelson argues that these spaces provided “the generative locale for the 
 
aspect of the economic system continues to manifest patterns established through race- and gender-based oppression, with direct 
causal linkages to those historical oppressions.  Addressing these contemporary manifestations would require largescale 
redistributions of wealth (to address racial maldistributions).  It would require programs to restructure labor markets, either through 
targeted education, or jobs programs.  It would require redistribution of economic power, e.g. through programs allowing members 
of historically oppressed groups to determine capital investments or corporate decisions.  
32 Katznelson, 1994:  11.   
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formation of collective identities and collective action.”33  While the substance of these 
collective identities and orientation of this collective action is determined by patterns of 
incorporation into the political system, and other supra-neighborhood factors, the structure of 
urban neighborhoods makes them an important site of identity and preference formation. 
Contemporary urban neighborhoods retain these features.  While rent-intensifying 
redevelopment of urban neighborhoods is displacing poor residents to exurban neighborhoods 
(which are not the focus of this dissertation), about one third of low-income households in the 
U.S. lived in cities as of 2017, where market sorting mostly concentrates them in predominantly 
low-income spaces, whether at the level of neighborhoods or census tracts.34   
Historically, formations attempting to organize working class populations have tried to 
do so in neighborhood contexts, in addition to the workplace.35  In the 1930s, union organizers 
conducted outreach in working-class neighborhoods, via neighborhood institutions and 
networks, to supplement workplace outreach, and to mobilize working-class communities to 
support unions in labor disputes.  In the 1960s, there were several attempts by radical 
formations to organize Black and White working-class neighborhoods.36  
Scholars have argued that the distinctive conditions of modern or contemporary cities 
make urban neighborhoods the most important site of grassroots mobilization and organizing 
around challenges to capitalism.  Manuel Castells (1983) argued that the expanded role in 
advanced capitalism of the state in providing collective goods (to bolster consumption and 
 
33 Ibid, 11. 
34 As of 2017, about half the U.S. poor population (49%) lives in suburban and small metro counties, while 34% live in cities and 17% 
in rural areas. (Parker et al, 2018).  On concentration of low-income populations at level of census tract, see Sugrue, 2004:  xvii) 
35 E.P. Thompson (1963) details how working-class neighborhoods of industrial centers like Manchester and Liverpool were the site 
of the development of movements which underpinned the Chartist movement.  Lichtenstein (1995) recounts how UAW organizers 
engaged workers in community institutions (such as fraternal societies), and propagated their discourses via media with circulation 
in residential communities (especially chapters 4 and 5). Lichtenstein, as well as Rosemary Feurer (2006) and Piven and Cloward 
(1977) note that workers mobilized social networks based in residential communities to support moments of intense struggle.  Piven 
and Cloward (Chapter 2) recount the extensive community organizing of communists and socialists during the Great Depression.  
Community organizing efforts in the 1960s are described in a later section of this chapter. 
36 These are described later in this chapter. 
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facilitate the reproduction of labor) has catalyzed movements, demanding expanded state 
provision and resisting state intrusions into quotidian life.  According to Castells, these 
movements, centering on institutions and processes in “the sphere of reproduction,” i.e., 
“community institutions… [associated with] housing, healthcare, education, cultural life,” are 
the most important source of resistance to capitalism.  David Harvey (2003) points to the 
increasing importance in the neoliberal city of “accumulation by dispossession,” the extraction 
of wealth through rent, foreclosure, and displacement from valuable land.  The rapid expansion 
of the real estate redevelopment industry has made these conflicts over space and property an 
increasingly important axis of class conflict in the city.  Harvey argues that this is the most 
critical form of resistance to neoliberalization and should be seen as a strategically important 
site 
Although Castells wrote before the neoliberal era, the retrenchment of public services 
since the 1970s has exacerbated problems of access to collective goods and deprivation.37  
Similarly, Harvey’s claim that neoliberalization has exacerbated affordable housing crises and led 
to widespread displacement is also clearly accurate.  However, I argue that these structural 
changes and associated exacerbation of problems in the sphere of reproduction are best seen 
merely as creating a structural potential for mobilization and organizing around these 
problems—a potential mediated by institutional and cultural contexts and fulfilled (or not) 
through the agency of political actors.  Spontaneous mobilizations around these issues may be 
more likely, and any formation attempting to organize lower classes around a progressive or 
socialist economic agenda has opportunities to organize around these issues.  I do not accept 
Harvey’s more sweeping claim that conflicts over housing and space are the most important site 
 
37 Mayer, 2006:  202-3. 
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of resistance to neoliberalization, given the continued importance of workplace conflict, and of 
the central role of labor unions in sponsoring and organizing conflict around consumption and 
housing.  And I do not accept Castell’s claims that structural features alone make movements 
around consumption, self-determination, and identity the most important forms of resistance in 
advanced capitalist societies, instead treating any mobilization as contingent. 
The same structural changes have also created a set of chronically disinvested 
neighborhoods.  Scholars have not considered how these conditions shape the potential for 
mobilization and organizing.  It is possible that these conditions create opportunities to organize 
around demands for reinvestment.  On the other hand, political scientists have shown that 
newly experienced losses (as in eviction and displacement, the characteristic problems of 
redeveloping neighborhoods) galvanize stronger reactions than chronically felt absences (as in 
divested neighborhoods). 
Community organizing of contemporary progressive and socialist formations 
Contemporary progressive and socialist formations are treating urban neighborhoods as 
a key site of movement-building.  Each is attempting to organize in lower-, working-, and in 
some cases precarious middle-class communities, even as most also organize in workplaces.  
Urban neighborhoods are thus an important site of contemporary contention over economic 
issues. 
A segment of DSA’s national leadership, and that in several chapters, view labor 
organizing as the most important avenue to building working-class power.  Nevertheless, many 
chapters have invested in grassroots community organizing, particularly in the context of issue 
and electoral campaigns.  Some embed their grassroots outreach in issue-based campaigns, 
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organizing rent control, Medicare For All, and other demands.  Some DSA chapters conduct 
outreach by providing services to working-class and low-income populations, such as clinics to 
repair car break lights.  Others have done extensive door-knocking and grassroots outreach in 
the Sanders campaign and other local, state, and national electoral campaigns, attempting to 
build chapter memberships through these drives.  Smaller membership organizations like 
Reclaim Philadelphia and Reclaim Chicago canvass around issues and elections, and attempt to 
recruit residents to their organizations in the process.38 
Labor unions’ issue and electoral projects also involve community organizing.  SEIU’s 
Fight for a Fair Economy involved “door-to-door canvas operations in communities of color in 
seventeen cities across the nation.”39  For example, United New York (the New York City branch 
of FFE), convened two SEIU locals with three community-based non-profits (each with large, 
existing grassroots base) to conduct grassroots outreach, with focus on organizing the 
unemployed in working-class and high-poverty neighborhoods of Brooklyn, Queens, and the 
Bronx.40  Another coalition of unions and community-based non-profits launched the New York 
Civic Participation Project, to organize residents of working-class, Latinx neighborhoods of three 
boroughs and on Long Island for lobbying for progressive legislation in local and state 
legislatures.41  Unite-HERE’s New Haven Rising project involved several years of community 
organizing and voter education.42  In Chicago, the Chicago Teachers Union and SEIU Health Care 
Illinois and Indiana have created programs to train and fund organizers in selected 
neighborhoods.43 
 
38 Denvir interview with Saval, Krajewski, and Mcillmurray, 2018.   
39 Milkman, 2014:  9. 
40 Turner, 2014:  90, 96-8. 
41 McFarland, 2014:  188, 191-3. 
42 Simmons, 2016. 
43 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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BLM-associated groups conduct “community engagement and organizing happening on 
the hyperlocal level.”44  Local chapters of BYP100 and BLMN, as well as single-city groups, have 
conducted outreach around issues and electoral campaigns, including their aforementioned 
economic agenda.45  Some had been doing base-building and political education steadily for 
years prior to the post-2012 popular mobilizations.46  In one well-funded national project, the 
Movement for Black Lives’ Electoral Justice Project uses foundation funds to “[help] 
communities build successful electoral campaigns,” providing training in canvassing and other 
grassroots organizing skills.47  Leaders intend this to complement, not “supplant grassroots 
organizing and movement-building.”48 
The vast majority of community-based non-profits have divested from grassroots base-
building (in a trend described later in this chapter).  However some groups have continued to 
organize around progressive and socialist economic agendas.  Most of these groups have 
modest budgets, raised through membership dues and small grants, and thus operate at a small 
scale.  While there is no national database of these organizations, one national network lists 72 
community organizations with some investment in community organizing around affordable 
housing and displacement.49  Some community-based non-profits receive funding from labor 
unions, enabling expansive community organizing.  In New York, for example, Make the Road 
has built a grassroots membership of 14,000 people, predominantly Latinx foreign-born or first 
 
44 Frost and Colon, 2015.   
45 Denvir interview with Ransby, 2018; Dawson interview with Taylor, 2019. 
46 Denvir interview with Ransby, 2018. 
47 Ransby, 2017:  114. 
48 Ibid, 114.  




generation immigrants, through outreach largely funded by 5 prominent union locals.50  A few 
progressive community-based organizations, funded in part by the Chicago Teachers Union, 
conduct grassroots outreach and leadership development, with focus on local policy issues.   
Summary and Outline of Subsequent Chapters 
The following chapter examines neoliberalization in Chicago, and the political regime 
which has articulated and supported this project.  I describes the agendas for policy change and 
institutional reform, and the underlying growth strategies which guide them.  I briefly describe 
the regime’s mechanisms for cultivating grassroots constituencies in high-poverty 
neighborhoods (especially noting its investments in community development and partnerships 
with neighborhood-based organizations).  And I place the regime in national and historical 
context. 
The following chapter describes the UWF coalition.  I review the coalition’s historical 
roots, and especially its steady growth since the early 2010s.  I present data on the actors who 
comprise the coalition and the coalition’s core agendas.  I also describe the coalition’s vision of 
neighborhood-based building, and its base-building projects to date.   
Chapter 4 describes UWF’s attempts to organize a new grassroots electoral organization 
in the Austin neighborhood.  I report the results of ethnographic field work, focusing especially 
on the ideologies which local recruits brought to the nascent organization, and how these 
shaped the organization’s development.  I also review biographical information about some of 
these recruits, showing that many are linked to Austin’s many non-profit organizations.  I also 
describe the field of neighborhood-based non-profit organizations in Austin (including their 
 
50 SEIU locals, the United Federation of Teachers New York, Communication Workers of America local in New York City “collectively 
provide hundreds of thousands of dollars” Goldmacher and McKinley, 2018.  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/nyregion/cuomo-nixon-wfp-labor-governor-election.html.  Accessed 4/19/18. 
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discourses, programs, connections to elites beyond the neighborhood). I show that the field of 
neighborhood-based activism is dominated by development organizations invested in neoliberal 
real estate development and groups committed to a conservative vision of restoring social fabric 
and norms.  I show that many of these groups have grassroots constituencies of their own, and 
connections to churches and block clubs with grassroots constituencies. 
Chapter 5 describes the rapid development of a highly effective, electorally-focused, 
socialist organization in Albany Park, affiliated with UWF, Working Families of the 33rd Ward 
(WF33).  I argue that the growth of this organization is rooted in three factors:  1)the long-term 
growth, at the city-level, of a population of activists, journalists, academics, and politicians, who 
share elements of a common analysis, agenda, and strategy collectively developed by Chicago’s 
left organizations and movements; 2)the sorting of many of these individuals into Albany Park 
amidst the gentrification process; 3)the growth of a secondary activist population, with 
shallower and vaguer commitments to progressive and socialist politics, since the 2016 
elections. 
Chapter 6 describes the base-building work of the new socialist organization described 
in the previous chapter.  I describe the milieu of non-profits and activist organizations in Albany 
Park, showing that it contrasts starkly with Austin’s, and with national trends.  I review WF33’s 
successful alliances with existing grassroots organizations, with shared commitments to 
grassroots organizing and socialist agendas, especially local groups focused on affordable 
housing and protection of undocumented residents.  I argue that it was possible to find socialist 
allies in Albany Park because of three features of the neighborhood:  1)the presence of activists 
steeped in radical trans-national activist networks; 2)the non-development of a field of 
organizations incorporated into the neoliberal regime; 3)the rapid gentrification and intense 
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CHAPTER 2.  Post-1960s Institutional Development and the 
Terrain for Grassroots Organizing 
The previous chapter demonstrated that grassroots organizing in urban, residential 
neighborhoods is an important dimension of the emerging contention over poverty, inequality, 
and related economic issues.  The remainder of this dissertation analyzes the terrain for 
grassroots organizing in contemporary urban neighborhoods.  What factors shape grassroots 
reactions to these contemporary economic problems, and particularly to the issues exacerbated 
by neoliberalization?  What factors shape the possibilities for grassroots organizing, creating 
opportunities or impediments for organizing around particular projects?  This chapter begins the 
investigation by reviewing past research on the historical development of neighborhood-level 
institutions and political cultures. 
Past work describes the development of a field neighborhood-based activism, through 
the interaction of racial justice movements; federal, local, and foundation policies; changing 
economic structures; and demographic shifts, since the late 1960s.  These changes were driven 
by neoliberalization at the federal level, and built on forms of capitalist dominance in the Post-
War era.  I will trace these institutional developments, and suggest that they entailed the 
creation and institutionalization of discourses which fused moderate and pro-capitalist—and 
later distinctively neoliberal—ideas about social problems and collective interests with militant 
discourses on racial justice.  Drawing on the theories of Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser, I 
will consider how these developments might shape the terrain for neighborhood organizing.  
This chapter will close by reviewing the methodology of the dissertation and explaining the 
choice of case studies and primary data sources. 
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1. Hegemony and the Construction of Consciousness and Interests 
This investigation does not consider the factors known to enable or repress 
mobilization, given residents’ propensity to mobilize, such as the availability of elite resources 
and opportunities for influence within political institution.51  I am interested in the class of cases 
in which progressive or social democratic formations invest significant resources in organizing 
and offer opportunities for at least some political influence.  This includes many (though 
certainly not all) of the contemporary efforts at grassroots organizing around left economic 
agendas. 
Instead, this inquiry focuses on neighborhood residents’ ideologies—specifically their 
understandings of contemporary social issues and individual and collective interests—and their 
material investments in particular distributive regimes or modes of accumulation, and how 
these structure their reactions to contemporary problems, and to the overtures of organizers.  
Past research has reinforced the intuitive position that people’s interpretations of their 
conditions, of their individual and collective interests and identity, and of political options, 
shape their propensity to mobilize, and to support particular project.52  Material investments in 
a social arrangement or process, institutional arrangements, or distribution of political power 
also shape these propensities.53  This project is an empirical investigation into patterns of 
ideology and material investment among the populations in question, and how these shape 
reactions to grassroots organizing. 
I draw on theories of hegemony, which suggest that consciousness and behavior are 
shaped by patterned or institutionalized social processes and relationships.  Past work has 
 
51 The “resource mobilization” perspective holds that the key variable explaining grassroots mobilizations is the availability of 
resources to facilitate required mobilize (usually via elite allies).  Scholars working within the “political process” framework argue 
that discontented groups mobilize when they perceive opportunities for political influence. 
52 McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow, 1999; Johnston, 2004. 
53 Ibid.  Katzenlson, 1981.  
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identified myriad social structures and processes affecting thought and behavior at many levels, 
through as many mechanisms.  As explained in later sections of the chapter, I am particularly 
interested in a set of theories which posit the internalization of conceptual categories, or the 
development of semi-conscious impressions or expectations about the world, through 
immersion in institutionalized social relations.  I am interested in how dynamic features of 
political life, like public policies and institutional developments, can introduce new discourses 
into quotidian social relations, altering subjectivities. 
By showing that beliefs and commitments are reproduced by particular social structures 
and processes, this approach captures that distributions of belief and commitment are 
conditional on particular social arrangements, and that their reproduction may be more or less 
likely, depending on the durability of those arrangements.  This perspective is especially useful 
for elucidating the possibilities for grassroots organizing.  Since organizing is an attempt by a 
political actor to shape someone’s conceptions of their own interests or options, it is important 
not simply to measure their opinion, but to understand the extent to which their beliefs are 
continually reproduced by social experiences, or grounded in material commitments, and 
therefore more or less susceptible to change. 
This perspective also makes it possible to see current patterns of consciousness and 
material commitments in historical context, as the product of particular historical 
developments.  We can identify key sequences of institutional development or policy change as 
creating or changing the social structures which pattern consciousness and behavior.  Relatedly, 
this perspective can reveal the role of particular social actors and their political projects in 
constructing this terrain.  For example, we can trace the construction of a particular distributive 
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regime centered on a particular group’s interests, or the embedding of a particular group’s 
ideology in local social contexts. 
Through such analysis, some scholars have demonstrated a circular process, in which 
the terrain for organizing in contemporary struggles was shaped, deliberately or not, by 
powerful actors who are the very parties to those contemporary struggles, or by actors with 
similar interests in earlier eras.  In such cases, the construction of terrain for future organizing 
may be an important form of political action, a way in which actors pursue their goals.  And we 
can see the ability to shape the terrain of organizing as a key advantage of powerful actors. 
It is only possible to identify which processes and effects matter in a particular political 
conflict through historically specific analysis.  As Tom Nairn argued, “there can be no easily 
abstractable ‘theory’” of the mechanisms of hegemony nor “any philosophical ‘strategy’ for 
transforming them.”54  The case studies of this dissertation are an open-ended empirical study 
of the terrain for contemporary organizing, seeking to inductively identify important factors.   
2. The development of neighborhood-level activism since the 1960s  
Past scholarship describes the development of urban and neighborhood institutions 
since the 1960s.  Specifically, this work describes two related developments:  changes in field of 
neighborhood-based activism, from an ideologically and strategically diverse field as of the late 
1960s, to a predominantly moderate pro-capitalist, and later neoliberal field of organizations; 
the rise of minority-led, neoliberal urban regimes, which pursue racial and class justice within 
the framework of market-oriented, corporate-led economic growth. 
This section of the chapter reviews, integrates, and extends this literature.  I will 
highlight the ways in which these emerging institutions produced discourses on social problems, 
 
54 Nairn, 2000. 
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racial and class justice, and collective interests, which synthesized pro-market ideas with 
elements of militant racial justice discourses of the 1960s.  I will also foreground the ways in 
which these institutions helped build constituencies for market-based development and other 
neoliberal policies.  In the following section, I will consider how these developments constructed 
the terrain for contemporary organizing around economic issues.    
Throughout this review, I will show how these developments at the urban and 
neighborhood levels are driven by neoliberalization at the federal level, and by features of Post 
War liberal order.  First, the orientation of community-based organizations and minority-led 
regimes were shaped by the economic conditions that Harvey and others describe as the 
characteristic features of a neoliberal economy (and thus the neoliberal macroeconomic and 
fiscal policies which helped produce those conditions):  intensified capital mobility, 
financialization, growth of the advanced service sectors, and increased investor interest in urban 
real estate.  Second, federal and foundation anti-poverty and social service programs, guided by 
identifiably neoliberal ideas about market superiority, also helped create the aforementioned 
field of community-based organizations.  
The key developments were also rooted in instantiations of capitalism within the Post-
War liberal political order.  The marginalization of social democratic tendencies in the 
Democratic Party after World War II, the domestication of most labor unions, and the 
dominance of certain liberal ideas among federal and foundation policymakers shaped 
opportunity structures for grassroots racial justice activists in the 1960s.  The former two factors 
left radical groups without powerful allies, and vulnerable to attacks.  The latter shaped the raft 
of federal, foundation, and corporate programs which channeled racial justice activists toward 
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moderate goals and strategies.  These factors remade the field of neighborhood-based activism 
and began to inculcate moderate outlooks in an emerging leadership stratum. 
These points are the basis for the hypothesis that the terrain for organizing against 
neoliberalism is constructed by neoliberalization itself (building on instantiations of capitalist 
domination in the Post-War order).  Neoliberal policies create economic conditions and 
programs which shape the development of institutions and political formations at the urban and 
local level, which may establish new patterns of thought and behavior that constitute the 
conditions for organizing. 
Development of the field of neighborhood-based racial justice activism  
From the mid-1960s through the 1990s, federal policy, foundation programs, market 
forces, and state coercion continually reconstructed the field of neighborhood-based racial 
justice activism  From an ideologically and strategically diverse field in the 1960s, these factors 
created first a field of moderate, liberal organizations, focused on service provision and 
community development, and later a field of distinctively neoliberal organizations, seeking 
community development through participation in rent-intensifying real estate redevelopment.  
Most organizations committed to other modes of activism (such as grassroots organizing and 
militant protest) were pressured to switch to service and development work, or were defeated 
by political attacks and coercion.  These developments also eliminated groups with radical 
ideologies from the field of neighborhood activism, either by forcing them to disband or go 
underground, or by coopting them into depoliticizing financial dependency on elites and modes 
of practice that embody moderate philosophies. 
Alongside urban regimes (discussed later), these neighborhood organizations were 
important nodes of discursive production.  With roots in militant Black and Latinx Power 
movements, activists in these organizations constructed their work in discourses drawn from 
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those movements, as racial empowerment, community control, and expression of an authentic 
racial culture.  As they constituted a domain of neoliberal civic activism, they produced 
neoliberal visions of racial justice.  The demise of more radical organizations entailed that radical 
versions of these discourses ceased to have organizational bases in minority communities. 
This field of community-based organizations also helped incorporate neighborhood 
residents into distributive regimes.  Black and Latinx middle-classes, expanding after the 1960s 
due to federal civil rights policies, use community development organizations as vehicles for 
economic mobility amidst institutional racism.  In the 1980s and 1990s, as community 
development organizations embedded their work in the real estate redevelopment industry, 
middle-class populations used community development organizations as vehicles for 
participation in this distinctively neoliberal mode of accumulation.  These organizations thus 
helped residents take a material interest in neoliberalization.  Working- and lower-class 
residents, increasingly immiserated by economic restructuring, became clients of non-profit 
service providers, and subjected to intensified policing and high rates of incarceration.   
 I trace these developments to policies, foundation programs, and other arrangements at 
higher scales.  I show that developments in the 1960s reflect fundamental features of the liberal 
Post-War order, and that developments in the 1970s through the 1990s were driven by 
neoliberalization at the federal level and the spread of neoliberal ideas among foundation elites. 
Narrowing the field of neighborhood-based racial justice activism, 1960s-early 1970s 
As late as the 1960s, there was a diverse field of racial justice activism in urban 
neighborhoods, reflecting the ideological and strategic diversity within the Black and Latinx 
power phase of the 1960s racial justice movement.  Some cities had vibrant radical activist 
milieus—networks of reading groups, cooperatives, Marxist and radical Black Nationalist 
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political parties and membership groups—which produced a continual stream of organizations 
and projects, some of which involved attempts at grassroots organizing in neighborhoods.55  
Some chapters of national civil rights organizations launched community organizing drives in the 
1960s:  chapters of the Congress on Racial Equality in New York City and Baltimore, for instance, 
seeing working-class power as integral to Black Power, organized low-income tenants to press 
demands for guaranteed adequate housing, and organized low-wage service workers into 
“community unions.”56  Street gangs turned activists organized tenants and welfare recipients 
into unions in low-income neighborhoods of Chicago and other cities, to assert demands for 
progressive economic policies.57  Across the country, diverse activists (including militant Black 
Power groups and middle-class progressive activists with professional backgrounds) demanded 
public support for locally controlled cooperative economic ventures, based on assertions of 
state and corporate responsibility for development of the ghetto economy.  Others, part of an 
ideological tradition viewing black-owned business as the crux of Black economic 
empowerment, launched more conventional capitalist enterprises.58  Many groups organized 
ghetto residents to support demands for community control of public bureaucracies, to be 
exercised by neighborhood-based organizations or popular participatory neighborhood 
councils.59   Others, like the Committed for a Unified Newark, operationalized community 
control as a combination of electoral projects, community-oriented economic ventures, and the 
development of an authentic cultural milieu, and organized grassroots participation in these 
 
55 E.g., The League of Revolutionary Black Workers in Detroit, for example, collected members of at least two radical Black 
Nationalist formations, a Trotskyist political party, ex-members of Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and Congress on 
Racial Equality (kicked out for excessive radicalism), and less experienced activists exposed to radical ideas in local study groups 
convened by leading black Marxist intellectual James Boggs (Georgakas and Surkin, 1975:  14-17). 
Self (2003:  222-4) describes a milieu of Black Nationalist intellectuals in Oakland, who synthesized Marxism with themes of Black 
Power such as the unity of racial justice struggles in the U.S. with anti-colonial struggles in the Global South. 
56 Schultz, 1986; Flug, 1990; These were part of an attempt to establish a new agenda for CORE, and an operational definition of 
Black Power, focused on lower- and working-class Blacks’ interest in workplace power and economic rights (Flug, 1990:  329). 
57 Dawley, 1973; Ellis, 1975; Fish, 1974. 
58 This and previous sentence, Hill and Rabig, 2012:  26. 
59 Rhomberg, 2003; Fish, 1974; Todd-Breland, 2013. 
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projects.60  Already by the mid-1960s, others defined community control narrowly, as simply 
electing black leaders to office, or gaining representation in elite-dominated bodies.61 
Throughout the 1960s, peaking with the Federal War on Poverty and Ford Foundation’s 
community development and community action programs, a spate of government and 
philanthropic programs channeled racial justice activists toward moderate forms of community 
control, service provision, and community development, remaking the field of neighborhood-
based activism.  Groups which tried to use these programs to launch more radical projects, or 
who pursued radical goals outside of these programs, were disciplined by market forces, or 
undermined by opposition of entrenched political interests. 
Several programs, based on the concept of “community action” highly influential among 
liberal policymakers, offered opportunities for activist participation in planning and 
administration of service and development programs.62  Most famously, the Community Action 
Program required “maximum feasible participation” of representatives of high-poverty 
communities in agencies administering the anti-poverty programs within the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964.63  Model Cities (1965), the Secondary Education Act (1965), and the 
Department of Labor’s Comprehensive Employment Program (1967), also created opportunities 
 
60 Rabig, 2016:  182. 
61 This was the orientation of CORE’s new national leadership in 1966.  The priorities of CORE president Floyd McKissick were running 
“U.S. Department of Labor-funded job training programs, the election of black officials, and the growth of black-owned businesses” 
(Flug, 1990:  342) 
62 O’Connor (1996); Greenstone and Peterson (1973:  4-6).  Ferguson, 2007:  70.  This idea held that poverty was perpetuated by the 
political and civic passivity of the poor, and that effective anti-poverty measures must socialize poor people into the norms of 
pluralist political participation, as well as cultivate a leadership stratum among the poor.  The idea drew on modernization theory, 
then current in the field of sociology, longer-standing ideas about localism and democratic participation, and assumptions about the 
poor’s lack of political and civic norms and skills.  The idea had been developed through a series of Ford Foundation programs since 
the 1950s, and spread among a network of social scientists, liberal elected officials, members of the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, and foundation officers, (including Ford staff, who had a “large and loyal following among policy officials in the 
Kennedy administration,” including personnel on the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (PCJD), the 
Bureau of the Budget, the Housing and Home Finance Administration, “many of them foundation alumni or grantees (First quote:  
Biles, 2011:  114.  Second quote:  O’Connor, 1996.).” 
63 The Office of Economic Opportunity instructed city-level program officers to “assist the poor in developing autonomous and self-
managed organizations which are competent to exert political influence on behalf of their own self-interest” (Amendments to the 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 1966) 
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for activist participation in governance (a testament to the influence of the community action 
idea among liberal policymakers at this time).  Philanthropic programs, and especially those of 
the Ford Foundation (which was responsible for formulating the community action idea) created 
similar opportunities.64 
Other federal and philanthropic programs fused entrepreneurship with community 
action, while others simply supported entrepreneurship among racial minorities.65  Beginning 
with the Special Impact Program in the 1966 renewal of the Economic Opportunity Act, a series 
of federal programs allocated federal funding for “community development corporations,” non-
profits developing neighborhood-level economies by building housing and real estate, offering 
low-interest loans, launching or incubating economic enterprises, and other activities.66  CDCs 
were also a priority of corporate and foundation philanthropy since the mid-1960s.67  Laura 
Warren Hill, Nishani Frazier, and others recount corporate and foundation initiatives in several 
cities, responding to urban unrest, helping minority residents start and grow businesses.68 
These programs elevated the many racial justice activists who already possessed 
relatively moderate understandings of community control, and capitalist visions of economic 
empowerment.  The secondary literature cites many examples of relatively moderate activists 
collaborating with local government and other stakeholders in governance, and launching Black 
Capitalist ventures, under the auspices of War on Poverty and Ford Foundation programs.69  The 
programs also channeled activists committed to more militant tactics and radical goals.  In New 
 
64 Ford’s programs in the mid- and late-1960s (i.e., after their Grey Areas programs) are described at length by Ferguson (2013).   
65 The Department of Labor provided grants for community groups to launch businesses in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Dawley, 
1973:  127-130).  The Nixon administration introduced a “Black Capitalism Initiative” in his first term (Hill and Rabig, 2012:  26) 
66 The Housing Act of 1968 and Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 offered additional federal funding for CDCs.  In the 
1960s, most models envisioned financial and technical assistance provided by government, philanthropists, and private sector 
actors, who could also participate in joint ventures and offer sheltered markets. 
67 Frazier, 2012; Ferguson, 2007 and 2013; Berndt, 1977 (see Case Study:  Union Sarah Community Corporation for evidence of 
corporate support for CDCs rooted in racial justice movements). 
68 Hill, 2012; Frazier, 2012; Dawley, 1973. 
69 Ferguson, 2007:  94.   For example, the Cleveland CORE chapter, with corporate and foundation backing, started the CORE 
Enterprises Corporation, a CDC geared toward fostering black-owned businesses in the inner-city. 
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York City, for example, War on Poverty programs absorbed CORE activists, frustrated by their 
unsuccessful attempts to organize tenants to pursue radical demands.70  Street gangs turned 
activists in Chicago, holding contradictory ideas about public responsibility for economic 
development of the ghetto and Black responsibility for racial uplift, embraced a program of 
Black Capitalism embodying the latter, when it was offered by corporate philanthropists and the 
Ford Foundation.71 
Activists who tried to use War on Poverty programs to pursue more radical goals were 
eventually defeated by entrenched political opposition or state repression, particularly as 
federal policymakers revised programs to give local governments more control of program 
administration, and to defund wayward activists, in the late 1960s.72  For example, militant 
activists in Oakland used the Oakland Economic Development Council (Oakland’s official 
Community Action Agency under the Economic Opportunity Act and Model Cities program) to 
organize a grassroots base, and launch mass protests against City Council and bureaucratic 
agencies, demanding control of federally funded job training and community development 
programs.73  Conservative forces in the city and state (including governor Ronald Reagan) 
consistently attacked these activists and eventually succeeded in having their federal funds cut 
off, after which the OEDC quickly collapsed.74  Scholars describe similar episodes in Chicago 
 
70 Schultz, 1986. 
71 Dawley, 1973.  Dawley recounts Operation Bootstrap in Chicago, which convened representatives of the mayor’s office, West Side 
Aldermen, Chicago police, representatives of some of the region’s largest employers (Sears Roebuck, Ryerson Steel, Illinois Bell 
Telephone, and Western Electric) and four street gangs-turned racial justice activists, to fund a series of business ventures in 1968-9, 
co-funded by grants from the Ford Foundation and the federal Department of Labor.  The gang member turned activists were 
motivated by Washington-esque ideas about blacks’ responsibility for uplift and “respectability” (which they held alongside 
contradictory ideas that white racism caused black poverty and whites were responsible for alleviating it).  Ellis (1969) and Brown 
(1979) tell similar stories about the West Side Organization in Chicago.  Those groups which survived became “vehicle[s] for Black 
Capitalism,” embedded in high-poverty neighborhoods, by the early 1970s.  Others, seen as irredeemably criminal, were destroyed 
by funders’ ambivalence and ferocious state repression. 
72 Biles, 2011:  148-150; Cazenave, 2007:  xii.  The Green Amendment to the 1967 Office of Economic Opportunity appropriations bill 
gave city governments more control over Community Action Programs. 
73 Rhomberg, 2004.  Self, 2003.  
74 Especially important was the Green Amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act, restoring municipal control of distribution of 
federal funds.  Nixon-appointed officials at the Department of Labor also helped defund insurgents in Oakland (Rhomberg, 2003). 
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(Fish, 1974; Todd-Breland, 2013), New York (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1974; Katznelson, 1981; 
Cazenave, 2007), and Los Angeles (Bauman, 2007), in which activists attempted to use War on 
Poverty programs to win substantive control over school systems and other public functions, 
eventually losing to entrenched bureaucratic and political interests, amidst declining federal 
support for insurgency.75 
   Many activists tried to use community development corporations to create “alternatives 
to capitalism,” building substantive community control over local economies through 
collectively owned and governed enterprises and reinvesting profits into grassroots organizing 
and other political projects.76  Most of these ventures quickly proved financially unsustainable, 
due to the inherent challenges of economic enterprises in a competitive environment, and to 
the erosion of consumer bases as industry fled cities in the late 1960s.  Brednt (1977), Frazier 
(2012) and Rabig (2016) recount CDCs’ abandonment of political ambitions and adoption of 
standard corporate models of governance within their first years.77  Rabig concludes that 
“[m]any community economic development corporations across the country tended to follow a 
predictable trajectory: once energized by radical critiques of a system seemingly immune to 
conventional reform, they settled into a more comfortable relationship to existing power.”78   
 
75 Perhaps the most famous instance was the attempt by Black activists to control public schools in the Ocean Hill-Bronseville 
neighborhood (see Fainstein and Fainsten, 1974:  chapter 6; Katznelson, 1981:  chapter 6).  Todd-Breland (2012, chapter 2) and Fish 
(1974, chapter 4) recount attempts by The Woodlawn Organization (TWO) in Chicago to pressure Chicago Public Schools and the 
University of Chicago to incorporate TWO into public school governance.  The War on Poverty, for all its cooptive effects, briefly 
created a window in where activists could sustain such challenges, winning funds and political cover from sympathetic federal 
bureaucrats. 
76 Rabig, 2016:  187.  Frazier, 2012:  69-74.  Berndt (1977) notes that Prominent Black intellectuals saw CDCs in this way in the late 
1960s, citing Stewart Perry:  Black Institutions, Black Separatism, and Ghetto Economic Development; National Policy and the 
Community Development Corporation; Charles Hampden-Turner (7). 
77 Berdnt, (1977):  The Union Sarah Community Corporation started in 1969 as an experiment in community capitalism, soon 
switched to more conventional business models, and then became a government-funded affordable housing developer by 1973 (see 
Part 2).  Frazier, 2012:  The Hough Area Development Corporation in Cleveland “transitioned form a promising, but not quite 
effective, community organization to an effective” to a profitable business with few ties to the community (84).  Rabig, 2016: “Many 
community economic development corporations across the country tended to follow a predictable trajectory: once energized by 
radical critiques of a system seemingly immune to conventional reform, they settled into a more comfortable relationship to existing 
power” (213). 
78 Rabig, 2016:  213. 
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Ultimately, most such institutions survived only if they repurposed as government- and 
foundation-funded affordable housing developers.79  
The decade’s most significant attempts to organize working-class and low-income 
populations around progressive and socialist programs were defeated by political opposition 
from entrenched interests, including labor unions, municipal leaders, and employers.  Segments 
of CORE and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, for example, attempted to 
organize low-wage workers into “community unions—worker organizations outside of formal 
labor unions, which backed up unionization and collective bargaining efforts with grassroots 
mobilizations of surrounding community members.80  While such projects garnered interest 
among workers, they eventually collapsed due to intense opposition of city governments and 
labor unions (who withheld support from SNCC and threatened to defund CORE unless the 
projects ceased).81  Black activists also formed radical caucuses within labor unions, some of 
which attempted to organize around radical economic programs in Black neighborhoods.82  
These projects ultimately collapsed under intense opposition of established union leadership, as 
well as employers and local governments.  While smaller radical Black and Latinx organizations 
continued to operate after the 1960s, historians consider these defeated projects as the most 
 
79 Frazier, 2012; Rabig, 2016; Purnell, 2012.  
80 On CORE:  Flug, 1990.  On SNCC:  Moye, 2004; Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee: “Mississippi Freedom Labor Union” 
81 CORE discontinued its “community union” organizing due to pressure from the UAW (which was its primary funder at the time), 
and incoming president Floyd McKissick’s preference for other economic agendas (Flug, 1990: 328-9).  Radical formations in unions, 
like the Detroit Revolutionary Union Movement, were able to sustain themselves mostly by remaining underground and exploiting 
loopholes in liberal institutions, and encountered ferocious opposition from the state and UAW whenever they acted openly 
(Georgakas and Surkin, 1975).  Schultz (1986) notes “the differences in tenement dilapidation, between lease holders and subletters, 
between families and single occupants, between the working poor and welfare recipients, between those resigned to substandard 
walk-ups and those aspiring to enter city projects” all made it difficult to establish a common tenant agenda or sense of solidarity.   
82 These left-leaning activists were only some of the many racial minority caucuses that “sprang up in literally dozens of unions in 
1967-1971” (Flug, 1990:  342).  Some pursued more moderate visions, such as racial equity in union leadership and promotions, and 
sought to increase their bargaining leverage with union leaders, rather than control of the union.  Others union-based formations, 
like the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, formed in 1972, sought racial equity within unions, and supported the progressive wing of 
national AFL-CIO leadership. 
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significant attempts within the racial justice movement to organize low-income and working-
class populations around left-leaning economic goals.83 
These developments were the first step in construction of a moderate field of 
neighborhood-based racial justice activism.  Although few of the community-based 
organizations created in the 1960s lasted through the next decade, the moderate goals and 
strategies they embodied were carried by a stratum of activists, socialized by these experiences.  
Toure Reed (2019) argues that War on Poverty programs reinforced participating activists’ 
tendency to think about political representation in terms of “ethnic pluralism and racial group 
authenticity.”84  Bette Woody (1982) similarly argues that experiences in CDCs and Community 
Action Programs socialized activists into an orientation toward consensus-building and 
cooperation rather than antagonism.  Moreover, activists emerged with access and relationships 
in “the world of local public administration.”85  While many brought these perspectives and 
connections to positions in Black urban regimes (discussed below), others brought them to the 
second wave of community-based organizations, developing in the 1970s and 1980s.86 
As Cedric Johnson (2017), Toure Reed (2019) and other scholars have argued, these 
developments can be traced to features of the Post-War order.  First, they reflect “the decline of 
left-labor militancy during the Cold War,” and especially the incorporation of organized labor 
into a liberal pluralist framework.87  By the 1960s, anti-communist pressures and resurgent 
corporate power had forced most labor unions to accept this framework, and unions had 
developed organizational interests in protecting “turf.”88  During the period under study, unions 
 
83 Marable, 2012 (forward to the 2012 edition of Georgakas and Surkin’s Detroit I Do Mind Dying; Dawson, 2013.  
84 T. Reed, 2019. 
85 Johnson, 2017. 
86 Julia Rabig (2016), observing the “first generation” of CDCs in Newark, comments that “CDCs served as a career ladder for activists, 
many of whom continued to work in these organizations after they acquired professional credentials” (191). 
87 T. Reed, 2019. 
88 Dudzick and A. Reed, 2015:  353-4.  Levi, 2003. 
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primarily backed liberal civil rights organizations.  Although a social democratic tendency within 
labor existed, based in the A. Phillip Randolph Institute, it focused more on elite-level policy 
negotiations than organizing or supporting grassroots groups.89  Leftist racial justice formations 
were thus deprived of powerful organizational allies, and organizational prerogatives caused 
some unions to oppose attempts by Black activists to organize low-wage Black workers in cities. 
Second, the substance of War on Poverty and foundation programs reflects the 
dominance among liberal elites of a perspectives which “uncoupled inequality from political 
economy,” attributing it instead to behavior and culture.90  The “community action” concept, for 
instance, was based on the idea that poverty was perpetuated by the political and civic passivity 
of the poor, and that effective anti-poverty measures must socialize poor people into the norms 
of pluralist political participation, as well as cultivate a leadership stratum among the poor.  
Scholars have traced the genealogy of these ideas, showing that an essentialist notion of culture 
supplanted class as an explanatory variable in a range of social theories by the mid-twentieth 
century.91  The dominance of this perspective in the Democratic Party in the 1960s was partly 
caused by the rehabilitation of capitalism through its apparent successes in World War II, beliefs 
that capitalist production had effectively solved the problem of scarcity, the discrediting of 
socialist ideas during the Cold War, and prejudice likely rooted in a middle-class sensibility. 
These developments in the organizational field also had important effects on discourses 
about racial justice.  The emerging field of neighborhood organizations elaborated moderate 
discourses on racial justice, and established the dominance of those moderate discourses.  
Specifically, these developments narrowed the meaning of contested concepts like “community 
control” and “Black Capitalism.”  Moderate (or moderated) activists attached these concepts to 
 
89 Hamilton and Hamilton (1997, especially chapter 8).  Johnson, 2017. 
90 T. Reed, 2019:  5. 
91 Michaels, 1992; A. Reed, 2004:  5-6.  
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a concrete set of moderate practices (service provision, community development, and 
participation in governance), implying that these activities fulfilled those racial justice goals.  
Moreover these articulations were institutionalized in the new organizations.  Radical 
articulations of these concepts were not institutionalized, as the organizations producing them 
were coopted or greatly diminished.  
Even as they moderated their definitions of racial justice, activists tried to construct 
their work as militant.  The accounts of Feguson, Frazier, and Rabig describe activists’ attempts 
to ensure that their moderate versions of community control and Black Capitalism retained the 
connotations of separatism and assertiveness which comprised some of the emotional 
resonance of the Black Power movement.  Rabig (2016) notes that even as they dropped social 
democratic practices, Community Development Corporations still tried to fulfill “calls for 
collective ownership that echoed through the black power era…on mostly symbolic terms,” 
presenting themselves as wielding economic power on behalf of the community, and their 
projects as collective assets. 
Further narrowing, lower-class demobilization, and expanding middle-class development 
activism, 1970s-1980s 
Three trends in the 1970s and 1980s, driven by neoliberal federal policy in multiple 
areas, and changing foundation practices, continued to reconstruct the field of neighborhood-
based racial justice practice: 
• Federal and foundation programs furthered narrowed the field of community practice, 
undermining remaining militant groups and causing the proliferation of service and 
development groups which eschewed grassroots organizing and mass mobilization. 
• Working- and lower-class populations became clients of non-profit service providers, 
effectively demobilizing politically.  This trend was driven, firstly, by neoliberal 
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macroeconomic and fiscal policies, which accelerated deindustrialization, and led to rapid 
increases in unemployment and poverty in working-class sections of Black and Latinx 
neighborhoods in many cities.  These dire conditions generated intense need for support.  
The aforementioned federal and foundation programs ensured that these needs would be 
met via non-profit service provision, rather than through militant mobilization. 
• Cadres of middle-class neighborhood-based activists focused on community development, 
serving primarily middle-class constituencies, grew in many cities.  This was rooted in the 
expansion of Black and Latinx middle-classes, due to civil rights legislation and enforcement, 
and federal and foundation programs creating opportunities for activists to pursue 
homeownership and entrepreneurship through community development non-profits, rather 
than other strategies. 
Federal urban and welfare policies in the 1970s and 1980s, part of the crystallizing 
neoliberal perspective on economic questions, continued to reconstruct the field of 
neighborhood activism.92  These policies maintained federal commitments to funding a variety 
of social services but devolved program administration to the neighborhood level, creating 
numerous opportunities for non-profit participation in service provision.93   The Community 
Development Block Grant program (1974) and the Carter Administration’s Urban Development 
Action Grant program (1976) and later the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program (1986), 
created numerous opportunities for non-profits to participate in low-income housing and 
commercial development.  One practitioner summarized that “by 1980 there were over a dozen 
 
92 Neumann, 2014:  284.  Neumann writes that “By the late 1970s, ideas about urban governance had narrowed among public and 
private sector actors until federal policymakers saw devolution and privatization as the only politically viable options for national 
urban policy.” 
93 Biles, 2011; Neuamn, 2014:  287; Harris, 1980:  95, 106-7, 144-6).  These included grants to run job training programs under the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (1973); grants for community development under the Housing and Community 
Development Act (1974); grants for provision of various services distributed by the Community Services Administration (which 
replaced the Office of Economic Opportunity in 1974) and the Office of Neighborhood Development, created in 1978. 
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federal programs providing important sources of support for local staff and projects...and an 
increasing number of foundations and corporations were making serious commitments to 
community groups.”94 
Meanwhile, federal and urban governments and foundations took care not to fund 
militant political work.  Federal urban policies throughout the 1970s and 1980s gave city 
governments’ control of the disbursement of federal funds, and urban politicians made political 
support, or at least quiescence, a condition of receiving Community Development Block Grants, 
Low Income Housing Tax Credits, and other federal funds.95  Abandoning experiments with 
“community action,” many foundations began to explicitly require grantees to eschew militant 
political work, and to adopt cooperative postures toward government and other stakeholders.96  
As many have observed, foundations also encourage technical solutions to problems, which 
erase antagonism and structural inequality.97 
The most obvious effect of these developments was the continuing proliferation of 
service and development organizations in Black and Latinx neighborhoods.  Harris (1980) 
describes the proliferation of state-funded social service agencies in high-poverty 
neighborhoods in this period.98  Stoecker (1997), Steinbach (2003) and Boyd (2007) each refer to 
a “second wave” of community development corporations, forming in these years, and funded 
by the aforementioned federal and foundation programs.99  Per their patrons’ requirements, 
 
94 Andrew Mott, quoted in Peirce and Steinbach, 1987:  26. 
95 Neuman, 2014:  288; Biles, 2011:  189; Immergluck, 2005.  Revenue sharing and CDBGs replaced the categorical grants of the War 
on Poverty programs with a block of annual funds, giving “municipalities broad discretion in deciding where and how.” (Grodach and 
Ehrenfeucht, 2015:  not paginated) E.g., in Chicago, Daley consolidated both LIHTCs and CDBGs into the larger pool of patronage, 
alongside city contracts, city-owned properties, and TIF funds (Betancur and Gills, 2004:  103). 
96 Local Initiatives Support Corporation, for example, eschews “assertive postures and contentious tactics as counter-productive” 
(Chaskin and Karlstrom, 2012:  ES 3).  This orientation is often express in rubrics of “relationship and trust-building” and “stakeholder 
collaboration.” 
97 Kohl-Arenas, 2015; Arena, 2012; Sites, Chaskin, and Parks (2007).  This is partly enforced through requirements for “data-driven 
and ‘evidenced-based’” programs and “performance-measurement outcome evaluation.” Sites, Chaskin and Parks, 2007:  530. 
98 Harris, 1980:  95, 106-7, 144-6. 
99 Stoecker, 1997:  2; Steinbach, 2003; Boyd (2007):  49. 
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these groups tended to eschew grassroots politics, prioritizing “technical details of development 
over community empowerment.”100 
The neighborhood-based groups which maintained commitments to grassroots 
organizing and militant mobilization through the early 1970s either repurposed or declined in 
these years.  Even groups that “would [have] prefer[red] to spend more time on ‘pressure 
campaigns’ instead found [themselves] occupied with making contributions to constituents 
through social service and community development projects.”101  In the words of one organizer, 
“we’ve gotten sucked into social services…residents just bring their problems to us.”102  John 
Gills (1991) and Michelle Boyd (2007) both conclude reviews of the post-1960s history of 
neighborhood practice with the observation that, by the late 1970s, militant CBOs had been 
replaced by community development organizations and service providers.103 
As described earlier in this chapter, federal macroeconomic and fiscal policies, enacting 
the emerging neoliberal perspective, expedited economic restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s.  
Rapid deindustrialization led to widespread unemployment and poverty in working-class 
sections of Black and Latinx neighborhoods, as elsewhere.  Whereas such conditions might have 
been the basis for political action, by the mid-1970s, most urban neighborhoods had no 
organizational or institutional bases for grassroots mobilization.  Seeking social services from 
government- and foundation-funded non-profits, was the only option available to immiserated 
working- and lower-class neighborhood residents.  As Michelle Boyd (2007) observes, these 
trends “steer[ed] poor blacks into service and welfare programs.”104 
 
100 Stoecker 1997, 9. 
101 Fisher, 1994:  199.  Harris (1980) makes the same point. 
102 Katz, 1990:  51. 
103 Gills, 1991: 43.  See Boyd (2007, 47): “By the next decade [i.e., the 1970s] …the protest and organizing orientation of these 
community groups was overshadowed by a focus on community economic development”  
104 Boyd, 2007:  64. 
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At the same time, federal civil rights policies caused a rapid growth of Black and Latinx 
middle-classes.  The 1964 Civil Rights Act established a framework for combatting employment 
discrimination, enforced by the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, leading to 
gradual increases in private sector hiring of Black and Latinx people.  Affirmative action 
programs in federal agencies expanded public employment of Black and Latinx people.  Brown 
and Erie (1981) summarize that “[b]etween 1960 and 1980, the proportion of black men 
working in professional, technical, and managerial jobs doubled, with more than half of the 
increase due to public social welfare programs.105 
Michelle Boyd (2007), Mary Pattillo (2007) and others note that the expanding middle-
classes increasingly pursued community development, via the vehicles of neighborhood-based 
community development corporations.  These non-profits helped aspiring households and 
entrepreneurs attain loans and technical assistance with home purchases and renovations and 
small business development, amidst redlining and discrimination.106  Logan and Molotch 
similarly observed the proliferation of these groups, by the mid-1980s: 
Operating through the community organization mechanism, the ‘better element’ in an 
otherwise disadvantaged area can function as a vanguard for change...Not surprisingly, 
those who ordinarily join and become leaders in a community organization tend to be 
the middle-class (or aspiring middle-class) homeowners.107 
 
The staff and leading participants of these organizations formed a “community-development 
elite,” a new stratum of civic and political leadership, expressing the distinctive politics of an 
expanding middle-class subjected to institutional racism.108  Boyd (2007) and Pattillo (2007) and 
 
105 Brown and Erie 1981, 308.  Quoted on Boyd, 2007:  49. 
106 Boyd, 2007:   
107 Logan and Molotch, 1987:  141.  Pattillo (2007) also notes the dominance of neighborhood-based  
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Monique Taylor (2002) found these actors highly active in planning, implementing, and 
contesting issues of neighborhood development, closely tied to the city’s political leadership.109 
The demobilization of the lower-classes and growth of community development 
activism had effects at the level of discursive production.  The growing field of community 
development organizations produced discourses constructing community development as racial 
empowerment and authentic racial expression.  Many of the activists involved had participated 
in the racial justice mobilizations of the 1960s.  Seeking reinvestment amidst redlining in the 
1970s and 80s, community development practitioners continued to construct their work as a 
vital racial justice practice.  One scholar, summarizing interviews with a national sample of 
community development practitioners in the 1980s, concluded that development activists 
identified as “descendants of neighborhood associations or protest groups of the 1960s that 
determined that empowerment is better obtained through the control of the economic 
resources within their communities rather than through advocacy tactics.”110  These 
organizations and their projects helped establish that moderate forms of community 
development and service provision were important, legitimate, and even militant form of racial 
justice practice.  Moreover, the elimination of remaining nodes of militant practice left still 
fewer organizational bases for articulations of racial politics which emphasized the exercise of 
popular power through grassroots organizing and militant mobilization. 
Market-oriented real estate redevelopment in the neoliberal city, 1980s-1990s 
A distinctively neoliberal articulation of this middle-class community development 
activism emerged in the 1980s and 1990s.  As neoliberal growth strategies and global capital 
 
109 Ibid, Pattillo, 2007. 
110 Rubin, 1995:  129.  Hegelson, 2014:  Chapter 6. Gills, 1991:  43.   Even in the neoliberal era, activists and politicians continued to 
reference racialized divestment, and the pursuit of redevelopment as resistance to white oppression, and universally beneficial to all 
neighborhood residents, or members of the race (Boyd, 2007). 
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flows fueled gentrification, neighborhood community development activists faced pressures and 
opportunities to participate in market-driven neighborhood revitalization processes, controlled 
by private developers and city planning bureaucrats.  Depending on their neighborhood’s place 
in the cycle of reinvestment, development activists lobbied local governments for inclusion in 
programs to stimulate market-based revitalization, participated in foundation programs 
designed to channel benefits of revitalization toward a broader swath of neighborhood 
residents, or struggled to control and shape rapid reinvestment already underway. 
While the public-private real-estate development industry’s interest in disinvested 
neighborhoods beyond Central Business Districts was the primary cause, neoliberal federal and 
foundation policies also encouraged non-profits to participate in market-based revitalization.  In 
the 1980s and 1990s, federal policymakers and foundation officers reconceived the role of 
community-based non-profits as mediators between free markets and neighborhoods, 
expressing the bi-partisan consensus on the superiority of market-based policies. 111  Federal and 
foundation programs required community groups to leverage private investment and partner 
with private sector developers as a condition of funding.112  A new spate of programs offered 
grants to groups promising to help marginal communities access local markets.113  Non-profits 
were also expected to function as corporations, with the “business talent and development skills 
once thought to be the exclusive province of the for-profit sector.”114 
 
111 The report was the work of The Futures Committee, a conference of civic and neighborhood leaders convened by LISC/Chicago.  It 
was reportedly inspired by a prior presentations by then State Senator Barack Obama (Blistein, 2009).  Marketization was one, 
sometimes implicit, element of the framework.  
112 Gordach and Ehrenfeucht, 2015:  CDBGs encouraged cities to use grants “as a catalyst for private investment.”   On the 
requirement of market-based interventions in post-Nixon federal urban policy, see O’Connor, 1999:  111. 
113 Fisher, 1994:  181.  Fisher observes that CBOs could win foundation, as well as government, funding by “developing highly specific 
and measurable development projects in which community people could work for their own economic betterment.” 
114 Pierce and Steinback, 1987:  30.  Also, Rubin, 1995:  134.  This perspective was articulated by LISC/Chicago’s report, Changing the 
Way We Do Things.  For LISC, as for federal policymakers, market-oriented forms of community practice were premised on the idea 
that government intervention had not worked, and that only projects which harnessed market forces were viable.  
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Federal and foundation programs helped establish frameworks for inter-sector 
collaboration on real estate redevelopment.  The federal Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
Program (1986) linked non-profits to private developers and investors.  Political scientist John 
Betancur and co-authors (2015) argue that the federal HOPE VI program (under which the 
federal government directed local Public Housing Authorities to replace high-rise projects with 
“mixed-income developments”) was especially influential in encouraging and coordinating 
collaboration between non-profits, private developers, and city agencies.  Margaret Weir (1999), 
William Sites and coauthors (2009) and several others recall that public-private-non-profit 
partnerships to stimulate market-driven neighborhood development was unquestionably the 
dominant paradigm for neighborhood improvement among major philanthropic foundations in 
the 1990s.115   
Once again, these activists, many of whom are rooted in militant racial justice 
mobilizations of the 1960s, continued to frame their work in discourses on racial empowerment 
and authenticity.  In a common trend, community development practitioners use discourses 
about racial authenticity both to legitimate redevelopment and to construct marketable spaces, 
as in “heritage tourism.”116  The community development organizations studied by Boyd (2007) 
constructed Black-led gentrification as way to preserve an authentic, inter-class racial 
community.  Sternberg and Anderson (2014), Betancur (2005), and Betancur and Kim (2015) find 
that a pro-development coalition (comprised of non-profits, elected officials, and upwardly 
mobile Latinx residents) similarly constructed market-driven real estate development as a way 
to express an authentic Latinx identity, while overcoming racialized disinvestment.  As Boyd 
(2005) observes, these groups “describe neighborhood development as a response to long 
 
115 Margaret Weir (1999); Sites et al (2009); Kubisch et al 2010; Chaskin and Karlstrom (2012); Betancur et al, 2015 (91) 
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patterns of racial discrimination, understand it as a form of resistance to racial subordination, 
and see it as a way to advance the race.”117 
A partial exception:  Neo-Alinskyite organizing 
While the bulk of the non-profit sector focuses on service provision and community 
development, a minority of non-profits use Saul Alinsky’s model of community practice, 
mobilizing neighborhood residents in advocacy campaigns.  These groups are cultivated by left-
leaning activists (many with roots in organized labor and the social movements of the 1960s) 
and by national institutions which train activists in Alinskyite strategies and help start new 
neighborhood organizations.  While some such groups have been instrumental in passing 
progressive policy changes, their activities are limited by financial dependence on government 
and philanthropic foundations, by federal tax laws regulating political activity by non-profits, 
and by groups’ tendency (an effect of Alinsky’s model) to pursue issue campaigns divorced from 
larger political strategies. 
There is no national database of such organizations.  However, the size of this field can 
be appreciated by reviewing national networks and umbrella organizations of such “power 
building” organizations.  Perhaps the most important of these networks was the Association of 
Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), which at its peak represented an estimated 
150,000 members nationally, in 700 local chapters in 50 cities.118  Other significant national 
networks include People's Action, a network of 41 “state and local grassroots power-building 
organizations;”119 Industrial Areas Foundation, with 65 local affiliates;120 Faith in Action 
 
117 Boyd, 2008:  752. 
118 Hurd and Kest, 2003:  120. 
119 People’s Action website, https://peoplesaction.org/.  Accessed 9/4/19. 
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(formerly the Pacific Institute for Community Organizing), with 44 affiliated organizations;121 and 
the Partnership for Working Families, comprising 17 local community-labor coalitions in 11 
states.122 
Many of these groups are rooted in and partly funded by religious congregations, and 
some receive funds from labor unions.  These groups are fostered and trained by national 
networks and institutions, such as the National Training and Information Center in Chicago, the 
Highlander School, and the Midwest Academy, which provides training in Alinskyite organizing 
and direct-action tactics.123 
These networks (and presumably the hundreds of member organizations) focus on a 
range of progressive policy issues.  Before its demise in 2010, ACORN organized around tenants’ 
rights, living wages, affordable housing, access to bank loans, and exploitative state and 
corporate practices including workfare and predatory lending.  ACORN chapters were 
instrumental in forming community-labor coalitions in many cities.124  Groups affiliated with 
People’s Action (at the time National People’s Action) and ACORN led the national policy 
campaign which resulted in the Community Reinvestment Act, and ACORN spearheaded the 
wave of living wage campaigns since the 1990s.125 
Withal their commitments to progressive agendas and pressure campaigns, these 
organizations are severely limited by three factors.  First, while groups receive some funding 
from membership dues, religious congregations, and labor unions, they receive most of their 
funds from government and foundation grants.126  The precipitous fall of ACORN after cuts in its 
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federal funding in 2009 illustrates the vulnerability of even the most established such 
organizations.  This financial dependence constrains these organizations to pursuing progressive 
causes within the framework of the national Democratic Party, and from using excessively 
disruptive strategies. 
Second, these groups’ financial solvency depends on their status as 501(c)(3) 
organizations under the federal tax code:  such organizations are tax-exempt, can receive 
foundation grants, and donations to them are tax-deductible.  Tax law bans 501(c)(3) 
organizations from partisan political activity.  These restrictions prevent the organizations from 
turning out their memberships in the electoral sphere, except in non-partisan campaigns.  This 
also limits such groups’ utility as coalition partners for groups operating advancing electoral 
projects. 
Finally, most of these groups pursue campaigns that are not part of a larger strategic 
project to win institutional power or enact structural change.  As noted, many of the activists are 
trained in Saul Alinsky’s model of organizing, which insists on letting local populations determine 
the organization’s agenda—organizers are not to begin with an analysis of their own.  This has 
led to failures to develop effective challenges to key drivers of inequality and poverty.127 
Minority-led neoliberal urban regimes 
The minority-led neoliberal urban regime refers to a type of municipal administration 
governing many U.S. cities after the mid-1960s.  These regimes enacted a moderate racial justice 
program, focused on patronage, attacks on racial disparity and discrimination, and descriptive 
representation (sometimes coupled with moderate devolutionary programs) within a neoliberal 
economic framework.  These programs were shaped by officeholders’ socialization into 
 
127 Heathcott (2011:  290).  E.g., the community reinvestment campaigns “can never fully stabilize neighborhoods, because the 
mechanisms that ultimately unravel the material basis of communities remain intact.” (290)  
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established modes of governance through the War on Poverty programs, the weakness of 
radical racial justice formations in most cities in the 1960s, and especially by the structural and 
political constraints facing all urban regimes (and especially those in declining, older cities) by 
the late 1960s. 
These regimes were a key institution producing neoliberal discourses on racial justice.  
Like neighborhood organizations, the regimes defined the meaning of racial interest, and of key 
concepts like community control and empowerment, in ways compatible with or supportive of 
neoliberal economic programs, uncoupling them from analysis of structural inequalities or 
exploitation, and demands for redistribution or democratic control of economic processes.  
Through patronage and coordination of grassroots participation in real estate redevelopment, 
these regimes also helped organize primarily middle-class segments of minority communities 
into distributive relationships within the neoliberal political economy. 
Origins and programs of minority-led, neoliberal urban regimes 
Demographic changes and minority political mobilization created the conditions for the 
election of Black officeholders in many cities after the mid-1960s.  Continuing white flight, and 
migration into cities of Black and Latinx populations, increased minority population shares.  
Black political mobilization, associated with the Civil Rights and minority Power movements, 
made minorities a larger share of the electorate.  From 1965 to 1980, the number of black 
elected officials in the U.S. increased from 100 to 1,813.  The number of black officials elected at 
the urban-level increased 619% in this time, and at the county-level 960%.128   
The same historical forces that reconstructed the field of neighborhood-based activism 
shaped the programs of minority-led regimes.  First, like leaders of neighborhood organizations, 
 
128 This and previous sentence, Katz, 2008:  190-1. 
49 
 
members of minority administrations were socialized and linked to networks of political and 
economic elites through War on Poverty programs.  Surveying the post-1965 wave of Black 
urban mayors, Bette Woody (1982) comments that “most were active in neighborhood, civil 
rights, and Office of Economic Opportunity politics in cities during the mid- to late 1960s” and 
many served on official Community Action Agencies.129  These roles were an entry point into “a 
complex recruitment and training process,” in which activists developed relationships with 
federal officials, liberal politicians, foundation officers, and corporate executives.130  This 
“political apprenticeship” introduced politicians and staffers to the “public management 
system’s entrenched protocols and operating logic, initiating them into the common sense of 
existing policy processes,” including dispositions toward consensus-building and stakeholder 
collaboration.131  
Second, though minority communities comprised the bulk of minority-led 
administrations’ electoral base, these administrations won power only on the basis of coalitions 
of radical and moderate racial justice activists, minority populations, and liberal establishments 
(including local Democratic Party organizations, labor unions, and segments of the business 
community).  Simply put, left-leaning activists were not powerful enough to win citywide 
elections on their own.132  In the few cases where Black Power formations dominated electoral 
 
129 Woody, 1982:  22. 
130 Woody (1982) suggests that experiences in the WOP, and perhaps subsequent experiences, “contributed to the later ‘policy’ 
orientation” (i.e., their disposition toward certain policy choices).  She refers to Newark’s Kenneth Gibson and Gary’s Richard 
Hatcher as having outlooks shaped by their professional experiences in think tanks associated with the Democratic Party (xvi).  
Woody suggests that one effect was a tendency toward mediating between opposed interests.  Several mayors had, in their previous 
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in Oakland and Young in Detroit, or between radical and conservative wings of black political factions, including nationalist and civil 
rights movements and organized labor.”  
131 On “political apprenticeship” see Moynihan, 1969; quoted in Johnson, 2017.  Second quote from A. Reed, 1999:  131. 
132 For example, in Oakland Black Power activists launched mostly unsuccessful electoral campaigns, around agendas of radical 
devolution and redistribution, in 1969 and 1973.  Three of the four candidates lost, mostly for the lack of financial and logistical 
support from the city’s powerful institutions (such as the Democratic party organization and labor unions) and for lack of a base 
beyond the black population in West Oakland. Remnants of these mobilizations “joined with white liberals, labor unions, and 
Democratic Party politicians” to support the liberal, black candidate Lionel Wilson in the 1977 mayoral election (Rhomberg, 2004).  
Georgakas and Surkin describe radicals’ need to compromise with liberals in Detroit to elected Mayor Coleman Young.  
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coalitions, such as Baraka’s Committee for a Unified Newark, they were unable to discipline 
candidates after their election.133 
Most importantly, minority-led coalitions won power in the context of severe fiscal crisis 
and worsening poverty and unemployment (rooted in economic restructuring, demographic 
changes, and federal cuts in urban aid).134  By the mid-1970s, per the emerging bi-partisan 
consensus on neoliberal economic policies, the Democratic Party rejected pleas for bailouts or 
other forms of stimulus for declining cities.135  These conditions effectively imposed a corporate-
driven economic growth strategy on urban regimes, as the only possible way to create 
desperately needed jobs and revenue. 
Socialized into strategic moderation, politically reliant on moderate and liberal coalition 
partners, and lacking other policy options, minority-led administrations adopted corporate-
centered economic growth strategies.  As Eisinger (1983) observes, “black mayors operate on 
the basis of a simple equation: private economic development in the city produces jobs in the 
private sector and tax money that may be used for jobs and purchases in the public sector.”136  
Administrations provided generous subsidies to businesses and developers to spur corporate 
growth and maintained the low tax rates and balanced budgets preferred by businesses and 
investors.  Reviewing the performance of black mayors and minority-led coalitions, scholars find 
few attempts at redistribution of resources to lower-classes through enhanced city services, 
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progressive taxation, or transfers.137  Relatedly, minority politicians did not use their office to 
forge new political coalitions capable of winning elections around redistributive agendas.138 
As Reed (1999) and Woody (1982) show, these regimes maintain popular support in 
minority communities through racial redistribution of patronage, and by incorporating 
symbolism and some demands of racial justice movements.  Browning et al’s comprehensive 
review shows that regimes increased minority shares in contracts and employment in city 
government.  In particular, regimes tried to satisfy movement demands for community control.  
As Woody recounts, some regimes attempted various forms of devolution of city functions and 
authority to the neighborhood-level.139  Browning and coauthors report minority-led coalitions 
increased minority representation in city boards and commissions.  Mostly, however minority 
mayors interpreted the principle of community control as representation of the community by 
authentic leadership—not as institutional reform or mass mobilization.  Politicians thus 
presented themselves as authentic representatives of the Black community, and constructed 
their office (and that of their appointees) as the fulfillment of community control.140 
Discursive production and organization of constituencies  
Like neighborhood organizations, the regimes were a key node articulating definitions of 
racial justice and interest, and of key concepts such as community control and empowerment, in 
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ways that were compatible with neoliberal economic policies.  They also helped to organize 
constituencies around expectations for patronage and participation in the neoliberal real estate 
development economy. 
The regimes helped define community control as descriptive representation, and to 
establish criteria for assessing the legitimacy of representatives.  As regimes legitimated 
themselves in assertions that their office fulfilled community control, they reinforced the notion 
that the core of racial empowerment was political representation by authentic representatives.  
And in their reliance on discourses of authenticity to validate their status as a legitimate 
representative of the community, they reinforced the centrality of this concept in conversations 
about representation. 
Regimes also helped to define racial interests.  As Reed (1999) comments, the agenda of 
patronage, community control, and attacks on racism shaped constituent expectations, 
“defining what benefits political action can legitimately be used to pursue.”141  Constituents 
could seek jobs and contracts, and later opportunities to participate in real estate 
redevelopment.  But programmatic goals, and especially those related to economic 
redistribution, were excluded from this definition of racial interest. 
The regimes helped to defined legitimate modes of political practice.  Insofar as 
community control was realized through election and appointment of Black officials, and black 
interests were served through conventional politics, the regimes delegitimized militant forms of 
activity, such as protest.  This effect was strongest where the regimes and their officials have 
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roots in the militant struggles of the 1960s, and thus “carry the historical sediment of 
adversarial, protest politics.”142   
Finally, these regimes were critical in organizing constituencies around the distribution 
of patronage and real estate redevelopment.  They have created networks of corporate clients 
relying on city contracts and procurement, creating strong ties between a minority petite 
bourgeoisie and the neoliberal regime.143  As Johnson (2015), Pattillo (2007), and others discuss, 
city governments help organize the participation of neighborhood residents and non-profits in 
real estate redevelopment, for instance by selling city-owned properties to targeted groups of 
neighborhood residents, creating quasi-official neighborhood planning entities, and providing 
grants to fund small development projects.  These programs provide opportunities to benefit 
from market-driven redevelopment. 
3. Research Questions Revisited—Historical Developments and the 
Terrain for Organizing 
These developments created and institutionalized definitions of racial interest and racial 
justice compatible with neoliberalism.  They ensured that discourses linking racial justice with 
critiques of capitalism or a left economic program were not institutionalized.  The developments 
also established modes of racial justice practice contained within the political system and reliant 
on elite funding, and left few organizations committed to grassroots organizing and mass 
mobilization.  Moreover, as global economic restructuring and neoliberal growth strategies 
reshaped urban political economy, the urban regime and neighborhood-based development 
organizations crafted a place in this economy for segments of minority populations in this mode 
of practice.  Regimes’ programs helped allies in minority neighborhoods profit from 
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143 Bennett, 2006: “opportunities for politically connected African Americans and Latinos to participate in residential development 
consortiums, or to bid on city contracts for various public works improvements, are legion” (54). 
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redevelopment, and community development organizations coordinated grassroots 
participation.  Many lower-class neighborhood residents became clients of non-profit service 
provider organizations. 
There are few published empirical studies about the effects of these structures on 
organizing.  However, I will discuss three possible impacts.   First, I will assess which actors and 
population segments are likely to have material investments in neoliberal regimes and 
neoliberal policies or economic processes.  Second, drawing on theories of hegemony, I will 
suggest that these developments made certain ideas about racial interest and political practice 
into taken-for-granted, “common sense” ideas for neighborhood residents.  Third, drawing on 
recent studies on the politics of neoliberalization, I will consider one specific ideological effect, 
in which non-profits and regimes may diffuse constructions of contentious political issues, 
legitimating displacement and inequality.  The goal of this section is to sketch general 
possibilities to be evaluated in the case studies in later chapters. 
Material commitments 
These institutional developments may have shaped neighborhood residents’ material 
interests in ways that make them less receptive to progressive or socialist projects.  First, 
neighborhood-based community development non-profits and regime policies help some 
population segments invest in neighborhood revitalization.  It is not clear, however, just which 
population segments have the capacity to benefit from revitalization.  Second, people who work 
for or run “the ever expanding ever shifting array” of non-profits likely have material 
commitments to neoliberal regimes who provide grants and contracts.144  While these groups 
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also have vested interests in devolution, this interest may align them which neoliberal or social 
democratic projects, depending on contingent factors. 
As structural changes in the economy have grown the Black and Latinx middle classes, 
non-profit development organizations and neoliberal urban regimes help these population 
segments participate in and benefit from real estate redevelopment.  The rise of the field of 
community development non-profits and the practices of neoliberal regimes have likely 
increased the number of neighborhood residents with a vested interest in the redevelopment 
economy.  We might expect property owners, focused on rising property values, and residents 
with secure tenures in the neighborhood, hoping able to enjoy new amenities, to actively or 
passively support rent-intensifying real estate redevelopment as a mode of pursuing community 
interests. 
However, it is not clear how wide a swath of property owners have real interests in 
neighborhood development.  Within the category of homeowners, there is a wide spectrum of 
financial, logistical, and other capacities, conferring differential abilities to afford rising property 
taxes, access “private and state sources of rebuilding capital,” navigate the investment process, 
and even evade unscrupulous investors’ attempts to buy properties for less than market 
value.145  Taylor (2019) argues that material interests in rising property values are also qualified 
by the level of precarity of property ownership.  Many Black and Latinx homeowners have sub-
prime mortgages, and underwater or nearly underwater mortgages—a fact dramatized by the 
extraordinarily high foreclosure rates in minority neighborhoods during the Great Recession.146  
Such factors complicate residents’ material interests with respect to redevelopment. 
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  People who work for or run non-profits may have material commitments to neoliberal 
regimes, and to neoliberalism per se.  Firstly, non-profits may function as a form of patronage:  
people who receive contracts or grants from the state are likely to be committed to the regime 
that provided those funds.  As in most patronage relationships, beneficiaries would be unlikely 
to support political challenges to neoliberal regimes. 
Second, insofar as non-profits perform former state functions, delegated to non-
governmental organizations, they have a vested interest in privatization and devolution, as such.  
The connection between devolution and neoliberalism is arguably contingent.  Historically, 
provision of goods and services via non-profits was juxtaposed to state provision, as the 
neoliberal alternative to Great Society-era liberalism.  For instance, in John Arena’s (2012) case 
studies, activists who became invested in non-profits gained a material interest in eliminating 
public housing.147  However, in different historical conditions, non-profit service providers could 
have a material interest in the expansion of public funding for social services, which would align 
them strongly with progressive and social democratic projects, than neoliberal ones. 
Effects on consciousness 
The work of Gramsci and Althusser suggests the possibility that these developments 
could influence the consciousness of neighborhood residents.  Their work provides a way of 
thinking about consciousness as “the effect of the system of ideological relations into which the 
individual is inserted.”148  They suggest that we should consider the way that the 
aforementioned discourses about racial justice and political possibility are embedded in the 
institutions and processes comprising quotidian life, such that individuals may absorb elements 
of them into their practical thought. 
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Gramsci depicts a process of ongoing ideological production and diffusion within 
quotidian social life.  His account focuses on “intellectuals,” actors embedded in social life who 
discursively construct quotidian social and economic processes, either as commentators, or as 
institutional actors who set up and coordinate those processes.149  Though they speak about 
mundane social elements, their discourses implicitly contain basic premises and concepts, 
including fundamental beliefs about the nature of the world, society, or justice.  People exposed 
to these constructions in the course of daily life internalize both the explicit content, and the 
implicit premises and concepts.150  These ideas come to form “common sense”—the 
unquestioned or unconscious assumptions used in thought and analysis.  In Stuart Hall’s reading, 
the concepts and categories absorbed through quotidian social life create the “forms of 
spontaneous thought within which the [individual] represents [the world] to himself [sic]...and 
‘lives out’ (i.e., genuinely experiences) his [sic] practical relations to it.”151 
Gramsci has an elaborate account of how the ideas of dominant groups tend to be 
embedded in quotidian social practices, such that they are absorbed into common sense.152  The 
institutional developments described in the previous section can be seen as inserting neoliberal 
ideas into political and economic institutions embedded in the lives of Black and Latinx 
communities.  The programs, practices, and discourses (and in the case of neighborhood-based 
institutions, the organizational form itself) of minority-led regimes and neighborhood-based 
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pedagogical practice (102-3), and Catholics from the forms of religious practice then propagated by “the Moderates” (53).  Mouffe 
(1979) reads Gramsci’s account of ideological influence it this way too. 
151 Hall, 1986:  30. 
152 Gramsci, 1977.  This account mostly rests on the claims that 1) coalitions advancing large-scale political projects tend to produce 
discourses, articulating their goals in terms of basic moral principles and based on basic premises. 2)“intellectuals” from all social 
strata tend to become incorporated into dominant partisan coalitions and leading institutions of knowledge production, driven by 
careerist incentives, and the need to pursue group interests within dominant systems; 3)This cooptation and incorporation entails 
accepting the core principles and premises of the dominant coalition; 4)the intellectuals then reproduce discourses on myriad social 
subjects, in myriad institutional and social contexts, using these core ideas.    
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institutions have been deeply shaped by neoliberalization, and embody neoliberal ideas.  From a 
Gramscian perspective, the question is simply a matter of the extent to which people encounter 
the discourses, programs and practice (and their implicit discourses) of those institutions in 
everyday life. 
There is not much empirical data on this question.  But, it’s plausible that people would 
encounter them regularly.  Consider that neighborhood-based community development 
institutions generate a continual stream of initiatives, development projects, events, and 
programs.  These objects are surely presented in the institutions’ discourses about the benefits 
of development and its importance as a mode of racial empowerment.  These constructions 
would imply additional ideas about racial interest and practice, and presume the validity of basic 
concepts such as “race” or “community.”  Of course, the impact of these processes would 
depend on the extent of organizational activity in the neighborhood—the degree of 
organizations’ capacities, and thus the number and stature of objects they produce; the number 
of such organizations; their public visibility; and the depth and breadth of their social networks 
among neighborhood residents, among other factors. 
As noted above, the neighborhood organizations and regimes have created community 
development as a participatory field, creating many opportunities for residents to engage in 
development projects or other development related work (e.g., attending planning meetings, 
joining “investment clubs,” improving public spaces to prepare for investment, etc.).  As people 
enact these practices, they may come to think in terms of the discourses of the development 
field:  they may start to think of themselves as property owners, entrepreneurs, investors, or 
consumers, and think of their interests in terms of property values.  While such subject positions 
are likely encouraged by many institutions in the neoliberal economy, the participatory nature 
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of neighborhood-based institutions might make them important sites of the formation of 
neoliberal subjectivities. 
Non-profit service providers may also shape the subjectivities of their clients.  Past work 
has not found that non-profit service providers tend to degrade clients, the way welfare 
agencies have been found to do.  Some work suggests that non-profit service providers’ 
programing is suffused with behavioral and cultural explanations for poverty and inequality.   
The absence of public responsibility for benefits, implicit in the dependence of some non-profits 
on philanthropy, may suggest to clients that they are not entitled to benefits. 
Constructing contentious issues  
Past work highlights a particular discursive intervention of urban regimes and non-
profits. Cedric Johnson (2015) and Michelle Boyd (2007) argue that these actors mediate 
conflicts over neoliberalization by constructing the contentious issues related to redevelopment 
in ways that fail to challenge political economic drivers of displacement, channel discontent 
toward moderate grievances and demands, and ultimately legitimate displacement.   
In Boyd’s (2007) study of the politics of redevelopment in a South Side neighborhood 
Chicago, non-profits and local political officials constructed issues in racial and cultural terms:  
actors were categorized by race, and as authentic community members or outsiders (by virtue 
of origins in and ties to the neighborhood); redevelopment was problematic insofar as Whites 
displaced Blacks from a historically Black enclave, erasing an authentic culture, and insofar as 
the redevelopment process benefitted outsiders rather than community residents.   Boyd notes 
that this construction elided class, hiding neighborhood segments’ conflicting material interests, 
and the unique vulnerability to displacement of lower-class residents.  By making race and 
authenticity salient, elites presented “black gentrification,” mixed income development, and 
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historic preservation—programs disproportionately benefitting middle-classes—as class-
transcendent common interests.153 
Johnson (2015) observes similar phenomena.  When speaking about gentrification and 
displacement, actors (not limited to urban regimes and non-profits) “criticize the motives and 
sincerity of newcomers and the implications of their presence and attitudes for the 
neighborhood life of natives.”  Again, actors are categorized as insiders and outsiders, eliding 
class.  Moreover, this narrative makes “individuals the center of the gentrification story,” taking 
the focus off systemic processes that produce ghettoization and housing crises, and potential 
remedies.154 
It is plausible that these issue constructions diffuse among neighborhood residents, 
affecting the terrain for organizing.  According to Boyd and Johnson, multiple elite actors 
frequently construct issues in this way.  These constructions are propagated during high-profile 
episodes of conflict over gentrification.  Moreover, these constructions would likely appear 
plausible to many residents, as they presuppose concepts of race and authenticity already likely 
to be common sense.  Residents who internalize these constructions of displacement might find 
it more difficult to articulate grievances and demands around the issue, and may be more likely 
to accept displacement as legitimate.  This could affect their reactions to grassroots outreach 
which proposed progressive or socialist positions on redevelopment. 
Questions for Empirical Research 
These analyses raise questions about the extent of participation in neoliberal modes of 
economic practice, and the extent of diffusion of neoliberal discourses—and relatedly about the 
dynamics of incorporation and of ideological production and diffusion at the neighborhood 
 
153 Boyd, 2007:  147. 
154 This and previous quotations:  Johnson, 2015. 
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level.  They also suggest the possibility of the demobilization of clients of service provider 
organizations. 
First, how widespread are direct investments in neoliberal modes of economic practice?  
The strata well-positioned to profit from real estate redevelopment and commercial 
revitalization, and with direct financial ties to neoliberal regimes, could be expected to be 
directly invested.  However, large swaths of even the middle-class have more ambiguous 
material relationships to redevelopment and neoliberalism.  The extent of investment likely 
depends in part on the extent to which non-profits and government programs facilitate 
residents’ investment in redevelopment and access to benefits from the government. 
Second, how common are beliefs supporting neoliberal modes of practice among 
populations of interest, either as consciously affirmed beliefs, or as unreflective assumptions?  
This raises questions about the dynamics of ideological production and diffusion in the 
neighborhood:  do non-profits have a significant audience, such that they could diffuse 
discourses broadly?  Do they have grassroots constituencies of their own?  or broad social 
networks?  Have the syntheses of neoliberalism with widely resonant discourses on racial justice 
been diffused, over time?   
Finally, it is not clear whether to expect particular political outlooks and behavior among 
neighborhood residents receiving services from non-profit providers.  While past work suggests 
these relationships may encourage political passivity and quiescence, the extent of such effects 




4. Methodology  
The following chapters present case studies, designed to elucidate how the institutional 
developments above have created neighborhood-level contexts which enable and foreclose 
particular types of political agency.  This project is designed to develop, rather than test, 
hypotheses.  While the analysis is guided by the preceding review of institutional developments, 
and by theories of hegemony, we do not have empirically grounded expectations about which 
elements of neighborhood context matter, or the causal pathways through which they affect 
organizing.  As several methodologists have affirmed, research questions at this stage require 
open-ended investigation to develop hypotheses about relevant factors and mechanisms.155  
The case studies use in-depth analysis of neighborhood contexts and detailed process tracing of 
a progressive coalition’s attempts to organize, to organically identify the factors shaping 
outcomes of the organizing project.156 
Contextual description and process tracing 
I conduct in-depth case studies of a left formation’s attempts to organize a popular base 
around progressive and socialist economic programs in two neighborhoods of Chicago since 
2015.  The two main components of these case studies are:  1) an analysis of neighborhood 
contexts, focused on neighborhood institutions and political cultures, using data drawn from 
local newspapers and publicly available organizational documents; and 2) tracing the organizing 
 
155 Gerring, 2007:  79.  King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994:  141.  George and Bennett, 2005:  28-30. 
156 This coalition is the subject of Chapter 3.  In brief, the coalition includes the city’s two largest labor unions, the Chicago Teachers 
Union (CTU), and SEIU Healthcare Illinois Indiana (SEIU HCII); approximately twenty community-based organizations (CBOs), 
including Alinskyite neighborhood councils, and neighborhood-based non-profits with roots in civil rights and immigrant rights 
movements; and several non-profit advocacy and service provision groups.  This formation seeks a redistribution of wealth to the 
working and lower-classes, primarily through progressive taxation, the cessation of corporate welfare, and the expansion of public 
provision of services, goods, and employment.  The formation regularly mobilizes large amounts of personnel and financial resources 
on well-planned and successful electoral and issue campaigns.  Through an increasingly sophisticated electoral apparatus, the 
formation has recruited, trained, and supported candidates for city, county, and state government, winning several races against 
regime-backed incumbents.  Since 2015, the formation has launched several grassroots base-building projects to try to expand its 
base of popular support among Chicago’s low-income populations. 
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process, using ethnographic data and publicly available information about organizations and 
personnel’s biographical histories. 
I perform an in-depth analysis of the institutions, patterns of activism, and political 
culture in both neighborhoods.  Using databases of local organizations, (e.g., those published by 
the city or by local organizations), I obtained complete (or as nearly complete as possible) lists of 
the civic, social, and political organizations in the neighborhood, including non-profits, business 
associations, grassroots associations (such as block clubs and neighbor associations), local 
movements, and official government institutions.  Using organizational documents, public 
statements of organization leadership, and local media, I analyzed: the types of projects these 
actors work on, including their typical goals and strategies; the discourses through which actors 
explicitly and implicitly construct their work and related elements; actors’ financial and political 
relationships to powerful actors beyond the neighborhood, particularly the city government and 
philanthropic foundations; actors’ organizational and social networks in the neighborhood, and 
ability to reach neighborhood residents. 
With this data, I attempt to glean important insights about the local context.  First, by 
reviewing neighborhood actors’ work, discourse, and relationships to forces beyond the 
neighborhood, I can specify their relationship to neoliberalization, showing how neighborhood-
level structures have been shaped by, express, and mediate the institutional developments at 
the city and federal scales discussed in this chapter—or, alternatively, how neighborhood-level 
structures have escaped the influence of these forces.  Second, I hope to depict the modes of 
practice constituted in neighborhoods and available to neighborhood residents as ways to 
address social problems and pursue interests.  Relatedly, I hope to uncover the discourses about 
social problems, collective interests, political possibilities, and other important elements which 
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are reproduced and propagated in the neighborhood.  Finally, by analyzing actors’ networks and 
relationships to neighborhood residents, I can clarify pathways through which residents are 
exposed to these discourses and participate in these modes of practice. 
I trace a left formation’s attempts to organize in these neighborhoods.  I collected data 
on the interactions between organizers and neighborhood residents.  By observing organizers’ 
outreach and through in-depth interviews with organizers and neighborhood residents, I 
examined the process of recruitment and formation of new neighborhood organizations.  I 
analyzed what factors drew residents to work with organizers or with the nascent groups.157  I 
also examined the ideas which recruits brought to the nascent neighborhood group.  Through 
interviews, and observation of the debate and discussion in which participants determined the 
nascent group’s goals and strategies, as well as of less formal conversations, I gathered textured 
data about recruits’ perspectives on social problems, their visions of social change, and their 
views on the goals and strategies which the nascent group should pursue.  I examined how 
these ideas shaped the development of the organization, informing its work, and leading to 
internal harmony or tensions.  For each of these questions, I supplemented ethnographic data 
with a complete review of the organization’s publicly available texts, including social media 
posts, website content, and statements in media. 
I was especially concerned to understand ways in which neighborhood-level structures 
and actors shaped organizing processes and outcomes.  First, I considered the ways that 
neighborhood organizations had shaped the ideas of neighborhood residents.  I noted close 
similarities of recruits’ discourses to those reproduced by neighborhood organizations.  And I 
collected biographical information on recruits, through interviews and analysis of publicly 
 
157 I was unable to obtain interviews with people who chose not to join the organization. 
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available documents, identifying experiences and relationships which appeared to shape their 
outlooks, including experiences and relationships with neighborhood institutions.  Second, I 
examine direct interactions between the nascent formation and extent neighborhood groups, 
documenting any collaborations or friction. 
Case selection and inferential logic 
I studied organizing projects in Austin, a predominantly Black neighborhood on 
Chicago’s far West Side, and Albany Park, a predominantly immigrant neighborhood on the Near 
West Side.  The neighborhoods have been shaped by Chicago’s neoliberal political economy, and 
neighborhood-level actors face the same city-level opportunity structures, encouraging 
particular kinds of political, economic, and social activities.  However, neighborhood-level 
factors of interest, including institutional milieus and political cultures, differ across the two 
neighborhoods.  By varying these neighborhood-level factors, within a single city-level context, I 
am able to gain additional purchase on the impact of the former, complementing the in-depth 
within-case process tracing.  While the case selection accentuates factors of interest in ways 
that is ideal for the development of hypotheses, the cases do not permit validation of 
hypotheses, for reasons discussed below. 
Given the limited number of existing cases, and limited access to those cases, case 
selection was driven in part by availability.  UWF, or actors closely affiliated with UWF, launched 
8 neighborhood-level organizing projects around 2015.  Of these, I studied the two at which I 
was most readily able to gain access.  I sought, but was unable to maintain, access at two other 
UWF-affiliated neighborhood-level organizing projects.158 
 
158 I attempted to study United Neighborhood of the 35th Ward and the 25th Ward Independent Political Organization.  Organizers 
at the former were eventually non-responsive.  The latter was undergoing internal divisions at the time and requested privacy. 
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By studying two neighborhoods in the same city, I was able to hold constant several city-
level factors.  The neighborhoods were steeped in the same political economic structures, and 
have been similarly affected by economic restructuring and neoliberalization.  Both 
neighborhoods experienced private divestment associated with white flight and 
deindustrialization since the 1970s, although Albany Park has since experienced a surge in 
reinvestment while Austin has not (discussed more below).  Both neighborhoods have high 
poverty rates, exacerbated by recent cuts in public services, amidst dramatic city-wide economic 
inequalities.  Neighborhood actors face the same city-level opportunity structures: a powerful 
neoliberal regime offers a range of material benefits to allies and punishment for political 
enemies; the regime, along with Chicago’s robust philanthropic sector, offers opportunities for 
neighborhood-level service and development work; Chicago’s thriving real estate 
redevelopment industry similarly offers opportunities for developers, investors, and property 
owners.  At the same time, a powerful progressive-left coalition, rooted in the city’s largest 
labor unions, and an array of community-based organizations, mass-membership organizations, 
and social movements, offers opportunities for left political projects and influence within the 
coalitions. 
The two neighborhoods selected differ with respect to important neighborhood-level 
factors.  First, neighborhood-level institutions have developed differently in the two 
neighborhoods, reflecting the neighborhood’s different demographics.  In Austin, an activist 
milieu has evolved in line with the national trends sketched in this chapter: militant advocacy 
groups demobilized or disbanded in the 1970s and 1980s; service provider and business-
oriented groups have formed and thrived, supported by foundation grants and city contracts.  
Recently, leading groups have focused on community development, under the auspices of city 
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programs.  In Albany Park, institutions have been shaped by the neighborhood’s position as a 
point of entry neighborhood for immigrants.  Having arrived in the United States recently, many 
of Albany Park’s activists have not developed relationships with neoliberal regimes and 
foundations.  Many formed their political outlooks in their country of origin, or through 
transnational activist networks, where they were exposed to ideas about strategy and social 
visions largely eliminated from mainstream U.S. political culture.  Several of Albany Park’s 
leading institutions have militant views on strategy, and radical, anti-neoliberal social visions. 
Second, although the neighborhoods have similar poverty rates, they face different 
economic problems, characteristic of their respective places in the cycle of disinvestment and 
reinvestment within the neoliberal economy.  Austin has been chronically disinvested since 
deindustrialization and White flight in the 1970s.  This is manifest in the deterioration of 
property and public spaces, a depressed commercial economy, and high rates of public disorder.  
Albany Park is undergoing rapid reinvestment, as one of the “hottest” real estate markets in the 
city.  This is manifest in a crisis of affordability, displacement, and cultural erasure.  I will argue 
that Albany Park’s gentrification has also brought a population of relatively young, affluent 
leftist activists into the neighborhood, shaping the context for grassroots organizing. 
The cases cannot function as the type of comparative case study which can validate 
hypotheses about the effects of particular factors.  As Gerring (2007) notes, comparative case 
studies can validate a hypothesized effect of one factor only by, in essence, holding important 
confounding factors constant.159  As noted, multiple important neighborhood-level factors differ 
across the two cases.  Given the lack of well-matched cases, I cannot isolate the role of any 
particular factor as accounting for different outcomes. 
 
159 As Gerring (2007) notes, to generate externally valid conclusions about an effect, “differences across cases must be sizeable 
enough to be interpretable in an essentially dichotomous fashion...and similarities must be close enough to be understood as 
essentially identical” (143). 
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Nevertheless, as Bennett and George (2005) recommend, I use inter-case comparisons 
to complement within case process tracing, to refine hypotheses about the effect of 
neighborhood-level factors.160   I am able to develop a more nuanced conception of how factors 
of interest matter by studying them in multiple contexts, in which those factors are constituted 
differently.  For example, I can examine how substantively different neighborhood-level 
institutions and activist milieus matter toward similar organizing projects.  The case studies are 
opportunities to observe more of the possible functions and impacts of these neighborhood-
level institutions and milieus, specify conditions in which these impacts may occur, and thus 
produce more nuanced hypotheses. 
Chicago’s progressive-left coalition has attained a size, amount of resources, degree of 
coherence, and level of political power beyond those of other contemporary, urban-level left 
formations.  The coalition has invested significant resources into neighborhood-level organizing, 
and can offer any recruits opportunities for influence within a powerful citywide coalition, and 
for power in the city’s governing institutions.  I will consider the exceptional power resources of 
Chicago’s left milieu when interpreting case study findings.  Insofar as organizing projects fail, 
the cases will have functioned as a “hard test”:  an inability to organize neighborhood-level 
support in this context would suggest that neighborhood residents’ ideological or material 
commitments to neoliberalism or opposition to left projects can be strong enough to impede 
even well-resourced organizing efforts by a powerful coalition.  Insofar as organizing projects 
succeed, outcomes must be interpreted with caution.  Such outcomes would not suggest that 
neighborhood-level factors under study are sufficient to enable a progressive-left base-building 
project. 
 




As George and Bennett (2005) and Collier (2011) argue, a key component of process-
tracing is evaluating plausible alternative explanations for outcomes.161  I consider several 
alternative explanations for the processes and outcomes I observe, beyond the neighborhood-
level factors of interest.  I rule out some of these factors through the case study design, and 
reject others as inconsistent with my ethnographic data.  However, I am unable to rule out 
several alternative explanations for my findings about neighborhood residents’ ideologies.  I 
conclude that several ideologies, diffused through neoliberal reforms, as well as ideologies 
predating neoliberalization, concurrently shape neighborhood residents’ views, with 
implications for organizing outcomes. 
The study design controls for some factors known to influence organizing and 
movement-building outcomes.  First, the level of elite resources invested in the project was 
constant across the two cases.  The resource mobilization perspective would propose that 
organizing outcomes reflect the level of material investment by elites.  At least initially, the 
United Working Families organization invested a similar level of resources in organizing in the 
two neighborhoods (and UWF ultimately invested more money and personnel in Austin, the less 
successful of the two cases).  The level of elite resources invested in base-building cannot 
explain the cases’ divergent outcomes. 
I also rule out the proposition (suggested by some recent social movement scholarship) 
that, in any given moment, neighborhood residents rationally evaluate which coalitions and 
projects offered the best opportunity to realize their goals, and respond to organizers 
accordingly.  Actors in the neighborhoods faced the same opportunities at the city-level and 
 
161 George and Bennett, 2005:  30.  Collier, 2011. 
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made very different choices.  Moreover, my examination of neighborhood residents’ ideologies 
and decision-making produced no evidence of such contemporaneous rational evaluations.  I do, 
however, consider how supra-local opportunity structures affect outcomes indirectly, by 
shaping local organizational milieus over time.  
I attempt to show how the neighborhood-level factors of interest may articulate with 
additional influences on neighborhood residents’ ideologies.  First, I consider the impact of 
several other discourses produced by neoliberalization.  In addition to the conceptions of racial 
interests and identity described in this chapter, neoliberalization entailed the production and 
diffusion of several neoliberal discourses which could cause attachments to neoliberalism or 
antipathy to progressive-left projects in general, or could undergird attraction to community 
development in particular.  Encouraged by many aspects of public discourse and neoliberal 
economic policies, these discourses include:  individualistic understandings of interest, which 
deprecate solidarity; entrepreneurial discourses, encouraging individuals to pursue interests 
through financial investment and business enterprise; and discourses about the superiority of 
markets to government modes of resource allocation and decision-making.162  Second, I consider 
the interaction and relative importance of distinctively neoliberal articulations of racial interest 
and identity and older ideologies which predate neoliberalization.  For instance, I consider the 
impact of ideologies about self-help and racial uplift, which assign responsibility for 
neighborhood conditions to residents rather than the state or corporations.  I also consider 
visions of Black Capitalism long predating neoliberalization, which see entrepreneurship as a key 
to racial empowerment. 
 
162 Lerner, 2011; Hall, 1989; Brown, 2015. 
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Through ethnographic data, in-depth analysis of individuals’ ideologies and decision-
making, I attempt to identify which ideas mattered in particular contexts, and how these ideas 
were acquired.  I consider the possibility of complex interactions, in which commitments to one 
set of ideas draw people to modes of practice which embody compatible but distinctive ideas.  I 
cannot completely account for or rule out the impact of all of the aforementioned ideologies, 
and I consider the possibilities that multiple forms of neoliberal ideology, absorbed via multiple 
channels, concurrently shape consciousness and reactions to progressive-left organizers.163 
 
163 As methodologists George and Bennett write, “scholars may at times have to live with some degree of indeterminacy when 
competing variables push in the same direction” (2005:  54). 
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CHAPTER 3: Chicago’s Neoliberal Urban Regime in Historical and 
National Context  
This chapter describes the neoliberal regime which has governed Chicago for the last 
three decades.  Using primary and secondary sources, this chapter reviews the regime’s policy 
agendas, modes of governance, and bases of political support.  Along with Chapter 3, this 
description is intended as a foundation for the case studies of neighborhood organizing in 
subsequent chapters. 
I argue that Chicago’s regime is an instance of a type of neoliberal regime common in 
U.S. cities since the 1970s.  This neoliberal regime formed in response to national and global 
trends, including the restructuring of the national and global economies since the late 1960s, 
major changes in federal urban policy since the Gerald Ford administration, and the spread of 
neoliberal ideas among urban elites.  These regimes prioritized the growth of the advanced 
corporate service sector and downtown real estate development, used supply-side growth 
strategies, adopted market-oriented institutional reforms, expanded the involvement of 
investors and financial markets in governance, and implemented policies through public-private-
non-profit collaborations.  These growth strategies shaped policymaking in other areas, 
constraining and orienting fiscal, social, and other policies.  While these policies drove the 
growth of highly skilled sectors of the economy, they also expedited private disinvestment in 
declining neighborhoods, contributed to polarized labor markets, and reduced public benefits to 
working-class and low-income populations.  Most neoliberal regimes thus presided over 
increasing economic inequality and high rates of poverty.  I will review the secondary literature 
on the emergence of neoliberal urban regimes nationally since the 1970s.  And I will show that 
the regime presided over by Mayors Richard M. Daley, Rahm Emanuel, and Lori Lightfoot, 
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closely resembles this type of regime, with similar goals, policies, and practices, and similar 
effects on low-income and working-class populations. 
I will also show that neighborhood-level institutions and racial politics have developed in 
Chicago in line with the national trends described in Chapter 1.  This chapter reviews anti-
poverty programs in Chicago, showing that the neoliberal regime and philanthropic foundations 
have established market-oriented development and service provision programs in Chicago’s 
troubled neighborhoods.  I will also show that the regime has helped establish a neoliberal 
framework for racial politics, channeling Black and Latinx politicians and activists toward 
demands for descriptive representation, shares of municipal patronage, and participation in real 
estate development. 
This chapter is intended to show that Chicago can be considered “typical” of a larger 
class of cases.  First, along with Chapter 3, this chapter shows that the political conflict in 
Chicago is typical of the conflicts between neoliberal regimes and social democratic formations 
happening in several cities nationally, with similar contestants, stakes, and salient issues.  
Second, this chapter shows that Chicago is typical with respect to the dissertation’s main 
explanatory variables—the historical developments of neighborhood-level institutions whose 
impact on possibilities for neighborhood organizing I hope to study.  Chicago’s typicality of post-
1960s U.S. cities, and of contemporary neoliberal-left conflicts, suggests that the findings of this 
study may have external validity.  The hypotheses developed through this study of Chicago may 
apply to neighborhood organizing around economic conflicts in other contemporary U.S. cities. 
In addition to describing the regime, this chapter makes an additional historical point, 
not directly related to the main arguments of the dissertation.  By showing historical continuities 
between the Post-War and neoliberal urban regimes, I argue that the current regime should be 
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seen both as a phase in the continuous control of the city government by economic elites with 
investments in local markets and property and as a historically specific formation.  This point 
advances a secondary argument of the dissertation, referenced in Chapter 1, that neoliberal 
formations are built on historically prior forms of upper-class domination. 
Outline of the chapter 
The first section of this chapter describes Chicago’s Post-War regime and its context.  
The suburbanization of firms and upwardly mobile, white residents diminished property values 
and consumer bases in central cities from the 1940s through the 1970s.  This eroded profits of 
central city firms and investors and the revenue of city governments, galvanizing local economic 
and politics elites to use public policy to drive central city revitalization.  Federal policy shaped 
these coalitions’ methods, providing opportunities for federally-funded public-private 
revitalization projects, especially the Urban Renewal Program.  Direct federal aid to cities and 
federal anti-poverty programs also eased urban governments’ fiscal constraints and underwrote 
public provision of welfare and other social goods. 
The second section describes the rise of neoliberal regimes in U.S. cities.  Beginning in 
the 1970s, global and national economic restructuring and major changes in federal urban policy 
encouraged urban policymakers to adopt neoliberal growth strategies.  I also review evidence 
that neoliberal ideas, the political power of local pro-growth elites, and the power of financial 
institutions pushed urban governments to adopt neoliberal agendas.  I then review the evidence 
of the wide adoption of neoliberal policies in US cities since the 1970s. 
The final section is an empirical overview of the current neoliberal regime in Chicago. 
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I describe the coalescence of the regime in the 1980s; the ideas of its leading actors; the 
patterns of collaboration between private, public, and non-profit actors; and the most 
consistent and consequential policies and practices. 
1.  Chicago’s Post-War Regime  
This chapter begins with a review of Chicago’s regime in the Post-War era.  I describe 
the national trends in the era’s political economy which shaped this regime, including the 
suburbanization of firms and upwardly mobile, white residents, and the resulting erosion of 
urban tax bases and property values.  The regimes of urban regimes were shaped by the 
Keynesian federal urban policies, which attempted to offset deindustrialization and stimulate 
development of declining areas, which funded social programs.  I also describe the “growth 
machines,” elite coalitions focused on growth of Central Business Districts, which dominated 
politics in Chicago, and other Post-War cities. 
The context for accumulation in the Post-War era:  suburbanization and Keynesian 
federal policy 
Suburbanization 
The Post-War suburbanization of firms and upwardly mobile, white households was 
driven by racialized aversion to the industrial city and underwritten by federal policy.  Racially 
and economically exclusive suburbs had been marketed by real estate firms and sought by 
upper- and middle-class whites as havens from racially transitioning cities and their machine 
governments since the turn of the century.164  Since the New Deal, federal housing, 
 
164 See for example the description of racialized appeals in marketing for suburban homes described by Judd, 1999.  Real estate 
interests also invented several mechanisms to ensure the economic and racial exclusivity of new suburbs at this time (Hayward, 
2007:  142; Judd, 1999:  128-9). 
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transportation, and fiscal policies greatly accelerated suburbanization.  Federal housing 
programs, most importantly the Federal Housing Administration’s home loan and mortgage 
insurance program, financed 11 million home purchases between 1934 and 1972, almost 
entirely in the suburbs.165  Starting in the 1940s, and booming in the 1950s, federal 
transportation policy financed the construction of regional highway networks, linking suburbs to 
central cities, and into regional transit networks.166  This accessibility made suburbs more 
attractive to residents and firms.  Fiscal policy, and especially accelerated depreciation 
allowances, created financial incentives for firms to invest in new facilities (as opposed to 
upgrading existing ones).  These allowances were written into the tax code of 1954 and were 
expanded in the Tax Act of 1961.167   
Nationally, the population of suburbs increased 60% from 1950 to 1960, and the ratio of 
suburban to urban housing construction inverted between 1934 and 1954 (the first 20 years of 
the FHA loan program) to nearly 80:20.  As suburbs drew mostly well-to-do households (and for 
decades almost no non-whites of any economic status), in addition to firms, suburbanization 
entailed major cuts to cities’ tax and consumer bases. 
Federal policy 
According to historians and political scientists, Post-War federal policy on cities was 
based on the same liberal ideas underlying other federal economic policies of the era.168  First, 
urban policies presumed federal responsibility for offsetting urban decline (even as other 
federal policies helped drive that decline) and ameliorating poverty and other social 
 
165 FHA’s homes were located mostly in the suburbs because FHA, a self-funding government corporation staffed by real estate 
professionals and collaborating extensively with the real estate industry, made loans according to “actuarial principles,” and 
assessed suburban homes much more favorably than urban ones (Gelfand, 1975:  216-19; Sugrue, 1996:  66; Judd, 1999:  128-9). 
166 Biles, 2011:  77-8. 
167 Ibid, 67; 153.  
168 Biles, 2011; Weir, Wolman and Swanstrom, 2005. 
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problems.169  Second, federal policies presumed a Keynesian principle that government stimulus 
could counter-balance cycles of investment and divestment.  Records from the Senate 
Committee on Urban Problems exhibit both ideas informing policy proposals and debates.  For 
example, Senator Paul Douglass (D, Illinois), who chaired the committee, argued for federal 
funding to stimulate reinvestment in “communities with high unemployment caused by new 
technology and stiff competition from low-wage regions such as the south,” urging that “such 
communities should not be abandoned to the vagaries of modernization.”170   
The era’s most important federal urban policies were based in established economic 
policy paradigms.  Since World War II, liberal policymakers understood their task as creating 
favorable conditions for private investment and corporate growth, not participating directly in 
production or development.171  This was the premise of Urban Renewal, which funded local 
governments’ efforts to demolish and clear “blighted areas” and “sell the vacant land, at a 
substantial ‘write down’ in price, to private builders,” and of other smaller federal urban 
redevelopment programs.172  Second, as historian Roger Biles observes, federal policymakers 
assumed that “urban reclamation depended on saving the central business district.”173  Urban 
Renewal and other programs used commercial and residential real estate redevelopment in 
downtown areas as a driver of the city’s economy—a presumption blending perfectly with the 
 
169 Dennis Judd and Todd Swanstrom argue, federal urban policy in this era was premised on the recognition that problems were 
concentrated in cities, and the belief that the federal government was responsible for addressing these problems (2004); Weaver, 
2015:  30. 
170 Douglass; quoted in Biles, 2011:  88. 
171 Weir and Skocpol, 2010. 
172 Abu-Lughod, 1999:  223.  Gelfand (1975) also notes that “federal funds were available only for the purchase and clearance of 
blighted properties; rebuilding was to be the task of private enterprise” (207).  Other programs with this premise include the 1958 
program sponsored by Douglass, and a bill he introduced intended “to attract private industry into areas with high and protracted 
unemployment rates by providing government incentives” (Biles, 2011:  90). 
173 Biles, 2011: 85 
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interests and perspectives of the elite coalitions running urban governments, as described 
below.174 
Initiated in the Housing Act of 1949, renewed by the Housing Act of 1954 and the 
Omnibus Housing Act of 1960, Urban Renewal was “the federal government’s principal policy 
answer to the question of how to save urban America.”175  The program allocated billions of 
dollars to urban governments over its lifespan.  Urban Renewal offered cities many 
opportunities to use federal money for demolition and private redevelopment of central urban 
land.  The federal government also provided economic stimulus to the localities in which it 
located its military research, development, and production.176  These programs were urban 
governments’ primary tools for redevelopment in this era.   
From the New Deal through the Great Society programs of the 1960s, the federal 
government assumed much of the financial burden for alleviating poverty and providing social 
services.  Beginning with the Wagner-Steagall Housing Act of 1937, the federal government built 
over a million units of public housing, most of it in cities.177  The federal government also 
distributed cash grants to poor families, through the Aid for Families with Dependent Children 
after 1935, and other programs.178  The 1964 Economic Opportunity Act and Model Cities 
program funded myriad welfare and other social service programs in U.S. cities.179 
 
174 Other ideas informing liberal federal urban policy at this time include a belief in regional planning, preferences for holistic 
approaches to urban poverty, and in the 1960s, a commitment to democratic participation of the urban poor.  The many other 
considerations shaping federal policies in this era (especially positions on racial integration) are described by chapters 3 and 4 of 
Biles, 2011.  
175 Ibid, 85. 
176 This was particularly true of industrial centers in Northern Cities during and immediately after World War II.  In the 1950s and 
1960s, most military production moved to coastal cities.  Federal investment in R&D for new military technology was concentrated 
in the Western and Southwestern areas known as the “Sun Belt,” and was the most important driver of that region’s growth in the 
post-war era (Abu-Lughod, 1999). 
177 Gelfand, 1975: 62-3.  The Taft-Ellender-Wagner Housing Act of 1949, authorized an additional 810,000 units (though not all were 
built) (Gelfand, 1975).  Kennedy’s Omnibus Urban bill in 1960 funded 100,000 units of public housing, previously authorized by the 
Taft-Ellender-Wagner Act, but built only a fraction of them (Biles, 2011:  93). 
178 Stocker and Wilson, 2004. 
179 O’Conner, 1999. 
79 
 
Post-war growth machines 
The “growth machine,” in Harvey Molotch’s term, were coalitions of actors with 
investments in local property and commercial markets and local businesses.  Growth machines 
were typically made up of realtors, developers, and real estate lawyers; businesses whose 
profits increased with the growth of local consumer markets; and investors concerned with 
return on investment in property or those businesses.  Numerous studies of urban policy-
making in the Post-War era found such coalitions dominating economic development policy 
(among other policy areas).180  In many cases, the coalitions formed, or were galvanized, when 
suburbanization eroded tax bases, property values, and consumer markets.  These actors sought 
public support for economic development.  In general, they advocated policies intended to 
stimulate an “entire syndrome of associated events,” including the expansion of industry, the 
labor force, and consumer markets; increased population density; and intensified land use.181   
Federal policies provided a framework in which to pursue this growth.  In many cities, 
growth coalitions coalesced around the federal Urban Renewal program.  The real estate, 
banking, and business interests comprising growth coalitions, for example, dominated the 
redevelopment authorities in charge of the program’s local implementation.182  Typical projects 
cleared large tracts in center cities, building high-end commercial, office, residential properties, 
as well as university campuses, convention centers, hospitals, and stadia (and exacerbating 
racial segregation, destroyed thriving neighborhoods, and displacing over one hundred 
thousand residents, while ignoring federal requirements to supply replacement housing).183  
 
180 See for example, Hunter’s classic work on elite governance in Atlanta (1964); Stone, 1989. 
181 Molotch, 1976; 310. 
182 Gelfand, 1975:  209. 
183 Gelfand (1975) estimates that the program was responsible for the destruction of 140,000 units of housing, and created 40,000 
units of replacement housing (208).  The social and political consequences of this and other post-war policies are discussed in 
Chapter 3.  See also Anderson, 1964; Gans, 1962; Jacobs, 1961. 
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Urban-based coalitions of corporate actors and investors also lobbied the federal government to 
include their cities in targeted federal stimulus programs, or for a share of direct federal 
investment.184  
Through the 1960s, growth-oriented urban governments also performed regulatory and 
redistributive functions, within the frameworks established by the federal government.  These 
governments implemented federal programs, such as the public housing program and the many 
service and welfare programs within the War on Poverty and Model Cities initiatives (after 
urban governments successfully secured control over the local implementation of those 
programs in 1967)185.  As urban sociologist Jason Hackworth (2010) notes, “In the immediate 
postwar period, local governments also functioned as an arbiter between capital and labor.”186   
Like the counterparts in neoliberal urban regimes, Post-War growth coalitions also 
sought local policies designed to create a “business-friendly climate,” including fiscal austerity, 
management-friendly labor policies, and additional public subsidies for firms.  As in the 
neoliberal era, these policies were understood to attract mobile firms and investors, choosing 
among localities.  However, growth coalitions appeared to pursue such policies less intensely, 
and urban governments to enact them less often, than in the neoliberal era.  Federal policies 
both bolstered cities’ fiscal situation and provided alternative (and often more politically 
attractive) pathways to economic development.  Both factors mitigated Post-War urban 
governments’ needs to compete for mobile investment.  As explained in Section 2, inter-local 
competition for investment (and the mobility of capital) would intensify greatly in the 1970s. 
 
184 Molotch, 1976:  312. 
185 Gelfand, 1981; Biles, 2011; 
186 Hackworth, 2010:  26. 
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Chicago’s post-war growth machine 
From the entire post-war era, Chicago was governed by  “a characteristic, growth-
oriented ‘urban regime.’”187  As elsewhere, the coalition included corporate and civic elites, 
specifically real estate developers and builders, banks, construction trades, merchants, 
corporate officials, professional planners, public administrators, and white and black civic 
leaders.”188  Historian Arnold Hirsch finds that this coalition formed through initiative of 
downtown real estate and commercial firms, and that these were the predominant actors.189  
Later, the coalition was coordinated by Mayor Richard J. Daley, a consistent proponent of 
downtown redevelopment and corporate growth.190  This coalition’s policy priorities reflected its 
members’ interests in maximizing the returns on fixed investment in local markets, property, 
and firms. 
As in other cities, “local elite anxiety over the city’s future has been a subtext for much 
of Chicago’s planning and redevelopment activity as far back as the 1950s.”191  These national 
trends toward suburbanization of firms and middle-class residents were pronounced in Chicago:  
The exodus of firms and households to the “wealthier set of ‘collar counties’ around the city” 
was reflected in the ratio of urban to suburban housing construction, which inverted from 74:26 
in 1928 to 28:72 in 1954.192  Chicago lost manufacturing firms to the suburbs, at first slowly, and 
 
187 Demissie, 2006. 
188 Smith, 2012:  18-19.  Demissie (2006) agrees, noting a coalition of the “mayor, municipal planning and redevelopment agencies 
and the city’s business leadership” (Demissie, 2006:  26). 
189 Preston Smith paraphrases the argument of Arnold Hirsch, in Hirsch’s Marking the Second Ghetto (1983): “before Mayor Daley’s 
reign the initiative for urban redevelopment emanated from real estate, banking, and commercial elites and not from political 
entrepreneurs” (Smith, 2012:  19). 
190 Fuchs, 1992. 
191 Demissie, 2006:  26. 
192 Abu-Lughod, 1999:  221. 
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more rapidly after 1957.  By 1972, Chicago had lost just over one quarter of its manufacturing 
firms, leaving 7,318.193  
In retrospect, the loss of firms in the post-war era was dwarfed by the more precipitous 
decline from the late 1960s.  And losses in municipal revenues were partly offset by federal 
programs, as noted above.194  Nevertheless, declining retail sales, real estate transfers, property 
values (particularly in the downtown) and other firm profits, galvanized corporate and real 
estate elites to stimulate growth.195  The resulting growth coalition saw revitalization of the 
central business district, or “the loop,” as the key to a larger renaissance, using similar 
arguments as pro-growth actors since:  a thriving downtown would spur residential and 
commercial redevelopment in the surrounding neighborhoods, which would in turn reinvigorate 
“the circulation of capital and labor,” and drive a regional economic resurgence.196  Chicago’s 
cities were also self-consciously competing with other localities to attract mobile firms and 
private capital, and a revitalized downtown was seen as an asset in this competition.197 
To this end, “Chicago’s strategy of central area revitalization had been anchored 
primarily in supporting office, headquarters, and institutional development, with specific 
enclaves also set aside for high-rise residential projects.”198  One element of this plan was 
“infrastructural investment…particularly through the expansion of the city’s transport system.” 
199  For example, the “Development Plan for the Central Area of the City of Chicago,” released by 
Planning Department in 1958 proposed to augment commerce in the Loop, through a network 
 
193 Firms also contracted after the war-time production.  The number of manufacturing jobs peaked at 668,056 in 1947 and 
fluctuated between 575k and 660k for the next decade. 
194 For instance, Douglas’ program, allocating $100 million in loans to industrial, rural, public areas “to attract private industry into 
areas with high and protracted unemployment rates by providing government incentives” (Biles, 89).  See also Harvey, 1989; 
Weaver, 2015 (especially Chapter 1) on federal responsibility for welfare at this time. 
195 Demissie, 2006:  26. 
196 Ibid, 2006:  29. 
197 Smith, 2012:  19. 
198 Demissie, 2006:  29.  Also Fainstein and Fainstein, 1986:  14) 
199 Ibid, 29. 
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of expressways between the central city and outlying suburbs, with designated parking 
facilities.”200  The city also expanded its rail transit system in ways designed to facilitate 
commuting to the central business district.  In these projects, Chicago drew on federal funds for 
public works initiatives.201 
As in other cities, the most important vehicle for downtown redevelopment was the 
federal Urban Renewal program.  Chicago’s renewal projects mostly created “downtown 
shopping and business centers and luxury housing.”202  This vision of reversing suburbanization 
and maximizing profits through revitalization of the CBD was sustained through the early 1970s.  
For example, this was still the framework for urban policy and planning in an influential planning 
document released in 1973 by the Chicago’s then leading civic group, the Central Area 
Committee.  “Chicago 21” envisioned the CBD as growing center of business, leisure, and 
cultural activity, and advocated continued public investment in the redevelopment.  The CBD’s 
expansion would cyclically drive and be reinforced by upscale residential development in 
surrounding neighborhoods and would attract firms from other localities. 
Like other urban governments in the post-war era, Chicago’s government implemented 
federal programs to redistribute income and bolster the social wage.  As historians describe in 
detail, federal public housing, welfare, and infrastructural investment programs were filtered 
through local governing arrangements, with most benefits distributed through the ward-based 
networks of the Democratic machine.203  Chicago’s politicians (like those in most other cities) 
implemented in these policies in racially discriminatory ways.204  The Daley administration was 
 
200 Ibid, 28-30. 
201 Bennett, 2006. 
202 Gelfand, 19975:  207 
203 These were supplemented by local largesse, in which politicians “material gifts in times of need and intervening on behalf of their 
‘clients’ to gain them access to city jobs and the resources of social service agencies” (Abu-Lughod, 1999:  215) 
204 Smith, 2012; especially Chapter 7. 
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also more fiscally conservative than those in other northern cities, initiating less social provision 
overall.205 
Review and summary of Part 1 
The post-war urban regime in Chicago was dominated by similar social forces as those 
which helm the neoliberal formation—corporate elites, and particularly those with fixed 
investments in local markets and property.  This coalition pursued a similar agenda of market-
expanding and rent-intensifying growth.  This agenda centered on the redevelopment of the 
CBD—an immediately self-serving goal, which was also articulated as in the public good. 
The post-war regime pursued growth through tactics unique to the post-war policy 
context.  Generous federal programs, and especially the Urban Renewal program, stimulated 
private investment, and provided a set of development tools, reducing reliance on business-and 
investor-friendly fiscal austerity.  Cities’ reliance on firms and private investment, and thus the 
pressures to compete for it, was also mitigated by direct federal aid, and federal backing for the 
city’s welfare functions. 
Chicago’s post-war regime can thus be seen as a coalition of economic elites, using 
government to support forms of profit accumulation centered in the city, in the distinctive 
context set by Post-War federal urban policy, and suburbanization. 
2.  National Emergence of Neoliberal Urban Regimes  
Urban governments around the U.S. adopted a new policy agenda, beginning in the 
1970s.  This agenda included: 
 
205 Abu-Lughod, 1999:  215. 
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• Growth strategies focused on attracting firms in the financial and advanced corporate 
services sectors, private investment in urban real estate and debt, and affluent consumers; 
• Supply-side policies, including fiscally conservative tax and spending policies and public 
subsidies for firms, developers, and investors; 
• Institutional reforms, including the privatization of public functions, reformation of public 
institutions along market principles, and insulation of public decision-making from political 
pressure.  
These reforms were adopted to varying extents, in various combinations with other programs, 
and in varying sequences, but have been documented in many U.S. cities since the 1970s. 
This section reviews the reasons for the wide adoption of neoliberalism at the urban 
level. I argue that global economic restructuring since the late 1960s, demographic shifts, and 
federal policy changes created pressures and opportunities for urban policymakers to adopt 
neoliberal reforms.  Neoliberal ideas, the political power of local growth coalitions, and the 
power of financial institutions may also have contributed.206  This section then review evidence 
of urban governments’ adoption of neoliberal policies since the 1970s. 
This section demonstrates that the regime emerging in Chicago since the 1980s 
(described in Section 3) is an instance of a type of neoliberal regime which emerged in many U.S. 
cities since the 1970s.  As discussed above, this fact is one basis for the claim that the case 
studies in subsequent chapters of this dissertation have external validity. 
 
206 I do not attempt to answer ongoing debates in political science and urban studies about the relative influence or precise 
interaction of those factors (such as the degree of autonomy of local politics from supra-local factors), instead accepting that all 
factors were relevant to some degree.   
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Context:  new pressures and opportunities   
From the 1970s onward, cities around the country faced a new set of economic 
conditions.  Starting in the late 1960s, changes in the structure of the national and global 
economies accelerated the deindustrialization of northern, industrial cities.  This 
deindustrialization, continuing white flight, in-migration of low-income residents, and cuts in 
federal funding left many cities in fiscal crisis.  National and global economic restructuring also 
drove the rapid growth in the financial and skilled corporate service sectors of the economy, 
enhanced capital mobility, and increased investor interest in municipal debt and urban real 
estate—changes which portended new pathways for urban growth.  
Economic Restructuring 
A series of interrelated developments altered the structure of the national and global 
economy, beginning in the late 1960s.  These changes had three linked consequences:  
deindustrialization, as industrial firms moved operations overseas and contracted; the further 
expansion of the financial and advanced corporate services sectors of the economy; and 
increased investor interest in urban real estate and municipal bonds. 
Deindustrialization and financialization  
While there is no single agreed on explanation for deindustrialization, most economic 
historians agree that the declining profit rate of American manufacturing firms, beginning in the 
late 1960s, was a crucial cause.  Between 1965 and 1973, average profit rates of manufacturing 
firms fell by 41%; average profits of all private firms declined 30%.207  To bolster profit rates, 
 
207 Brenner, 2009.  
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firms leveraged improving logistics and communication technologies and relocated overseas to 
tap low-cost labor in developing countries.208  
Meanwhile, the decline in manufacturing profits, and the general volatility of financial 
markets at this time (due to the collapse of the international financial system in the early 1970s) 
helped spur the expansion of the financial sector of the economy.209  To meet the growing 
demand for profit-bearing financial activity, the private financial sector “grew in size and 
influence in the years following the profit crisis of the 1970s.”210 
The expansion of the financial services sector drove the further downsizing of domestic 
manufacturing in the U.S..  With profits declining, industrial firms faced difficulties obtaining 
private investment.  The declining profitability of manufacturing and growth of the financial 
sector also encouraged non-financial manufacturing firms (and other non-financial firms) to 
“financialize” their own activities—expanding their own financial functions, increasing the role 
of investors in corporate governance, and orienting strategies toward the [prerogatives] of the 
stock-market.211  Krippner summarizes, “Confronted with labor militancy at home and increased 
international competition abroad, non-financial firms responded to falling returns on 
investment by withdrawing capital from production and diverting it to financial markets,” just 
like investors had.212 
 
208 Abu-Lughod, 1999:  228-280.  As Abu-Lughod summarizes, “relocation of production plants overseas was the preferred strategy 
of transnational corporations” facing declining profits. 
209 Weber, 2010.  Around this time, financers developed new instruments through which they could turn profits of off financial 
transactions themselves, such as the securitization of various assets (debt, property, revenue streams).   
210 Weber, 2015:  255. 
211 Krippner, 2005:  182.  Brenner describes the change in the same way: “with low returns on capital stock discouraging long-term 
placement of funds in new plant and equipment, money went increasingly to finance and speculation” (2006:  189).  Berger (2013) 
explains that firms “shareholder orientation” produced a preference for “firms with a single focus to larger, vertically-integrated 
conglomerates, as this allowed investors to balance their portfolios with firms in different sectors, thus distributing investment 
risks.” 
212 Krippner, 2005:  182. 
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This reorientation of firms’ policy was reinforced by the increasing power of investors 
and financial managers within firms.213   The late 1960s also saw a wave of purchases of 
manufacturing firms by institutional investors, like asset management firms and pension 
funds.214  Firms’ shareholder orientation led firms to shrink or eliminate activities which, though 
profitable, did not raise short-term stock prices, which generally included activities which 
produce returns over longer time horizons, require large capital investment up-front, or require 
large workforces.215 
The growth of the advanced corporate service sector 
The expansion of the corporate services sector followed from the globalization of 
production.  As described above, technological advances allowed firms to relocate production 
overseas, to disperse production among many locations, and to market and distribute products 
globally.  This created increasingly complex logistical and managerial tasks for firms:  regular 
activities required management of complex, global production and distribution chains, 
coordinating activities and the movement of materials and money, among operations in many 
different places.  These tasks increased firms’ need for various logistical management, 
accounting, and other business services.216  Fainstein and Fainstein (1986) summarize that 
advanced corporate services have been the “growth sector” of the US economy since the 
1960s.217  Their proportion of firms and employees has increased steadily since the 1970s.  By 
 
213 According to Krippener (2005), there is not a consensus on whether shareholder orientation “come[s] from inside non-financial 
corporations, initiated by management, or has…been imposed on non-financial firms by financial sector ‘outsiders’” (2005:  201).  In 
some firms, investors intervened directly in corporate management (Useem 1996); in others, firms’ financial managers became 
increasingly powerful within the governance structure; others adopted policies to align the incentives of management more closely 
with those of investors, such as by tying executive compensation to stock market performance (Davis and Kim, 2015:  206) 
214 Berger, 2014; Davis and Kim, 2015:  206. 
215 Berger, 2014. 
216 Sassen, 2005:  28-9. 
217 Fainstein and Fainstein, 1986:  4-5. 
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the late 1990s, “the value of financial corporations and funds dwarfed the net worth of 
nonfinancial corporations.”218 
Investor Interest in Urban Real Estate and Municipal Debt 
As noted, the decline in manufacturing output and profit rates made investors seek 
profitable outlets for investment elsewhere.  As early as the 1980s, real estate became a 
primary “outlet for surplus reserves of money capital fleeing the primary sector of 
production.”219  Investors thought real estate values likely to be insulated from trends affect 
other sectors of the economy.  Thus, “[i]nstitutional investors developed a penchant for urban 
real estate investments as a way to balance their portfolios of corporate equities and bonds.”220  
In addition to increasing steadily since the 1980s, investment in urban real estate also increases 
rapidly when rates of profit from other forms of investment dip. 
Private investors’ share of municipal debt also started to increase in the late 1980s.  This 
was rooted in the same search for profitable outlets of surplus capital, and urban governments’ 
increasing reliance on private investment (noted above) and corresponding solicitousness of 
private investors.  Municipal bonds, long considered low-yield investments, became increasingly 
popular among private investors.  Investor interest in these areas increase even more in the late 
1990s, when investment banks sought outlets for surplus capital.221 
Federal Policy and Economic Restructuring  
It should be noted that, all along, federal macroeconomic, fiscal, and monetary policies, 
founded on principles of laisse-faire and monetarism, abetted and accelerated this economic 
 
218 Weber, 2015:  255. 
219 Weber, 2015:  256. 
220 Hagerman, Clark, and Hebb, 2007.   
221 Weber, 2015:  258.  This surplus was produced by the “dramatic expansion of capital markets and the global savings glut.” 
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restructuring.  These federal policies are described in Chapter 1.  Key federal policies included:  
the rejection by congressional majorities and the Carter and Reagan administrations of 
proposals to bolster the declining industrial sector and industrial regions; revisions to federal tax 
code that accelerated corporate relocations, and thus deindustrialization; reductions in federal 
taxes on profits from investment and deregulation of financial markets further encouraged the 
shift of investment from productive activities to speculation; and drastic cuts in federal aid to 
cities. 
Fiscal crisis 
Several factors created a fiscal crisis for cities in the 1970s and 1980s.  The loss of 
industry, especially from older, northern cities, diminished cities’ tax bases.  This loss of revenue 
was compounded by continuing departure of upper- and middle-class residents, caused by the 
departure of industry and racial integration of cities.  Cities’ revenues were depleted further by 
the aforementioned cuts in federal aid.  Cities’ service burdens increased in this decades as well, 
with the aforementioned devolution of welfare responsibilities and (in some northern cities), 
the in-migration of relatively poor residents.  These factors comprised a fiscal crisis, pushing 
many cities to the brink of bankruptcy.   
Urban governments embrace neoliberalism  
The aforementioned changes did not simply cause urban governments’ adoption of 
neoliberal policies.  However, they created a context in which cities were desperate to raise 
revenue and create jobs, in which attracting corporate service firms and private investment was 
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a relatively attractive option, and in which supply-side growth strategies and business- and 
investor-friendly policies were necessary to attract such firms and investment.222 
The fiscal crises created intense pressures for city governments to generate jobs and 
revenue.  And cuts in federal aid made urban governments more dependent on private 
investment and corporate expansion.  As geographer Helga Leitner (1990) explains, declining 
federal aid “increased dependence of the local state on the health and tax base of its own local 
economy,” and thus on private investors and firms, “since they control the availability and flow 
of capital and credit.”223 
The expansion of the financial and advanced corporate service sectors heralded a new 
niche for cities as the sites of firms in the ascendant financial and specialized corporate service 
sectors of the economy, and as a site for the investment for surplus capital.  An economic niche 
as a center of advanced corporate services was suggested not just by the proliferation of 
advanced corporate service firms, but for their tendency to locate in geographically 
concentrated clusters of other such firms.224  David Harvey explains that “economies can be 
generated by bringing together diverse activities within a restricted space of interaction so as to 
facilitate highly efficient and interactive production systems,” sharing information, and enjoying 
reduced transaction costs among each other.225  This feature of the new economy portended a 
role for cities as sites of such clusters. 
 
222 It should be noted that the aforementioned federal policy changes were explicitly intended to push urban governments to adopt 
neoliberal policies.  The President’s National Urban Policy Report of 1982, for example, affirmed that “state and local governments 
have primary responsibility for making their urban areas attractive to private investors” (US Department of Housing, 1982: 14.)  As 
Weaver (2015) summarizes, federal policymakers envisioned cities competing for private investment, and benefiting from the 
discipline imposed by this competition. 
223 This and previous quotation, Leitner, 1990:  157.  Sites (2003) makes similar points (42-3).  As Weaver (2015) notes, this 
dependence on the market was an implicit or explicit purpose of federal policy changes.   
224 Sassen, 2005:  29.  
225 Harvey, 1989:  8.  Saskia Sassen (2005) calls this an “agglomeration economy.”  
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Some scholars argue that the need to obtain favorable credit ratings from financial 
institutions was the key factor driving policymakers’ support for neoliberal policies.  Their 
increased reliance on investors makes local governments more dependent on the institutions 
which mediate access to financial markets.  Since the 1970s, urban governments’ ability to 
access financial markets is determined by “bond ratings agencies,” such as Moodies and S&P, 
who rate the credit-worthiness of municipal governments.  Governments with low ratings are 
effectively frozen out of bond markets or must pay exorbitant interest rates.226  Credit ratings 
are “based on the municipality’s financial history (past and current debt), its economic outlook 
(whether growth is going to occur), and its administrative structure and history.”227  In 
particular, bond ratings agencies reward city governments who reduce expenditures, maintain 
business-friendly climates, exert reliable control over sources of revenue (e.g., real estate 
development process) and who can “hold claimants other than investors at bay” (i.e., discipline 
or marginalize constituencies such as labor or the poor).228  Weber (2015) Hackworth (2007) 
thus argue that bond ratings agencies pressure urban governments to adopt neoliberal policies 
including corporate-led growth strategies, fiscal austerity, and entrepreneurial forms of 
governance. 
Others suggest that urban elites’ ideological commitments to market-based growth 
strategies and institutional reforms also inspired neoliberal reforms.  Several studies describe 
widespread enthusiasm among intellectuals and policymakers about managerialist ideas, or 
“public entrepreneurialism,” “which attempts to apply the outlook and techniques of private-
 
226 The weight of these agencies ratings has increased as long-term trends in financial markets make a larger share of investors 
depend on the rating agencies for risk assessment.  Since the early 1970s, bond markets are comprised increasingly of buyers legally 
required to buy only high-grade bonds (as determined by the ratings agencies).  Local banks have also scaled back their role of 
mediating the sales of municipal bonds, leaving investors more dependent on the knowledge of the ratings agencies.  
227 Hackworth, 2007.  
228 Hackworth, 2007.  Rachel Weber (2015) adds that “The growing interdependency, complexity, and uncertainty of global economic 
activity…raises the premium paid for demonstrable control over the factors that might threaten repayment and cause owners to 
default on their obligations” (253). 
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sector management.”229  Widely read and discussed books like Robert Poole’s Cutting Back City 
Hall and Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing Government argued that privatization of public 
functions, corporate firm-style management of public institutions, and shrinkage of government, 
produced improved outcomes.  According to such texts, “through tax cuts and private provision 
of ‘so-called public goods,’ a city could actually ‘improve service and make it much more 
responsive to citizen desires.’”230  Bennett (2010) suggests that urban policymakers were 
exposed to such currents (e.g., through networks and associations of public officials and 
conferences) and were persuaded by their arguments.  Other studies suggest that many urban 
elites were persuaded by the “global city hypothesis”—the idea “globalization is restoring 
vitality to major control centers because they are involved in the upper circuits of trade and 
finance.”231  Abu-Lughod (1999) and Harvey (1989) each describes conferences of urban 
policymakers, in which attendees agreed that forms of development which “have the 
strongest…capacity to enhance property values, the tax base, the local circulation of revenues, 
and…employment.” 232 
And still other scholars attribute urban government’s adoption of neoliberal policies to 
local interest group pressures.  As noted by Weaver (2015), “[m]any scholars of urban politics 
have illustrated the degree to which ‘developmental,’ pro-market elites have come to dominate 
urban regimes in recent decades.”233   Just as in the Post-War era, coalitions of “business and its 
prominent organizations—the downtown corporations, large developers and their supporters” 
united “in a general program of fiscal parsimony and central-business-district growth.”234  Many 
 
229 Leitner, 1990:  147. 
230 Weaver, 2015:  30.   
231 Abu-Lughod, 1999:  327. 
232 Harvey, 1989:  13.  Abu-Lughod describes a 1989 multi-city conference on “restructuring” in the Rust Belt (1999:  323).  Harvey 
describes a similar conference in Orleans, England in 1980 (1989:  2).   
233 Weaver, 2015:  14. 
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studies of neoliberalization at the urban level show that such elite coalitions functioned as 
political entrepreneurs, mobilizing to articulate a neoliberal agenda, building political coalitions 
to pass it, and participating in its implementation. 
Although they attribute the change to different combinations of the aforementioned 
factors, scholars agree that urban governments around the US adopted some version of a 
neoliberal policy agenda beginning in the 1970s.  This agenda included a focus on growth of the 
corporate services sector and real estate development, supply-side growth strategies, and 
managerialist institutional reforms.235  This agenda was adopted unevenly and at different times 
across cities.  The timing and extent of its implementation, and the substance of reforms, 
reflects local political and institutional condition.  However, there was also significant 
consistency across cities, particularly among older, erstwhile centers of manufacturing. 
Fiscal austerity and business- and investment-friendly climate 
The agenda includes revenue and spending policies oriented to the preferences of 
corporations, investors, and relatively affluent individuals and households for low taxes—and as 
a necessary consequence, cuts in social spending.  Many cities cut taxes, particularly corporate 
and income taxes.  Insofar as cities instituted or raised taxes in this era, they tend to prefer sales 
or vice taxes, or other taxes which 1) target consumers rather than corporations; and 2) 
distribute the tax burden across all residents, regardless of income.   These governments also 
cut public expenditures in areas other than economic development.  Common areas of 
retrenchment included community-based social services (e.g., libraries, public education, health 
centers) and welfare (financial assistance, public housing), and basic city services like housing-
code enforcement, sanitation, and even fire-fighting. 
 
235 “a persistent and recurrent theme since the mid-1970s” (Harvey, 1989b:  5); “such a diverse array of municipalities have ‘chosen’ 
such a common path” (Hackworth, 2007:  16) 
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Most cities maintain expenditures on economic development.  Governments offer a 
range of direct financial incentives to firms to locate in the city, or to expand.  Commonly used 
incentives include subsidies, tax abatements, giveaways of publicly owned resources, and access 
to federal funding.236  Cities also indirectly subsidize corporate activity by funding the 
infrastructure needed for corporate activity.  This includes investment in communications, 
transportation, and utilities infrastructures.  It may also include investment in “qualities, 
quantities, and costs of local labor supply,” which may lead urban governments back into 
investment in some forms of public education.237 
Investment in economic and real estate development  
As in the Post-War era, urban governments invest public resources in the 
redevelopment of commercial and residential areas.238  The creation of spaces and amenities 
oriented toward high-end consumers is part of the strategy to attract corporate service firms 
and retain their middle- and upper-class employees as city residents (and thus taxpayers).  
These spaces are also intended to attract tourism more generally.  Summarizing such initiatives, 
David Harvey observes, “[a]bove all, the city has to appear as an innovative, exciting, creative, 
and safe place to live or to visit, to play and consume in.”239  
In addition to creating attractive spaces and amenities, real estate development is a 
source of revenue which does not impinge on the business climate through taxes.  Real estate 
transfer fees and rising property values (and thus property taxes) “allow the municipality to 
sustain low tax rates, attain favorable bond ratings, and increase borrowing for expensive 
 
236 Logan and Molotch, 1984:  58. 
237 Harvey, 1989b:  8. 
238 Investment in office space, consumer attractions, entertainment facilities, spectacles, “have all become much more prominent 
strategies for urban regeneration” (Harvey, 1989b:  9)  
239 Harvey, 1989:  9. 
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infrastructure schemes”240  Thus, “property-led development becomes one of the few tools 
available for enhancing revenues.”241  
To stimulate these forms of development, the city provides public funds and logistical 
support to the real estate development industry.  In her review of urban development policies, 
Leitner (1990) concludes “a greater amount and new variety of financial incentives are now 
made available to developers and businesses for property development,” including “tax 
abatements and rebates to land-purchase subsidies, low-interest loans, loan guarantees and 
equity-financing.”242  The city underwrites loans by investors to developers, backing loans with 
its “full faith and credit.”   
City governments have created new mechanisms to raise revenue for development 
projects.  Through various kinds of state enabling legislation, governments have securitized city 
assets, such as infrastructure, public employee pensions, and tax revenues—that is, they have 
arranged for those assets to be bought and traded by investors on commodities and financial 
markets.243  To ensure the city’s existing revenue streams are allocated to development, some 
governments have created “special taxing districts,” in which property taxes are diverted into a 
special fund dedicated to financing development projects in that district, instead of going into 
the city’s general fund.244 
Changes in governance 
City governments have created new forms of governance, designed to heed the 
preferences of firms and investors for 1) insulation of financial and fiscal decision-making from 
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244 Fainstein and Fainstein, 1986:  19. 
97 
 
political pressures and 2) institutionalized collaboration between the city and investors and 
developers, respectively. 
Some cities remove authority over financial and fiscal policy to unelected boards, as in 
New York City.  More commonly, cities create autonomous districts, with autonomy over their 
finances, and not subject to political pressures.  Cities control and manage economic 
development processes through unelected, “public-private” agencies—i.e., official 
governmental bodies, comprised of city bureaucrats and private stakeholders in economic 
development.245  These institutions generally have the power to issue bonds, use eminent 
domain, and other key decisions associated with the development process.  In their non-
democratic form, these institutions insulate economic development from political contention, 
and ensure the influence of pro-development corporate and political actors over development 
decisions.    Such arrangements also signal to investors that the city’s lucrative corporate and 
real estate development will continue. 
City planning and development agencies changed their practices to more directly 
support real estate redevelopment.  In New York, for example, expedite the planning agencies’ 
primary task was redefined as “shepherd[ing] developer-initiated projects through New York’s 
complicated land-use disposition process.”246  Departments in other cities also formed new 
routines for collaborating with real estate developers.247  This reorientation was also reflected in 
the department personnel, increasingly drawn from business and real estate development 
backgrounds.248 
 
245 Brenner and Theodore, 2002.  They observe the replacement of old bureaucratic agencies with “managerialist and networked 
institutions.”  Leitner (1990) similarly finds that “local public and quasi-public development agencies…have been newly instituted or 
invigorated in most cities” (147).  Other authors make similar observations.  Federal urban policy required city governments to 
create public-private agencies as a condition of federal funding (Leitner, 1990:  155). 
246 Sites, 2003:  45. 
247 Harvey, 1989. 
248 Leitner, 1990:  149. 
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3. The Neoliberal Regime in Chicago 
This section will describe the historical origins of Chicago’s neoliberal regime, and its 
contemporary policy paradigms, practices, and bases of political support.  I will note historical 
continuities with Post-War growth machine.  And I will describe the consistent neoliberal 
orientation of the regime’s public policies and institutional reforms since the late 1980s.  Finally, 
I will show how the regime has constructed a neoliberal racial politics, similar to that articulated 
by the Black urban regimes, described in Chapter 1. 
Origins of the neoliberal regime  
By the late 1970s, Chicago faced many of the same economic and fiscal problems as 
other deindustrializing cities.  Civic and political elites, maintaining a long-standing commitment 
to Central Business District growth, adopted new growth strategies, envisioning Chicago as a 
“corporate center” and tourism destination.  Policymakers oriented policy in multiple areas to 
competing with other locales for mobile investment, firms, taxpaying residents, and tourists, in 
line with their counterparts in other cities. 
Context:  Economic Restructuring and Fiscal Crisis in Chicago  
Deindustrialization 
Whereas Chicago lost manufacturing firms to the suburbs through the late 1960s, after 
the 1968, the entire region (Chicago and suburbs) lost firms to the Sunbelt, and other 
countries.249  Alongside these relocations, several of Chicago’s most prominent industries and 
firms contracted or shut down altogether.  Chicago’s famous Stockyards closed in 1971.  US 
Steel’s plants in Chicago, which were making record profits as late as 1973, didn’t survive the 
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recession of 1979-83.250  In 1970, Chicago was home to eight of the country’s largest railroads 
companies.  By 1990, 2 had gone bankrupt, and 5 others were consolidated into larger rail lines, 
based in other cities.251  Manufacturing continued to decline, and by 2000, Chicago had lost 
about 267,000 industrial jobs. 
Loss of Tax-Paying Residents 
Relatively affluent whites continued to leave Chicago after the late 1960s.  Between 
1960 and 1980, the number of middle- and upper-income families living in Chicago declined 
more than 30%.252  This was driven partly by declines in household wealth associated with job 
loss, but mostly by continued exodus of middle-class whites to the suburbs.  This exodus is 
reflected in the declining percentage of whites in Chicago, falling from 68% in 1950, to 51% in 
1960, and 39% in 1970, with most of the departures middle- and working-class whites.253  The 
erosion of Chicago’s tax base is also reflected in declines in median family income, which 
dropped from $34,500 in 1970 to $30,707 by 1990;254 and the percentage of residents below the 
poverty line, which increased from 14.4 % in 1970 to 21% in 1990.   
Fiscal Crisis 
 The decline in Chicago’s tax base was manifest in a series of fiscal emergencies in the 
1970s and 80s.  Starting in the early 1970s, “fiscal crises struck the city’s public school and 
transit systems, and the decay of public infrastructure was visible across Chicago.”255  Chicago 
Public Schools accumulated a deficit of $85.2 million in 1976 and declared bankruptcy in 1979, 
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rescued only by an emergency bailout by the city and state.  The school district’s bond rating 
was also lowered to lowest possible grade at this time.256 
Growing elite consensus on neoliberalism  
Texts from the late 1970s and 1980s show that elites adopted neoliberal ideas about 
economic development even before these ideas were articulated as a coherent policy agenda or 
adopted by the urban government.  Past research and primary texts from those years show a 
concern with interlocal competition for investment and belief in the necessity of supply-side 
mechanisms for stimulating economic growth. 
The focus on service sector growth and competitiveness is visible in a 1989 report, 
written by three academics prominent in local policy-making circles.257  This report argued that 
Chicago was well-positioned to compete with other localities for a share of service sector firms, 
given its existing share of key service industries.258  Abu-Lughod (1999) argues that, around the 
same time, some of Chicago’s policymakers foresaw a competitive advantage in the competition 
for service firms in the presence of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board of 
Trade, two of the most prominent stock market and commodities exchanges in the world.259  
Elites also appeared to put an increasing emphasis on fiscal austerity and supply-side 
growth strategies, framing them as necessary to attract firms and investment and stimulate 
growth.  A 1980 comment by an executive of a locally based bank exemplified this:  “What we 
need is control on the city’s spending and a control on patronage.”260  Leaders from prominent 
 
256 Kyle and Kantowicz, 1992: 29. 
257 This includes, for example, David Allardice, Wim Weiwel, Wendy Wintermute.  Allardice was an economist at Chicago’s Federal 
Reserve Board.  Wim Weiwel was an urban planner, who had worked in the Washington administration.  Wintermute was an 
economist who had evaluated Chicago’s affirmative action and other programs, for their effects on Chicago’s labor markets. 
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259 Abu-Lughod, 1999:  327.  Chicago Mercantile Exchange houses the International Monetary Market, the busiest “futures market in 
international exchange rates” in the world. 
260 Nina Karlich, Executive Vice President of First National Bank, quoted in R.C. Longworth, “City on the Brink,” Chicago Tribune; 
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civic organizations, including Chicago’s Urban League made similar arguments.261  A group of 
four political scientists commented in 1987 that many in Chicago’s planning community believe 
the city “can compete only by offering bigger and better corporate incentives.”262  Summarizing 
the changing common sense of Chicago’s political and economic elites, a group of political 
scientists observed that “civic leaders in both the private and public sectors viewed their role as 
primarily one of ‘preparing the ground’ for capital.”263 
Elites in the 1980s and 1990s also saw public support for redevelopment as a way to 
maximize the impact of private investment in real estate, which had surged since the early 
1980s.  Data on private investment in real estate in down Chicago show a marked increase 
beginning in the early 1980s.264  This growth in private real estate investment reflected national 
trends, driven by tax credits for building rehab in the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 and wider 
developments in financial markets, as discussed in the previous section.  From 1983-1987, with 
the Washington mayoralty providing relatively little financial support for real estate 
development, private dollars flowed into the construction of “office, rental and condominium, 
hotel, retail/recreation, and educational facility development” in the downtown.265  Throughout 
the 1980s and early 1990s, pro-growth elites called for more public investment in real estate to 
leverage this private investment.266 
Coalescence of a neoliberal regime 
A coherent, neoliberal regime coalesced in the 1990s, and has governed Chicago since.  
This regime is defined by close collaboration between city government, firms, individual 
 
261 Squires et al, 1987:  14. 
262 Squires et al, 1987:  49. 
263 Molotch, 1982; quoted in Squires et al, 1987:  11-12. 
264 Demissie, 2006:  The investment were partly “a response to publicly initiated redevelopment efforts, in some measure a 
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265 Demissie, 2006:  28.  This included significant investment in commercial and major expansions of university campuses and the 
redevelopment of the North Pier. 
266 See for instance journalist John McCarron’s series of articles in the Chicago Tribune, “Chicago on Hold:  The Politics of Poverty.”  
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corporate elites (acting via formal civic associations or informal relationships with government 
officials) and non-profits in formulating and implementing neoliberal policy, institutional reform, 
and planning agendas.  In this section, I will describe these regular forms of collaboration and 
review the most consistent themes of the regime’s agendas. 
Richard M. Daley, the son of long-time mayor Richard J. Daley, articulated a more 
coherent and consistent version of the “corporate center” vision and supply-side strategy than 
previous mayors, from his election in 1989.  The economic development programs of Mayor 
Harold Washington (1983-1987) and his successor Eugene Sawyer (1987-1989) attempted to 
keep industrial firms in the city and redistributed profits from downtown real estate 
development through hiring and other regulations.267  Prior mayors Byrne (1979-1983) and 
Bilandic (1976-1979) had not fully embraced a development strategy based on inter-local 
competition for corporate service firms, and mixed supply-side growth programs with old-style 
patronage and other vestiges of old regime.268   By contrast, Mayor Daley clearly articulated the 
corporate center strategy as early as his 1989 mayoral campaign.  In a typical speech, he 
remarked: “The city is changing.  You’re not going to see factories back . . . I think you have to 
look at the financial markets, banking, the service industry, the development of O’Hare Field, 
tourism, trade. This is going to be an international city.”269  In short, Daley’s vision was “to 
entrepreneurialize government actions…build a more supportive local business climate, and 
fashion a globally competitive, consumption-oriented city” (or, in his own words, “a global 
competitive city”).270 
 
267 Clavel and Giloth, 2015. 
268 Bennett, 2007. 
269 Demissie, 2006:  22. 
270 First quotation from Wilson and Sternberg, 2013:  983.  Second quotation from Shaw, 2007. 
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This growth strategy was outlined in a series of planning documents, written by the 
Commercial Club of Chicago, a civic organization comprised mostly of corporate executives, and 
implemented almost unchanged by Daley’s Department of Planning and Development.  The 
document Chicago Metropolis 2020, written in 1997, articulated a set of general parameters and 
goals for Chicago’s planning and development policies.271  The plan frames economic growth as 
a fundamentally a matter of inter-local competition:  Chicago necessarily “competes with 
practically every sizeable metropolis in the nation, and increasingly in the world, based on the 
quality of life we offer our residents and the quality of business environment we hold out to 
employers.”272  In addition to the usual supply-side mechanisms, the plan called for reforms to 
make shrink metropolitan government and make it better able to interface with the private 
sector, and the privatization of public services, especially education.  These reforms were 
presented as enhancing Chicago’s “competitiveness.”273  The same neoliberal arguments are 
visible in the Chicago Central Area Plan, written in 2003 by a group of consultants and 
implemented by the Departments of Planning and Development, Transportation, and the 
Environment.274  This plan presumes the city’s commitment to a corporate center strategy, and 
expresses confidence in “Chicago’s prominence as a node in the network of global cities.”275  It 
foresees continued growth of office, commercial, and residential real estate in the Central 
Business District, as the district becomes “the downtown of the Midwest.”276   
 
271 written by Elmer Johnson, a former corporate exec; Ryerson International CEO Frank H. Beal, Inland Steel Vice-President George 
A. Ranney, Pittway Corporation CEO King W. Harris, and real estate titan Fritz Halstrom (Wilson and Sternberg, 983); all members of 
the Commercial Club, according to all observers Chicago’s preeminent civic organization  
272 Johnson, 2001; quoted in Bennett, 2010:  127. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Authors included personnel from the architectural firm (and frequent city collaborator) Skidmore Owings & Merrill, and the non-
profit financial institution Chicago Community Trust. 




Where Post-War planners saw slum clearance and large-scale infrastructure as drivers of 
redevelopment, more recent strategies prioritize amenities and spaces for consumers, at small 
and large scales.   This includes a general orientation to planning emphasizing the experience of 
pedestrians.  The 2003 Chicago Central Area Plan, for example, prioritized “walkability” of the 
Central Business district.  The redevelopment agendas for many areas in Chicago use “culture-
driven strategies,” building spaces to show case the area’s “cultural heritage, exporting their 
cultural identity.”277   
By the late 1990’s, the corporate center paradigm of economic growth was described as 
“hegemonic” among policymakers and the networks of elites with whom they worked.  Rast 
(1999), and Clavel and Wiewel (2015) both describe the notion of economic growth driven by 
service sector expansion and consumption as unquestioned premises in the city’s planning 
agencies, noting that the Department of Planning and Development’s  “executives shared the 
business elites’ vision of a new Chicago.’’278 These themes are present in subsequent planning 
and policy documents.279 
Public policy and institutional reforms 
Public Investment in Corporate Development  
The Daley and Emanuel administrations have consistently offered direct financial 
incentives—such as tax abatements, subsidies, and other financial benefits—to firms to locate, 
remain, and expand in Chicago.  They have also indirectly subsidized business by funding the 
construction of infrastructure used by firms. 
 
277 Spirou, 2006:  295. 
278 Clavel and Giloth, 2015:  20; similar description of planning and development departments in Squires et al, Chapter 6. 
279 E.g., the 2006 report by the Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce emphasized “the Chicago Region[’s] competitive[ness] in the 
global supply chain” and the 2009 Chicago Central Area Plan. 
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One of the most commonly used mechanisms for subsidizing corporate and real estate 
development is Tax Increment Financing (TIF).  The TIF program diverts portions of the city’s 
property taxes to a special account, separate from the city’s general fund.  Funds in these 
accounts can be spent at city officials’ discretion.280  As of January, 2017, Chicago has $1.4 billion 
in its TIF accounts. 
It is common for the city government to offer firms a package of subsidies and tax 
breaks to locate or expand operations in Chicago.  Packages usually include subsidies for firms’ 
construction of new facilities; breaks on property, income, and other taxes; waivers of city fees; 
and other direct financial incentives.  As Bennett (2007) and others observe, it became common 
for incoming firms to receive some such benefits.  For example, the city gave a package worth 
$56 million to Boeing in 2001, to build their new headquarters in Chicago (creating 450 jobs).  In 
2017, the city offered $8 million in tax breaks to Method soap plant in Pullman neighborhood 
(creating 60 jobs).  A review of a monthly city council hearing reveals myriad such packages. 
The Daley and Emanuel administrations have tried to attract firms to Chicago by building 
infrastructure needed for firms’ operations.  The Daley administration focused primarily on 
transportation and communications infrastructure, for instance expanding the city’s fiber-optic 
and broadband networks.  The Emanuel administration has invested in research and office parks 
and business incubators, financing the construction of new facilities, marketing them, and 
offered financial incentives for firms to move in.   In 2012, the administration provided funds to 
build 1871, a 50,000-square foot office space, designed to be an incubator for technology start-
 
280 Normally, property taxes flow into the city’s general fund.  Property values are periodically reassessed, and any increase in 
property taxes (based on increased property values) flows into the general fund.  Under the TIF program, the city can freeze the 
amount of property taxes flowing in the general fund at their current level.  Any increases in property taxes (based on increased 
property values) flow into the separate TIF account. 
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ups.281  The Emanuel administration planned a similar hub for life-sciences and biotechnology 
industries in the CBD and a “Digital Manufacturing Design Lab” to “create a manufacturing hub 
for entrepreneurs and small and medium-sized businesses” in a nearby neighborhood.282 
Real Estate Redevelopment  
The city most directly supports real estate redevelopment by subsidizing private 
development projects with public funds.  Developers usually initiate projects and obtain city 
funds.  For instance, developers urged the city to create new TIF districts in the central business 
district, to assist projects which the developers envisioned.283  The city also gave developers “a 
range of resources typically used for community development,” including CDBG funds.284 
The city also drives residential and commercial real estate development indirectly 
through its support for corporate development projects.  The aforementioned 1871 office space, 
for example, spurred the revitalization of the surrounding “River North” neighborhood.   In the 
words of one observer: 
The entire surrounding neighborhood was flourishing. Formerly full of warehouses and 
prostitutes, and abutting the old Cabrini-Green, River North had become the home to 
Groupon, Google’s Chicago operations and hundreds of other digital start-ups — 7,500 
tech-industry jobs in total. 
 
In 2016, 2,400 new luxury apartments were under construction in the neighborhood.  In other 
cases, the city prepared the way for private redevelopment, assembling parcels of developable 
land, and auctioning or gifting them to private actors.285  For example, after demolishing all 82 
public housing high rises, the city sold much of the land to private developers.286 
 
281 Lazare, 2014. 
282 Spielman, 2015. 
283 Weber (2015):  147, 152. 
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285 Wilson and Sternberg, 2013:  988. 
286 On the South Side for example, the city demolished 5 housing projects (Stateway Gardens, Robert Taylor Homes, Dearborn 
Homes, Ickes Homes, and Madden Park–Wells-Darrow Homes), which “yielded almost 300 acres of newly cleared land.”  At least half 
was slated for auction to private developers (Wilson and Sternberg, 2013). 
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The Daley and Emanuel administrations also developed largescale recreational facilities.  
The Daley administration’s projects included Millennium Park, a plaza and park in the city’s 
downtown; Grant Park, a large green space housing a series of museums and other attractions; 
the Navy Pier recreation and event center; and the refurbishment of Soldiers’ Field football 
stadium.287  The Emanuel administration has invested in upscale recreational facilities, such as a 
series of boathouses on the Chicago River and lake-front live music venues.  Both 
administrations provided financial support for the expansion of “central Chicago-based 
universities, and other units of cultural capital.”288 
Public investment in all these forms has been highly concentrated in the central 
business district and abutting regions.  During Daley’s administration, public subsidies for real 
estate development were concentrated in four “redevelopment zones:  South Loop–Bronzeville, 
Pilsen–University Village, the East-West gentrification corridor, and the Central Loop.”289  
Betancur and Gillis (2004) also found that “the central business district and its surrounding areas 
have captured the bulk of infrastructure and capital improvements,” and that TIFs have 
generally been used to build “middle- to upper-class residential development” in neighborhoods 
susceptible to upgrading.290  As developers and investors take interest in redevelopment in 
further outlying areas, the city appears to be extending public support to projects in those areas. 
Developers have enjoyed a striking degree of access and influence over planning and 
development decisions under Daley and Emanuel.  Urban historian Pierre Clavel and former 
Chicago city planner Giloth recount that Mayor Daley instructed officials in relevant city 
agencies to work closely with private real estate developers, and to follow their lead on forming 
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area redevelopment plans.291  Rachel Weber similarly reports that Daley instructed officials in 
the Department of Land Use and Zoning, the Department of Planning and Development, the 
Department of Historic Preservation, and other relevant agencies to defer to private developers 
when formulating plans.292  Developers have also influenced decisions over the creation of TIF 
districts and other financing mechanisms, enjoying “great autonomy over budget decisions 
worth millions to them in subsidies.”293   At the neighborhood level, aldermen made decisions 
about zoning and TIF allocation in close concert with developers.294  Many commentators note 
the high degree of access to aldermen and influence over zoning decisions by developers.295 
Since the mid-1990s, philanthropic foundations and non-profit development 
organizations have partnered with government and the private real estate industry on 
redevelopment.  Non-profit agencies receive city contracts to build affordable housing, 
culturally expressive public works of art, or other projects, within a larger real estate 
redevelopment project planned and implemented by private developers.  Non-profits can help 
legitimate redevelopment projects, and integrate concerns with equity into private, for-profit 
development, on the latter’s terms.  Political scientist John Betancur (2015) argues that the 
paradigm of non-profit agency work has become common since its operational success in the 
transformation of Chicago’s public housing.296 
 
291 Clavel and Giloth, 2014. 
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Mayor Daley mostly resisted tax and fee increases in his 22-year mayoralty.  After 
reducing property taxes in 1989, Daley’s budgets raised them an average of 1% a year until 
2009.  Daley also generally opposed sales tax increases, and raised other taxes or fees sparingly, 
until 2009.297  Daley did increase some business taxes, including the real estate transfer tax 
(2008), the hotel and motel tax, and a corporate head tax.  For additional revenue, the Daley 
administration sold public assets.  Daley proposed (and the city council approved) the 
privatization of the city’s tow truck fleet (1989), a toll-bridge on Interstate 90 (2006), the city’s 
parking garages (2006), and the city’s parking meters (2008).  Daley attempted to lease other 
city assets.298 
Mayoral Emanuel’s budgets (addressing the short-falls created by Daley’s unwillingness 
to raise taxes) have relied mostly on relatively regressive taxes and fees.  For example, 
Emanuel’s 2018 budget raised water and sewer taxes, property taxes, and fees on the city’s 911 
service, ride-sharing services.299  Other sources of revenue advocated by Emanuel include an 
increased sales tax (exempting some goods and services typically used by lower-income 
consumers) and a casino.  Emanuel consistently opposes progressive taxes as hostile to business 
and investment, for example commenting in the 2015 mayoral campaign that “jobs, companies, 
and families would be fleeing the city of Chicago” if it passed a corporate head tax.300   
 
297 An increase in water and sewer taxes in 1989 (offset by a property tax reduction), a tax on bottled water, and an increase the 
city’s real estate transfer tax, to fund the Chicago Transit Authority in 2008. 
298 Daley attempted to lease Midway Airport (Chicago’s second and smaller airport) to a consortium of private investors, but the deal 
collapsed due to uncertainty associated with the recession of 2008. 
299 The city fee for using 911 was also raised in 2014.  Property taxes were raised each year from 2015 to 2018.  The city also raised 
the amusement tax on large concert venues in 2017.  The Chicago school district also raised property taxes by $224.5 million in 
2017. 




Mayor Daley’s support for corporate growth and real estate redevelopment caused his 
opposition to most forms of economic and real estate regulation.  Daley sustained some of the 
zoning regulations designed to retain manufacturing in designated areas of the city, but 
removed such restrictions from other areas, opening land for residential and commercial use.301  
Daley also opposed a living wage ordinance and used the only veto of his mayoralty to kill an 
ordinance regulating “big box stores.”302  Emanuel’s moderate, progressive regulations are 
discussed below, under anti-poverty policies.  
Labor Policy 
Mayor Daley did not attempt to significantly reduce the power of organized labor and 
signed lucrative contracts with public employee unions.  In 2009, Daley signed a 10 year contract 
with Teamsters and other unions (in part to bolster the city’s Olympic bid with the promise of 
labor peace).  A Daley-appointed panel recommended reform of public employees pensions, 
including reduced employee benefits and higher worker contributions.  However, according to 
most commentators, Mayor Daley took new action to implement these changes. 
 Mayor Emanuel has also advocated reduction in public expenses on pensions.  To date, 
his administration was stymied in its attempts to accomplish these cuts through contract 
negotiations, lobbying for state reform, and legal action.  Emanuel’s acceleration of school 
closings and lay-offs of public school teachers are widely seen by local commentators as efforts 
to discipline the Chicago Teachers Union.303  
 
301 Clavel and Giloth, 2015. 
302 Tattersall, 2010. 
303 Interview with Jackson Potter, 3/8/17. 
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Financialization of Urban Policy and Governance 
Through the late 1970s, urban governments received federal funding for economic and 
real estate development projects.304  Since the elimination of the Urban Development Action 
Grant program in 1980, urban regimes have had to use local tax revenues and bonds to finance 
development.305  For example, in 2013, Emanuel created the Chicago Infrastructure Trust, to 
arrange financing of largescale development projects. 
In addition to spending TIFs on development, the city securitizes TIFs and sells them to 
investors.  The city has been increasingly proactive in in marketing TIFs to investors, “developing 
a substantial staffing and clientele infrastructure for it” for engaging with investors, bond 
markets.306  The securitization of TIFs increasingly tied to the city’s economic development to 
international bond markets.  As TIFs and other financialized funding mechanisms became the 
primary source for redevelopment funding, investors also gained influence over redevelopment 
priorities.307  This further constrained the city to prioritize “residential and high-end commercial 
development, because that was the best bet for generating the financing.”308  
Neoliberal education reform  
Since 1995, Daley and Emanuel have advanced a long-term reform agenda of the public 
school system.  This agenda institutes corporate forms of management and free-market forms 
to schools and education bureaucracies.  This includes top-down systems of accountability (such 
as evaluating teachers based on test-scores, centralized oversight by system administrators of 
underperforming schools, and incentive-based rewards for teachers, administrators).  These 
reforms also privatized education and related services, effectively replacing public schools with 
 
304 Urban Renewal program; Urban Redevelopment Action Grants 
305 Was this the last federal urban dev program? 
306 Clavel and Giloth, 2015:   
307 Weber, 2015: “financing drove development priorities” (152). 
308 Clavel and Giloth, 2014: 30. 
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privately operated charter schools and contracting with firms to provide janitorial, food, and 
other services.  Daley and Emanuel (and their allies in the education bureaucracy) have 
attempted to remove constraints on the decision-making of administrators, such as union 
contracts and institutionalized forms of participation in school governance by parents and 
community members.309  Other reforms attempted to enhance students’ and parents’ ability to 
choose a school. 
Mayor Daley, his successive appointees to CEO of Chicago Public Schools, the 
Commercial Club of Chicago, and other elites, articulated an understanding of school reform as 
integral to Chicago’s “economic competitiveness.”  The Commercial Club of Chicago published 
Left Behind, and Still Left Behind, describing the importance of a well-trained workforce to 
Chicago’s ability to compete for mobile firms.  Mayor Daley and CPS administrators made similar 
points, and also noted the importance of school reform to attracting middle- and upper-class 
taxpayers back to the city. 
The educational reform agenda elaborated by these actors was distinctively neoliberal 
in a second sense.  Policy proscriptions embodied the neoliberal and managerialist ideas.  
Directly quoting Milton Friedman, Left Behind argued that the monopoly structure of public 
education produced inefficiency and poor performance, and advocated the subjection of all 
aspects of the CPS to market discipline.310  It also advocated forms of governance and operations 
based on those of private firms.311  Officials in the Daley and Emanuel administrations made 
similar arguments, as in Daley-appointed CEO of CPS Arne Duncan’s comment, “I’m a big 
 
309 Pauline Lipman, 2011.   
310 Left Behind defined creation of competitive markets and consumer choice, through privatization, as the top priority.  It argued 




believer in choice and competition.  You need to have strong charter schools with real 
accountability.”312 
The vision outlined in this arguments was implemented, beginning with Daley’s 
“Renaissance 2010” plan in 2004.  This initiative closed underperforming or underutilized public 
schools and built 100 new schools, two thirds of which would be charter or contract schools.313  
CPS also enacted new forms of performance monitoring, and systems of sanctioning and 
rewarding schools and teachers. 
This reform agenda was implemented by, and helped foster, a far-reaching system of 
private and non-profit actors.  The city contracted with for-profit education companies, many of 
which are owned by investment firms; another civic organization comprised of corporate 
executives, Chicago’s Civic Committee, formed a new organization and invested $50 million into 
new charters in 2006.314  More generally, “product lines, for-profit supplemental educational 
services, non-profit services, think tanks, and more have evolved to support, elaborate, and 
justify this agenda.”315 
Other institutional reform 
Daley and Emanuel presided over the managerialist reforms of multiple city agencies, 
including the Chicago Transit Authority and Chicago Parks Department (both under the auspices 
of mayor-appointee and Ayn Rand-devotee Forest Claypool).  At each, reforms include sale of 
city assets, outsourcing core the agency’s functions to private firms, and downsizing 
 
312 Quoted in Lipman, 2011:  45. 
313 Charter schools are publicly funded and privately operated by outside firms.  These schools used nonunion teachers (until charter 
school teachers unionized in 2017).  Unlike Chicago’s public schools, charters were not bound by the state law requiring governance 
of the school to include an elected body of teachers, parents, and community members, known as a Local School Council. 
314 Lipman, 2011. 
315 Lipman, 2012:  560. 
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workforces.316  Similar, but even more comprehensive reforms were made in the Chicago 
Housing Authority.317 
Approaches to poverty and inequality  
According to my review of public statements and official documents, politicians and civic 
elites associated with the regime most often define poverty and economic inequality as 
problems of exclusion from the mainstream economy.  They implicitly or explicitly affirm the 
existing economic structure, policies, and growth strategies as sound and potentially able to 
benefit all Chicagoans.  Other commentators have observed the use of cultural explanations for 
poverty.  Though less frequently in recent years, elites have also constructed low-income 
populations as incurably pathological, to legitimate displacement and punitive policies. 
In the late 1980s, political scientist Gregory Squires and coauthors observed that 
Chicago’s policymakers accepted the nationally influential idea that any attempts to address 
poverty and associated social problems require economic growth.  Policymakers in Chiago saw 
poverty and inequality “as issues that can only be addressed after higher-priority concerns—
generating economic growth—have been resolved.”318  The influential planning document 
(referenced above), Chicago Metropolis 2020, written by the Commercial Club of Chicago, 
acknowledged the disparate impacts of Chicago’s post-industrial restructuring, but asserted that 
economic growth was universally beneficial, and the basis for any efforts to address poverty: 
[b]enefits to the majority have been accompanied by serious costs, borne mostly by 
those living in the distressed areas of the central city and in the worst-off suburbs…the 
interests of the inner-city poor, prosperous Gold Coasters, the working-class residents of 
 
316 Claypool’s Speech from "Achieving Great Parks," the March 1996 LWRD Urban Parks Institute conference held in Austin, Texas:  
“We privatized our harbors, garbage collection, equipment maintenance, parking lots, our computer system, medical and risk 
management, Soldier Field and the zoo, among other things.”  At the CTA, cutting the workforce by over 8 percent; at the Parks 
Department by almost 30% (Kampf-Lassen, 2016) 
317 Reed and Bennett, 1999. 
318 Squires et al, 1987:  11-12. 
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outlying Chicago neighborhoods and inner suburbs, and the middle-class homeowners 
of Wilmette, Oak Park, and Olympia Fields converge.319 
 
Former mayor Rahm Emanuel most often proposed to address poverty under the rubric 
of “inclusive growth,” in which chronically disinvested and high-poverty neighborhoods on the 
South and West sides benefit from the city’s growth.  One of Emanuel’s common rhetorical 
tropes exemplifies this vision of inclusivity:  My real goal is that the kids out of Lindblom can see 
themselves at a place like 1871.  Regardless of where they live in the city, I want children in 
Chicago to see downtown, the central business district, and envision themselves as part of this 
dynamic city — the city of energy and opportunity, the city that’s on the move.320 
The neoliberal regime’s discursive constructions of impoverished populations, and that 
of other actors participating the market-based development projects supported by the regime, 
have varied according to political circumstances.  Wilson and Sternberg (2013) analyze 
constructions of poor populations by politicians, real estate developers, and non-profit staff, in 
articles in the Chicago Tribune and in their own interviews.  Residents were constructed through 
one of two discourses.  One, resembling the “underclass discourse” described by Reed (1999, 
2016b), constructs residents as pathologically unable to conform to important social norms.  
Such people were barriers to the improvement of the neighborhood and needed to be removed 
or controlled.  The other emphasized mutable cultural problems, rooted in structural exclusion, 
and the poor’s need and desert for uplifting interventions.  The director of a Community 
Development Corporation in Bronzeville exemplified this construction: “Bronzeville…now 
come[s] back after years of neglect, from the indifference of people…locked into a stifling…and 
 
319 Commercial Club of Chicago, 1999:  46. 
320 Austin, 2013:  13.  Emanuel made a similar comment at the Chicago Mayoral Debate Forum March 25, 2015:  “people can look at 
the skyline, the energy, power, etc. and represents, and see themselves having a place in it.”  In an interview during the 2015 
campaign, Emanuel answered a question on poverty by stating that “we want all parts of the city to grow, all parts have strengths 




afflicted culture. But it’s a hurting and in-need population, and we cannot forget their needs.”321  
Wilson and Sternberg find that the second discourse became more prominent than the first 
after 2005, when local resistance imperiled redevelopment plans, creating a need to coopt 
popular resistance and legitimate redevelopment.   
The regime has primarily attempted to achieve inclusive growth through three types of 
program:  citywide programs and site-specific actions to stimulate private investment in 
disinvested areas; programs and initiatives to expand access to early-childhood and post-
secondary education; and modest progressive regulations of corporate activity designed to raise 
wages and worker benefits.  The regime’s neoliberal education reform programs were also 
intended to expand access to quality education (among other goals), but this was discussed 
above. 
Stimulating market-based development 
The Emanuel administration has tried to spur private investment in disinvested 
neighborhoods through a shifting mix of public programs and publicly funded projects.  These 
programs and projects are always within the dominant paradigm of economic development: 
they use public investment to spur market forces, are implemented by private developers and 
neighborhood-based non-profit development groups, and are envisioned as alleviating poverty 
through economic growth and the creation of private-sector jobs.  In some cases, the projects 
come with modest set-asides for affordable (i.e., below market-rate) housing and public job 
training programs.  Some projects included mechanisms for public input in redevelopment 
planning. 
 
321 Linda Kardasz, in 2009.  Quoted in Wilson and Sternberg, 2013. 
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The 2013 Chicago Neighborhoods Now Initiative exemplifies this approach.322  The 
initiative allocated tax revenues to business and developers to subsidize commercial and 
residential construction projects in selected commercial corridors.  For instance, in Bronzeville, 
the Emanuel administration pledged $153 million in subsidies, and also raised $800 million in 
private investment, for the construction of upscale commercial and residential properties (which 
became “The Shops and Lofts at 47th street).323  The project was intended to permanently make 
the area more attractive to consumers and residents, driving self-sustaining economic 
development.  It would also create “thousands upon thousands of construction jobs.”324  Similar 
projects were planned for 6 other neighborhoods.325  The Daley and Emanuel administrations 
regularly provides public revenues for smaller-scale development projects, which are intended 
to function in the same way.326 
Access to education and youth jobs 
The Emanuel administration has also pursued economic inclusion by supporting access 
to early childhood education and post-secondary education.  In 2013, the administration 
instituted full-day Kindergarten at all Chicago elementary schools, allocating $15 million dollars 
to fund the program.327  In 2014, the Emanuel administration expanded a program to provide 
free pre-kindergarten education to all Chicago residents, and expanded the STAR Scholarship 
program, offering tuition-free education at several Chicago-area colleges for all students 
graduating from Chicago Public Schools with a 3.0 or better GPA.  The Daley and Emanuel 
 
322 Other development programs in this framework include the Chicago Treasurer’s 77 Proud Initiative, providing small businesses 
and entrepreneurs access to capital, and the Retail Thrive Zone, Neighborhood Opportunity Fund, and Small Business Improvement 
Fund programs, discussed in the section The Neoliberal Regime and Race. 
323 Parker, 2013. 
324 Hayes and Francisco, 2013. 
325 The CNN program was also rolled out in parts of Englewood, Rogers Park, Uptown, Little Village, Pullman, and the Eisenhower 
Corridor. 
326 Bennett, 2006; Weber, 2015. 
327 Vevea, 2013.   
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administrations also made public investments in particular community colleges, for example 
allocating several million dollars 
Constructing a neoliberal racial politics 
As in other cities, politicians and activists in Chicago have articulated minority interests 
in ways compatible with, and in some cases actively supportive of, neoliberalization.  Racial 
interests have been constructed as:  community control, defined as representation by authentic 
representatives and sometimes as devolution and grassroots participation in governance; a 
share of particularistic benefits, whether through formal affirmative action policies, or informal 
targeting of jobs and contracts; opportunities to participate in and profit from rent-intensifying 
real estate development; and attacks on racial discrimination.  These definitions are continually 
reproduced by a set of politicians and civic elites, with political, financial, and other ties to the 
neoliberal regime.  The regime has also organized grassroots constituencies around streams of 
particularistic benefits and real estate redevelopment programs  
Machine politics and the definition of racial interest  
Chicago’s history of machine politics, in which the city government distributed public 
jobs, contracts, and city services to supporters, and along ethnic lines, has had lasting effects on 
understandings of racial interest.  Through the early 1970s, Chicago’s machine exchanged 
particularistic benefits for political support, organizing vast patronage networks in Chicago’s 
neighborhoods.  The government’s capacity to distribute patronage was greatly weakened, first 
with the city’s fiscal problems in the late 1960s and 1970s, and then by a series of federal court 
rulings, known as the “Shakman decrees,” which banned the distribution of public jobs to 
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political supporters.328  But the distribution of particularistic benefits, including municipal jobs 
and contracts, has remained an important function of city government. 
While the machine distributed benefits highly unequally along racial lines, Blacks and 
Latinx populations were nevertheless incorporated into the machine on similar terms as other 
groups.  U.S. Congressman William Dawson organized a “black submachine”—patronage 
networks throughout Chicago’s Black Belt “under the aegis of the white-controlled Cook County 
Democratic Party organization.”329  In this arrangement, Blacks received “the types of rewards—
the opportunity to seek prominent public office, control of patronage jobs, and privileged access 
to city services—that had long defined the aspirations of the city’s immigrant and ethnic 
politicians.”330  As national Civil Rights mobilizations generated pressures to address systemic 
issues, including racial segregation and discriminatory allocation of city services in the 1960s, the 
submachine attempted to keep civil rights demands off the agenda.331  Latinx populations were 
incorporated in to the machine on a similar basis.332   
Black and Latinx Nationalist mobilizations in the 1960s and 1970s 
As Cedric Johnson observes of the Black Nationalist movement in general, Chicago’s 
nationalist movement was characterized by ideological and strategic diversity.  But, as in other 
cities, many nationalists in Chicago emphasized political empowerment, economic solidarity and 
autonomy, cultural authenticity, and community control of neighborhood development. 
Several scholars note that actors with varied ideological perspectives converged on a 
vision of “black political power independent of the existing machine, inspired by racial pride and 
 
328 Hegelson, 2014; Squires et al, 1987.  The ward organizations which had organized neighborhood residents on behalf of the 
machine rapidly declined (“with the possible exception of [Illinois House of Representatives Speaker Michael] Madigen’s home 
ward”) (Interview with Carl Rosen, 3/15/17). 
329 Smith, 2012:  12. 
330 Bennett, 2006:  45. 
331 Helgeson, 2014. 
332 Torres, 1991:  168-9.   Richard J. Daley appointed Latinx people to a few relatively prestigious city jobs.  There were three Latinos 
on Board of Education and one on the Regional Transit Authority in the 1960s. 
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solidarity,” and on the view that racial unity was the key to attaining political power.333  For 
some, these political goals were part of a broader separatist project.  For example, the Nation of 
Islam and Universal Negro Improvement Association (which had large presences in Chicago 
through at least the 1980s), coupled this vision of independent political power with the pursuit 
of collective economic self-reliance through entrepreneurship and solidaristic economic 
behavior, seeing them as pillars of Black autonomy within an irredeemably racist society.334  A 
group of locally influential scholars at a Black Studies Program at Northeastern Illinois University 
and the Institute of Positive Education linked this political project with a program of cultural 
autonomy.335  Others, including the League of Independent Negro Voters, based their vision of 
political independence on a critique of the racist practices of Chicago’s machine, but were open 
to pragmatic interracial alliances and integration.336  
These actors, like their counterpart in other cities and nationally, may have been 
informed by early, influential formulations of Black Power, which were based on a pluralist 
model ethnic succession.  In these formulations, Blacks needed to maximize their ability their 
ability to compete for benefits in the pluralist system, as other ethnic groups had done in U.S. 
history.  Larry Bennett (1993) observes that this vision may also reflect the socializing effects of 
the machine:  “[f]or many African-American political activists, most of whom ‘trained’ in politics 
either within the Richard J. Daley Democratic organization or by fighting that same organization, 
the rightful consequence of black Chicagoans coming to power was their dictating the allocation 
of municipal resources.”337   
 
333 Helgeson, 2014:  217, 207. 
334 On Nation of Islam’s projects and relationship to other Black Nationalist formations in the 1960s and 1970s, see Helgeson, 2015:   
On the United Negro Improvement Association’s enduring presence in Chicago, see McDuffie, 2015:  140-1.  On their participation in 
Black Nationalist mobilizations in the 1970s and 1980s, see Alkalilmat and Gillis, 1989.  
335 Alkalimat and Gillis, 1989. Todd-Breland, 2013. 
336 Helgeson, 2015:   
337 Bennett, 1993:  436. 
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Gillis (1991) and Boyd (2007) have described another Black and Latinx Nationalist 
tendency in Chicago focused on controlling economic development in Black and Latinx 
neighborhoods.  This vision was espoused by neighborhood-based organizations, many of which 
grew out of Civil Rights mobilizations in the 1960s.338  Groups applied the nationalist ideas of 
empowerment and self-help in a vision of local influence over public decisions on planning, 
investment.339  Many of these groups engaged in militant political action to protest public and 
private disinvestment and municipal spending priorities, and demanding control of development 
funds and decision-making.340  
The Harold Washington mayoralty and the definition of racial interest 
The Harold Washington mayoralty (1983-1988), and the mass movement supporting his 
candidacy, represented both a nationalistic pursuit of minority political power and particularistic 
benefits, and a progressive vision of redistribution of power and resources.  Due to the 
constraints on Washington’s mayoralty, only the former agendas were durably institutionalized 
in lasting policy changes and political practices. 
The Black nationalist tendencies referenced in the previous section were one pillar of 
the mass movement around Washington’s candidacy.  Alkalimat and Gillis (1989) recount the 
“nationalist oriented, community-based, middle-class leadership” of the movement, based in 
various political organizations, academic institutions and civic groups with a “Black 
nationalist/Pan Africanist ideological orientation.”341  This tendency dominated the Task Force 
for Black Political Empowerment, an umbrella organization which helped launch the Washington 
 
338 Boyd, 2007:  Chapter 2. 
339 Ibid, Chapter 2. Gillis, 1991. 
340 Gillis, 1991. 
341 Alkalimat and Gillis, 1989:  Chapter 7. 
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campaign, and was the campaign’s primary vehicle for popular mobilization.342  Members of this 
tendency saw Washington’s mayoralty as a project of realizing Black political power, 
independent of the machine, and rooted in a mobilized and united Black community.343  Bennett 
(1993) argues that this tendency also viewed the mayoralty as an opportunity to obtain spoils of 
office.344 
The Washington campaign also mobilized the network of progressive neighborhood-
based development organizations.  Although financially dependent on foundations and federal 
grants, these organizations had exploited the instability and diminished power of Chicago’s 
machine since the early 1970s to maintain relatively militant and assertive political activity 
through the 1980s.345  These groups sought in Washington’s mayoralty substantive devolution of 
control over planning and economic development.346 
The Washington administration realized some of the first tendency’s goals for the racial 
redistribution particularistic benefits.  While the administration rationalized the distribution of 
city jobs and contracts through civil service reform, it instituted Affirmative Action and “first 
source” hiring programs, which channeled benefits to Black (and to a lesser extent Latinx) 
communities.347  Bennett (1993) summarizes that “[a]s do most African-American big-city 
 
342 Ibid: 63-4. 
343 Gillis, 1991; Alkalimat and Gills, 1989. 
344 Washington’s electoral coalition combined machine veterans, “comfortable with spoils politics as traditionally practiced in 
Chicago,” and Nationalists who “could think of no reason for the black community not to use its city government to meet its specific 
needs, African-Americans at long last having come to power” (Bennett, 1993:  433) 
345 Immergluck, 2005:  217-19.  After the death of Richard J. Daley, and amidst the regime’s financial troubles, Mayors Balandic and 
Byrne were not been able to obtain the same level of control over neighborhood-level politics as Daley had. 
346 Gillis, 1991.  Clavel and Giloth, 2014:  “the principle that services and capital projects should be decided and delivered not only 
through City Hall but also through neighborhood organizations as well” (22). 
347 Clavel and Giloth, 2014:  23.  The administration enacted affirmative action in city purchasing and contracting and created a “first 
source” hiring program (requiring corporations receiving city contracts or benefits to hire workers from the neighborhoods in which 
they or their projects were located). 
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governments, the Washington administration placed considerable emphasis on affirmative 
action in city hiring and contracting.”348 
The administration also helped realize the nationalist vision of independent political 
power in at least two ways.  First, the administration launched and won a lawsuit to force the 
redrawing of Chicago’s wards, creating four new majority-minority wards, which elected racially 
descriptive representatives in the subsequent special elections.349  Second, the Washington 
mayoralty realized Black political empowerment symbolically.  For many observers, the 
Washington administration embodied Black empowerment.  The intensely, and at times 
explicitly, racialized political conflicts, especially in Washington’s first term, encouraged the 
perception that the Washington mayoralty entailed “racial succession” in the control of city 
government.  Some of Washington’s campaign rhetoric evoked this idea (although he took pains 
to play down this theme in office).350 
The administration attempted to realize progressive economic policy agendas, informed 
by the demands of neighborhood-based groups.  The administration enacted several programs 
to prevent the departure of manufacturing firms from Chicago.351  It also devolved substantial 
control of planning and economic development to politically independent, progressive 
neighborhood organizations, and transferred economic development funds from downtown 
projects to distressed neighborhood.352  It was unclear if either program had the potential to 
substantially alter patterns of economic development or redistribute resources in the city.353  In 
 
348 Bennett, 1993:  435. 
349 Fremon, 1988:  9. 
350 Alkalimat and Gillis, 1991; Bennett, 1993  
351 Industrial retention initiatives included task forces on keeping key industries; “planned manufacturing districts” (which were 
zoned to support manufacturing); and the Local Industrial Retention Initiative, which provided a range of planning and support 
services to industrial firms in designated areas (Clavel and Giloth, 2014). 
352 Gillis, 1991. 
353 Clavel and Giloth (2014) cite the retrospective comments of proponents of industrial retention from the Washington 
administration that the policy could not succeed in the absence of a federal industrial policy. 
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any case, both innovations were undone early in the Richard M. Daley mayoralty:  Daley 
reprioritized rent-intensifying commercial and residential development, centralized control of 
planning and development decisions in the planning department, and instructed this 
department to collaborate closely with the private development industry, rather than 
neighborhood-based non-profits.354  Daley also had ended most of Washington’s industrial 
retention initiatives by the late 1990s.355 
The neoliberal regime and the definition of racial interest 
The Daley and Emanuel administrations have produced and propagated neoliberal 
constructions of racial interest and justice through three main strategies.  First, they used the 
institutional powers of the mayoralty to incorporate Black and Latinx politicians and civic leaders 
into the regime.  Operating within the regime’s policy frameworks, these leaders continue to 
present their work and tenure in office in discourses on racial empowerment and uplift, helping 
to generate a neoliberal-compatible construction of racial justice.  Second, by organizing 
patronage relationships with minority constituencies, and by talking about minority interests in 
terms of particularistic benefits, the regime reinforces the tendency for minority populations to 
think about political interest in terms of particularistic benefits, rather than transformative 
policy demands.  Third, the regime’s programs and practices have helped mostly middle-class 
homeowners and businesses in minority neighborhoods participate in market-oriented 
redevelopment.  In so doing, the regime cultivated a strata of economic and civic actors who can 
articulate market-based development as racial interest. 
Incorporation minority political and civic leadership 
 
354 Clavel and Giloth, 2014:  23-4. 
355 Ibid, 27-8. 
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The Daley and Emanuel administrations have incorporated minority political and civic 
leaders into the regime.  These leaders articulate widely resonant conceptions of racial 
empowerment and authenticity, drawn from Nationalist mobilizations, in ways that are 
compatible with mayoral dominance and the regime’s policy frameworks.  In this way, they help 
produce and propagate neoliberal constructions of racial interest and justice.  
The Daley and Emanuel administrations have used the institutional powers of the 
mayoralty to build a layer of loyal political allies in minority communities.  Both administrations 
used the mayoral ability to appoint aldermen to create political allies in minority communities, 
appointing a civic or political leader with a following in the community, and securing their 
political loyalty through this appointment.356  The administrations wielded the mayor’s other 
institutional powers, such as the ability to facilitate or impede local economic development 
projects, to secure existing minority leaders political support.357 
These practices have produced a layer of regime-allied minority politicians with 
prominent institutional positions, including in city, county, state, and national governments.358  
For the regime, these relationships have several political functions.359  They have a crucial effect 
on the definition of racial interest and justice, similar to that of the “Black urban regime,” 
described in Chapter 1.  These prominent institutional politicians pursue relatively narrow 
agendas, within the regime’s policy frameworks.  But they present these agendas, and their own 
 
356 In Chicago, when an incumbent alderman is removed from office during their term, the mayor can appoint an interim alderman, 
who serves until a special election is held.  Often, the appointed alderman is able to secure political advantages of incumbency 
during their interim service.  Rahm Emanuel appointed Silvana Tabares in the primarily Latinx 23rd Ward in 2018, and Sophia King in 
primarily Black 4th Ward in 2016, and Natashia Holmes in the primarily Black 7th Ward in 2013.  Richard M. Daley appointed 19 
aldermen over his 22 years in office.  Strategic appointments in minority communities included Emma Mitts in the primarily Black 
37th Ward in 2000, Carrie Austin in the predominantly Black 34th Ward in 1994, and Roberto Maldonado in the largely Latinx 26th 
Ward in 2009. 
357 Interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17.  As Han said, “people have to, it’s a one party town; if you want to have any impact, particularly 
on behalf of a marginalized community, then you have to play the game.” 
358 Prominent examples of close Daley allies, with large followings in minority communities, included alderman and later U.S. 
Representative Luis Gutierrez, and alderman and the first Black president of the Cook County Board of Commissioners, John Stroger. 
359 In addition to maintaining City Council majorities, these allies bolster their patrons’ credibility and popularity in minority 
communities, and can provide resources amidst any charges of racism. 
126 
 
tenure in office, as the fulfillment of a racial empowerment agenda, drawing on the discourses 
of the Black Power and Harold Washington movements, in which many served.  In the words of 
one commentator, “Chicago has many politicians who come out of those movements, and who 
very vocally carry that torch, but who’ve spent twenty years selling out to Daley and the Chicago 
machine.”360  These politicians are a thus a crucial mechanism fixing the meaning of racial 
empowerment, authentic representation, and other nodal concepts of racial justice discourses, 
in ways that are compatible with, or supportive of, neoliberalism.  
Particularistic benefits 
The Daley and Emanuel administrations have built constituencies in minority 
communities by distributing particularistic benefits.  Though civil service reform has greatly 
reduced politicians’ ability to distribute municipal jobs to political supporters, they still control 
the distribution of some contracts, grants, and jobs.  Bennett (2006) observes that 
“opportunities for politically connected African Americans and Latinos to participate in 
residential development consortiums, or to bid on city contracts for various public works 
improvements, are legion.”361  Emanuel emphasized the delivery of jobs to minority 
communities in his 2015 and (prior to his decision not to run for reelection) 2019 mayoral 
campaigns.362  In several cases, these benefits are distributed via prominent churches in minority 
neighborhoods, who receive city contracts to provide services in exchange for endorsements 
and political support.363 
 
360 Interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17. 
361 Bennett, 2006:  54. 
362 In mayoral debates and candidate fora in 2015, Emanuel emphasized the number of minority jobs and contracts in the building 
trades, the Chicago Transit Authority, and his own administration. Chicago Mayoral Debate Forum March 25, 2015 
In 2018, when launching his ultimately aborted reelection campaign, Emanuel trumpeted his proposal for “incentive programs 
aimed at boosting minority contracting and employment” (Spielman, 2018.  https://chicago.suntimes.com/chicago-politics/lightfoot-
calls-emanuels-95-million-police-academy-plan-ill-conceived/) 
363 Interview with Jason Lee, 3/1/17.  
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The Daley administration built larger grassroots networks of political supporters in 
minority communities.  Most notably, in 1993, Daley helped organize the Hispanic Democratic 
Organization, a network of Latinx activists, many of whom held city jobs, which mobilized 
campaign workers and financial contributions for regime-backed candidates.  Before HDO’s 
indictment for exchanging municipal jobs for political support and subsequent disbanding in 
2008, it could “flood campaign workers into electoral districts with substantial Latino 
populations” and was a powerful source of grassroots support for the regime.364 
By organizing political support around particularistic benefits, the Daley and Emanuel 
administrations have reinforced the tendency for minority communities to think about politics in 
terms of particularistic benefits, distributed along ethnic and territorial lines.  Three 
commentators noted that this way of thinking about politics is deeply engrained in Chicago’s 
minority communities, impeding the task of organizing around transformative policy 
demands.365  
Cultivating minority constituencies for market-based development 
The regime has also built constituencies in distressed minority neighborhoods by 
facilitating participation in market-oriented development, organizing homeowners, business 
owners and aspiring entrepreneurs.  The Department of Planning and Development has 
provided discrete benefits to targeted neighborhood residents, for instance selling city-owned 
properties at a discount rate to nearby property owners.366  The Daley and Emanuel 
administration also created vehicles for constituencies to participate in local redevelopment 
planning.  The Daley administration created Community Conservation Councils in several 
 
364 Bennett, 2006:  52.  
365 Interview with Jason Lee, 3/1/17.  Interview with Jackson Potter, 3/7/17.  Interview with Carl Rosen, 3/15/17. 
366 Johnson, 2015:  192.  Johnson describes the low-cost auction of city-owned properties on South Side of Chicago, in which only 
people who already owned land on the block were eligible. 
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neighborhoods, participatory organizations which convened local residents, developers, and 
elected officials.367  Observing one South Side CCC, Pattillo (2007) observes that the alderman-
appointed members were overwhelming middle-class homeowners and that the CCC was 
primarily concerned with rising property values.368 
In his second term, the Emanuel administration launched two programs which support 
small business development in targeted minority communities on the South and West Sides.  
The Neighborhood Opportunity Fund distributes grants to small businesses and non-profits in 
eligible South and West Side neighborhoods.  Businesses in select neighborhoods can apply for 
grants of up to $250,000, for new construction or rehabilitation of buildings, with additional 
bonuses if business is owned by or hires neighborhood residents.  The program had 800 
applicants and 57 grantees in 2017 and 2018.369  The Retail Thrive Zone program distributes tax 
revenues to business in 8 designated retail corridors in 6 West and South neighborhoods.  In 
2017 and 2018, 108 small businesses (mostly restaurants, retailers, or arts and culture venues) 
received grants of up to $250,000.  The city also created a streamlined process for obtaining tax 
abatements for businesses in these corridors.  In addition to these programs targeted to 
minority communities, at least two other citywide small business programs deliver benefits to 
minority communities.370 
These programs have absorbed many of the racial justice activists who had pursued 
entrepreneurship and community control of development as racial empowerment strategies.  
Michelle Boyd (2007) recounts how non-profit neighborhood development groups, rooted in 
 
367 Another such participatory body is the Tax Increment Financing Advisory Boards, designed to enable community input into the 
use of funds in special Tax Increment Financing accounts. 
368 Pattillo, 2003:  66-8.  
369 The Fund was created in 2017.  Revenue is supplied by a fee which developers pay if they exceed zoning restrictions on building 
size and density. 
370 These are the Small Business Improvement Fund, which allocates local tax revenues to business construction or expansion 
projects, and the Small Business Improvement Fund Bridge Loan Program, which connects small businesses to secure small loans 
from non-profit financial institutions. 
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Black Nationalist struggles, formed relationships with the Daley administration’s Department of 
Planning and Development and private developers in the 1990s.371  Chapter 4 of this dissertation 
shows that Black Nationalist activists in the Austin neighborhood arranged the inclusion of a 
local corridor in the Retail Thrive Zone and Neighborhood Opportunity Fund programs, and 
reoriented their civic organizations toward market-based development. 
As these programs organize business and property-owners around opportunities to 
profit from redevelopment, they create a layer of civic and economic actors who can articulate 
market-oriented development as racial interest.  Boyd describes community development 
organizations, enmeshed in relationships with the Daley administration and private developers, 
presenting redevelopment as the expression of an authentic racial culture.  Chapter 4 shows 
that activists in Austin also constructed redevelopment in Black Nationalist discourses.  Finally, 
the Emanuel administration presented its business programs in this way, valorizing minority 
business development, and referencing racial groups or immigrants when describing his 
administration’s business development programs.372  
Bases of political support  
Actors from the segments of the economy supported by the neoliberal regime are, not 
surprisingly, the core of the regime’s political coalition.  Political scientists Larry Bennet observes 
that elites in the aforementioned sectors “offer various forms of political assistance to the 
mayor—tactical advice, access to campaign contributors, support from one or another civic 
organization.373  The bulk of financial contributions to Daley’s and Emanuel’s election campaigns 
 
371 Boyd, 2007:  Chapter 3. 
372 For example, in an interview launching his ultimately aborted 2019 reelection campaign, Emanuel noted “almost half the new 
businesses started in this city are started by immigrants.  They keep a vibrancy to a city…” (WGN interview, 4/23/18) 
373 Bennett, 2006:  52. 
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come from actors in the FIRE industries and real estate developers.374  At the ward level, 
developers are often the largest contributors to their aldermen’s reelection campaigns (except 
for allies of the mayor, who receive large contributions from the mayor’s SuperPAC) and 
aldermen often have investments in real estate concerns after (or even during) their time in 
office. 
Aldermen themselves are also well-integrated into the regime.  Alignment with (or 
acquiescence to) the regime is reflected in consistent support for mayor’s proposals (including 
proposed budgets, and legislation the mayor introduces or endorses).  Former alderman turned 
political scientist Dick Simpson (and colleagues) measured the rate at which aldermen vote with 
and against the mayor’s proposals.  Through the 2000’s, most aldermen voted with Mayor Daley 
at least 90% of the time.375  City Council mostly continued to function as a “rubber stamp” for 
Mayor Emanuel’s proposals, except for “a small handful of regularly dissenting Aldermen.”376   
The integration of aldermen into the regime is also reflected in the active participation 
of many aldermen in the regime’s economic projects:  As noted, aldermen are central players in 
rent-intensifying redevelopment in their neighborhoods.  Many aldermen actively support 
corporate growth through the regime’s supply-side mechanisms, for example, allocating public 
funds to firms as subsidies.  Most aldermen pursue race and class based redistribution through 
the regime-assimilated frameworks of affirmative action in city contracting and hiring.377 
The alignment of the aldermen with the regime is secured by the mayor’s ability to fund 
aldermen’s reelection campaigns (or those of challengers).  They mayor’s institutional powers 
also create many opportunities to reward or punish aldermen by supporting or impeding 
 
374 https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/summary?cid=N00024813&cycle=CAREER.  Accessed 2/10/18. 
375 Simpson et al, 2004. 
376 Zmuda and Simpson, 2013; Simpson et al, 2015. 
377 Interview with Larry Bennett, 3/13/17. 
131 
 
economic development in their wards (as discussed more in Chapter 5).  As Bennett (2006) 
points out, the deterioration of the old ward-based patronage organizations left aldermen 
without a strong source of electoral support in the ward, leaving them more dependent on the 
mayor.378 
A set of civic organizations, in fields such as women’s rights, poverty alleviation, and 
public health, help formulate and implement equity- and inclusion-oriented policies, within the 
regime’s larger economic framework of corporate-led growth.  While these organizations 
sometimes act independently of the regime, their implicit support for its policy frameworks and 
frequent collaboration with it on policy development suggest they are best seen as its left wing, 
or “loyal opposition.”  The boards and leaderships of these organizations are often drawn from 
the upper echelons of corporate Chicago.379 
Discussion  
This chapter is intended to set the stage for the case studies of neighborhood-level 
organizing in subsequent chapters.  Like Chapter 3, this chapter enables a fuller understanding 
of the identity and significance of key actors, programs, and institutions described in subsequent 
chapters.  Most simply, the referent will be clear when subsequent chapters mention the 
neoliberal regime, or its constituent programs, actors, or practices.  Also, along with Chapter 3, 
this chapter situates neighborhood-level developments and outcomes in a broader political 
context.  It will be possible to see how particular neighborhood projects or movements are 
aligned with the neoliberal or left formations.   For example, we can see that neighborhood-
 
378 Bennett, 2006:  52. 
379 One exemplary group is Women Employed, an advocacy group for interests of “working women,” articulated within the regime’s 
economic framework.  The group advocates modest increases in state provision (e.g., for education and job training) and modest 
regulations (e.g., a minimum wage and paid sick live law).  Women Employed collaborated with the regime to develop and pass 
policies on paid sick leave and workplace gender discrimination.  
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level racial justice activism focused on market-oriented real estate development can be easily 
incorporated into the neoliberal regime, given the regime’s constitutive commitments to rent-
intensifying development.  In this way, it will be possible to see how outcomes at the 
neighborhood-level have concrete implications for the conflict between the left formation and 
the neoliberal regime. 
This chapter helps ground the dissertation’s claim to speak to a particular class of cases. 
This chapter showed that Chicago resembles other contemporary cities in important ways. 
First, Chicago’s regime is typical of the neoliberal regimes proliferating in U.S. cities since the 
1970s, with similar policy commitments and modes of governance, and similar underlying 
visions.   Along with the description of Chicago’s left formation in Chapter 3, this chapter thus 
shows that the contemporary political conflict in Chicago is similar to that recently occurring in 
other U.S. cities.  Second, the primary explanatory factors of this study—the post-1960s 
institutional developments hypothesized to shape the terrain for neighborhood organizing—
have occurred in Chicago, in line with national trends.  Any findings about the effects of these 
institutional developments may generalize to the other cities where these developments have 
occurred. 
This chapter also makes two points about Chicago’s neoliberal regime which do not 
directly relate to the dissertation’s main questions about the terrain for neighborhood 
organizing.  I argue that the current regime should be seen both as a phase in the continuous 
control of the city government by economic elites with investments in local markets and 
property, and as an articulation of upper-class interests, specific to the political economic 




Chicago has long been governed by economic elites who use policy to facilitate profit-
making.  Though not examined in this dissertation, scholars have described similar coalitions of 
corporate elites dominating city government and orienting policy toward maximizing 
accumulation since the 1830s.   Below, I show that a coalition of real estate, commercial, 
financial, and industrial interests dominated policy-making in several key areas including 
planning, economic development and taxation from the end of World War II through the early 
1970s.  The contemporary regime, and its pursuit of corporate- and real estate-led growth, 
should be seen as a moment in this long chain of elite-dominated governments oriented toward 
maximizing profit.  
On the other hand, these elite-dominated formations respond to and reflect the 
particular economic, political, and institutional conditions of their historical moments.  For 
example, in any era, the composition of the governing coalition reflects the city’s industrial 
base—with relatively more industrialists in the Post-War era, and relatively more actors from 
the financial and corporate service sectors in the contemporary regime.  Elite economic and 
governance visions also reflect the era’s federal urban policies, macro-economic trends, 
dominant intellectual currents, and evolution of public institutions.  Below, I show that the 
neoliberal regime should be seen as a product of historically specific economic, political, 





CHAPTER 4:  The United Working Families Coalition and Chicago’s 
Resurgent Left 
There is a growing political formation in Chicago, comprised of progressive labor unions, 
neighborhood-based non-profits, racial justice organizations, political action groups, and 
assorted other actors.  Intensely critical of the neoliberal regime and its policies, this formation 
seeks economic redistribution along class lines, a racial justice program focused on eliminating 
racially discriminatory policing practices and developing a public safety program oriented 
toward restorative justice, protection of undocumented immigrants, and enhanced democratic 
control of public institutions. 
In the last 10 years, this formation has become “a secure node in local politics:” it has 
built “a popular constituent base dependable and potent enough to challenge [the neoliberal 
regime] other than episodically and symbolically.”380  The formation regularly mobilizes large 
amounts of personnel and financial resources on well-planned and successful electoral and issue 
campaigns.  Through an increasingly sophisticated electoral apparatus, the formation has 
recruited, trained, and supported candidates for city, county, and state government, winning 
several races against regime-backed incumbents.  The formation has also led, or participated in, 
successful lobbying campaigns at the city and state level, and appears to have secured close 
relationships with several state and municipal legislators.  Since 2015, the formation has 
launched or supported new efforts to organize grassroots support for its agendas in several of 
Chicago’s high-poverty neighborhoods. 
This chapter has two purposes.  First, it attempts a more comprehensive description of 
this evolving, amorphous formation than is currently available in the secondary literature.  I 
 
380 Reed, 2016b:  268. 
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reviewed coalition documents (including published texts, statements of leaders, and internal 
communications), public financial records, and media coverage of coalition activities, and 
conducted interviews with 11 leaders and staff members of coalition organizations.  I describe 
the coalition’s composition and structure, and its policy agenda, key ideological tensions, and its 
political activities. 
Second, this chapter sets the stage for the case studies on neighborhood organizing in 
subsequent chapters, in two ways.  Along with the preceding review of Chicago’s neoliberal 
regime, this study describes the current political conjuncture in Chicago, clarifying the axes of 
political contention, key political formations and political opportunity structures.  This 
description clarifies the identity of many of the key actors involved in those neighborhood 
organizing projects, and allows a fuller understanding of the political stakes of those projects.  
This chapter also reviews a set of historical developments which could be expected to shape the 
terrain for neighborhood organizing:  the growth of the left in Chicago may have produced left 
activists and diffused left discourses on issues, identities, or political possibilities.  These 
developments could transform the context for neighborhood organizing, just as I expect 
neoliberalization has. 
Outline of Chapter 
This chapter presents the following findings: 
• I first review the history of the formation, noting its origins in a relatively small 
progressive coalition, active in the 1990s and 2000s.  I recount how a series of reactions 
to neoliberalization and associated problems expanded the coalition, widened its 
agenda, and produced a set of shared analyses and vision. 
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• I next discuss the current composition and structure of the coalition, recounting its 
members, the members’ links to a broader left milieu in the city, and the coalition’s key 
institutional nodes. 
• I next discuss the coalition’s ideologies and agenda, reviewing their social and political 
analysis, and their broad policies agendas for economic redistribution, transformation of 
the criminal justice system, racial justice, democratization, and protection of 
immigrants.  I also describe their vision of a political movement based in the working- 
and lower-classes, capable of taking power and enacting desired policy changes. 
• I discuss key ideological tensions in the coalition, noting divergent definitions of racial 
justice, and different views about the amount and kinds of neighborhood economic 
development that are desirable.  I argue that the coalition’s vision and agenda around 
economic development are not yet well developed or coherent. 
• I will briefly review the coalition’s political work, noting their electoral projects and 
legislative lobbying. 
• Finally, I will describe the coalition’s attempts to continue to expand, focusing on their 
leadership and activist training programs, and grassroots base-building initiatives. 
Table 4.1:  Abbreviations in this chapter 
UWF United Working Families 
CTU Chicago Teachers Union 
SEIU HCII Service Employees International Union Healthcare, Illinois Indiana Missouri Kansas 
AFSCME American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 
GC Grassroots Collaborative 
GIA Grassroots Illinois Action 
LSNA Logan Square Neighborhood Association  
KOCO Kenwood Oakland Community Organization  
BRA Black Roots Alliance 
CODE Communities Organized for Democracy in Education 
MBL Movement for Black Lives 
BYP100 Black Youth Project 100 
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BLM Black Lives Matter 
1. Development of the UWF Coalition 
This section reviews the historical development of Chicago’s left milieu and community-
labor coalition.  It traces the origins of the coalition to progressive issue and electoral campaigns 
in the 1990s and 2000s.  It then recounts the growth of the coalition and broader milieu during a 
series of grassroots movements and organizational transformations in the late 2000s and early 
2010s, catalyzed by the Great Recession and neoliberal austerity programs.  These movements 
mobilized new people and groups into politics, many of whom developed some affiliation with 
the coalition.  The movements, and emerging relationships among groups and activist networks, 
helped to diffuse a left analysis and agenda.  This section highlights three key developments:  
the radicalization of the Chicago Teachers Union in 2010, the struggles against neoliberal school 
reform in the late 2000s and early 2010s, and grassroots movements responding to Chicago’s 
housing crises in the same years.381 
The Grassroots Collaborative and progressive coalitional activity in the 1990s and 
2000s 
The United Working Families coalition can be traced to collaborations among 
progressive labor unions and NGOs on issue and electoral projects in the 1990s and 2000s.  
While there were several such recurring collaborations, past scholarship and my own 
 
381 Commentators and my interviewees noted that other grassroots movements had the same effects, mobilizing new groups and 
people into left activism, and generating some ideas which informed the Chicago’s progressive-left forces’ analysis and agenda.  
These include the Occupy Chicago mobilization (which, like the original Occupy Wall Street event, convened protestors for a 
sustained occupation of public spaces in the Central Business District, with a broad focus on economic inequality), a grassroots 
movement to protest the closure of six public mental health clinics beginning in 2012, a movement to undermine Chicago’s bid to 
host the 2012 Winter Olympics (called No Games Chicago), and a dramatic and successful sit-down strike at the Republic Windows 
factory.  The mental health movement helped establish the left’s focus on neoliberal disinvestment from public services (Burt, 2018; 
Interview with Natalie Crary, 2017).  Occupy Chicago, No Games Chicago, and the Republic Windows Strike helped inspire an 
assertive and militant political posture generally, and a focus on class inequality (Interview with Matt Luskin, 2017). 
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interviewees identify the umbrella organization the Grassroots Collaborative and its campaigns 
as especially important precursors to United Working Families.382  These coalitions and 
campaigns fostered relationships among key actors comprising Chicago’s contemporary left, and 
helped actors refine political strategies. 
The key pillar of the Collaborative, providing most of its financial and personnel 
resources, was the Service Employees International Union’s large healthcare local, SEIU Local 
880 (which later affiliated with the multi-state union SEIU Health Care Illinois and Indiana).  
Most of the remaining members were neo-Alinskyite neighborhood-based organizations, 
focused on grassroots organizing and advocacy campaigns.  These groups were formed by 
personnel trained in Alinsky’s mode of community organizing, and were financially supported (at 
least in their early years) by the National Center for Training and Information, the Industrial 
Areas Foundation, and other national entities supporting this form of community practice.  The 
roots in Alinskyite ideology and support from NCTI help explain these CBOs’ divergence from 
national trends described in Chapter 2 of political incorporation into dominant regimes and 
focus on service provision and/or development.  Interviewees also cited an absence of other 
effective service-provider or advocacy organizations in the neighborhood (and thus the 
opportunity to obtain foundation funding for service work despite engaging in contentious 
politics) and a local grassroots constituency supportive or demanding of contentious political 
work as additional factors explaining these groups’ orientations.383  Among these groups, 
 
382 Others sustained progressive coalitions in the 1990s and 2000s in Chicago include the Chicago chapter of Jobs with Justice and the 
Industrial Area’s Foundation’s United Power.  The former has convened a wide array of progressive groups, but only shallowly and 
episodically, and thus has not forged relationships (Dobbie, 2010:  55).  The latter “has been unable to build deep relationships 
among members or launch substantial campaigns” (Moberg, 2006).   Forming in 2011, a slightly later coalition was Stand Up Chicago, 
part of the SEIU’s national Fight for a Fair Economy (mentioned in Chapter 1).  This coalition convened the same actors as the 
Grassroots Collaborative, in addition to the then newly radicalized Chicago Teachers Union.  The coalition focused on a living wage 
ordinance for box stores, and the receipt of tax breaks and other public subsidies by banks and other large corporations (Bradbury et 
al, 2014:  93). 
383 Interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17; Interview with Carl Rosen, 3/15/17. 
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scholars cite the Chicago chapter of the Association of Community Organizations for Reform 
Now (ACORN; renamed Action Now in January 2008, after its formal exit from ACORN, due to 
disagreements with national ACORN leadership over strategy) as the most influential member of 
the collaborative (in addition to SEIU 880).384  Other NGO members of the collaborative included 
Blocks Together in Humboldt Park, Albany Park Neighborhood Council (which later developed a 
close political relationship with the neoliberal regime and attenuated its militant advocacy), 
Brighton Park Neighborhood Council, and the citywide NGO Chicago Coalition for the Homeless. 
385 
The Grassroots Collaborative helped lead a series of issue campaigns in the 1990s and 
2000s, mostly focused on the rights of undocumented immigrants and wages and working 
conditions of lower-class workers.  The coalition led or participated in “inside-outside” 
campaigns (i.e., campaigns combining direct lobbying of legislators via close personal 
relationships and grassroots mobilizations to demonstrate popular support) related to amnesty 
for undocumented immigrants, the right for undocumented people to obtain a driver’s license, 
city funding for affordable housing in rapidly development neighborhoods, and raising the state 
minimum wage.386  It also led a series of more sustained policy campaigns focused at the city 
level, successfully pursuing a living wage from 1995 to 1998, and unsuccessfully seeking an 
ordinance to ban “big box stores” (such as Wal-Mart) tin 1999, and an ordinance requiring big 
box stores to pay a living wage from 2004-2006. 387 
 
384 Dobbie, 2010; Tattersall, 2011. 
385 On Blocks Together’s sponsorship by the National Training and Information Center (an Alinskyite organization, as described in 
Chapter 1):  Heathcott; Scully, 1999:  99; Chaskin et al, 2001:  105.  On Albany Park Neighborhood Council’s sponsorship by the 
National Training and Information Center:  Noden, 2002.  On Brighton Park Neighborhood Council’s sponsorship by the Industrial 
Areas Foundation, and its Chicago affiliate, United Power for Action and Justice:  Block, 2009. 
386 Tatersall, 2011. 
387 Tattersall, 2011:  69.  The anti-Wal Mart campaign co-led by the United Food and Commercial Workers of Chicago. 
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Grassroots Collaborative, and especially ACORN and the SEIU 880, were also active in 
the electoral sphere.  ACORN led two efforts to build a political party to the left of the 
Democratic Party in the 1990s It attempted to affiliate with the national Working Families Party, 
and later started the New Party, which ran slates of candidates for City Council and in the late 
1990s (and elected an alderman in the 15th Ward).  In 2004 and 2007, the Grassroots 
Collaborative, and especially the SEIU 880 deployed an unprecedented level of money and 
personnel on aldermanic campaigns, targeting aldermen who had not voted for the coalition-
backed Living Wage and “big box store” ordinances.388 
Contemporary observers credited the Grassroots Collaborative with building the 
organizational and personal relationships which underpin the United Working Families coalition.  
As SEIU HCII staffer and UWF board member Alex Han mentioned that Grassroots Collaborative 
has been a space 
to intentionally build relationships between organizers and activists and leaders 
of different organizations, and those relationships have been the basis for 
ongoing collaboration…[It’s] not just executive directors and presidents of 
unions [who] can sit down and talk with each other, but there’s been a lot of 
membership leader training together. 389 
 
Dobbie (2010) argues that living wage campaigns were “widely credited [i.e., by Dobbie’s 
interviewees] with opening up local unions to the benefits of working with community groups 
and laying the groundwork for tighter collaboration” subsequently.390 
Informants emphasized working through issues related to “turf”—i.e., building trust that 
collaboration wouldn’t infringe on each organization’s own interests.  Quoting the director of an 
NGO participating in the GC, Dobbie (2010) argues that this trust developed gradually:  “I don't 
lose my identity being part of the Grassroots Collaborative…it's about building relationships and 
 
388 Sites, 2013:  2580-1. 
389 Interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17. 
390 Dobbie, 2010:  32 
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building trust, and realizing that nobody's self-interest is going to be stomped out, but whenever 
we can come together and have a collective interest, that's when we all gain.391  Han echoed this 
sentiment, noting that collaboration has “allowed us to work through some of those thorny 
issues.”392  
According to past scholarship and my interviewees, the living wage campaigns helped to 
develop coalition leaders’ strategic vision of using issue campaigns as a tool for movement-
building.  Tattersall reports interview data that Grassroots Collaborative members were 
impressed by their successes with grassroots outreach and leadership development in the 2004-
2006 living wage campaign.393  Terry Davis, a retired union organizer, recalled that the living 
wage campaign, and the follow-up challenges to opposed aldermen, “was one of the first times 
you saw a policy campaign tied directly to an electoral mobilization.”394 
Reorientation of the Chicago Teachers Union 
In 2010, a left-leaning caucus, the Caucus of Rank-and-File Educators (CORE) won 
control of the Chicago Teachers Union.  Prior to CORE’s election, the CTU had a typical “business 
unionist” orientation, pursuing its goals through insider negotiations with district policymakers, 
and restricting its focus to wages and working conditions, narrowly defined.395  CORE committed 
the union to a set of goals and strategies which scholars have labeled “social movement 
unionism,” building coalitions beyond the union, investing in grassroots organizing, and pursuing 
a broad policy agenda. 
 
391 Dobbie, 2010:  54 
392 Interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17. 
393 Tattersall, 2011:  82. 
394 Interview with Terry Davis, 3/6/17. 
395 Bradbury et al, 2014.  Bruno and Ashby, 2016.  MacAlevey, 2016. 
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Under CORE, the union has invested in organizing and mobilizing rank-and-file workers 
for workplace militancy and political action.  It has attempted to build close relationships with 
parents of public school students, with students, and with community-based activists.  The 
union has committed to a broad education policy agenda, opposing neoliberal education 
reforms (including charterization, reliance on standardized testing, and cuts in public education 
funding), and articulating a vision of comprehensive reinvestment.  And it has pursued a wider 
progressive policy agenda, including public reinvestment in social services, public support for 
affordable housing, and progressive revenue policies.  The CTU has consistently tried to advance 
these agendas in its contract negotiations with the city, and in electoral and issue campaigns at 
the city and state levels.  After it’s reorientation, the CTU quickly joined the Grassroots 
Collaborative, Stand Up Chicago, and other left-leaning citywide advocacy coalitions.  
CORE was comprised of “long-time socialists” (some of them members of the 
International Socialist Organization), and progressive Democrats alienated from the union’s 
conservative leadership.396  The organization was galvanized by decades of neoliberal reforms 
and frustrated by the union’s failure to contest them.  As several biographers recount, CORE 
members developed an analysis of neoliberalization as a class project through a series of 
reading groups and informal study sessions prior to winning control of the union.  Their analysis 
appealed widely to rank-and-file teachers who had observed the pattern of disinvestment and 
school closures in the district.397 
The reorientation of the CTU was a pivotal moment in the development of Chicago’s 
left.  Several of my informants cited the CTU’s 2012 strike as a key moment inspiring a more 
assertive left politics and activism in the city.  More importantly, the CTU greatly increased the 
 
396 Uetricht, 2014.  Bradbury et al, 2014. 
397 Bradbury et al, 2014. Bruno and Ashby, 2016.   
143 
 
resource base of Chicago’s left.  With 32,000 members, the CTU is the city’s largest labor union.  
The CTU’s personnel and financial resources enabled Chicago’s progressive coalition to quickly 
expand its issue, electoral, and organizing campaigns.  Along with the SEIU HCII, CTU contributes 
the vast majority of funding to the electoral campaigns of UWF, and (according to multiple 
commentators) accounts for most of the coalition’s lobbying clout at the state level.398 
Opposition to neoliberal education reform 
Struggles against neoliberal education reform deepened relationships between the 
Chicago Teachers Union, progressive neighborhood organizations, and left-leaning academic 
institutions and helped produce a common analysis of neoliberalization as an upper-class 
project and as a moment in a long history of racial apartheid in Chicago.  They also diffused an 
analysis of neoliberal education reform and gentrification as inseparably linked programs. 
Several of Chicago’s progressive neighborhood organizations had been protesting school 
closures and charterization since the launch of those reforms by the Richard M. Daley 
administration in 1995.  Even prior to winning control of the CTU, CORE (the aforementioned 
left-leaning caucus in the CTU) began working with these neighborhood groups to develop a 
vision of resistance to neoliberal education reform.399  Past scholarship, as well as my interviews, 
recount collaborations between CORE, Kenwood Oakland Community Organization, the Pilsen 
Alliance, Blocks Together, ACORN/Action Now, the Grassroots Collaborative, and other 
progressive groups.400  While I have not been able to obtain enough data to unpack the 
processes of ideological synthesis, data suggest that these conversations helped produce a 
common analysis:  community groups (especially KOCO and the Pilsen Alliance) and scholars 
 
398 Interview with William Sites, 3/16/17. 
399 Bradbury et al, 2014:  14.  Interview with Matt Luskin, 3/7/17.  Interview with Jackson Potter, 3/7/17. 
400 Bradbury et al, 2014:  14-15, 23. 
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contributed an analysis of neoliberal education reform as a deliberate attempt to expedite the 
displacement of working-class and low-income residents of color from neighborhoods with 
potential for redevelopment.401  CORE’s members contributed an emerging critique of 
neoliberalization and disinvestment as a class project, siphoning resources to economic elites.402  
Mathew Luskin, CTU organizer and UWF board member, recalls that community activists also 
impressed on CORE a racial justice perspective, constructing neoliberalization as a moment in a 
long history of racialized disinvestment and educational apartheid, and the importance of 
democratic control of schools.403 
These meetings gave rise to the Grassroots Education Movement, which drew in 
progressive organizations of parents of public school students, members of Local School 
Councils, and others, in addition to the aforementioned collaborators.  The GEM was later 
institutionalized as the CTU’s Community Board, which met on a monthly basis to help 
determine the policy agenda of the CTU.  As CORE took over the CTU, it greatly scaled up 
grassroots organizing against neoliberal reforms, mobilizing this coalition numerous times for 
citywide or neighborhood-based actions, including direct actions, grassroots lobbying 
campaigns, and GOTV efforts.404  When the CTU relaunched its charitable foundation in 2014, 
these collaborators were among the groups receiving grants.405 
 
401 In the 2000s, activists at the Kenwood Oakland Community Organization articulated this framework, refining it in a series of 
projects with researchers at University of Illinois at Chicago’s Collaborative for Equity and Justice in Education (see, e.g., Brown, 
Gutstein and Lipman 2010:  “Arne Duncan and the Chicago Success Story:  Myth or Reality?”).  Activists at Pilsen Alliance, a left-
leaning organization which formed in 1997 to contest redevelopment-induced displacement in the Pilsen neighborhood, also worked 
with scholars at UIC’s CEJE during these years, producing a similar critique. 
402 Bradbury et al, 2014:  18.  CORE members had been reading Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine, and deconstructed the fiscal crisis 
used by Chicago’s policymakers to defund education. 
403 Interview with Matt Luskin, 3/7/17. 
404 For example, the coalition mobilized in the 2012 CTU strike, with community and parent groups organizing parents and students 
to support teachers and providing a valuable imprimatur (Bradbury et al 2014; MacAleavey; interview with Luskin, 2017; interview 
with Potter, 2017).  The coalition held direct actions and outreach in response to many school closings, particularly after the wave of 
53 closings in 2013. 
405 The Foundation had existed since 1969.  The Foundation’s endowment was increased dramatically in 2014 with the sale of a 224-
unit apartment building owned by the CTU. 
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Mobilizations around foreclosures and evictions 
The 2008 financial crisis caused hundreds of thousands of home foreclosures and court-
ordered evictions of tenants in Chicago, precipitating a wave of grassroots resistance.  Key 
grassroots groups understood the crisis through an anti-capitalist framework, and articulated 
demands for non-capitalist allocation of housing.406  These groups included the Chicago Anti-
Eviction Campaign (CAEC), founded in 2009 by veterans of struggles to preserve public housing, 
and Occupy Our Homes, and Communities United Against Foreclosure and Eviction, which grew 
out of the Occupy Movement and included many Occupy activists.407 
These groups attempted to organize vulnerable homeowners and renters and led 
militant direct actions, such as “eviction blockades” to disrupt court-ordered evictions (usually 
resulting in the arrest of protestors).408  They also led illegal occupations of vacant properties—
i.e., “squatting”—helping evicted or homeless people move in, or converting vacant properties 
into community centers and offering classes and services.409  The groups also conducted more 
conventional forms of policy advocacy, pursuing stop-gap measures (e.g., for moratoria on 
foreclosures) and systemic reforms, such as large-scale support for land trusts or housing 
coops.410 
CAEC, CUAFE, and Occupy Our Homes usually framed their work in progressive and anti-
capitalist and socialist visions.  CAEC asserted that housing is a human right, and justified their 
 
406 Austen, 2013.  By 2013, there were 62,000 vacant properties in the city, many of them recently foreclosures.  Two-thirds of these 
were in predominantly Black neighborhoods on the South and West Sides.  Another 82,000 foreclosure cases were in the Cook 
County’s Circuit Court as of January 2013.  At that time, about 40% of homeowners in low-income West and South Side 
neighborhoods held mortgages that were currently “underwater” (i.e., the homeowners owed more on their mortgages than their 
homes were worth).  Between 2008 and 2013, hundreds of thousands of affordable rental housing units were lost when buildings 
were foreclosed. 
407 Right to the City Alliance (2015):  Unpublished draft of Alternative Housing Model Report. 
408 See news bulletins on Chicago Anti-Eviction Website:  http://chicagoantieviction.org/.  Accessed 1/11/19.  On Communities 
United Against Foreclosure and Eviction see Anyonomous: “Stories of Struggle. Foreclosure and Eviction in Chicago” 
(http://www.areachicago.org/1499/; accessed 1/11/19); and Mata, 2012. 
409 Chicago Anti-Eviction Website:  http://chicagoantieviction.org/.  Accessed 1/11/19.   
410 Right to the City Alliance:  Unpublished draft of “Alternative Homes Report.”  Available from author upon request. 
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occupations and resistance actions in these terms.411  CAUFE alternately traced the housing 
crisis to corporate greed—indicting banks’ predatory lending practices and speculators’ reckless 
investing—and to the fundamentally exploitative and anti-social nature of capitalist housing 
markets.412 
While I was not able to determine the size and reach of these groups (or the size of the 
larger wave of grassroots resistance catalyzed by the foreclosure crisis), CAEC and CUAFE appear 
to have had large chapters in neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates.  As of 2012, CUAFE had 
chapters in five neighborhoods in the West, Near West, and North Sides.413  CAUFE also 
developed close relationships with other neighborhood-based non-profits in those 
neighborhoods, forming coalitions with the capacity to mobilize significant numbers of 
neighborhood residents.414  According to one participant, CAEC had a large following on the 
South and West Sides, and built chapters in several neighborhoods.415 
By 2012, these groups were collaborating with Grassroots Collaborative, SEIU HCII, the 
CTU, and other of Chicago’s left coalition on a range of causes, suggesting the absorption of 
these activists into a larger anti-neoliberal struggle.  CUAFE, CAEC, OOH and other grassroots 
housing groups joined protests against school closings and other aspects of neoliberalization.   
For example, in 2012, CUAFE joined protests against Chicago’s hosting of a NATO meeting, 
whose official messages were about the city’s spending priorities; in 2013, CAEC joined a rally 
and press conference held by the CTU (and also attended by representatives of SEIU HCII and 
Action Now).416  As the foreclosure crisis subsided, CAEC and CUAFE co-led efforts around 
 
411 Crawford, 2013.  Austen, 2013.  
412 E.g., Kampf-Lasin and Burt, 2012:  “This bitter reality, that there are nearly two empty homes for every homeless Chicagoan, 
illustrates the deep injustice of a housing system rooted in profit drive and built on a house of cards.” 
413 Mata, 2012. 
414 Anyonomous: “Stories of Struggle. Foreclosure and Eviction in Chicago” (http://www.areachicago.org/1499/; accessed 1/11/19). 
415 Interview with Chris Poulos, 5/23/19. 
416 Tadalan, 2012. 
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evictions associated with gentrification.  Meanwhile the CTU and Grassroots Collaborative 
joined actions around foreclosures and vacant houses.417 
2. Composition and structure of the UWF coalition  
Composition of the UWF coalition 
Table 4.2 lists the members of the coalition, the type of organization, their geographic 
focus, and two characteristics of the organization’s activities:  what they do as a member of the 
coalition and what other activities they perform which aren’t directly related to the coalition. 
The activities referenced (such as “advocacy,” “mobilization,” or “grassroots organizing”) are 
defined below. 
Table 4.2:  Member organizations of the UWF Coalition 





























SEIU Healthcare Illinois 
Indiana 
Labor Citywide Electoral, advocacy, 
organizing 
Other member services 
Amalgamated Transit 
Union 
Labor Citywide Electoral, advocacy Other member services 
Cook County College 
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Labor Citywide Electoral, advocacy Other member services 
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Citywide Advocacy  Other advocacy, 
consensus-building 
Multi-Member Institutions 
The coalition has two multi-member institutions, United Working Families (UWF) and 
the Grassroots Collaborative (GC).  UWF and GC have several important functions:  they convene 
the leading intellectuals members of the coalition for collective discussion and decision-making 
about the coalition’s agenda, strategy, and principles; UWF run the coalition’s electoral 
campaigns, and GC coordinates some of the largest grassroots lobbying campaigns; and UWF 
programs recruit and train progressive and leftist activists. 
United Working Families 
UWF is a non-profit political organization, preforming several functions.  It recruits, 
trains, funds, and mobilizes support for electoral candidates; it recruits and trains community 
organizers, and coordinates grassroots organizing campaigns; it recruits and convenes affiliated 
member organizations and unaffiliated activists and groups to participate in discussions and 
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debates about goals and strategy; and it fosters new neighborhood-based electoral 
organizations.  UWF is attempting to scale up all four of these functions.  According to 
interviewees, UWF also is the site at which coalition members convene to determine strategy 
and goals.   
UWF was founded by a set of labor unions and community-based organizations in 2013.  
Although UWF has an independent staff, its Board of Directors is comprised by two 
representatives from each of its 11 member organizations, and 6 at-large members (which 
include 2 elected officials and 2 activists from currently unaffiliated neighborhood-based racial 
justice organizations).  UWF member organizations include 5 labor unions (Chicago Teachers 
Union, Service Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois and Indiana, Chicago Cook 
County College Teachers Union, Amalgamated Transit Union, and Warehouse Workers 
Organizing Committee), and 6 neighborhood-based political action groups (Action Now Institute, 
People United for Action, Grassroots Illinois Action, 22nd Ward Independent Political 
Organization, 25th Ward Independent Political Organization, and 33rd Ward Working Families).  
UWF continues to grow, with a board member predicting in the Spring of 2018 that “[i]n 6 
months, we may have affiliated to UWF every type of non-labor organization that exists …From 
a neighborhood club…to Political Action Committees, to the Chicago Democratic Socialists of 
America.”418 
The United Working Families Organization is also emerging as a center of the coalition 
for some purposes.  Without question, UWF is the center of the coalition’s electoral activities, 
having assumed some of the electoral functions formerly performed by the CTU, SEIU HCII, and 
Grassroots Illinois Action.  In addition, UWF appears to be emerging as the center of coalition-
 
418 Interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17. 
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wide deliberation and decision-making, with interviewees reporting it as the key site of 
development of shared strategies, agendas, and larger visions.  UWF also appears to be the 
center for the development of a cadre capable of leading the entire coalition.  They recruit 
leading members of coalition organizations to participate in leadership training programs.  This 
appears to create a two-tier structure, in which individual organizations train cadres at the 
neighborhood-level, and UWF trains a city- or coalition-wide cadre. 
Grassroots Collaborative 
Grassroots Collaborative has been an important vehicle for collaborative issue 
campaigns since the late 1990s.  My interviewees, and those of previous studies, credit GC as an 
important site for the development of relationships and of a common political and strategic 
vision.  In these relationship-building and deliberative functions, GC helped pave the way for 
UWF, and has now been supplanted by it. 
GC continues to formulate and implement issue-campaigns and grassroots lobbying 
campaigns.  Most recently, GC has led campaigns for transparency and accountability around 
Chicago’s bid to host the new Amazon headquarters and for elimination of corporate tax 
loopholes and has lobbied alongside several other organizations for a comprehensive state 
legislative agenda.  In these campaigns, Grassroots Collaborative helps to formulate goals, 
mobilize the memberships of its 11 member organizations, and serves as a media spokesperson, 
often receiving access to mainstream media outlets.  In 2011, members from GC formed 
Grassroots Illinois Action (GIA).  GIA was set up as 501©4 organization, legally allowed to 
engage in partisan electoral activity.   
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SEIU Health Care Illinois and Indiana 
As mentioned, SEIU HCII (formerly SEIU Local 880) was the most powerful supporter of 
progressive issue and electoral campaigns in Chicago through the late 2000s.  They remain, 
along with the CTU, the source of the vast majority of the coalition’s financial resources and 
rank-and-file members.  For instance, SEIU HCII is the largest donor to UWF’s Political Action 
Committee, contributing $162,480.20 since 2015.  With 91,000 members in four states SEIU 
HCII’s membership provides a large portion of the personnel for UWF’s GOTV operations (such 
as phone-banking, canvassing, etc.).  
 In addition to supporting UWF and GC, SEIU HCII participates in issue and electoral 
campaigns aligned with UWF, GC, and other members discussed below.  Most recently, SEIU 
HCII has turned out hundreds of members to participate in direct actions associated with the 
national Poor People’s Campaign.  Earlier in 2018, SEIU HCII helped fund and staff the Lift the 
Ban Coalition, working to end the state ban on rent control.  Historically, SEIU HCII has 
participated in campaigns against school closings, in favor of TIF reform and elimination of 
corporate tax loopholes, in favor of police accountability, and in favor of immigration reform.419 
Chicago Teachers Union 
CTU is the other major provider of financial support and personnel for the coalition.  For 
example, the CTU is the second largest financial contributor to UWF’s PAC, contributing 
$105,000.00 since 2015.  It also furnishes campaign workers from among its 25,000 members. 
The CTU also does a lot of political work in its capacity as a union (i.e., not through the 
vehicle of UWF or GC).  The CTU conducts direct lobbying, cultivating relationships with 
legislators, and often meeting legislators to advocate legislation.  It also conducts grassroots 
 
419 SEIU HCII Website, accessed 3/27/18. 
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lobbying, directing its large membership to contact representatives about legislation, attend 
public hearings, or take other political action, several times a year. 
The CTU may be the coalition’s most prominent media spokesperson, regularly quoted 
in mainstream outlets about political issues (and especially those related to education).  In 
particular, the CTU’s former president, Karen Lewis, was the coalition’s most famous 
personality—brilliant, charismatic, and media savvy, she appeared frequently in local news 
media.420  
The CTU also functions as the primary conduit through which many community-based 
organizations connect to the coalition.  Leaders of the CTU have long-standing relationships with 
leaders of these organizations, and the CTU has collaborated closely with these organizations in 
issue campaigns, primarily around education and financial issues.  Many of the community-
based groups associated with the coalition continue to work regularly with the CTU in 
formulating agendas for education policy through the CTU’s Community Board (a 15-member 
body tasked with hold the CTU accountable to its community-based allies).  Finally, the CTU’s 
philanthropic foundation also funds many of the community-based non-profits and citywide 
advocacy groups which politically support the coalition’s agenda. 
Community-Based Non-Profits 
The coalition includes an array of neighborhood-based non-profit organizations 
committed to varying combinations of service-provision, policy advocacy, local economic 
development, affordable housing development, and grassroots organizing.  These organizations 
are all 501c3 organizations, legally prohibited from partisan electoral work. 
 
420 MacAleavy, 2016.  In a poll, Lewis was voted the third most popular black figure in Chicago.  
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The degree of independence and willingness to engage in political contention varied 
across these organizations.  Kenwood Oakland Community Organization and Pilsen Alliance, for 
example, have weak ties with the Emanuel administration and eagerly participate in contentious 
campaigns against that administration.  By contrast, Communities United works closely with Ald. 
Deborah Mell, an appointee and close ally of Emanuel.  Communities United attempts to 
support progressive causes without publicly breaking from the regime and its agenda.   
A complete list of community-based 501©3 non-profits affiliated with the coalition is 
included in Table 4.2, above.  This includes groups and with roots in the civil rights movement 
(KOCO), Latinx empowerment movement (ENLACE), anti-gentrification struggles (Pilsen 
Alliance), or the Alinskyite tradition of community organizing (Brighton Park Neighborhood 
Council).   
Structure of the UWF coalition 
Among these organizations, there are varied levels of involvement in coalition projects.  
I define two levels of coalition members.  First, I define “core members” as organizations who 1) 
participate most frequently on coalition events; 2) contribute relatively large amounts of 
financial, personnel, and other resources; 3)initiate and lead campaigns and projects; and 
4)have strong institutional ties to other groups in the coalition.  Core members are United 
Working Families, Grassroots Collaborative, Grassroots Illinois Action, Chicago Teachers Union, 
Service Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois Indiana, Action Now Institute, 
Kenwood Oakland Community Organization, and the Pilsen Alliance.  I define “other members” 
as organizations who 1) collaborated with Core Members on at least 3 issue, electoral, or 
organizing campaigns in the last year; 2) have some institutional ties to other groups in the 
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coalition.  This includes all other coalition members.  Organizations at these levels are 
distinguished from the coalition’s extended network, and form a set of other progressive and 
leftist formations with whom the coalition has complicated relationships, as discussed below. 
I consider the following types of institutional linkage:  1)whether the organization 
receives funding from the Chicago Teachers Union and/or Service Employees International 
Union Healthcare Illinois Indiana; 2)whether the organization is a member of the coalition’s key 
multi-member institutions:  United Working Families, Grassroots Collaborative and the Chicago 
Teachers Union Community Board  Institutional linkages are listed in Table 4.3 (along with 
whether an organization is defined as a “core” or “other” member). 















NA No No Yes Yes 
Grassroots 
Collaborative 
No NA Yes Yes Yes 
Chicago Teachers 
Union 
Yes Yes NA NA Yes 
SEIU Healthcare Illinois 
Indiana 
Yes Yes Yes NA Yes 
Amalgamated Transit 
Union 
Yes No No No No 
Cook County College 
Teachers Union 
Yes No No No No 
Warehouse Workers 
Organizing Committee 
Yes No No No No 
Arise Chicago No  No  No Yes No 
Communities United No No Yes Yes No 
Blocks Together No Yes Yes Yes No 












No Yes Yes Yes No 
ONE Northside No Yes No Yes No 
Pilsen Alliance  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Southsiders Together 
Organizing for Power 
No No No Yes No 
Southwest Organizing 
Project 
No No No Yes No 
Grassroots Illinois 
Action 
Yes NA No No Yes 
People United for 
Action 
Yes No No No No 
Action Now Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
American Friends 
Service Committee 
No Yes No  No  No 
Chicago Coalition for 
the Homeless 
No Yes No No No 
Ongoing expansion and development  
Coalition members envision two main kinds of growth:  First, they envision an expanding 
popular base through grassroots organizing, described in Section 6 of this chapter.  Second, they 
hope to turn UWF into an independent political party, united around a political and social vision, 
and with the institutional power to discipline affiliated elected officials. 
Informants mentioned efforts to develop a shared, coherent, vision which transcends 
the disparate demands of the “social movements that we all come out of.”421  In Han’s words, 
 
421 Interview with Mathew Luskin, 3/10/17. 
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“[a] political party should be a vehicle for imagining a different vision of society.”422  Coalition 
members observed that this process was already well underway, and that the UWF board 
functioned as the site of ideological development, through regular and intensive conversations 
about the coalition’s core values and social vision. 
UWF is implementing multiple strategies to increase its capacity to discipline candidates 
and elected officials.  In the words of Amisha Patel, executive director of the Grassroots 
Collaborative, coalition members have been asking, UWF is attempting to “build our own 
infrastructure, separate from the candidates…[to] hold these people accountable.”423  Their 
efforts to recruit and train candidates from progressive and leftist movements and 
organizations, rather than choosing from among existing candidates, is intended to give UWF 
more control over the vision and agenda of electoral campaigns.  UWF’s leadership 
development programs, which cultivate a cadre with UWF’s (increasingly coherent) ideology, 
may also enhance UWF’s ability to run ideological coherent campaigns.  
Coalition members see multiple benefits of these party-building measures.  First, insofar 
as UWF has a determinate agenda and ideology of its own, it could use campaigns to draw 
voters to these positions, instead of running candidate-centric elections.  Each electoral 
campaign would become an opportunity to recruit voters to the party’s platform and ideas.  
Second, coalition members believe that having a more established partisan brand would give 
UWF more leverage over its candidates and elected officials, which in turn allows UWF to run 
more ideologically disciplined electoral campaigns.  Finally, interviewees suggest that creating a 
political pole of this sort could attract other progressive and leftist movements and 
organizations who previously had not found an adequate electoral vehicle. As Luskin observes, 
 
422 Interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17. 
423 Uetricht, 2015. 
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there needs to be “a political home for progressive movements that doesn’t exist in either 
party.” UWF’s project is a matter of building that home or “building space for movement 
politics—politics to the left of the Democrats.”424 
In the 2015 and 2018 election cycles, UWF recruited and trained some of their own 
candidates.  In 2015, UWF held a “candidate training” program, and included “several dozen 
candidates” for City Council.425  UWF eventually choose candidates to endorse and support from 
these program participants.  In 2018, all 4 candidates endorsed by UWF had been active in 
groups associated with the coalition and/or received training from UWF’s training and 
leadership development programs. 
• Brandon Johnson was an organizer with the Chicago Teachers Union, active in mobilizations 
against school closings and other campaigns for education policy reform.  Johnson was also 
field director for a UWF-backed aldermanic candidate in 2015. 
• Delia Ramirez was president of the board of directors of Logan Square Neighborhood 
Association (a neighborhood-based non-profit who is a member of the GC and CTU 
Community Board, and participates in the Coalition’s issue campaigns).  Ramirez was 
recruited to run for State Rep by a former organizer at Grassroots Illinois Action.426 
• In 2015, Aaron Ortiz participated in UWF’s internship Program, in which UWF organizers 
train participants in basic organizing skills and electoral strategies and worked on a 
campaign. 
More recently, UWF offers an annual Movement Leadership Camp, a weekend-long 
intensive political training program.  75 Chicago-area activists attended in 2018.  11 of these 
 
424 Ibid. 
425 Uetricht, 2015.  The 40-hour training program included skills like canvassing, campaign management, media strategies (Interview 
with Emma Tai, 3/5/17). 
426 Tai and Patel, 2018. 
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attendees went on to participate in UWF’s year-long training program, the Movement Leader 
Fellowship.  This program provided further education and placed participants on UWF’s 
electoral campaigns “with support from experienced UWF members and staff.”427  At least one 
of Movement Leader Fellow is running for a city council seat in 2019.428  UWF proactively 
recruits “young people of color from the rank and file of our movements” to these programs.429 
The CTU has also been training its delegates and rank-and-file members, and recruiting 
parents, students, and community members to its training programs, since 2011.  Since 2012, 
the CTU has held an annual Summer Organizing Institute, with instruction in organizing, running 
issue and electoral campaigns, and other political skills.  The CTU also has programs to conduct 
educate members of Local School Councils about policy issues and city and state politics, and 
has held numerous workshops on voter registration, canvassing, and other skills. 
As of the Spring of 2018, individuals involved with UWF continued to discuss exactly 
what this political pole would look like and how to build it.  In the words of one UWF board 
member, “a lot of questions are getting posed that frankly none of us have any experience with.  
When have we been this relevant?”430  Another added, of the conversations about UWF’s 
development and trajectory, “one of my big takeaways from it is a realization of just how little 
experience we have with this.”431  A third observed that Chicago has had “no left party, no labor 
party, no social democratic party… we don’t even have a language of what a party would look 
like, or how to relate to it.”432 
 
427 Ibid. 
428 Rosana Rodriguez is running in the 33rd ward—this is discussed at greater length in Chapters 5 and 6. 
429 UWF Blog Post, 5/2018. 
430 Interview with Mathew Luskin, 3/17/17. 
431 Interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17. 
432 Interview with Marc Meinster, 3/17/17. 
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The UWF coalition within a broader left milieu in Chicago 
The UWF Coalition’s Relationship to Other Large Progressive and Radical Formations in Chicago 
The coalition has a loose relationships with other progressive and radical political 
formations in Chicago, including the Chicago chapter of the Democratic Socialists of America, 
Reclaim Chicago (a member-based political organization formed by personnel from Bernie 
Sanders’ 2016 presidential campaign in Illinois), organizations associated with the Movement for 
Black Lives, and a network of elected officials and activists centered around presumptive State 
Senator Jesus “Chuy” Garcia.  The coalition does not have institutional connections with these 
formations, but has collaborated with them on particular campaigns and is exploring the 
possibility of deeper relationships.  The coalition also appears to have ideological and/or 
strategic disagreements with each of these formations. 
The Movement for Black Lives 
The Coalition has collaborated with groups and activists associated with the Movement 
for Black Lives, the upsurge in racial justice mobilizations since 2014, colloquially known as Black 
Lives Matter.  Nodes of the Coalition have participated in MBL-led actions and vice versa.  UWF 
and the CTU are actively trying to deepen these relationships.  There are both ideological 
commonalities and tensions between MBL activists and components of The Coalition. 
Since 2015, these formations have supported each other’s actions and collaborated on 
joint campaigns around immigration and the district attorney’s election.  During contentious 
contract negotiations in the fall of 2016, Chicago’s local Chapter of the Black Lives Matter 
Network pledged support for teachers in the event of a strike, and set up an alternative school 
to which picketing teachers could send their children.  BLM also supported the CTU in their one-
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day strike in April of 2016.  As noted, Action Now (via Blackroots Network), as well as the CTU, 
supported direct actions organized by Black Lives Matter and Black Youth Project 100 to protest 
the city’s coverup of Laquan Macdonald’s shooting by police.  In 2014, the CTU sent busses of 
members to join protests in Ferguson, Missouri over police violence and accountability.433 
The CTU, UWF, and SEIU HCII have also collaborated with BLM (and other groups) on 
work for immigrant rights and Muslim rights.  For example, UWF members led one section of a 
protest against President Trump’s executive order suspending travel and immigration from 
certain Muslim-majority countries.   One UWF board member referenced a longer history of 
collaboration on immigrant and Muslim rights issues.434  SEIU HCII, CTU, and the GC also worked 
alongside Black Lives Matter and the Black Youth Project 100 in events supporting the Fight for 
$15 campaign.  UWF and SEUI HCII worked with Black Youth Project 100, Assata’s Daughters, 
and other organizations to hold candidate fora and GOTV work in the 2016 elections. 
The CTU and UWF have intentionally tried to build deeper relationships with 
organizations and activists from the Movement for Black Lives.  The CTU intentionally included 
activists affiliated with MBL in their organizer training programs in 2015 and 2016, and UWF 
included activists from Black Youth Project 100 in their “movement leader school” in 2018.  A 
desire to deepen ties with MBL may inform UWF’s attempts to cultivate a cadre of activists 
attentive to racial and economic justice, discussed in the next section. 
There appear to be both ideological commonalities and tensions between the coalition 
and MBL activists.  The Coalition, and the CTU in particular, has intentionally framed conflicts 
over public investment in education and social services as matters of racial justice (as discussed 
at greater length in the next section).  Their public statements routinely describe the 
 
433 Moser, 2016. 
434 Interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17. 
162 
 
underfunding of public schools as “educational apartheid.”  The Coalition also shares the MBL’s 
notion of a “school to prison pipeline,” in which the lack of educational opportunities combined 
with the deployment of criminal justice actors and carceral-style techniques in schools, push 
students toward crime and ultimately incarceration.  An SEIU HCII staffer, and other 
commentators, argue that MBL activists have been attracted to The Coalition by these 
positions.435 
There have also been tensions between these formations around criminal justice 
rhetoric and policy.  The CTU and UWF support many of the same reform measures as MBL 
activists, but do not support full abolition of the police and carceral institutions.  The CTU 
leadership tends to use conciliatory rhetoric about the Chicago Police Department and police 
officers.  The CTU and UWF do not endorse, but also avoid having to publicly repudiate, the 
more radical proposals and antagonistic rhetoric of MBL activists. 
Occasionally, events highlight this latent tension between The Coalition and MBL 
activists.  At a CTU-led rally in April of 2016, a leader of the MBL-associated Assata’s Daughters 
said, during a speech, “[expletive] the police, [expletive] the CPD, and [expletive] anyone who 
rolls with them.”  The Chicago Police Department and Fraternal Order of Police called on the 
CTU to repudiate the comments.  CTU President Karen Lewis made a twitter statement implicitly 
disavowing the comments, but otherwise the CTU was silent about the issue.   The leader from 
Assatta’s Daughters, perhaps prompted by Lewis’ disavowal, publicly questioned the 
commitment of CTU, and organized labor more generally, to racial justice: 
The CTU keeps acting like they are on our side, but then Karen Lewis refuses to say cops 
need to get out of schools…I went [to the rally] knowing I would say exactly what I said, 
especially after seeing the ways labor has been so slow to support the [Black Lives Matter] 
 
435 Interview with anonymous SEIU HCII staff member, 3/17/17. 
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movement and asks the cops to come to rallies and events. Until they come out explicitly 
opposed to cops in schools, I don't think we are fighting on the same side.436 
 
This ideological disagreement between The Coalition and the Movement for Black Lives mirrors 
tensions within the CTU membership, as discussed in the following section. 
Reclaim Chicago 
As of 20178, the coalition was exploring how best to relate to a formation called Reclaim 
Chicago.  Reclaim Chicago is the local political action committee of the People’s Lobby, a 
national grassroots membership-based organization (with a structure similar to ACORN).437  
Reclaim Chicago also receives financial and personal backing from the labor union National 
Nurses United, and thus has a significant popular base. 
UWF and Reclaim Chicago have overlapping, but sometimes conflicting, electoral 
agendas.  In 2015, both supported Jesus Garcia for mayor and Kim Foxx for District Attorney, 
and both supported Will Guzzardi for state representative in 2014.  However, they differed on 
another state representative race, with Reclaim Chicago backing Christian Mitchell over the 
UWF-backed Jay Travis.  The two formations do have common allies among elected officials, 
including UWF’s closest ally in Chicago’s city council and the Illinois state legislature, 
respectively, Alderman Carlos Rarmirez-Rosa and Representative Guzzardi. 
Two interviewees associated with UWF suggested the formations have an underlying 
ideological difference.  They observed that Reclaim is informed by Alinskyite notion in which 
substantive issues are subordinate to the primary goal of winning popular power.  Both 
interviewees suggested that Reclaim’s willingness to back Christian Mitchell over Jay Travis, 
 
436 Moore, 2016. 
437 Interview with Mathew Luskin and Marc Meinster, 3/17/17. 
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despite the former’s significantly less progressive policy agenda, reflected this insufficient 
attention to issues.   
The Coalition’s Extended Network 
Individual members of the Coalition have their own networks of allies and collaborators, 
many of whom are not otherwise affiliated with the Coalition.  The CTU, SEIU HCII and Action 
Now have deep relationships with a large number of organizations and activists.  Many of the 
neighborhood-based non-profits associated with the coalition have networks of allies among 
organizations and political officials in the neighborhood.  Through these networks, the coalition 
has indirect connections to dozens, if not hundreds, of additional political groups and actors in 
Chicago, including single-issue advocacy groups, organizations of parents of public school 
students, racial justice groups, and many others. 
Individual Groups’ Relationships to Racial Justice Organizations 
Action Now is part of a coalition called the Black Roots Alliance (BRA), with two racial 
justice organizations, Southsiders Organized for Unity and Liberation, and the Workers Center 
for Racial Justice.  The BRA is explicitly dedicated to representing Chicago’s African American 
population.  It frames its goals and campaigns (which include police accountability, full 
employment, increased investment in public schools, and single-payer health care) as part of a 
project of black liberation and racial justice.  BRA conducts grassroots organizing in Chicago’s 
black neighborhoods (most often in the context of election campaigns), and lobbies at the local 
and state level.  
BRA’s network extends among Chicago’s newer and progressive racial justice groups, 
particularly those associated with the Movement for Black Lives.  In direct actions, particularly 
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on issues of police violence and accountability, and in a voter engagement campaign for the 
2016 district attorney’s election, BRA worked alongside Black Lives Matter, Black Youth Project 
100, and others. 
BRA collaborates enthusiastically with the coalition on some of its more explicitly race-
conscious campaigns.  They backed UWF-trained and -endorsed candidate for Cook County 
Commissioner, Brandon Johnson in 2018.  They did not take positions on the other UWF 
candidates in 2018.  Action Now, on the other hand, backed all of UWF’s candidates in 2018, 
while continuing to help steer UWF. 
The CTU and SEIU HCII also maintain some relationship with other racial justice 
organizations.  I have found several examples in which CTU or SEIU HCII officials often speak at 
events held by racial justice organizations, such as conferences, conventions, and direct actions.  
In one recent example, CTU Recording Secretary Michael Brunson spoke on behalf of the CTU at 
a weekend conference hosted by the Chicago Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression, a 
racial justice group based on the South Side, dating back to the 1960s.438 
The CTU’s Relationships with Educational Advocacy Groups 
The CTU works closely with a range of groups focused on education policy.  The CTU 
intentionally cultivated these groups as allies in struggles over city and state education policy, 
particularly on issues of funding (and the related questions of curricula, facilities, and social 
services), school closures, and standardized testing.439   For example, on standardized testing, 
the CTU joined the “More Than a Score Coalition” with two organizations of public school 
parents, Parents 4 Teachers and Parents United for Responsible Education, and the grassroots 
 
438 Salas, 2018:  “Survivors of police torture share stage with Angela Davis” 
439 Bradbury et al, 2014; Nunes et al, 2015; Bruno and Ashby, 2017. 
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group Raise Your Hand.440  The CTU also works with associations of professional educators, 
including Teachers for Social Justice. 
The Coalition’s Relationships with Public Sector Unions 
In electoral campaigns, the UWF coalition usually works with a set of other labor unions.  
Looking at the coalition’s campaign contributions, the candidates it supports were usually also 
supported by SEIU HCII’s and CTU’s respective state-level affiliates, SEIU Illinois Council and the 
Illinois Federation of Teachers.  The UWF Coalition’s candidates are also supported by the state-
level and local AFSCME councils, and to a lesser extent by the International Union of Operating 
Engineers Local 150 and the Chicago Federation of Labor. 
The CTU also works closely with the city and state public sector unions on contract 
disputes and pension reform policy, and with other teachers unions on state educational 
policy.441   The CTU conducts joint lobbying efforts with AFSCME Council 31, the largest main 
state-wide public employees union, to combat efforts at pension reform.  They have also backed 
the city’s police and firefighters, and Chicago Transit Authority workers in their contract 
negotiations.  
Geographically-Based Groups’ Local Alliances 
The neighborhood-based groups affiliated with the Coalition have geographically-based 
alliances with other actors in the neighborhood.  It appears that these alliances are most often 
issue-specific alliances, dedicated to one of the salient concerns in the neighborhood.  In some 
cases, these alliances bring the neighborhood-based organization into a relationship with a local 
 
440 E.g., state lobbying on rules for special education class size, CTU worked with disability advocacy groups, including Access Living, 
Equip for Equality, as well as Illinois Education Association and Illinois Federation of Teachers. 
441 The coalition’s labor allies are AFSCME Council 31, the main state-wide public employees union, and Amalgamated Transit Union. 
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alderman whom the Coalition does not support, creating a potentially conflicting set of loyalties.  
Logan Square Neighborhood Association (LSNA), Brighton Park Neighborhood Council, and 
Communities United each have multiple local alliances of this sort.  Communities United has 
entered into a particularly close working relationship with Ald. Deborah Mell (of the 33rd ward), 
a close ally of Emanuel.   
Other Infrequent and Issue-Specific Collaborations 
UWF, the Grassroots Collaborative, the CTU, and SEIU HCII are working with an array of 
other progressive groups on two grassroots lobbying campaigns at the state level, the Illinois 
People’s Agenda (a comprehensive legislative agenda encompassing many of the policies listed 
in the next section of this chapter on the coalition’s agenda) and Tuition Free Illinois (a campaign 
to make public universities free for Illinois residents).  Both campaigns includes several of the 
individual groups involved in the Grassroots Collaborative and the CTU community board, and 
many groups otherwise unaffiliated with The Coalition.  For example, the People’s Agenda is 
backed by a coalition called Fair Economy Illinois, which includes GC member organizations ONE 
Northside and Jane Addams Senior Caucus, and two state-wide groups unaffiliated with UWF, 
GC, CTU, or SEIU HCII. 
3. Ideology and agenda  
This section presents an analysis of the coalition’s ideology, based on a qualitative 
discourse analysis.  I analyzed texts including:  public statements by leading coalition staff and 
electoral candidates, to media outlets, at public events, and at private coalition events (which I 
attended, or for which I obtained transcripts); official documents, including official platforms, 
mission statements, and annual reports of coalition organizations; published documents, such as 
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press releases, published studies, policy advocacy documents in-depth interviews with high-level 
staff or officers of coalition organizations.  In sum, I performed in-depth discourse analysis of 20 
documents, written or spoken by coalition actors.442  
I found a series of ideas which organized the coalition’s social and political vision.  These 
ideas were very consistent across the coalition, and especially across the most powerful 
institutions of the coalition (UWF, the CTU, SEIU HCII, and Grassroots Collaborative); they were 
consistent over time, and across different types of text and venue (such as public statements of 
candidates, speeches of coalition officers to internal audiences, and research and policy briefs).  
In brief, the coalition has three master ideas, which organize most of its discourse: 
• Large numbers of Chicagoans, and disproportionately racial minorities, are afflicted by 
poverty, defined as multi-fold deprivation, and associated psychological and material 
effects.  
• Society’s resources are distributed unjustly, allocated to “economic elites” instead of to 
lower-income and working-class people, causing this poverty.  This misallocation of 
resources is sustained by the political dominance of the affluent and can be corrected by a 
political movement by the lower classes. 
• The coalition articulates an alternative vision focused primarily on expanded provision of 
public goods and social services through, funded by progressive taxation, public 
employment, and public support for unionization. 
 
442 Scholars place many caveats on interpreting public discourse.  Public statements of political actors are assumed to be strategic 
communications, designed to achieve objectives with certain audiences, and thus cannot be taken as a reliable indication of actors’ 
actual beliefs.  This problem is not relevant here, given my interest in the coalition’s political positions.  The publicly articulated 
positions themselves are what I am trying to document, not actors’ “actual” beliefs.   I selected texts so as to maximize the likelihood 
to find different discourses.  I chose texts that were produced in different conditions, by different types of actors, for different 
audiences—all factors found in past political discourse analyses to shape the content of texts.  For example, I included texts created 
by teams of researchers, intended for an audience of policymakers, and texts created by coalition leaders, intended for a mass 
audience.  Given this method of text selection, I can more confidently interpret findings as representing the range of ideas within the 
coalition.  I could also more confidently interpret the aforementioned finding of consistency across the coalition as not an artifact of 
my text selection. 
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I also found one slightly less consistent theme:  The coalition is committed to 
democratic participation by members of the lower classes, particularly those in marginalized 
races, both within the coalition itself, and in government.  They call for measures to foster this 
participation within the Coalition, and for public policies to expand the enhance democratic 
participation. 
1.  The Condition of the Working and Lower Classes  
One of the coalition’s most important discourses is an elaborate description of the 
levels, forms, and effects of poverty in Chicago.  Coalition actors describe in great detail the 
many forms of material deprivation experienced by poor Chicagoans, and of the effects of this 
deprivation on cognitive and emotional development, and on opportunities for professional and 
educational attainment.  In one important instance of this discourse, coalition members argue 
that such poverty is the root of Chicago’s high rates of violent crime.  This discourse is important 
for the high proportion of coalition texts which include it, and because it often functions as a 
justification for the coalition’s demands and proposals, and as the source of the coalition’s 
moral urgency. 
The Incidence and Form of Poverty 
Coalition actors recount in detail the level and forms of deprivation in Chicago.  They 
describe poverty as entailing multiple forms of deprivation—a lack of basic necessities, including 
stable, secure, and adequate housing; adequate and nutritious food; and physical and mental 
health care; and relatedly, a diminished ability to obtain employment sufficient to cover the cost 
of living.  In a typical statement, a CTU report describes poverty as a condition entailing 
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“multiple or late-night jobs, cramped and unhealthy housing, lack of heat, and insufficient 
food.”443  A spokesperson for the CTU described poverty similarly in a public statement in 2017: 
These students come from some of the most disinvested neighborhoods on Chicago’s West 
and South Sides where communities have long suffered…high levels of poverty, 
unemployment, lack of affordable housing and community violence. For families and 
children within these communities, access to basic resources like healthy food options and 
trauma centers is limited.444  
 
Coalition texts also frequently observe that poverty entails residence in communities 
which lack adequate educational, medical, and other services and resources.  UWF texts often 
refer to the inadequate educational and health care facilities in low-income communities.  
Actors working on health care issues, including the CTU, community-based non-profits such as 
KOCO, recite examples of poorly resourced schools, such as the lack of important curricula 
(including arts programming, foreign languages, sports, and recess), staff (such as counselors, 
nurses, librarians, and special education staff), basic facilities (heating and air conditioning), and 
resources (such as computers).  They also point to large class sizes, and dilapidated and rodent-
infested classrooms.445   
References to the high rates of these forms of deprivation pervade coalition texts.  The 
Chicago Teachers Union frequently refers to poverty rate among CPS students (77.8% in 2018), 
the number of homeless students (about 15,000 in 2012),446 the number of students exposed to 
violent crime in their neighborhoods,447 the high proportion of black and Latino students who go 
to schools with at least 90% poverty rates, and other similar metrics.  Speeches by UWF officials 
 
443 CTU, A Just Chicago (2012):  12. 
444 Rodriguez, 2017:  1. 
445 CTU, A Tale of Two Chicagos (2015) 
446 CTU Press Release, 3/10/12. 
447 Lewis, 2017. 
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and candidates frequently reference “massive unemployment…endemic in black communities,” 
high rates of housing insecurity, and other forms of deprivation.448  
Effects of Poverty 
Coalition members also have an elaborate account of the effects of poverty on health, 
human development, and educational and professional attainment.  In one important variant of 
this discourse, coalition actors argue that poverty is the root cause of high rates of violent crime, 
and that alleviating poverty (as well as other forms of racial oppression and discrimination) is 
the only way to effectively reduce violence.  
Coalition members argue that the experiences of deprivation, exposure to problems 
related to poverty, and associated stresses and traumas, adversely affect personal development.  
The CTU often references published studies on the effects of poverty (and associated 
experiences) on cognitive and emotional development.449  A typical statement, from 2017, 
referenced data “that childhood experiences of abuse, neglect, family dysfunction, experiences 
of poverty, housing instability, extreme discrimination and community violence all had the 
capacity to impair development on the brain and body.”450  
Coalition members argue that poverty also interferes with educational and professional 
development, either via the aforementioned effects on cognitive and emotional development, 
or by creating material impediments.  A 2015 CTU report details the “intimate connection of 
health, housing, jobs, segregation, and funding to education,” citing data that exposure to 
trauma, malnourishment, housing instability, parental unemployment can undermine 
 
448 Speech by Emma Tai at 2017 UWF Convention. 
449 E.g., the CTU’s Quest Center (their in-house research organization) publishes studies and references many others in their website.  
https://www.ctunet.com/quest-center/research/topical-bibliographies/impact-of-poverty-on-education 
450 Rodriguez, 2017:  1. 
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education, through a variety of mechanisms.451  More colloquial expressions of the same point—
for instance that “children cannot come to school ready to learn until their basic needs have 
been met”—pervade coalition discussions of education.452 
This connection between poverty (and its impacts on health) and human development 
frames many coalition policy proposals.  Anti-poverty measures are simultaneously 
interventions to improve health and educational outcomes.  For example, a 2015 CTU document 
argues that, to most effectively improve education outcomes, “Chicago should take concrete 
steps to address serious inequities in access to good-paying jobs, housing, and health care, as 
well as inequitable arrest and incarceration rates.”453  The CTU also frames the neoliberal 
regime’s decisions to cut counseling services and nursing from schools in low-income 
neighborhoods in terms of this connection between poverty, mental health, and education:  the 
removal of counseling and mental health resources is especially egregious given the extremely 
high need for such services in high poverty neighborhoods. 
The coalition argues that poverty, and its associated traumas, cause Chicago’s most 
pressing issue—the high rates of violent crime in lower-income neighborhoods.454  Some 
coalition texts explicate the connection between poverty and violence, arguing that a 
desperation for resources drives property crime, that a lack of educational and employment 
opportunities make youth gangs attractive, or that the aforementioned effects of trauma (and 
 
451 Chicago Teachers Union, 2015.   
452 The example taken from a sign of a CTU member at a demonstration; posted on CTU’s website.   These points resembles an 
element of the “culture of poverty” argument, in asserting effects of poverty on individual and collective development and behavior.  
However, coalition members do not seem to accept the notion that behavioral and cultural effects would persist independently of 
changes in material circumstances, and do not see behavior and culture as the proper sites of intervention.  Rather, the argument is 
that crime and violence need to be seen as inseparable from poverty:  the divestment and exploitation which create poverty also 
create crime and violence.  And only by addressing poverty, and the divestment and exploitation in which it is rooted, can the city 
address crime and violence. 
453 CTU A Just Chicago  
454 As noted in Chapter 3, Chicago has had extraordinarily high rates of violent crime since 2014, highly concentrated in the 
predominantly black and Latinx neighborhoods on the city’s South and West Sides.  Coalition members consistently trace the 




particularly the effects of exposure to violence) make violent behavior more likely.  In a typical 
example of the latter, CTU President Karen Lewis writes: “Every shooting of a child brings confusion, 
sorrow and fear for their classmates. Left untreated, these emotions cast a dark cloud, affecting young 
people's ability to learn and focus — and, in the worst scenarios, leading them down the path to 
violence.”  Most often, coalition members assert in more general terms that the conditions of 
poverty reproduce violent crime, and that effectively addressing violent crime requires 
alleviating poverty.  In these arguments, the coalition attempts to define the choice as between 
thoroughgoing social reinvestment on one hand and continued violent crime and a massive 
criminal punishment system on the other.  
The belief that poverty causes violent crime is also expressed in the concept of the 
“school to prison pipeline,” invoked almost every time UWF or the CTU discusses education 
policy.  In this, a society which does not address the multi-fold problems of students merely 
transmits them from criminogenic social environments to lives of crime, and in many cases the 
criminal punishment (aka criminal justice) system.  This transmission is accelerated by harshly 
punitive forms of discipline and behavioral control at schools. 
Inequality 
In other moments, coalition texts’ emphasis shifts from the absolute harms of poverty, to 
inequalities between lower- and upper-classes.  Most often, discussions of inequality refer to 
the unequal opportunity for educational and professional advancement, following from 
resource disparities in all aspects of life.  In a typical example, the CTU writes,  
Education in the U.S. is subject to huge disparities in opportunity (the “opportunity gap”): 
some groups of students have incredible experiences while a much larger group is subject 
to extremely limited in-school and life experiences. These educational opportunities are 
directly linked to students’ socioeconomic status, and what happens outside schools is 
more influential than what happens inside.455 
 
455 CTU, 2015:  7. 
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2. Class Conflict Over the Distribution of Resources Via State and Local Policy  
In a second consistent and important discourse, coalition actors describe politics and 
policy through a master narrative about political conflict between low-income and working-class 
people and “economic elites” (larger corporations, investors, and affluent people).  This 
narrative has the following elements: 
• State and local governments enact public policies which allocate society’s resources 
away from low-income and working-class communities and people, toward economic 
elites.  These policies include cuts to public services and resources, regressive revenue 
policies, and tax-breaks, subsidies, and other “giveaways” to economic elites. 
• This pattern of public policies is produced by the political power of economic elites, 
sustained through campaign finance, personal relationships with politicians, and more 
corrupt dealings. 
Some texts connect this narrative to the aforementioned narrative about poverty by implicitly or 
explicitly arguing that the elites’ regressive policy agenda causes or exacerbates poverty, or that 
the coalition’s redistributive agenda is necessary to address poverty.456  Coalition members 
articulate the same class conflict in the context of workplace relations, but this articulation is 
significantly less prominent than their narrative about distribution of resources through revenue 
and social policy. 
The Current Regressive Polices  
The narrative of class conflict over resources pervades the public statements of coalition 
actors, including key organizations like the UWF and the CTU, and most individual politicians.  
 
456 Other commentators also see allocation of resources via public policy is the center of the coalition’s project.  Local journalist 
Micah Uetricht calls the conflict over neoliberal austerity policies “the heart of the CTU’s organizing in recent years” (Patel and 
Uetricht, 2016).  See also Bradbury et al, 2014. 
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Statements typically juxtapose policies which allocate resources to economic elites with policies 
cutting services needed by lower classes.  They also reference the agency of economic elites in 
causing these policy outcomes.  The following comments from CTU’s A Just Chicago and UWF’s 
Official Platform exemplify this structure: 
• “For decades the wealthy and their corporations have used their political influence 
to slash their tax obligations and drain profit from public programs and assets, then 
call for us to ‘live within our means.’”457 
• “…city leaders continue to privilege a small select group, while ignoring community 
voice and needs. The results are aggressive downsizing of city assets and services, 
major giveaways to connected bankers and corporate leaders, and implementation 
of destructive school policies.”458  
Many other coalition texts have a very similar narrative.459 
Coalition candidates voice the same narrative.  The coalition-backed candidate in the 
2015 election, Jesus “Chuy” Garcia, exemplified this when asked how he would finance an 
expansion of public services:  “It’s a question of priorities…I will stop the use of taxpayer dollars 
to fund the cronies and connected, the wealthy individuals and we will redivert that money to 
the neighborhoods.”460 
When coalition actors speak on specific issues related to revenue and public services, 
they most often construct those issues in terms of this narrative.  Coalition actors usually 
construct the city’s Tax Increment Financing (TIF) program—one of the most frequent subjects 
 
457 UWF Platform:  6. 
458 CTU, 2015. 
459 See, for instance, a 2016 interview with Amish Patel, executive director of Grassroots Collaborative:  “it’s a constant fight to get 
money back from corporate hands that don’t need that money and to make sure that that money does go back into the 
neighborhoods across the city.”  Patel and Uetricht, 2016. 




in coalition direct actions, lobbying, and electoral campaigns—as a vehicle through which “[b]ig 
business is taking resources away from schools and working families.”461  Coalition direct actions 
targeted particularly egregious instances of receipt of TIF funds by wealthy developers, 
businesses, and institutions.  For example, protests targeted the billionaire Penny Prtizker after 
she received TIF funds for a new hotel in The Loop.  Protests also targeted owners of a new 
luxury car dealership, Bank of America, United Airlines, and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 
who received $6 million in TIF funds to renovate their bathrooms, in the infamous case of the 
“golden toilet.” 
Coalition actors construct policies related to public employment in terms of this same 
class conflict over the distribution of resources.  They criticize city decisions to privatize public 
services as increasing the profits of economic elites at the expense of public workers.  Similarly, 
they construct the shrinkage of the public sector as keeping economic elites’ tax burden low, at 
the expense of public workers.  For example, Executive Director of the Grassroots Collaborative, 
Amisha Patel describes a private educational service contractor thusly:  “[t]he contractor was 
trying to make as much money as possible off of schools, and it did that by not paying workers, 
not giving them the equipment they needed, and not having enough workers to do the work.”462  
The replacement of public schools with privately-operated charter schools; use of private 
contractors to provide public services; and cuts to the workforce of public schools, the transit 
authority, and the parks department, have all been described in these terms. 
 
461 Tax Increment Financing program is explained in detail in Chapter 2. Apparent in series of protests, public statements about 
particular allocations of TIF funds to firms or projects, such as the funds given to billionaire Penny Pritzker for the construction of a 
new luxury hotel in the Central Business District, to DePaul University for the construction of a new basketball arena, and most 
infamously to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to renovate their bathrooms, in the case of the “golden toilet.” 
462 Patel and Uetricht, 2016. 
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Political Dominance by Economic Elites  
State and local governments enact these regressive policies because the political system 
is “dominated by the wealthy and their corporations.”463  Texts frequently allege “crony 
capitalism” (i.e., government decisions which reward well-connected private firms or actors), 
driven by the influence of money in the electoral process, personal ties between policymakers 
and elites, or more blatant forms of bribery. 
The aforementioned revenue, privatization, and subsidy policies are often described in 
these terms.  Amish Patel, Executive Director of the Grassroots Collaborative, suggests that 
cronyism undergirds the city’s privatization policies, describing charter schools as CPS’ attempts 
to “move [the money] to the private sector, move it to their banking buddies.”464  Similarly, 
Brandon Johnson, a prominent voice in the CTU, and successful UWF-backed candidate for Cook 
County Commissioner, publicly describes Emanuel’s opposition to progressive taxes as 
reluctance to “actually tax his friends.”465 
Even when not alleging malfeasance, coalition texts depict undue political influence of 
economic elites.  Many texts decry influence through financial means, for example referencing 
“the explosion in political spending by just a handful of ultra-rich individuals” or “huge sums of 
lobbying and campaign cash directed at Congress by hedge funds and private equity firms.”466 
Other texts describe cultural biases of policymakers.  For example, when asked to 
elaborate on politicians’ relationship with economic elites, Patel argued that the two groups 
share an upper-class cultural and social background, and thus biases toward certain kinds of 
 
463 UWF Platform. 
464 Patel and Uetricht, 2016. 
465 Brandon Johnson, on the radio show What’s Left with Brandon Johnson, on WVON 1690AM Talk of Chicago radio.  Segment 
originally aired May 13, 2017 at 11:00 AM. 
466 First quotation from Tai, 2018; second from CTU Blog, 3/18/2016.  https://www.ctulocal1.org/posts/ctu-supported-progressive-
revenue-legislation/.  Accessed 9/24/16. 
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policies.  This, Patel suggested, helps explain city policies, such as the refusal of Mayor Emanuel 
and Board of Education president David Vitale to pressure Bank of America to renegotiate 
financial agreements harmful to the city: “There’s also the fact that the decision-makers are of 
the world of the folks who are profiting off of those decisions. So when you have an appointed 
board of education appointed by a mayor who is a former investment banker himself, whose 
side do you expect [them] to be on?”467 
Connecting Class Conflict Over Policy with Poverty 
Coalition actors link this conflict over policy to poverty (the multifold deprivation and its 
consequences for people and neighborhoods described above).  Many texts argue or imply that 
the current policies exacerbate or cause the current levels of poverty—and especially the city’s 
violent crime problem—and that the coalition’s redistributive agenda is required to fix it. 
Brandon Johnson, at the time a Chicago Teachers Union organizer and radio host (and now the 
Democratic nominee for Cook County Commissioner), exemplified the coalition’s linkage of 
these issues, in a pair of comments in his radio program: 
“what is most troubling about the financial state of Illinois, is that we are the 5th largest 
economy in the United States, one of the wealthiest places in the world is right here in Illinois, 
and somehow the wealth and the resources and the people that need it are not getting it, 
they’re being ignored…We’re seeing it play out in the streets of Chicago, with the 
overwhelming levels of violence…Here in Chicago you don’t see that kind of boldness.  You 
have a city that’s bleeding…schools, the violence, we’re talking 30 % unemployment in black 
Chicago, we’re talking Great Depression level numbers.  Absent something bold and 
substantial, you’re not going to be able to fix it.”468 
As local commentator Lee Sustar writes, the coalition’s agenda can be read as an 
“alternative vision of handling the city’s violence problem.”469  CTU President, Karen Lewis, 
presented a similar view in a 2017 Op-Ed: “We must eradicate the conditions that create 
 
467 Patel and Uetricht, 2016. 
468 Both quotations from Brandon Johnson, on the radio show What’s Left with Brandon Johnson, on WVON 1690AM Talk of Chicago 
radio.  Segment originally aired May 13, 2017 at 11:00 AM. 
469 Sustar, 2016. 
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violence. That means policy change and resources: fully funded schools and thousands of new 
jobs that pay a fair wage.”470 
3.  Alternative Vision:  Political Mobilization and Economic Redistribution 
The coalition’s alternative vision and agenda is also constructed in terms of this class 
conflict, the trade-off between elites’ profits and wealth and the needs of lower-income and 
working-classes.  The coalition’s agenda is presented as the inverse of the economic elites’:  it 
would allocate resources away from the wealthy, toward the working- and lower-classes, in the 
forms of progressive revenue policies and greatly enhanced public services.  Implementing this 
policy vision requires the lower- and working classes building political power through organizing 
and formation of an independent political party. 
 Statements of this redistributive policy vision pervade coalition texts.  For example, the 
UWF Official Platform pledges to “call for public services that meet real human and social needs. 
We will demand that our economy and tax system must be reorganized to meet those needs.”471  
Elsewhere it advocates “a tax system that redistributes wealth, challenges those profiting from 
human suffering, works against growing income inequality and expands democratic voice on the 
economy.”472  More generally, coalition actors regularly talk about greater investment in public 
schools, in the provision of health and child care in neighborhoods, in affordable housing, and in 
employment programs in these terms.473 
 
470 Lewis, 2017. 
471 UWF Platform:  6-7.    
472 UWF Platform. 
473 For example, the UWF Platform continues:  “Privatization takes from communities that are hurting the most…We not only must 
stop cuts to vital programs, but fight for dramatic expansions of services like mental health, childcare, and other programs necessary 
to meet pressing and growing needs.”  Or Brandon Johnson’s radio program, What’s Left:  “Those places where there is a strong 
taxing base…Even if they complain—the fact that their schools are funded…the fact that they have librarians and libraries, the fact 
that there’s actually low unemployment or ‘help wanted’ signs”  
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One frequently stated coalition policy goal is a large expansion of public employment.  
The WUF Platform affirmed that “[w]e believe that our communities deserve and need full 
employment – and that the public sector needs to be an engine for creating the jobs necessary 
to rebuild communities that have been devastated by decades of neoliberal experiments in 
austerity.”  A largescale public employment program was also on UWF’s list of “strategic 
priorities” in 2017. 
Although less frequently than expanded public provision of jobs and services, the 
coalition also advocates laws and policies to bolster labor rights and benefits.  They call for a $15 
minimum wage, a right to unionize, and legislation requiring paid sick and family leave.  They 
also advocate the preservation of public workers’ pensions.  
Constructing an Antagonism 
Finally, it should be noted that, in these discourses, the coalition constructs a political 
subject, defined by class and race, and its nemesis, “economic elites.”   When they speak directly 
about identity, coalition members tend not rigidly specify boundaries:  Notwithstanding 
ubiquitous mentions of “working-class people, and especially working-class people of color” or 
“working-class and lower-income people,” it is not clear exactly who can belong.  For example, 
the collective subject can include small business and property owners. 
The coalition tends to define the out-group more concretely.  Patel, for example, argues 
“[w]e have to actually name the people who are causing this crisis and go after them…the 
administration, the banks, the wealthy, and large corporations.”474  A CTU document, for 
 
474 Patel and Uetricht, 2016. 
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example refers to “the affluent” and “those on the other end of the economic scale.”475 More 
general references to “elites,” “the 1%,” or “big business” are ubiquitous. 
Coalition actors often supplement this narrative of class conflict with affirmations of public 
employees’ dedication, and particularly their dedication to serving populations who rely on 
public services.  In the process, the coalition supplants the narrative of conflict between 
taxpayers and public employees, arguing that “[f]or both groups, the real enemy is the 1%.”476  
4. Views on Racial Justice 
Leaders’ understandings of racial justice 
Using interview data and analysis of leaders’ public statements and other texts, I 
attempted to reconstruct coalition leaders’ understandings of the relationship between race 
and class, at the levels of social analysis and political strategy.  All support a program of 
economic redistribution along class lines, recognizing that this would benefit racial minorities.  
All support additional measures to combat racial discrimination.  And all see Chicago’s large 
working- and lower-class Black and Latinx populations as essential constituencies for the left.  
But beyond this consensus, there appeared to be two tendencies: 
• The first sees the program of economic redistribution, supplemented with anti-
discrimination measures as sufficient to achieve racial justice.  Proponents of this tendency 
see racial subjugation as functioning primarily to concentrate racial minorities in lower 
classes—an economic effect best redressed through economic programs.  Proponents of 
this tendency recognize that poor and working-class Black and Latinx populations 
understand the world through a framework emphasizing racial injustice as such.  
 
475 CTU, 2012. 
476 Bradbury et al, 2014. 
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Proponents of this tendency thus see a critical political work as articulating a class justice 
program within widely resonant discourses on race. 
• The second tendency sees an additional set of race-conscious programs and practices as 
necessary to achieve real emancipation.  These programs and practices could be defined as 
self-determination for racial minorities.  These include policies of democratic control of 
schools and other institutions and political leadership of racial minority populations within 
the UWF coalition.  Some members seemed to suggest that the coalition must articulate its 
project within a racial justice framework not simply for political expediency, but so as to 
realize the goal of self-determination of historically oppressed racial minorities.  
Underpinning these views seems to be the view that a subjective dimension of politics is 
intrinsically important.  Most proponents of this tendency recognize the challenges of 
building a racial justice movement which pursues economic redistribution as well as self-
determination, given the historical development of racial justice ideologies. 
It should be noted that the vast majority of coalition texts speak about race and class in 
a way that is compatible with both tendencies.  These texts simply to refer to both class and 
racial groups when discussing the coalition’s agenda, identity, and analysis.  For example, almost 
every coalition text about the regime’s policies notes the harms to both lower classes and to 
racial minorities.  Texts reference the economic dimension of neoliberal policies and social 
problems, then note that they hit lower-class racial minorities especially hard.  In a typical 
example, the UWF Platform observes that “[a]ttacks on public resources through austerity, 
defunding and privatization…reduce the influence of working people, especially people of color, 
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over social decisions.”477  The CTU’s Schools Chicago Students Deserve similarly argues that 
neoliberal school reforms put “disproportionate harm on students of color.” 
Class justice as racial justice 
Some coalition leaders seem to see economic redistribution along class lines as the one 
indispensable core of any social justice project.  They do not have an elaborate racial justice 
vision beyond this class justice vision (though they do support anti-discrimination measures, 
such as eliminating discriminatory policing practices). 
This perspective on the relationship of race and class was articulated by Carl Rosen, 
president of United Electrical Workers, Western Region (which is affiliated with United Working 
Families).  Asked about the coalition’s agenda for predominantly Black neighborhoods on the 
West Side, Rosen outlined by a class-focused social analysis and a program of economic 
investment: 
The problem is capitalism.  That’s the fundamental problem, because these are the 
communities that are providing the reserve army of the unemployed, basically.  They’re 
concentrated.  The solution that could exist, theoretically, within the current framework 
is basically a Marshall plan for those neighborhoods, where you bring in tremendous 
resources, including a jobs program…but you’re also having to accept that you’ve got a 
whole generation or two generations who have been deprived of education and due to 
poverty have been deprived of their brains developing properly…478 
 
Rosen first states that the key factor determining the conditions of this population was capitalist 
relations—the population’s function within capitalism as a “reserve army of labor.”  Though he 
didn’t specify, this statement can be interpreted as implying that the salient effects of racial 
subjugation were positioning Blacks within the class structure.  Rosen suggests that the salient 
effects of this positioning were poverty and access to education (with second order effects on 
 
477 UWF Platform:  6. 
478 Interview with Carl Rosen, 3/15/17. 
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cognitive development).  And this situation can be redressed by a massive public investment, 
including community development and a jobs program. 
Former CTU organizer and UWF Political Director Jason Lee, and other UWF staff who 
requested anonymity made similar arguments.  They recognize that race has been a central 
determining structure within the political economy.  They understand racial segregation, 
discrimination, other forms of racialized oppression and exclusion primarily in economic terms 
as confining large shares of minority populations to lower positions in the class structure, such 
that they were subjected to intense deprivation, exploitation, and expropriation.  An economic 
justice program, which addresses capitalist exploitation and deprivation in general, will address 
the interests of racial minorities confined to the lower classes by racial subjugation. 
Racial justice as class justice and self-determination  
A second tendency advocates a racial justice agenda extending beyond economic 
justice.  This agenda includes policy positions, such as democratic control of schools and other 
institutions, and particular modes of political practice, such as leadership by members of 
oppressed groups.  Most of this agenda appears to focus on political self-determination. 
This vision was articulated by Mathew Luskin’s (CTU organizer and CTU representative 
on the UWF board) comments on the coalition’s education agenda.  Of course, Luskin 
recognized a class dimension, stating that the coalition must lead “the struggle around revenue 
and the private sector and wealthy have to be the ultimate targets on that.”  But he went on to 
explain that he also embraced a program for democratic control of education, including an 
elected (as opposed to mayor-appointed) school board.  Luskin mentions that he was convinced 
that the latter issue was an important part of a racial justice project: 
I used to be skeptical about the elected school board campaign, I thought it was a 
distraction—we have an elected city council, what difference does that make?  I thought 
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it was organizations picking the wrong issue.  But I did agree that the union had to build 
a program around anti-racism in education…It’s really hard to overstate the extent to 
which democratic demands and confrontation of racism are deeply intertwined.  I really 
underestimated the degree to which an elected school board spoke on a very visceral 
level to that…There’s a chance that an elected school board could make space for some 
really bad [expletive]. 
 
Luksin does not justify the position in terms of desirable policy outcomes (indeed acknowledging 
the possibility of unintended negative consequences), nor does he cite a strategic imperative to 
placate allies.  Rather, he sees democratic control as an important part of a racial justice project.  
Moreover, the importance of democratic control appears to exist on a subjective plane: 
“democratic demands” resonate with people’s need to confront racism “on a very visceral 
level.”  Luskin seems to imply here that democratic self-assertion and empowerment are a 
necessary part of overcoming the particular forms of subjugation experienced by racial 
minorities. 
SEIU organizer and UWF board member Alex Han described the political self-
determination of racial minorities within the UWF coalition and movement in similar terms.  In a 
discussion about the coalition’s relationship to Black populations of South and West Side 
neighborhoods, Han argued that the coalition must make space for activists with a Black 
Nationalist perspective.  Firstly, Han dismisses the notion of converting such activists to a 
different view of the world: 
If you come out of an experience where Black Nationalism is both a way to develop an 
analysis of the world—and it makes sense, it makes as much sense to me as [expletive] 
anything in the world—and that you’ve seen the way to take political power is this 
outgrowth from the civil rights movement into the Panthers, and into the 
Washingtonian kind of politics, then why would you let [anyone] who has a different 
understanding of the issue convince you otherwise? 
 
For Han, such a conversion is not merely infeasible.  Rather, he seems to suggest that, for 
historically oppressed populations, determining their own political praxis is an indispensable 
part of emancipation:  It’s important to recognize that they can articulate their own vision, and 
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to make space for that.  We can try to build something like a Black Nationalist socialism, a 
socialist liberation movement…that would allow them to lead the struggle, to lead their fight in 
a way that is authentic. 
In these comments, Han seems to depict a form of self-determination, in which 
historically oppressed populations construct their own emancipatory praxis.  While Han does 
not specify why this is important, he may, like Luskin, valorize a form of subjective political 
autonomy as a key aspect of freedom. 
Articulating class justice within racial discourses 
Proponents of both understandings of racial justice recognize the strategic necessity of 
articulating a class program in widely resonant racial justice discourses, which stress themes 
such as racial identity, empowerment, and unity.  I will recount three strategies through which 
the coalition attempts to develop a class focused racial justice politics. 
First, many coalition texts and speakers present the coalition’s economic programs as a 
racial justice project.  Most simply, texts recount the respective impacts of neoliberal and left 
programs on racial minorities.  For example, the UWF Platform observes that “[w]hen public 
jobs are lost, our neighborhoods and communities as a whole suffer the 
consequences…particularly…black and brown communities.”479   Criticism of 2013 wave of 
school closings invariably mentioned the impacts on Black and Latinx populations.480 
Some coalition leaders are especially proactive in constructing class programs in racial 
justice discourses.  Bradbury et al (2014) describes the concerted efforts by Black leaders of the 
CTU to diffuse CORE’s racial justice framing of education issues via Black media outlets and 
 
479 UWF Platform:  6. 
480 CTU, 2012. 
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organizational networks in Black communities.481  This was certainly a consistent theme in the 
radio show of former teacher and CTU organizer, and current Cook County Commissioner, 
Brandon Johnson, on the historically Black radio station WVON.  Johnson’s show, What’s Left, 
which was funded by the Chicago Teachers Union foundation, discussed social problems facing 
African-Americans in Chicago, and tracing them to economic inequality, upper-class dominance, 
capitalist exploitation, and neoliberal public policies. 
Second, the coalition attempts to build a class-conscious racial justice politics by training 
leadership.  For example, Alex Han suggested that the coalition can cultivate activists who 
articulate a class justice agenda through a Black Nationalist discourse through leadership 
development:  “How do we develop union leaders who are great activists in the workplace, to 
get them in the mix with people who have a broader analysis… a union activist and leader who 
understands the levers that control their work environment, and the levers that control their 
community and neighborhood—that’s the intersection that we need.”482  Indeed, UWF’s 
Movement Fellowship program could have this function, as it draws participants from labor and 
neighborhood-based racial justice movements, and included education about political economy. 
Finally, some of the coalition’s grassroots outreach work involves trying to present a 
class program within the frameworks through which people currently understand politics.  Jason 
Lee describes his attempts to present a redistributive program in a way that resonates with both 
a Nationalist framework which elides class, and with the conservative perspectives common in 
Black communities:  “how can we talk about the issue of greatest concern, violence, in way that 
moves from the moralistic, individualistic, cultural pathology discourses, to show the roots of 
the problem in the political economy.”  Emma Tai similarly describes trying to make economic 
 
481 Bradbury et al, 2014. 
482 Interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17. 
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issues legible to conservative residents of high-poverty neighborhoods by linking them more 
familiar issues of parenting and cultural decline.  The ability of organizers to make this case will 
be a central theme of forthcoming chapters. 
The white working-class 
I was able to attain less data on coalition members’ views on the coalition’s intentions 
vis a vis Chicago’s working- and lower-class White populations.  There appears to be a 
willingness among some coalition members to accept that a portion of the white working-
classes would be alienated by race-conscious discourses and programs.  In an interview, Tai 
suggested that this would be acceptable, because, given Chicago’s demographics, a coalition of 
racial minorities and middle- or upper-class white progressives could win citywide elections and 
a City Council majority.  She also seemed to believe that at least a portion of the White working-
classes could be won on the basis of UWF’s class program.483  Two informants argued that the 
ethical imperative to engage directly with issues of racial justice outweighed any political costs, 
but also believed that the coalition could win on a racial justice program.484 
5. Vision for an alternative economy 
I argue that the coalition’s visions of an alternative economy and neighborhood 
economic development are relatively underdeveloped:  coalition statements on these areas 
tend to be vague, inconsistent, and not part of a coherent analysis or plan.  I note that the 
coalition does not have any strong linkages to actors or organizations doing research and 
analysis on these issues.   
 
483 Interview with Emma Tai, 3/6/17. 
484 Interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17.  Interview with anonymous CTU staff member, 3/6/17. 
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Economic Growth and Job Creation 
The coalition appears not to have any detailed plan for economic growth and job 
creation, coherently rooted in an analysis of the economy.  In my review of coalition texts and 
interviews with coalition staff, I found relatively little discussion of economic growth or 
production as such.  The coalition clearly rejects the supply-side economic growth policies of the 
current regime but may not have developed alternative policies.  This silence may indicate the 
coalition’s intention to layer redistributive mechanisms onto the current corporate-service- and 
high-tech manufacturing-centered economy.   
One frequent coalition proposal is a public jobs program.  Most discussions of this 
program focus on the moral and practical superiority of alleviating poverty and crime through 
public provision of jobs (and other goods), rather than through punitive policies.  One UWF 
staffer discussed the costs and potential financing of a public jobs program.  But I have been 
unable to find any detailed plans about a jobs program, such as the structure of the program, 
the types of work to be undertaken, or the relationship between the jobs program and the 
private sector. 
Firm and Investor Behavior 
The coalition intends major changes in economic policy, including new taxes on firms, 
investors, and affluent residents, and the cessation of tax breaks, subsidies, and other financial 
grants to firms and developers.  Many actors in Chicago repeat the argument, common among 
intellectuals and policymakers since the 1970s, that such policies would cause Chicago’s firms to 
relocate to other cities with more favorable business climates, depress local real estate markets, 
and slow commercial and residential construction. 
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I found limited and inconsistent discussion of possible behavioral changes by firms, 
developers, and investors, of the potential effects of those changes on economic growth or city 
revenues, and of measures to prevent or mitigate those changes or their effects.  Discussions of 
this issue are far less common than moral arguments for redistribution.   
All actors appear to assume that the city would not lose so much economic activity as to 
lose the revenue needed to finance its redistributive agenda.  The coalition’s proposes to 
finance greatly enhanced public services by (among other things) taxing the profits and 
transactions of investors and firms.  Their proposals thus presume the continued existence and 
profitability of these activities.  For example, one coalition leader described the coalition’s 
redistributive policies as viable because of the “great amount of wealth in Chicago that you can 
tax.”485 
Some actors argue, in somewhat vague terms, that redistribution can improve economic 
growth.  First, investment in human development (through public education, mental health 
provision, and other means) will produce a better-trained workforce and greatly increase the 
intellectual capital of Chicago’s population.  This can attract firms to the city despite increased 
taxes and lessened corporate subsidies.  A more intellectually developed and creative 
population will also contribute to a vibrant economy in other ways.  Second, redistribution can 
enhance the purchasing power of Chicago residents, creating conditions for growth in 
commercial and residential markets. 
While eminently plausible, I have found only one, relatively vague mention of each of 
these ideas in coalition texts.  They do not appear to have a detailed account of how these 
processes would work.  Details such as the projected benefits for firm productivity or profits, the 
 
485 Interview with Emma Tai, 3/8/17. 
191 
 
levels of redistribution required to produce beneficial effects, or how to control inflation, are 
not discussed.  Some actors reject as empirically false the common claim that higher taxes and 
reduced subsides would cause capital flight.  In interviews, a UWF board member and a UWF 
staffer argued that affluent residents tend to choose their place of residence on factors other 
than taxes.  They see the upscale amenities built by the Daley and Emanuel administrations—
and particularly the relatively few top quality schools—as sufficient to attract affluent residents. 
Missing Linkages to Centers of Ideological Production 
The coalition does not appear to have linkages to actors or institutions developing ideas 
about alternative economic arrangements and alternative approaches to neighborhood 
development.  This void may underlie their underdeveloped ideas. 
In the area of economic growth and job creation, there appear to be few institutions 
articulating alternatives to the neoliberal paradigm.  Some organizations associated with the 
Harold Washington administration’s industrial retention efforts continue to articulate large-
scale and small-scale strategies for small business development.  Examples include North Branch 
Works, a non-profit think tank and development corporation formulating city zoning and 
economic development policies to foster small businesses, and especially manufacturing; 
Manufacturing Renaissance, a non-profit advocating policies to stimulate local manufacturing 
and green technology; and its affiliate the Chicago Manufacturing Renaissance Council, a 
partnership of firms, non-profits, labor unions and educational institutions, which drafts and 
advocates similar policies.  The coalition does not have any linkages with these organizations, 
and several coalition leaders were not familiar with them.  
There are few successful models of equity-oriented, non-market-driven neighborhood 
economic development currently operating in Chicago.  The vision and practices of even the 
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most progressive non-profits community development organizations are embedded in the 
market-based paradigms of the real estate industry.  Most non-profit developers pursue one of 
three goals: 
• Demonstrating to private developers and investors that projects in previously 
undeveloped neighborhoods can be profitable; 
• Building small amounts of affordable housing in neighborhoods undergoing 
gentrification; 
• Resisting unwanted developments through community organizing and direct action. 
Even those progressive neighborhood-based organizations affiliated with the coalition, which 
have advocated for years for “development without displacement,” have primarily engaged in 
defensive fights.  As such, they have not had an opportunity to articulate a positive model for 
neighborhood development. 
4. Political activities 
Electoral Campaigns  
The UWF Coalition has built a powerful electoral apparatus.  Financial and personnel 
resources come primarily from the SEIU HCII and the CTU.  UWF supplies campaign managers 
and other staff, coordinates campaigns with neighborhood-based allies, and provides cadres of 
volunteer campaign workers. This has enabled larger and better-financed campaigns, running 
and/or backing larger numbers of candidates at city, county, and state levels, all of whom have 
run competitive races. 
In 2015, the UWF coalition backed 16 candidates for City Council and a mayoral 
candidate—significantly larger than the coalition’s previous slates of 9 and 4 city council 
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candidates in 2007 and 2011.486  The 2015 UWF slate included 7 incumbent aldermen, the 
members of the City Council’s Progressive Reform Caucus, and nine challengers, three of whom 
won.487  The Coalition also backed Chuy Garcia’s mayoral campaign in 2015.  In 2019, the 
coalition backed fifteen candidates for City Council, including three incumbents and twelve 
challengers.  Two of the incumbents and seven challenges were elected.  In total, there is a 
block of 11 strongly progressive or socialist alderman on City Council, 9 of whom were 
supported by UWF. 
UWF supplied most of the logistical, and personnel support for these campaigns.  In 
Aldermanic races, UWF helped set up campaign operations in the ward, hiring staff, and drawing 
volunteers and donations from the memberships of the CTU and SEIU HCII.488  SEIU HCII and 
CTU, and to a lesser extent the PACs associated with the Grassroots Collaborative and UWF, 
supplied a large majority of the financial support for these candidates.  The campaign 
contributions to Tara Stamps, UWF’s candidate for alderman in the 37th ward, exemplify the role 
of the UWF Coalition’s, and of its unions:  of approximately $305,000 in total cash and in-kind 
contributions received by the Stamps campaign, the major Coalition organizations contributed 
just over $175,000, or approximately 57% of the total.  This does not include the cash and in-
kind contributions of individuals associated with the coalition.489  The coalition contributed 
similar levels of funding to the 8 other new challengers which it supported in 2015. 
 
486 Uetricht, 2015. 
487 In 2015, UWF backed the following incumbents:  Ald. Leslie Hairston (5), Ald. Roderick Sawyer (6),  Ald. Toni Foulkes (16), Ald. 
Ricardo Munoz (22), Ald. Scott Waguespack (32), Ald. Nick Sposato (36), Ald. John Arena (45).  These aldermen have supported a 
progressive policy agenda and proven themselves willing to vote against the Mayor’s positions.  The UWF-backed challengers who 
won were Ald. Carlos Rosa (35), Ald. David Moore (17), and Ald. Sue Sadlowski Garza (10).   
488 Interview with Emma Tai, 3/6/17. 
489 Of this, the CTU accounted for $99,734 (or 32.7% of the total), SEIU HCII accounted for $42,946.25 (or 14.1% of the total), 
Grassroots PAC accounted for $20,000 (or 6.5%), and UWF PAC accounted for $12,505.86 (or 4%).  The latter two PACs are funded 
primarily by the CTU and SEIU HCII. 
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In 2018, the UWF Coalition provided similar levels and forms of support for four 
candidates for county and state-level office: Delia Ramirez and Aaron Ortiz for state 
representative in the 4th and 1st districts, respectively; and Brandon Johnson and Alma Anaya, 
running for Cook County Commissioner (i.e., a member of the county legislative body, the Cook 
County Commission).  UWF held weekly canvasses on behalf of these candidates.  UWF built 
much of the neighborhood-level campaign apparatus for the Johnson and Ramirez campaigns 
since 2015.  As two Coalition leaders wrote in a post-election article, “Johnson’s campaign 
manager, volunteer coordinator, and campaign chair all came from” UWF’s 2015 campaign in 
that neighborhood, and the political organization that was built in that neighborhood after the 
campaign.490  Similarly, the Ramirez campaign used the electoral infrastructure built in the 4th 
district by Grassroots Illinois Action since 2014.  The CTU and SEIU HCII, and to a lesser extent 
the GC and UWF political action committees, supplied much of the funding for the Johnson and 
Ramirez campaigns.491   
Legislative Work 
The Coalition has sustained or scaled up lobbying campaigns, particularly in the areas of 
education and fiscal policy, at the state and local levels.  CTU, SEIU HCII, GC, Action Now, and 
others engage in “direct lobbying”—meeting with elected officials and their staffs to advocate 
legislation, drafting legislation, and cultivating relationships with legislators.  The CTU is a 
regular participant in coalitions lobbying for progressive education policy at the state level.492  In 
2018, the CTU and GC were part of a coalition lobbying state legislators to pass a comprehensive 
 
490 Tai and Patel, 2018. 
491 For example, the CTU and SEIU HCII were the first and third largest donors to Brandon Johnson’s campaign, donating $125,500 
(19% of the total) and $56,750 (9% of the total) respectively.  Alma Anaya and Aaron Ortiz’s largest donors were PAC’s associated 
with Chuy Garcia and Illinois State Senator Tony Munoz.  They did receive a significant amount of money from the CTU, though less 
from other Coalition organizations. 
492 E.g., they were regular attendee at the Illinois General Assembly’s Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force. 
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progressive policy agenda called “the People’s Agenda.”  In 2017, the CTU and GC lobbied state 
legislators to oppose a comprehensive education reform bill known as “the grand bargain.”493  
The Coalition also lobbies at the local level.  Since 2011, coalition members have written and/or 
lobbied on behalf of ordinances related to charter school and school closing moratoriums, 
official declarations of city support for state legislation creating an elected school board, and 
progressive revenue ordinances.   
To date, few of the city ordinances introduced at the behest of the coalition have passed 
City Council. In most cases, their ordinances were introduced by allied councilmembers, 
received many co-sponsors, but were killed in a City Council committee by opponents. 
However, in several cases, City Council or the Emanuel administration adopted more 
moderate versions of revenue and social provision legislation advocated by the Coalition.  While 
Coalition-backed legislation to allocate Tax Increment Financing surpluses to public schools 
failed in 2013 and 2016, Mayor Emanuel unilaterally allocated a portion of unused TIF funds to 
CPS in 2016 and 2017.494   Similarly, three of the Emanuel administration’s most progressive 
proposals were preceded, within 2 years, of Coalition lobbying efforts for more expansive 
versions of the same policy.495 
Whether the UWF Coalition has influenced policy, they appear to have influenced 
behavior of allied legislators.  At the state and city levels, legislations regularly introduce bills 
advocated, or written, by Coalition members.  The Coalition may have also contributed to a 
change in the agenda of the Progressive Reform Caucus in the City Council. 
 
493 CTU Blog, 3/3/17.  https://www.ctulocal1.org/posts/illinois-needs-a-peoples-agenda-not-another-bad-bargain/.  Accessed 
5/1/17.  “Our members traveled to Springfield to tell their Senators that the Grand Bargain is a Bad Deal, they made district visits 
and logged nearly 3000 calls to their senators in one day!” 
494 The Tax Increment Financing program is explained in Chapter 2. 
495 The Paid Family Leave policy, endorsed by Emanuel but rejected by City Council in 2015, created less generous family leave 
options than a bill crafted by the Coalition.  The $13 minimum wage enacted by Emanuel in 2014, was spurred by the Coalition’s 
years of work for a $15 minimum wage.  And the Emanuel administration’s program to offer free Pre-Kindergarten education to all 
children in Chicago resembles a program long advocated by the CTU, GC, and others. 
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The coalition may have contributed to the rising public salience of some its policy 
concerns, although this has not yet been systematically tested.  However, content analysis of 
the candidate debates in the 2015 mayoral elections shows that the issues emphasized by the 
coalition in previous years—the misuse of TIFs, inadequate education funding, charter schools, 
and the elected school board, were highly salient.496 Moreover, polling data clearly shows that 
the coalition (and particularly the CTU) are seen as a more credible source of education policy 
reform than Mayor Emanuel, by a majority of Chicago residents.497 
To date, the coalition’s most significant impacts on public policy have come through the 
CTU’s collective bargaining with the city.  In negotiations in 2016, the CTU won a city investment 
in a pilot program to create “Community Schools,” schools with greatly expanded counseling, 
healthcare, and other services.498 
Direct Action 
  Coalition members also engage in direct actions, including rallies, protests, sit-ins, and 
marches.  Since 2011, GC, CTU, KOCO and other organizations have led or participated in direct 
actions around corporate welfare and TIF abuse, school closings, and other issues.  In 2013 
alone, the CTU led 4 direct actions to protest school closings on the South Side of Chicago 
alone.499   
5. Grassroots Organizing  
The coalition is currently attempting to expand popular support for a left program 
among the low-income and working-class, and racial minority populations, whom it views as its 
 
496 Both candidates had well-developed positions on them, and were asked about them at every debate.  See debate on 3/16/15 and 
forum on 3/25/25. 
497 Bradabury et al, 2014.  MacAleavy, 2016. 
498 Uetricht, 2014:  97. 
499 Bradabury et al, 2014.  MacAleavy, 2016.  CTU blog postings. 
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most likely supporters.  This section recounts coalition leaders vision for base-building, evaluate 
coalition organizations’ current capacities to implement this vision, and then review a set of new 
base-building projects launched by the coalition since 2015—two of which are the focus of 
subsequent dissertation chapters.500  To fill this void in base-building capacity, the coalition has 
launched or supported the development of at least a dozen new neighborhood-level political 
organizations since 2013. 
The coalition’s vision of organizing 
Most coalition leaders see grassroots base-building as part of the coalition’s political 
strategy—a means of attaining the institutional power necessary to advance the 
aforementioned policy agendas—although some also see the democratic empowerment of the 
populations in question as an end in itself.  Most of my interviewees assumed that the goal of 
base-building was advancing a policy agenda, and that base-building contributes to that goal by 
enhancing the capacity to win elections and referenda.  For example, four informants either 
described the importance of organizing as related to unseating neoliberal-aligned aldermen, or 
implied that subsequent electoral outcomes were a metric of success of organizing projects.501  
While presuming the same goal of advancing a policy agenda, others saw UWF’s task as 
mobilizing grassroots populations for a wider range of political actions, including electoral 
mobilization, but also contentious mobilizations.502  A few saw UWF’s organizing as empowering 
 
500 I define “base-building” as some combination of 1)organizing people, such that they could be mobilized at strategically important 
moments; and 2)propagating a message among people, such that they are inclined to mobilize on behalf of the organizing principal.  
“Grassroots base-building” involves direct, unmediated interactions, possibly leveraging social networks and relationships, to build 
relationships and/or propagate messages. 
501 Field notes, 3/6/17. 
502 Interview with Chris Polous, 5/23/18. 
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the populations in question to hold elected officials accountable, and as invigorating civic and 
political engagement more generally.503 
UWF leaders recognized grassroots base-building as a necessary component of UWF’s 
strategy for attaining institutional power, given the coalition’s structurally rooted political 
disadvantages vis a vis the neoliberal regime.  First, the coalition must rely on mobilizing a 
grassroots base, because it cannot match the level of spending on elections of lobbying of the 
neoliberal regime.  Rooted in the city’s most lucrative industries, candidates associated with the 
neoliberal regime have generally outspent UWF-backed candidates.  In 2015, for example, the 
Emanuel administration raised far more money than the UWF-backed Chuy Garcia, drawing 
mostly from the finance, real estate, and advanced business sectors.  As scholar William Sites 
observed, the coalition’s reliance on base-building “reflects in part the inevitable limits to labor’s 
capacities to compete on the terrain of campaign finance.”504   
Second, as long as it is out of power, the coalition needs an organized grassroots base as 
a counterweight to the neoliberal regime’s institutional powers.  As Chapter 2 noted, the mayor 
has many mechanisms for influencing aldermen and other local and even state elected officials, 
including the ability to provide campaign funds and to facilitate or impede economic 
development in a neighborhood.  In the past, the mayor has successfully pressured alderman, 
elected with UWF- or Grassroots Collaborative support, to defect to the neoliberal regime.  UWF 
leaders see an organized grassroots constituency as one way to prevent such defections. 
 
503 As Alex Han said, “neighborhood base-building is essential—you need people locally who can elect and hold accountable on local 
issues and the ways those local issues intersect with larger issues” (Interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17).  In Jackson Potter’s words, 
“having a space that forces you out of your cocoon, particularly now with this electric opportunity to bring people together, because 
they’re worried, and they want to talk, and they want some strategy and ideas for what they can do, these spaces are abnormally 
useful” (Interview with Jackson Potter, 3/10/17). 
504 Sites, 2013:  2582. 
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Interviewees shared elements of a more specific base-building vision.  First, leaders 
envisioned an ongoing presence in target neighborhoods, as opposed to episodic outreach, 
during a crisis or election.  Informants mentioned continually building relationships with local 
residents and organizations.  Two suggested that the coalition could continuously propagate its 
messages about issues and other points at the neighborhood-level, by canvassing, or by 
engaging in public conversations.505  Several informants reported that frustrating experiences in 
the 2015 citywide elections underscored the need for ongoing engagement in neighborhoods.  
Two organizers who had worked in the Austin neighborhood felt the coalition’s lack of any 
consistent presence was a key factor in the UWF-backed candidate’s loss.  Organizers lacked a 
pool of volunteers in the neighborhood, access to local social networks, or grounded knowledge 
needed to target canvassing—things which a more consistent organizing outreach could 
provide.506 
Relatedly, coalition leaders envision engaging in the public conversations in important 
neighborhood-level civic and political venues.  As CTU Chief of Staff Jackson Potter articulated, 
base-building is a matter of making connections and participating in conversations in such 
venues:  Any strategy for a populist resurgence in the city of Chicago has to involve ground 
troops, it has to involve that door-to-door familiarity; it has to involve local institutions—
churches, CAPS meetings, things that people naturally gravitate toward when they have a 
problem.507  An organizer (who requested anonymity) similarly argued that “neighborhoods 
matter—that is where a lot of those conversations [i.e., about issues] happen.  We can and 
 
505 Anonymous organizer:  “We can and should be in those spaces, making our case.  That’s how people will become familiar with 
our way of looking at these issues.” 
506 Interview with Jason Lee, 3/1/17.  Interview with Emma Tai, 3/6/17. 
507 Interview with Jackson Potter, 3/10/17. 
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should be in those spaces, making our case.  That’s how people will become familiar with our 
way of thinking, and our positions start making sense.”508 
Coalition leaders envision cultivating leadership within neighborhoods, ideologically 
aligned with the coalition, but capable of independent action.  Such leaders would be less 
vulnerable than coalition organizers to portrayal as outsides and inauthentic representatives of 
the neighborhood.  As Jason Lee, former CTU organizer and UWF political director explained, 
unions and union-backed candidates have been weakened in neighborhood-level struggles, 
where perceived “authenticity” is the source of legitimacy and credibility.509  A local leadership 
would be capable of articulating the coalition’s positions on issues while also competing on the 
terrain of authenticity.  Moreover, insofar as the coalition could outsource neighborhood-level 
outreach to ideologically aligned activists and leaders at the neighborhood-level, they could rely 
less on media buys and paid outreach, greatly reducing the financial costs of elections. 
Discussion 
Like several other formations in the United States, the United Working Families coalition 
is attempting to advance a progressive-left agenda, in a political system dominated for decades 
by a neoliberal regime.  This chapter recounted the growth of the coalition, from a small 
progressive coalition in the early 2000s to a powerful formation, articulated through 
independent institutions.  Mostly drawing on the personal and financial resources of its large 
labor union members, the coalition now wages legislative and electoral campaigns at a 
significant scale, and has built a block of 11 affiliated aldermen on Chicago’s City Council.  This 
 
508 Interview with anonymous organizer at a coalition-affiliated organization. 
509 Interview with Jason Lee, 3/3/17. 
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block may be more resistant to cooptation than previous progressive formation in the city, given 
UWF’s growing capacity to discipline elected officials. 
This chapter also described UWF’s ongoing attempts to organize grassroots support for 
its agenda.  Like other left formations described in Chapter 1, UWF sees grassroots base-building 
as a key strategy for advancing its project.  This Chapter recounted the limited neighborhood 
base-building capacities of UWF’s current member organizations, and UWF’s attempts to launch 
of support several new grassroots organizing projects in high-poverty neighborhoods of Chicago. 
The rest of this dissertation examines these emerging base-building projects.  These 
projects are a chance to study the dynamics of organizing around a progressive-left agenda in 
urban neighborhoods.   Chapter 2 showed that city-wide and neighborhood-level developments 
have shaped neighborhood level institutions, and projected neoliberal discourses about race, 
political possibility, and other phenomena.  UWF organizers will have to operate in this terrain.  
And the processes and outcomes of these projects will reveal how, if at all, neighborhood-level 
institutions and cultures pattern ideological and material commitments, and how these shape 
possibilities for organizing. 
This base-building projects also are an opportunity to study how the terrain for 
neighborhood-level organizing has been shaped by the expansion of the left.  The growth of the 
UWF coalition was part of a wider expansion of popular interest in progressive and socialist 
politics in the city.  This development may have generated activists in neighborhood, or diffused 
left ideas.  The UWF coalition has also projected its discourses, via mass media, high-profile 
direct actions, and charismatic public figures. 
To elucidate these questions, subsequent chapters will examine two UWF-backed 
organizing projects, in the 33rd Ward (and predominantly the sections in the Albany Park 
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Chapter 5:  Organizing in Austin and the 37th Ward 
Introduction 
Since the summer of 2015, United Working Families (UWF)510 has attempted to create a 
new, grassroots political organization in the Austin neighborhood on Chicago’s West Side.  UWF 
envisions the Greater Austin Independent Political Organization (GAIPO) as a vehicle to build 
and mobilize a progressive base in the neighborhood.  They have attempted to recruit local 
residents to join the organization and participate in local outreach, networking, and other 
movement-building and electioneering activities.  If successful, GIAPO would cultivate and 
mobilize a constituency on behalf of progressive, anti-neoliberal candidates and causes in the 
37th ward. 
Institutions and ideological currents in the neighborhood could subvert these goals.  
Austin residents recruited to GAIPO rightly bring their own perspective and beliefs to the 
organization.  These may conflict with the intentions of UWF’s organizers, and pull GAIPO to 
other projects, even those supportive of the neoliberal regime.  Civic and political institutions, in 
the neighborhood and beyond it, may also draw GAIPO to causes or projects other than those 
intended by UWF. 
UWF’s attempt to build GAIPO is an opportunity to examine the political culture and 
institutions of contemporary Austin and how they mediate struggles over neoliberalism.  What 
ideas do Austin residents bring to the nascent organization?  How do these shape their reactions 
to UWF’s organizers, and their behavior within GAIPO?  How did other institutions and 
organizations in the neighborhood relate to GAIPO?  As UWF organizers attempted to recruit 
 
510 UWF is the main political vehicle for the large and well-resourced community-labor coalition in Chicago.  UWF was created by, 
and is backed by, the Chicago Teachers Union, SEIU Healthcare Illinois and Indiana, Action Now (formerly Chicago’s chapter of 
ACORN), and 7 other labor and community-based non-profit organizations.  UWF is described extensively in Chapter 4. 
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and work with local residents, there were many opportunities to witness these factors and the 
ways in which they created opportunities for, and impediments to, organizing around an anti-
neoliberal project. 
Summary of Findings 
First, I found that the field of civic, political, and social institutions in Austin conforms to 
the national trends described in Chapter 1. 
• Several of Austin’s leading non-profits and its elected officials work on business and real 
estate development, in concert with city and foundation programs and private developers.  
Steeped in a Black Nationalist tradition, leading actors articulate their market-oriented 
projects as a form of racial empowerment, expression of an authentic racial culture, and 
defense against White racism.  Particularly in their community development work, these 
actors produce a distinctively neoliberal rendition of Black Nationalist discourse.  They also 
help link a more traditional program of Black Capitalism, focused on business development, 
to the neoliberal regime. 
• Austin’s other leading non-profits, many of its grassroots associations, and its political 
leaders focus on apolitical, voluntarist service projects.  These actors also receive funding 
from city government and foundations.  Most participants describe this work as building 
social fabric, and thus addressing social problems rooted in cultural and behavioral malaise.  
Some practitioners link this work to community development, describing self-help as a way 
to prepare the neighborhood for capital investment. 
• Austin had no groups focused on mass mobilization for political action.  While the 
neighborhood had several militant grassroots neighborhood organizations as of the early 
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1970s, these collapsed or shifted to service provision or the aforementioned projects in the 
1970s and 1980s.  
Most of the Austin residents who joined GAIPO were also committed to community 
development or to voluntarist self-help work.  Some GAIPO recruits appeared to have 
internalized the identifiably neoliberal discourses on real estate development as racial 
empowerment articulated by the local non-profits.  Other recruits espoused Black Capitalism 
discourses, focused on Black business development generally, without the specific attachment 
to neoliberal modes of real estate redevelopment.  However, some of these individuals 
advocated collaboration with local non-profits on real estate development projects.  Another 
segment of GAIPO recruits prioritized voluntarist self-help projects similar to those undertaken 
by local non-profits and neighborhood associations, constructing them in the same discourses 
about addressing social problems rooted in the declining social fabric.  Only two recruits 
espoused a class analysis of social problems, and supported the socialist agenda pitched by 
UWF’s organizers. 
I found suggestive evidence that GAIPO participants’ commitments, and underlying 
perspectives on social problems, were shaped by Austin’s robust field of non-profits and 
grassroots associations.  I will document the close similarities between GAIPO participants’ 
discourses on social problems and racial interests and those articulated by Austin’s leading non-
profits.  I will also show that several GAIPO members had previous or ongoing affiliations with 
these non-profits, working on their development and/or self-help projects. 
GAIPO recruits’ ideological tendencies caused recurrent conflicts between GAIPO 
recruits and the UWF organizers over GAIPO’s direction.  GAIPO recruits raised repeated 
demands to use the organization as a vehicle for apolitical self-help projects (such as block 
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clean-ups, distribution of free school supplies, etc.), or to collaborate with a local non-profit—
deeply enmeshed in the neoliberal regime—to fostering black-owned businesses through a 
market-oriented development project.  UWF organizers tried to keep the organization focused 
on electoral politics and oriented toward progressive, anti-neoliberal solutions.  Ultimately, 
several GAIPO recruits, frustrated with GAIPO’s direction, left the organization. 
These findings suggest that the institutional developments since the 1960s, described in 
Chapter 1, have created important barriers to organizing around economic issues.  Fostered by 
the neoliberal regime and the real estate development industry, the neighborhood’s most 
prominent institutions reproduce discourses on racial interest and social problems compatible 
with neoliberalism, link those discourses to neoliberal programs, and in some cases, articulate 
new discourses synthesizing older racial justice traditions with neoliberal ideas.  These 
institutions reproduce Austin residents’ commitments to neoliberal or neoliberal-compatible 
modes of activism.  UWF’s organizers found a population committed to self-help and 
development, and poised to pursue those commitments through foundation- and regime-
funded programs.  Austin residents recruited to GAIPO maintained these commitments even 
when faced with the alternatives presented by UWF. 
The findings also illustrate the barriers to UWF’s strategy (described in Chapter 3) of 
articulating a left racial justice politics.  The narrowing of the field of neighborhood activism 
since the 1960s has ensured that moderate, neoliberal and neoliberal-compatible definitions of 
racial justice are continually reproduced and diffused, while left definitions have been 
eliminated from public currency in the neighborhoods.  These changes are a moment in a longer 
history of the cultivation, by political and economic elites, of racial justice praxis compatible with 
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capitalism.  At least among the mostly middle-aged and middle-class Austin residents 
participating in GAIPO, such understandings of racial justice appeared to be common sense. 
Methodology 
I identified Austin’s civic, social, and political institutions from a list of neighborhood 
organizations published annually by Austin Weekly News, a local newspaper.  I collected data on 
the institutions’ programs and discourses from organizational websites, and from newspaper 
articles.  I included all articles on Austin institutions in three local news outlets, Austin Weekly 
News, Austin Talks, and The Voice, and in several citywide publications.  I obtained information 
about institutions’ funding sources from publicly available financial records and annual 
statements. 
I conducted field research on GAIPO beginning in March of 2017.  During multiple site 
visits, I attended and observed formal and informal GAIPO events, including:  neighborhood 
canvasses; official meetings of GAIPO’s steering committee; debriefings, where members 
discussed recent canvasses and actions; and informal social gatherings.  I conducted in-depth 
interviews with participants, including UWF’s professional organizers, local residents on GAIPO’s 
steering committee, and local residents who participated more sporadically.  I supplemented 
these data with an exhaustive review of GAIPO’s public documents (mostly consisting of posts 
on social media).  I also reviewed the few published articles on GAIPO and its members in Austin 
Talks and the citywide weekly investigative magazine, the Chicago Reader. 
1.  Austin’s Institutions and Political Culture 
I found that seven of Austin’s most prominent non-profits, as well as its elected officials 
and many churches, focus on self-help projects, intended to build social fabric, restore social 
norms, and improve physical spaces.  Another seven of Austin’s non-profits, as well as its 
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elected officials and churches, focus primarily on fostering black-owned businesses.  They 
promote entrepreneurship, solidaristic consumer behavior, and especially, the development of 
commercial real estate.  These clusters of non-profits, officials, churches, and block clubs, 
comprise the bulk of Austin’s civic sector.  Strikingly, I found only two organizations who allocate 
much of their resources to advocacy and to grassroots mobilization of residents in political 
causes.  Table 5.1 provides a list of Austin’s non-profits, categorized by their primary activities.  
Below, I review the programs, and relationships to the neoliberal regime, of exemplary 
organizations. 
This field of organizations has been systematically created by elites beyond the 
neighborhood.  Austin’s self-help and community development organizations are steeped in 
long-standing traditions of self-help and Black economic empowerment.  But their programs 
express distinctively modern and neoliberal variants of those traditions, adapting them to the 
realities of chronic disinvestment, fiscal austerity, and the dominance of free-markets.  City 
governments and philanthropic foundations also encourage these forms of work, quite simply, 
by funding them, while refusing to support more militant and politicized grassroots organizing 
and advocacy.   
Table 5.1.  Neighborhood organizations in Austin, by area of activity 
Economic Development 
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All of the above 
Austin Coming Together 
 





Office of Ald. Emma Mitts 
 








Social Fabric and Local Self-Help Discourses 
Austin’s largest non-profit organization, Westside Health Authority, exemplifies the self-
help programs of many of Austin’s civic, social, and political institutions.  Many of WHA’s 
programs are designed to rebuild the neighborhood’s social fabric, building social networks and 
relationships among neighbors.  Leaders’ statements and program documents explain WHA’s 
intentions to foster a sense of community, restore social norms, and thus improve public safety 
and socialize young people.  Though less frequently, some documents emphasize that such 
changes create an environment conducive to economic development.  For example, in its “Every 
Block a Village” program, WHA helped organize block clubs, recruiting neighborhood residents 
to participate in block clean-ups, repairs, and other self-help activities.511  WHA’s Good 
Neighbors Campaign links block clubs with local churches, community groups, the police 
department, and other neighborhood institutions.512   
Many of Austin’s other prominent institutions conduct similar programs.  Austin Coming 
Together, the neighborhood’s second largest non-profits, and two smaller non-profits sponsor 
block clubs, community-building programs, and “greening” projects.513  The neighborhood’s 
political leaders, including 37th Ward Alderman Emma Mitts, and 29th ward Alderman Antonio 
Taliaferro, articulate similar perspectives on the neighborhood’s problems, tracing crime and 
delinquency to the decline of social fabric and norms, and encourage residents to form block 
 
511 As of 2015, EBV had attained a significant scale, with relationships with residents on 100 blocks of Austin, and outreach underway 
to another 200 blocks.  For information on WHA’s EBV program, see a description by one of their funders, the Marguerite Casey 
Foundation, at https://caseygrants.org/who-we-are/inside-mcf/every-block-a-village-westside-health-authority/ (accessed 6/19/17) 
or a description in a biography of WHA’s founder, at http://ssa.uchicago.edu/ssa_magazine/every-block-village (accessed 3/1/19).  
Under EBV, WHA also recruited block club members to participate in volunteer activities, chosen by residents, and coordinated by 
WHA, such as block clean-ups, mentoring activities, and sports leagues.   
512 This program is described in Volume 1, Issue 1 of WHA’s newsletter Good Neighbor News, available 
http://healthauthority.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Westside-Health-Authority-Good-Neighbor-News-September-2017-.pdf 
(accessed 3/1/19). 
513 E.g., ACT held the Austin Block Club Challenge, called on block clubs to submit a photo of members to Facebook, which 
“demonstrate the theme of unity.” 
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clubs to pursue informal social control and uplift activities.514  The Chicago Police Department’s 
15th District also encourages residents to form block clubs to practice informal social control (in 
line with citywide department policy).515  And several local churches espouse the same 
perspective and lead block-clean ups and other social-fabric themed projects.516   
Local leaders report a widespread concern with social fabric and norms among Austin 
residents.  WHA’s founder Jacqueline Reed described a grassroots planning process which set 
the organization’s priorities during its formative years:  Austin residents called for efforts to 
rebuild social fabric and restore informal social control. 
They were concerned about the decline in moral values among youth reflected in the 
open disrespect on the streets and in the classrooms. They were concerned about the 
isolation and lack of relationships among neighbors; several had ‘remembered when 
everybody looked after each other,’ and helped with each other’s children.517 
  
These institutions all receive funding from the city government and major philanthropic 
foundations.  WHA is funded by the Marguerite Casey Foundation and the MacArthur 
Foundation, among others, and receives contracts from the city government to administer job-
training and youth education programs.  ACT is funded by grants from the Local Initiatives 
Support Corporation, United Way, and other major philanthropic foundations.  SANA received a 
city grant to build a park in 2017.518 
As Evelyn Brooks-Higginbottom, Victoria Wolcott, and other historians have shown, 
philosophies of self-help and community-building, as a response to social problems ultimately 
rooted in systemic racism and economic marginalization, have deep roots in African American 
 
514 Mitts also features the themes of educational and employment opportunities. Mitts cultivates block clubs by offering them 
access, hosting meetings of block club presidents, soliciting their input on public policy, and  regularly attends block club events. 
515 The website of CPD’s community policing program, Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy, lists advice for starting block clubs:  
https://home.chicagopolice.org/online-services/block-clubs/ (accessed 3/1/19).  The Community Liaison for the 15th District also 
proactively works with homeowners to encourage block clubs.   
516 Zhang, Xueer:  “Stronger relationship in 2018 priority for Austin ministers, residents and police,” Austin Talks, 11/15/17. 
517 See the “Founder’s Message” section of WHA’s website:  http://healthauthority.org/about-wha/founders-message/ (accessed 
6/19/17).  In 2016, WHA again solicited community input to determine its priorities, and again found widespread concern with social 
fabric and norms, and the same nostalgic vision of a more united community. 
518 Studenkov, Igor:  “Austin veteran garden clears cost hurdle,” Austin Weekly Times, 4/2/18. 
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political culture.519  But, the historical prevalence of these ideas in Black communities was 
caused in part by the intervention of white elites.  Consider, for example, the Urban League, 
which helped to popularize “respectability politics” in Black communities.  From the 1910s to 
the 1950s, the Urban League organized hundreds of block clubs—including dozens in Chicago’s 
Black neighborhoods—using them to promulgate “advice about health, cleanliness, deportment 
in public places, care of children, overcrowding, and efficiency” among neighborhood 
residents.520  As Amanda Seligman points out, the League choose such uplift strategies, instead 
of more assertive civil rights strategies, because white benefactors threatened to withdraw 
financial and political support if the League chose otherwise.521   
 More recently, city governments and philanthropic foundations have encouraged these 
forms of apolitical self-help activism.  As several historians recount, since the early 1970s, 
foundations and city governments have been more likely to support non-confrontational forms 
of community-based activism.  Projects and organizations focused on “community-building” 
(i.e., augmenting relationships among residents, and between residents and local institutions), 
upgrading or restoring public spaces, and other forms of local self-help are among funders’ 
priorities. 
Black-Owned Business and Economic Development  
Several of Austin’s largest non-profits, as well as its local elected officials and prominent 
churches foster entrepreneurship and work with public and private partners on real estate 
development projects.  These actors describe this work as a form of racial empowerment, and 
as the expression of authentic Black culture.  They also invoke the arguments long hegemonic 
 
519 Higginbottom, Evelyn Brooks:  Righteous Discontent The Women's Movement in the Black Baptist Church: 1880-1920 (1993); 
Wolcott, Victoria:  “‘Bible, Bath, and Broom’:  Nannie Helen Burroughs, the National Training School, and the Uplift of the Race” 
(1997). 
520 Seligman, 2016:  28. 
521 Ibid, 26. 
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among neoliberal policymakers:  that market-driven economic growth is the most (if not only) 
way to effectively combat poverty and associated social problems. 
This work is exemplified by two of Austin’s most prominent civic organizations, the 
Austin African American Business Network Association, and the Austin Chamber of Commerce.  
Both offer local businesses a variety of support services, and work on economic development 
projects.522  In recent years, AAABNA and ACOC have collaborated with Austin’s other leading 
non-profits, Austin’s aldermen, and city agencies on a series of large-scale projects to revitalize a 
commercial strip of Chicago Avenue.523  Westside Health Authority and Austin Coming Together, 
and several smaller non-profits, also participate in these entrepreneurship and commercial 
development projects.524 
Like similar coalitions documented in other neighborhoods, these actors tend to 
construct their projects as opportunities for authentic expression of black culture—drawing on a 
strand of Black Nationalist discourse, popularized in the 1960s and 1970s.525  Echoing a strand of 
Black Power discourses from the 1960s, these organizations also talk about entrepreneurship 
and real estate development as a form of racial and community empowerment, creating 
opportunities for control over local economic processes and institutions, and buffering the 
 
522 These services including networking opportunities, clerical and legal services, grant-writing help, and publicity.   Since 2016, ACOC 
has been working with 28th Ward Alderman Antonio Taliaferro on a multi-site development project, focused on arts and culture-
related businesses, surrounding Austin Town Hall.  ACOC functions as a developer, mediating between property owners, builders, 
and prospective tenants (Dean, 2016). 
523 They are leveraging a combination of city programs to subsidize private investment in a long-disinvested commercial strip in 
Central Austin.  At the request of AAABNA and alderman, the city Department of Planning and Development created a Special 
Services Area in the corridor, levying additional property taxes on the area to fund enhanced city services, such as security, 
sanitation, and utilities (what other cities refer to as Business Improvement Districts). 
524 WHA is a major partner in the Chicago Avenue development project.  In 2017, WHA launched the Institute for Business and Social 
Enterprise of Austin to train Austin residents in entrepreneurship skills and connect them to business opportunities (including those 
in the new development projects).  The aforementioned Good Neighbor Campaign also links residents with “business and economic 
development opportunities.” 
525 Johnson, Cedric:  Revolutionaries to Race Leaders (2007).  Michelle Boyd (2007), John Anderson and Carolina Sternberg (2015) 
and Adolph Reed (2016) each describe the use of these discourses in the context of real estate development projects.  There are 
several examples of the use of themes and symbols from these discourses in the Chicago Ave. corridor project.  For example, WHA’s 
promotional materials suggest the corridor will “establish a cultural identity that is reflective of the proud people and businesses 
that call the corridor home.”  AAABNA and ACT personnel and elected officials talked extensively about “the representation of black 
culture” in the new businesses and streetscape.  (Austin Village Chicago SSA Website; http://www.av72chicago.com/blog; accessed 
9/11/17; Dean, Terry:  “Public artwork destined for bus turnaround at Austin and Chicago,” Austin Talks, 12/28/16) 
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community from economic forms of racism.526  Finally, actors fuse these discourses with 
neoliberal arguments, asserting that business development will create job opportunities, 
addressing Austin’s social problems, especially violent crime.527  
While WHA and other groups working on self-help and community-building projects 
disseminate their vision to residents via block clubs, AAABNA’s vision of business development is 
disseminated via public events and the group’s large memberships and social networks.  Local 
media suggest that AAABNA’s monthly Black Economic Empowerment Rallies (highlighting one 
black-owned business in Austin each month) draw large numbers of Austin residents, including 
politicians, clergy members, and other community leaders.528  AAABNA has strong ties to 
Austin’s most prominent churches, with prominent pastors serving on AAABNA’s board, and 
participating in its public events.  AAABNA leaders also speak at services at these churches.529 
Prominent actors have constructed Black-owned business and entrepreneurship as a 
key mode of racial empowerment and cultural expression since at least the Reconstruction 
era.530  This tradition was well-established in Chicago, and was institutionalized in Austin and 
adjacent areas as they underwent demographic transition in the 1960s.  Two of the most 
prominent grassroots racial justice groups in the late 1960s, both street gangs turned activists, 
Conservative Vice Lords and the West Side Organization, were encouraged by federal programs 
and corporate and foundation grants to prioritize entrepreneurship (before being destroyed by 
 
526 E.g., the text for one of AAABNA’s flyers, encouraging Austin residents to shop at local black-owned business:  “Stop the economic 
genocide!” 
527 ACOC and AAABNA leaders also cite developmentalist arguments linking economic growth to social improvement.  AAABNA 
founder and Executive Director, Malcolm Crawford frequently invokes typical arguments that Fusing developmentalist ideas with a 
nationalist appreciation for the redemptive promise of cultural self-determination and intra-racial solidarity, former ACOC Executive 
Director Lilly suggested “[b]ringing more African-American culture to Austin may be the key to cleaning up the violent behavior.  
More black-owned businesses and organizations in Austin can help each other survive” (Harrison, 2010). 
528 Dean, Terry:  “Local Residents Support Another Black-Owned Business,” Austin Talks, 3/3/15. 
529 Since 2014, AAABNA or its leading personnel have co-hosted events with Pastor Ira Acree’s St. Johns Bible Church, Pastor Steve 
Epting of Hope Community Church, and Marseil Jackson, pastor and radio host on WVON (the latter two of whom were or are 
currently on AAABNA’s board of directors). 
530 Hill, Laura Warren and Julia Rabig:  The Business of Black Power:  Community Development, Capitalism and Corporate 
Responsibility in Postwar America (2012).  Michael Dawson, Black Visions. 
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state repression in the early 1970s).  Since at least the early 1970s, Chicago had a vibrant “buy 
Black” movement, encouraging solidaristic economic behavior, within a Black Nationalist 
framework.  This movement had at least one significant leader based in Chicago’s West Side, Dr. 
Webb Evans (known as “Mr. Buy Black”) and the United American Progress Association.531  The 
37th Ward Alderman from 1985 to 2000, Percy Giles, was also a proponent of Black-owned 
business, constructing it as a means of racial empowerment.532  I found that one key leader of 
Austin’s non-profits is steeped in these lineages:  AAABNA founder and Executive Director, 
Malcolm Crawford, cites as inspirations Dr. Evans, and Minister Rahim Aton, a leading 
proponent of black-owned commerce as a strategy of racial empowerment, associated with the 
Black Nationalist wing of 1960s and 1970s racial justice movement. 533 
The focus on market-oriented commercial real estate development appears to be a 
novel expression of this long-running philosophy, one reflecting the distinctive opportunities 
and pressures of the neoliberal era.  Writing about a different Chicago neighborhood, Michelle 
Boyd (2007) observed that community-based organizations, rooted in racial justice struggles, 
shifted to a focus on community development in the 1980s and 1990s, as a response to the 
chronic disinvestment form ghetto neighborhoods, and as a way to participate in the emerging 
public-private real estate development industry.  Neoliberal urban policies both exacerbated 
this disinvestment (cutting remaining social services), and fostered the real estate development 
industry.  By the 1990s, actors in long-marginalized neighborhoods could only attract a share of 
public and private investment by getting into the real estate redevelopment game. 
 
531 Mitchell, 2016. 
532 Feltag, 1990. 
533 Mitchell, 2016. 
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Absence of Radical or Militant Political Organizations 
By the late 1960s, Chicago’s West Side was a hot bed for radical political activism.  A 
comprehensive study for seven community organizations committed to the strategies of 
grassroots organizing and confrontational advocacy of Saul Alinsky in Austin alone.  These 
groups built large grassroots membership, mobilizing them in small- and medium-scale 
campaigns against banks, landlords, and city government.534  Several street gangs turned to 
activism, politicized by the Black Power movement.  While these groups, most notably the West 
Side Organization and Conservative Vice Lords, prioritized business development, they also 
organized tenant unions and organizations of welfare recipients.   
Each of these tendencies fell apart by the late 1970s.  Racial justice groups within unions 
disintegrated, either failing to win struggles for control within the union, or as a result of lay-offs 
and union decline more generally.  Militant racial justice groups such as the Conservative Vice 
Lords disintegrated under vicious attacks by local government, predominantly through the 
criminal justice apparatus.  More generally, changing federal and foundation policies posed a 
stark choice for community-based activists:  organizations could shift priorities, and focus on 
providing social services or community development, and receive generous federal and 
philanthropic grants; or they continue to focus on grassroots organizing and advocacy and go 
bankrupt.   Moreover, by the mid-1970s, ongoing deindustrialization (itself enabled and 
accelerated by federal policy), created acute needs for social services and community 
development in neighborhoods like Austin.  For these push and pull factors, most groups chose 
to focus on service provision or community development. 
 
534 The most powerful among them were considered enough of a threat to be targeted for infiltration and disruption by the Chicago 
Police Department.  
Two of these, the Organization for a Better Austin and Northwest Community Organization founded the group National People’s 
Action, which was instrumental in passing the Community Reinvestment Act in 1977. 
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2.  Organizing GAIPO  
GAIPO’s Origins  
The immediate impetus for the creation of GAIPO was the disappointing results of the 
2015 aldermanic elections in the 37th ward.  The 37th ward was one of 16 targeted by United 
Working Families for extra investment in the 2015 elections.535  UWF had perceived an 
opportunity to defeat a close ally of Emanuel, 17 year incumbent Emma Mitts, based on her 
association with a badly deteriorated neighborhood and the unpopular mayor.536  UWF 
recruited and trained CPS teacher and CTU member Tara Stamps, and invested $76,000, and 
staff and logistical support, into the race.  Stamps narrowly lost in a run-off, Mitts’ first run-off in 
4 elections.537 
The Stamps campaign had brought several professional organizers, affiliated with United 
Working Families and its member organizations, to Austin.  Emma Tai, a professional organizer 
who became the Executive Director of UWF in 2016, was Stamps’ campaign manager; three 
organizers affiliated with the Chicago Teachers Union, Quinn Rawlins, Jason Lee (now UWF’s 
Political Director) and Brandon Johnson (elected in 2018 to the Cook County Board of 
Commissioners), also worked on the Stamps campaign. 
After the election, these four individuals and Stamps herself concluded that the Stamps 
campaign revealed the need to build a permanent organizing infrastructure in Austin.  In Tai’s 
words, the election outcome, despite UWF’s large investment and Ald. Mitts’ negative 
 
535 As explained in Chapter 4, United Working Families is the primary electoral vehicle of Chicago’s community-labor coalition.  In the 
2015 election, it trained, endorsed, and funded 9 aldermanic candidates. 
536 Interview with Emma Tai, 3/8/17.  
537 Stamps forced Mitts into the first run-off in her 18 year tenure (in 4 elections), and lost by only 400 votes.   
217 
 
associations, reflected “the limits of base building within a four month election cycle.”538  
Without an existing, already organized base, and an organizational vehicle for outreach, the 
campaign started at a disadvantage.  Lists of CTU and SEIU HCII members in the ward produced 
a small number of campaign volunteers, insufficient for an effective ground game.  Nor did 
these volunteers confer access to dense social networks or already-developed constituencies in 
the neighborhood.539    Comparatively, Ald. Mitts’ ward-level networks, though small relative to 
pre-Shakman Decrees days, were a significant advantage.540  The need to start from scratch 
raised campaign costs.   And the lack of an indigenous base may have left Stamps more 
vulnerable to portrayal as an outsider.   
Tai, Lee, and Stamps, thus determined the need for a longer-term base-building project.  
A neighborhood-level organization would provide the need foundations for future campaigns, 
reduce campaign costs, and cultivate indigenous leaders, capable of localist authenticity, and 
credibility on neighborhood issues.541  Tai and Lee also theorize that the judgment of an 
organization, with visibility and credibility in the neighborhood, could sway more voters than 
conventional outreach techniques.542 
To this end, Emma Tai, Jason Lee, Tara Stamps and others personnel, with contacts 
made during the campaign, began recruiting for a new, permanent political organization in 
Austin in the Spring of 2015.  Partnering with a few local residents with whom organizers had 
 
538 Interview with Emma Tai, 3/8/17. 
539 Interview with Jason Lee 3/3/17.  
540 As described in Chapter 2, the “Shakman Decrees” banned hiring for political considerations in Chicago’s municipal government, 
eliminating the primary basis for political patronage networks.  The decrees are widely seen as undermine the ward organizations 
which underpinned the classic Chicago political machine.  On Mitts’ relative advantage, Lee said “in the land of the blind, the one-
eyed man is king.” 
541 Interview with Jason Lee, 3/3/17. 
542 Tai and Lee believe that the key to influencing voting behavior at a significant scale creating an organization whose political 
judgement people trust.  This is based on a theory that people take cues about political choices, or about the significance of 
politicians, groups, other objects, from the entities they trust.  Political campaigns should intervene in this cue-taking process, rather 
than trying to disseminate ideas.  (in this, Tai and Lee are in line with the “heuristic” theories of political decision-making developed 
by leading political psychologists.   
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connected during the Stamps campaign, these individuals, starting canvassing and conducting 
outreach at local political events.  New recruits accrued gradually, and Tai reports that a core of 
regular members had solidified by the Summer of 2016. 
The Current Form and Structure of GAIPO 
As of the Summer of 2018, GAIPO had approximately 16 regular members.543  Beyond 
this regular membership, GAIPO draws a fluctuating amount of less consistent participants.  
Almost all are residents of Austin, though occasionally meetings draw participants from 
surrounding neighborhoods.  Meetings have add up to 40 attendees (including the regular 
members), and as few as 10.  In 2017, GAIPO formally registered as a Political Action Committee 
under state law.544   
In 2017, GAIPO members, with Tai’s assistance, formed a decision-making and 
leadership structure.545  The Organizing Committee is GAIPO’s central decision-making and 
planning body.  The Organizing Committee’s monthly meetings (and GAIPO’s monthly 
canvasses) are the one regular event which all official GAIPO members are expected to 
attend.546  The Organizing Committee addresses GAIPO’s formal business, such as election of 
officers, and deliberates about GAIPO policy and strategy.547  For example, in the Spring of 2017, 
the committee discussed the problem of retaining recruits, and considered tactics to facilitate 
connections with potential recruits.548   
 
543 Interview with Tai, 3/8/17. 
544 D-I Statement of Organization, filed with Illinois Board of Elections.  Accessed 4/30/17. 
545 Minutes of Organizing Committee meeting, 2/25/17.  
546 Interview with Tai, 3/8/17.  
547 For example, in February of 2017, the committee elected officers (2 Co-chairs, Secretary and Treasurer), officially adopted 
GAIPO’s mission and vision statements. 
548 Personal communication from Ms. Nickie Abraham, 6/22/17.  
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There is a smaller core of leaders who take additional responsibilities, and appear to 
have relatively more influence in discussions.  This core includes the organization’s official 
officers:  co-chairs Mr. Ben Frazier and Ms. Nickie Abraham, treasurer Ms. Rose Barrett, and 
secretary Mr. Francis Black.549  Anecdotal evidence suggests officers convene to discuss 
decisions with each other, prior to bringing the matter to the organization’s formal decision-
making bodies.550 
Organizing Committee members were among the most vocal and effective participants 
in the group discussions I witnessed.  It appeared that these individuals had some ability to set 
the agenda of a group discussion, at multiple levels:  the co-chairs facilitated the meeting, which 
entailed bringing a printed agenda of topics.  They also exercised informal influence:  these 
members were more vocal and assertive in group discussion, and shaped the course of the 
conversation, establishing the most important aspects of the topic.551  On substantive debates, I 
observed these members state their positions more confidently than other members, and some 
members appeared to defer to them. 
To date, the other important category of participants in GAIPO are the professional 
organizers associated with the community-labor coalition.  In GAIPO’s early days, Tai and Lee 
(and to a lesser extent former CTU organizer Quinn Rallins) seem to have been involved in many 
aspect of GAIPO’s development.  They led canvasses, trained members in organizing tactics and 
other skills, facilitated meetings, and, at least in some cases, led political education.552  As of the 
Spring of 2017, Lee and Rallins no longer participated regularly, and Tai had begun to 
 
549 I use pseudonyms to refer to informants, unless the informant either ran for public office, or was speaking in a professional 
capacity.  I refer to informants by their first or last name according to what the informants themselves preferred or tended to use.  
550 Personal communication from Ms. Nickie Abraham, 6/22/17. 
551 Field Notes, 3/16/17. 
552 This political education is described in newspaper coverage of GAIPO meetings—Hutson, 2016; Kremer, 2015.  Also, Interview 
with Lee, 3/3/17; Interview with Tai, 3/8/17. 
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intentionally scale back her directive role, ceding functions to the emerging membership.553  
Still, when in attendance, Tai’s natural leadership qualities, and GAIPO members’ evident trust 
in her, still draw her into a leadership role.554  Tai may also have helped the Organizing 
Committee design GAIPO’s organizational structure, and recruitment process.555 
The Regular Activities of GAIPO 
Recruitment 
The organizers appear to have established that community organizing would be one of 
GAIPO’s top priorities.556  This priority was institutionalized in the a set of routines related to 
canvassing and training.557  Several members have attended an “organizer training session,” 
conducted by Tai, Lee, or Rallins, educating members on the importance of organizing and on 
tactics.558  At least since the summer of 2016, GAIPO has held two canvasses per month (with a 
hiatus from November, 2016 through early March, 2017). 559  GAIPO members also distribute 
flyers for their upcoming meetings at local churches, libraries, parks, and restaurants, and on the 
organization’s Facebook page.560 
 
553 Interview with Jason Lee, 3/3/17.  Interview with Emma Tai, 3/8/17.  Pursuant her view that this organizing model cannot be 
replicable if it depends on the extraordinary contributions of outside organizers.  To this end, she has scaled back her meeting 
attendance, and refers questions of organizational policy to the officers—for example, deliberately not attending the March GBM, 
and referring the question of my participation to the officers. 
554 Field notes, 3/11/17.  For example, at a canvass and debriefing in March of 2017, Tai suggested that the organization adopt an 
official resolution about new canvassing procedures during an impasse, and tutored members in parliamentary procedure—
members’ receptivity to Tai’s interventions was clear. 
555 Interview with Tai, 3/8/17. 
556 I am inferring that this was a priority for organizers based on the amount of attention devoted to canvassing and organizing 
training. 
557 GAIPO’s organizing routines include regular neighborhood canvasses, and a series of follow-up mechanisms through which 
members can be integrated into the organization.   
558 On organizer training as a method of intake, and Tai’s presence at some of these meetings:  Interview with Tai, 3/8/17 and Field 
Notes 3/11/17.  On trainings being hosted by Rallins:  I inferred this from GAIPO Facebook posts indicating the date and location of 
organizer training sessions, and newspaper accounts mentioning Rallins leading those events—Facebook post 7/6/16; Hutson, 2016.  
559 Facebook posts.  These canvasses use typical organizing tactics—using voting records and party affiliation data to target 
households, and typical conversational scripts (eliciting primary concerns, and suggesting their systemic and political roots through a 
series of leading questions).  All people contacted through a canvass are contacted again by GAIPO members, and invited to an 
upcoming meeting.  This can be one of the organization’s General Body Meeting.  New attendees at these meetings are encouraged 
to attend an organizer training session, and then to join the team of canvassers.   
560 Field notes, 3/16/17. 
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These processes produced much of the current membership. 561  Others members of the 
Organizing Committee reported seeing flyers, or hearing the organization mentioned at 
church.562  The ongoing canvassing creates a trickle of new recruits, with the usual attrition at 
each stage of organizational commitment:  Tai estimates that, for 40 attendees at an intake 
meeting, she would expect 7 or 8 at the training.563  
 GAIPO also has meetings designed to enhance relationships among current members.  
GAIPO holds relatively informal meetings at a member’s house, as a space for socializing and 
conversation.  Tai has not tried to determine the agenda of these meanings.  From her 
perspective, the house meetings function to deepen relationships among GAIPO members, and 
foster identification with the organization.564 
Planning and Deliberation 
GAIPO holds monthly General Body Meetings.  In my observations, these have three 
functions:  1) Participants share and debate analyses of important issues, including the nature 
and causes of neighborhood problems; potential solutions; the relative importance of different 
problems; and the merits of positions on particular public policy questions.  The resolution of 
some conversations indicated that persuasion and consensus-building occurs over the course of 
these conversations (though I do not yet have any data to show whether persuasion was 
durable).  2)Participants discuss and debate GAIPO’s upcoming political actions, including 
strategizing about potential actions, briefing for upcoming actions, and debriefing on past 
actions.  3)The meetings appeared to function as a social gathering.  Members were evidently 
 
561 Field notes, 7/24/17.   
562 Field notes, 7/24/17. 
563 Interview with Emma Tai, 3/8/17.  The Organizing Committee has discussed ways to increase the effectiveness of recruitment 
efforts and retention, and most recently developed new recruitment materials, an “information card” to collect recruits’ contact 
information, and deliver GAIPO’s contact information and mission in an easily digestible way (Personal communication with Ms. 
Nickie Abraham, 6/22/17.  
564 Interview with Emma Tai, 3/8/17. 
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delighted to see each other, and the meeting was punctuated by many thorough laughs—
members interacted as friends.565  General Body Meetings usually include a presentation by 
members or a guest on a designated topic. 
Political Action 
GAIPO has engaged in several, strategic ward-based political actions.  GAIPO sends 
members to attend official public events, with the goals of participating in policy discussions, 
increasing the organization’s local visibility, and in some cases, pressuring local officials.  In 
2017, GAIPO participated in a campaign against the expansion of charter schools in Austin.  In 
February, GAIPO members attended an anti-charter rally at a local high school.  Later that 
month, members attempted to confront Alderman Emma Mitts about charter expansion at her 
“ward night” (though she avoided the confrontation).566 
As of Spring 2017, GAIPO members were preparing to attend the Chicago Police 
Department’s (CPD) precinct meetings.  In July of 2015, Tara Stamps, Tai, and others convened 
outside CPD Superintendent McCarthy’s “listening tour” in Austin, protesting the meeting’s 
closure to the public, and calling for CPD receptivity to community input.567 
Finally, GAIPO cultivates a presence in local and city-wide media.  The former co-chair, 
Ms. Bailey Donaldson, and organizing committee member Constance Daniels gave statements to 
the Chicago Reader, (an investigative newspaper with a citywide readership) on gun violence, 
city policy, and GAIPO’s political goals.  Mrs. Darlene Frazier wrote an op-ed on GAIPO’s work 
 
565 Field notes, 3/11/17 and 3/16/17. 
566 Field notes, 3/16/17. 
567 “Shut Out but Not Shutting Up:  Young Voices Speak Out about Chicago Violence,” on website of Westside Health Authority.  
Accessed 7/20/17.  http://healthauthority.org/shut-out-but-not-shutting-up-young-voices-speak-out-about-chicago-violence/ 
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and goals for another citywide publication.568  Three of GAIPO’s monthly meetings have been 
covered by Austin newspapers.569 
3.  Research Questions 
Taking shape in a complex environment, GAIPO is an opportunity to observe the effects 
of local ideas and institutions on neighborhood base-building for an anti-neoliberal project.  The 
first section examines the characteristics of GAIPO’s regular members, including their 
demographic traits, their organizational affiliations, and their political backgrounds.  The second 
section examines the ideas about key social and political phenomena which GAIPO members’ 
and participants’ bring to the organization.  I will also document the degree to which ideas are 
institutionalized, widely held, and disputed.   
2.1 Member Characteristics:  Demographics, Affiliations, Political Background 
Demographics 
There was a clear pattern in the demographic characteristics of GAIPO members.  In line 
with findings on participation in civic and political affairs in urban neighborhoods, GAIPO’s 
regular members were almost all middle-class.  Of the 14 regular members for whom I obtained 
information, 12 were currently employed or retired from professional or “white-collar” jobs, 
primarily in education and clerical work.  All 14 had completed some form of higher education, 
with a majority holding a bachelor’s degree.  All 9 of the members for whom I obtained data 
were current homeowners.  Tables 5.2 and 5.3 break down the occupations and educational 
attainment of the 14 members on whom demographic information was available. 
 
568 Personal communication with Emma Tai, 3/11/17. 
5691)Hutson, Wendell:  “'Powerless in their own neighborhoods, 'Austin residents vented frustrations with neighborhood's violence 
at July 7 meeting” in Austin Daily News, 7/13/16. 
2)Kremer, T.J.:  “West Side group says new tax needed to help stop the violence.”  In Austin Talks, 11/30/15. 
3)Kremer, T.J.:  “As gun violence continues to surge in Austin, residents look for answers,” Austin Talks, 9/21/15. 
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Table 5.2.  Occupations of Regular GAIPO Members 
Accounting, other clerical 4 
Teaching 4 
Sales 1 
IT Specialist 1 
Artist 1 
Social work 1 
Childcare provider 1 
Security guard 1 
 
Table 5.3.  Educational Attainment of Regular GAIPO Members 
Masters or more 2 
Bachelors 11 
Associates degree 1 
 
There were also patterns with respect to age, race, and gender.  As Jason Lee observed, 
“[o]ur sweet spot is middle-aged African American women whose kids are out of school.  That’s 
the base.  We have a few people with school aged children.”570  Not surprisingly, given Austin’s 
87% black population, all but one regular members are African-American.  The remaining 
member is white.  Of the aforementioned 14 members, 4 are currently retired.  At official 
meetings, I observed that non-regular attendees also tended to be what Jason described as 
middle-aged.  For example, at the March 16th meeting, two of 7 non-regular members 
mentioned being retired CPS teachers, and 2 more mentioned having adult children or 
grandchildren. 
GAIPO has struggled to involve two demographics in particular:  younger Austin 
residents and lower-income residents (including lower-income segments of the working-class 
and low-income populations).   Both the UWF organizers and GAIPO members have repeatedly 
stated their desire to incorporate these demographics.  In interviews and informal 
conversations, UWF organizers and multiple GAIPO members acknowledged that working class 
 
570 Interview with Jason Lee, 3/3/17.  
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and lower-income people were underrepresented in the organization.  Ms. Nickie Abraham and 
Ms. Bailey Donaldson listed inroads in these populations as a priority for the coming year.571 
Organizational Affiliations  
Almost all of GAIPO’s regular members have connections to other civic or political 
institutions in the ward or city, and/or have histories of political activism.  Four have 
connections (either volunteers or financial supporters) to non-profit organizations engaged in 
service-provision and/or community development; four are members of block clubs or 
neighborhood associations; four were volunteers at local churches. 
Three of GAIPO’s regulars are affiliated with non-profit and/or religious organizations in 
Austin or nearby neighborhoods.  Mr. Dawson Floyd, a teacher at a local charter school, 
volunteers in a capacity I was unable to determine at Austin’s largest non-profit service 
provider, the Westside Health Authority (described at length in Chapter 5).  Mr. Floyd has 
posted positive comments on social media related to at least three other local non-profit 
organizations, specializing either in community development or service provision.572 
Mr. Robert Davis, who works professionally as the coordinator of a church-based service 
provision program, also co-founded a church-based mentoring program on the West Side.  Mr. 
Davis also leads service-based work as an elder at New Life Community Church.573  Mr. Davis, for 
example, leads group of congregants to clean-up nearby blocks of Austin.  
Mrs. Betty Simpson, an artist and entrepreneur, contributes financially to at least three 
mission-based non-profits in and around Austin:  CAN Chicago, an organization providing mental 
health care and assisted living for youth who have experienced severe trauma; Homan Square 
 
571 Field notes, 3/11/17; Personal communication with Ms. Nickie Abraham, 6/22/17. 
572 The NGOs were the Resident Association of Greater Englewood, Austin Coming Together, and The Healing Corner. 
573 Johnson, 2014. 
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Foundation, a community development non-profit in a neighborhood just east of Austin; and 
Perspectives Charter Schools, a network of charters on Chicago’s West and Near West Sides. 
In one-on-one or group conversations, four GAIPO members mentioned belonging to 
block clubs or neighborhood associations.  Two members specifically mentioned they had been 
part of these associations for many years— “for decades,” and “for as long as I can remember,” 
respectively.  All four mentioned participating in some of the activities typically associated with 
block clubs, including patrolling the neighborhood for illicit or disorderly activity, and cleaning 
up trash.574 
Political Background 
Mr. Ben Frazier, GAIPO’s co-chair, was active in the movement for Harold Washington’s 
election, and in ward-based organizations affiliated with Washington in the 1980s.  Mr. Ben 
Frazier joined the 37th Ward IPO, built in 1985 to support Washington allies running for 
alderman and Democratic committeeperson.  The IPO clashed with the ward’s old alderman and 
his ward organization, in a ward-level theatre of the citywide fight between Washington and the 
old Democratic Machine.575  Among other activities, Mr. Ben Frazier was the appellant in a 
lawsuit accusing the machine candidate for Democratic committeeperson, Thomas Simmons, of 
fraud, and seeking his removal from the ballot.576 
Mrs. Darlene Frazier, a retired accountant, and a very prominent—and eloquent—voice 
in GAIPO’s meetings, also participated in the Washington-era mobilizations, and maintains ties 
to some remnants of the Washington-era formation.  Though I was unable to speak directly with 
 
574 Field Notes, 3/16/17. 
575 Pervious alderman, Frank Damato, a staunch supporter of the Richard J. Daley machine and “Verdolyk block” on city council, 
boasted that “Mr. Washington is not going to pick the black alderman who will serve the 37th ward.  My Regular Democratic 
Organization will.  The next aldermen will be one of my 38 precinct captains who is black” (Freemon, 1988). 
576 Chicago’s election laws require candidates to submit a petition with 324 in order to be added to the ballot.  Frazier’s suit 
challenged Simmons’ signatures as fraudulent—a common trick in elections in Chicago. 
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Mrs. Frazier about her past activism, Ms. Tai described her as “very plugged in” to the 
cotemporary institutions with ties to the Washington movement and administration.  Ms. Tai 
mentioned Mrs. Frazier’s close attention to political programming on WVON, an African-
American oriented talk-radio station, with a long history of civil rights and black nationalist-
oriented political activism.577   
I found only one member who was involved with more recent racial justice-oriented 
social movements.   Mrs. Simpson, GAIPO’s one regularly participating white member, 
mentioned her participation in Chicago’s Black Lives Matter organization. 
Two regular GAIPO members are also members and elected delegates in the Chicago 
Teachers Union. Both have been active, in their capacity as teachers and union members, in 
struggles against school closures.578  Ms. Nickie Abraham, GAIPO’s current co-chair, has served 
as her school’s elected representative in the CTU House of Delegates since 2012.  Nickie has 
served as an elected representative to the CTU’s House of Delegates since 2011, Ms. Kent at 
least since 2017. 
2.2 Members Ideologies  
Field observation, interviews, and an analysis of GAIPO’s documents, produced four 
findings about the ideas in circulation in GAIPO: 
Finding 1:  At a very basic level of problem perception, GAIPO members universally agree.  
Members perceive the same neighborhood conditions as problematic.  They reference these 
problems, their extent, and urgency during conversation without debate or need for clarification 
 
577 Searcy, 2012; Squires, 2000. 
578 Ms. Kent participated in CPS public hearing, criticizing CPS decision to close the elementary school at which she worked.  
https://soundcloud.com/wbez/4-29-13-chambers-gblat-heff.  Ms. Kent’s speech begins at 38:09. 
Nickie mentioned her attendance at anti-closure rallies in a personal communication, 3/11/17. 
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or adjudication.  Violent crime was universally recognized as the most urgent problem.  
Members had similar, though not identical, lists of secondary problems. 
Finding 2:  At the level of problem definition, I observed a diversity of ideas.  GAIPO does not yet 
have official, codified positions, and I did not observe the conversational patterns that would 
indicate degrees of informal institutionalization, or even a consensus position.  Rather, I 
observed three distinct discourses on the causes and solutions to neighborhood problems, each 
articulated repeatedly, across multiple contexts of the organization’s activity, and with multiple 
proponents among the organization’s leaders and membership. 
• One discourse traced Austin’s crime to breakdowns in social networks, and in pro-social 
norms and behavior.  Accordingly, GAIPO’s priority should be to rebuild the community’s 
broken networks and culture.  At times, prominent proponents of this discourse posited a 
relationship between improved social networks and economic growth. 
• The second discourse defined employment as the root of community health.  Proponents of 
this discourse did not articulate an elaborate or vivid account of this causal relationship.  
However, they offered more detailed policy analysis than proponents of other discourses. 
• The third discourse described the roots of the neighborhood’s conditions in a long-term 
project of debasing black neighborhoods, led by whites.  Proponents of this discourse 
emphasized the city’s divestment from the neighborhood, and focused on generating black-
owned businesses.   
Finding 3:  As an organization, GAIPO managed this ideological diversity in three ways. 
• I observed attempts at syntheses among these discourses.  In particular, some (though not 
all) proponents of the social networks and norms discourse eagerly embrace the element of 
racial conflict of the anti-black project discourse. 
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• At times, GAIPO merely aggregated the various concerns (without acknowledging any 
tensions among them). 
• When individual members spoke on behalf of GAIPO (for instance, when producing an 
organizational document or speaking to the press), they used their preferred discourse, and 
did not use the others. 
• It is not yet clear if any discourse, or elements of them, are emerging as dominant. 
Finding 4:  In the one concrete public policy discussed at-length, GAIPO members had diverse 
views on charter schools, but universally opposed the expansion of privately run charters, 
framing it as against the interests of the community. 
Finding 5:  Lastly, I observed extensive agreement that GAIPO’s primary strategy is to build 
electoral power through community organizing.  Some members were clearly attracted to non-
electoral forms of collective action (generally the same members who affirm the causal 
importance of social networks and norms).  But the organization’s most active participants are 
firmly committed to a strategy of winning political power through elections, by local organizing.  
This strategy was an explicit premise (and at times, even an implicit premise) for discussions of 
their upcoming activities, and a theme of most of their public texts. 
Finding 1:  Common Perceptions of Neighborhood Conditions  
Perhaps not surprisingly for individuals compelled to local activism, GAIPO members are 
acutely aware of the conditions in Austin.  Though different understandings of causes and 
solutions quickly obtruded into conversation, there is widespread agreement about the 
existence, extent, and urgency of some problems.  Everyone seemed to recognize the high rates 
of violent crime, unemployment, and poverty, and the low rate of educational attainment, and 
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most saw violent crime rates as especially urgent.  Members took these points as unproblematic 
facts in conversation.  And GAIPO members had similar (though not identical) lists of concerns.   
I observed in informal and formal discussions a universal concern with Austin’s violent 
crime.  Violent crime came up frequently in informal conversation among members during two 
days of field observation.579  People shared anecdotes about hearing gun shots at night (indeed, 
“every night”), about which areas and blocks were more or less safe, and about recent incidents.  
These comments usually elicited similar anecdotes or knowing assent and I did not observe any 
disagreement about the existence or intensity of the violence problem.  Crime dominated 
formal discussions at the March 2017 General Body Meeting as well, where nearly every 
attendee mentioned reducing violent crime as one of GAIPO’s raisons d’etre. 
The shared prioritization with violent crime was reflected in the ways that members 
talked about other issues.  In discussions at the March 2017 General Body Meeting, for example, 
members frequently stated the importance of other concerns in terms of their implications for 
violent crime.   Bailey, the former co-chair, prioritized unemployment for its implications for 
crime rates. 
Mr. Dawson Floyd, an organizing committee member and frequent presence on GAIPO’s 
Facebook page, posted a document explaining economic development and improved social 
capital in terms of their effects on crime rates.580  In fact, when asked “one thing you would 
change about Austin today,” several mentioned other issues.  But those who elaborated 
explained that their respective priority issue was important because it would address the violent 
crime problem.581 
 
579 Field notes, 3/11/17. 
580 Facebook post, 10/26/16.  
581 Field notes, 3/16/17. 
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Beyond violent crime, members had diverse, but overlapping perceptions of 
neighborhood problems.  People clustered into two groups—one which spoke more often about 
social networks, culture, parenting and religion, and one who talked most about employment 
and schools.  People in the former group also recognize unemployment and low educational 
attainment as problems (for instance, assenting to other members’ comments about them).  It 
was not clear to me if people in the second group recognized deteriorated social networks, 
flawed parenting, and other cultural and behavioral issues as problems. 
Finding 2:  Three Discourses on Problems’ Causes and Solutions  
Alongside shared perceptions of incidence rates and urgency, I observed a diversity of 
ideas about the causes of and potential solutions to neighborhood problems.  I found three 
distinct discourses on the causes and solutions to neighborhood problems, each articulated 
repeatedly, across multiple contexts of the organization’s activity, and with multiple proponents 
among the organization’s leaders and membership.   
Discourse 1:  Social Norms and Networks 
I observed one set of ideas about the causal importance of norms, and the social 
institutions that uphold and transmit them.  Several members articulated this analysis at the 
March 16th General Body Meeting, in response to the prompt “If you could change one thing 
about Austin today, what would it be?”  One first time attendee, a retired CPS teacher, captured 
the points made by multiple speakers, in a particularly long and impassioned speech.  She 
argued at length that social disorder led a vicious cycle of social disengagement and withdrawal, 
diminished social control, and worsening social disorder, leading ultimately to crime.  I distilled 
three points from her speech: 
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First, the most effective solution to crime is proactive effort by the community’s adults 
to maintain social order and socialize kids—this prevents disorder and crime, and leads to pro-
social behavior by kids.  She offered examples of such activity:  she described her own 
experiences maintaining a vocal and visible presence on her bloc (asking kids not to stand on her 
lawn or idle cars in front of her house, offering passersby home-cooked food, etc.).  She 
described what used to be common parenting methods (parents, particularly fathers, 
monitoring children’s schoolwork, supervising their and neighbors’ kids after school, and around 
the neighborhood).  She contrasted this with absent and disengaged parents today, and argued 
that the inadequate parenting caused the neighborhood youth’s behavioral problems, including, 
ultimately, crime.582 
Second, she argued that residents’ propensity to engage in those beneficial parenting 
and social control practices is inseparable from residents’ connections to each other.  She 
argued that simply getting to know one’s neighbors made all parties feel invested in the block or 
neighborhood.  This feeling of investment motivated informal social regulation.  She contrasted 
a more connected neighborhood in a bygone era to the current, disengaged neighborhood. 
Third, this speaker implied that building better social networks (and thus restoring levels 
of informal social control and socialization) was ultimately a matter of Austin residents’ changing 
their own behavior.  She suggested that residents simply needed to “show their face,” and to 
communicate with their neighbors, to start a virtuous cycle.  Like other speakers in this cluster, 
this speaker did not mention other causes of the decline of social networks beyond resident 
behavior. 
 
582 Field notes, 3/16/17. 
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This speech exemplified a series of comments.  Other members had also expressed the 
importance of adult residents’ behavior around the neighborhood and parenting, and of getting 
to know neighbors.  A few people referenced a bygone era when these behaviors were more 
common.  The aforementioned speech was met with murmurs and statements of agreement.583    
This cluster of speakers included at least one member of GAIPO’s Organizing 
Committee—Dawson Floyd, a young man and teacher at a local charter school.  Mr. Floyd made 
a similar point about social networks producing feelings of investment in the community.  He 
argued that “unity,” “all of us coming together,” would give residents a sense of collective 
purpose, and the spiritual and practical capacity to address the neighborhood’s problems.584 
A similar analysis was articulated in a document posted on GAIPO’s Facebook wall in 
November of 2016, and possibly distributed at GAIPO’s 11/17/16 organizer training session 
(Picture 5.1, below).585  The author of the document is unknown, but it was posted on Facebook 
by Mr. Floyd.  This document posits the same relationship between strong social networks and 
crime, and establishes the development of social networks as the most important target of 
collective action.  The document adds “economic development” as the mechanism linking 
improved networks to reduced crime. 
   The document makes quite explicit the priority of social networks, with the headline 
“Building a Social Network strengthens our community” (emphasis in original).  The next block 
of text explains “A strong social network leads to a lower crime rate or no crime at all.  The 




585 Facebook post 10/26/16.  It was created as part of an advertisement for that meeting, and its juxtaposition with the meeting flyer 
suggested it was something of an agenda for the meeting. 
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The document also highlights the importance of economic growth.  Specifically, the 
document describes a virtuous cycle in which strong social networks reduce crime, attract 
business, and spur economic growth, which in-turn strengthens social networks, and so on.  It 
states that “Economic growth in our neighborhood will lead to improvements in all facets of 
life.”  Alongside a graph depicting the inverse relationship of economic growth and crime rates, 
the document reads: “A powerful social network lowers crime rates and attracts more 
businesses to move into our neighborhoods.” 
Picture 5.1:  Document Associated with GAIPO’s November 17th Community Forum 
 
Discourse 2:  Jobs as the Primary Cause 
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A second set of GAIPO members and meeting attendees argues that unemployment 
causes the community’s other problems, and particularly crime, and thus should be the primary 
focus for interventions.  Proponents of this analysis have produced the most detailed policy 
proposals, but have not yet articulated the importance of employment, or its links to other 
neighborhood problems, in the sort of detailed and vivid fashion in which the aforementioned 
speakers celebrated social networks.  Two of the three prominent proponents of this analysis 
were younger members of GAIPO.  The UFW coalition’s organizers have attempted to propagate 
this analysis within GAIPO. 
Gaby Davidson, a recent college graduate from Austin, and then GAIPO’s co-Chair, 
articulated this analysis in response to the same prompt (“what is one thing you would change 
about Austin today”) at the March, 2016 General Body Meeting.  Davidson described the 25% 
unemployment as “a travesty,” and very briefly argued that job opportunities for Austin’s youth 
would prevent criminal enterprise.586  
Some GAIPO members share an intense concern with community norms and social 
networks, but see employment as causally prior.  At the March General Body Meeting, a middle-
aged woman, and first time GAIPO participant, described at length her concern with Austin’s 
deteriorated social norms, and absent parents, in much the same terms as the speaker 
described in the previous section.  But she went on to argue that jobs are the cornerstone:  with 
more employment, “the rest would come.”  She explained that jobs, and especially businesses 
owned by local families (“mom and pop businesses”), would make Austin residents “feel 
invested” and “connected” to the community.  She argued that this sense of investment and 
 
586 Field Notes, 3/16/17.  
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connection makes residents perform the types of informal social control and social 
engagement.587 
At a 2016 meeting, Diane Coleman, a 30 year Austin resident, also melded the jobs- and 
socialization-focused analyses.  Coleman observed that people involved in crime “are young, 
black men with no job or positive, male role models in their lives.”  Coleman argued for 
enhanced investment in “helping our youth and young adults,” through employment programs, 
mentoring, and other means.588 
Interestingly, these two comments were the most elaborate articulations of the causal 
importance of employment which I heard.  Even the proponents of this perspective, such as 
Davidson, did not articulate the causal importance of employment in detail—and certainly not in 
the level of detail as the speakers in the last section used when describing the importance of 
social norms, networks, and parenting. 
Davidson and other GAIPO members have, however, described in detail the gaps in 
employment opportunities, and the policies needed to address them.  Constance Daniels, an 
Organizing Committee member, described the inadequacy of local job training programs in the 
Chicago Reporter (speaking on behalf of GAIPO): “There are some programs, but some of the 
jobs that they offer require degrees, or people need transportation to get to them.”  Davis 
argued that “training programs aimed at unskilled workers, as well as getting jobs back into 
Austin, are where the resources are needed most.”589 
The coalition organizers’ limited pedagogical interventions have attempted to propagate 
this jobs-centric analysis.  Jason Lee articulated an employment program in great detail at a 
2015 meeting.  Lee described this employment program as an anti-violence program, 
 
587 Field notes 3/16/17. 
588 This and previous sentence, Hutson, 2016. 
589 This and previous sentence, Hinton, 2017. 
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presupposing the causal link between unemployment and violence.  Lee described in detail the 
financing of the potential program with a “1.5 percent tax on city income:” 
“If our household made $60,000 a year, we’d basically have to give up $2.50 a day to 
create this program. So we’d have to give up a medium iced latte from Dunkin Donuts 
every day.  Now I’m not saying that’s not a sacrifice, but think about what we’d be able 
to get.”590 
Discourse 3:  Racial Conflict and Racial Interest 
A third discourse traced the community’s current problems to the history of inter-racial 
conflict in the United States.  In this, Austin’s problems are caused by a white power structure’s 
long-term project of degrading and marginalizing black people.  At the March 16th General Body 
Meeting, and in an editorial, the primary proponents of this analysis also brought up the matter 
of black-owned businesses in Austin.  They implied that reversing the decline in black-owned 
businesses should be a priority for the community (implicitly defining that community in terms 
of residence and race).  The overarching causal analysis proved attractive to proponents of both 
previous analyses:  some (though not all) who had espoused concern with social behavior and 
jobs, respectively, rearticulated their concerns within this racial conflict framework, after that 
framework’s elaboration. 
At the March 16th General Body Meeting, this analysis was first articulated in a 
conversation about the similar plight of black neighborhoods across American cities.  The 
present author had noted the similar rates of violent crime, school closures, and unemployment 
between Austin, and certain neighborhoods of other cities.  The first-time attendee who had 
synthesized concerns with employment and social behavior (described above), responded that, 
in light of these similarities, “there must be a plan” to systematically diminish black people’s 
 
590 This and previous sentence, Kremer, 2015b.  
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status.  This spontaneous reaction indicates an inclination to interpret information in terms of 
an anti-black project. 
Mrs. Darlene Frazier, a member of the organizing committee, responded with an 
elaborate and quite eloquent analysis of a historical anti-black project.  She asserted that indeed 
“there is a plan” to systematically diminish the economic and social status of blacks, 
implemented over several decades.  The plan aimed ultimately to reduce blacks to their old 
status of near-slavery.  She suggested that this process uplifted whites proportionally to the 
degradation of blacks.  Mrs. Frazier didn’t specify any particular agency behind the plan (mostly 
describing it in the passive voice, or speaking of agents with pronouns with unidentified 
referents).  At times she seemed to describe a self-aware and intentional conspiracy of a white 
power structure.  At times, she seemed to allow that the degradation of blacks was the 
emergent effect of any number of uncoordinated actions, led primarily by whites, and 
motivated partly by racism, the “plan” being a metaphor.  My impression was that Mrs. Frazier 
was open to conceptualizing the causes of the degradation of the black community in a range of 
ways.591 
Neither Mrs. Frazier, nor the members who agreed with her, were open to an 
alternative explanation of the historical degradation of the black community which emphasized 
federal policy changes, described in race neutral terms.  The present author noted changes in 
federal urban and macro-economic policy, and a related economic restructuring, and the effects 
on working-class neighborhoods, including black ones—this comment garnered no response 
whatsoever.  The discussion instead proceeded in ways that presupposed Mrs. Frazier’s 
 
591 All data on this speech drawn from Field Notes, 3/16/17. 
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conception of an anti-black plan.592  Both in her initial comments, and in response to the present 
author’s comments on federal policy, Mrs. Frazier was emphatic—using a more assertive tone 
and language than any other speaker that night—that this anti-black project defined the context 
of the neighborhood.   
In the immediately ensuing conversation, Mrs. Frazier and several other attendees 
framed contemporary social problems in terms of inter-racial conflict, and articulated the 
interests of the community in race-conscious ways.  In this conversation, they focused on the 
city’s divestment from the neighborhood, and on the lack of black-owned businesses.  Mrs. 
Frazier interpreted the city government’s uneven investment in downtown and neighborhood 
development as a manifestation of this zero-sum inter-racial conflict, in which whites 
systematically degraded blacks, and simultaneously uplifted themselves.  Earlier in the meeting, 
both Mrs. Frazier and Mr. Frazier (the co-chair) had referenced the simultaneous investment in 
the downtown and divestment from the neighborhoods as important problems, though they did 
not frame the problem at any length.  In this comment Mrs. Frazier extended the anti-black plan 
frame to interpret this particular problem of uneven investment.593  
This comment did not specify actors involved in this orientation of urban development 
policy, investment or specific divestment practices or policies.  Mrs. Frazier may have chosen 
not to address these specificities for any number of reasons (including rhetorical effects, 
practical constraints, etc.).   Or, the silence on specificities, like the slippage among types of 
agency and intentionality, may indicate places where the causal analysis has not yet been 
 
592 Of course, that the participants in the conversation did not respond to the author’s alternative theory may be attributable to 
“source characteristics,” including my unfamiliarity with the group and visible status as an outsider (among many other, less 
flattering possible characteristics).  Inasmuch, this event can’t be taken definitively as evidence of the participants’ non-receptivity to 




elaborated.  Again, this may entail an openness, by the individuals in question, to a range of 
content. 
Soon after, Mrs. Frazier, Nickie, and two other attendees discussed black-owned 
business in Austin.  The speakers did not explicitly connect this issue to the anti-black plan.  
However, aspects of the conversation suggest that the issue was conceptualized through some 
elements of that “anti-black plan” discourse, if not through the full causal analysis.  First, this 
issue was brought up in the context of a conversation, provoked by Mrs. Frazier’s speech, about 
how to respond to the anti-black plan.  Black-owned businesses were discussed almost 
immediately after, implying that this was an area in which the plan and its effects were felt, and 
could be addressed.  Second, multiple speakers described the issue in terms of similar narratives 
of decline and zero-sum racial conflict.  Mrs. Frazier, Ms. Eliason, and the two other participants, 
agreed about how few businesses in the community were black-owned now, whereas there had 
been more decades ago.  These 4 attendees also decried that most of the stores in the 
community were liquor stores, pay-day loan offices, and beauty parlors, with few grocery stores, 
or other essentials.  This was also compared to the local commerce decades ago.594 
On the causes of this decline, participants noted facts consistent with the narratives of 
racism and zero-sum inter-racial conflict.  Nickie suggested that the paucity of black-owned 
businesses is caused in party by racial discrimination in loan-giving.  Another attendee noted the 
many businesses owned by White and Asian people, who do not live in the neighborhood. 
More so than the other two discourses, the causal analysis appeared to attract 
adherents.  Mrs. Frazier’s speech elicited several responses which either explicitly agreed, or 





followed up the initial description of “the plan” with comments about how to act, given the 
systematic degradation of blacks.  In one exchange, meeting attendees rearticulated the issues 
of norms and behavior of Austin residents, given the context of the anti-black plan.  Ms. Regina, 
an older woman and organizing committee member, referred to the same behavioral problems 
enumerated by other attendees earlier as precisely “what they want you do”—i.e., how the 
perpetrators of the plan want blacks to respond.  The first-time attendee who had expressed 
concern with social behaviors and jobs (described above) agreed, saying it was essential for 
blacks to “resist” those anti-social behaviors that “come with” systematic divestment and 
oppression, lest blacks play into the designs of those perpetrating the anti-black plan. These 
comments indicate the resonance of “the plan” argument with attendees.  They also indicate 
that the social norms and behavior discourse is amenable to rearticulation within the framework 
of this broader causal analysis.595 
 There is also a theory in circulation among GAIPO members that some actors, motivated 
by an anti-black agenda, conspire to deliver weapons into Austin, and other black 
neighborhoods.  Proponents of this theory recount rumors about “crates” of guns left on the 
street, and about the delivery of guns via freight trains, temporarily stopping on nearby tracks.  
Two of GAIPO’s flyers may have referenced this theory, asking “Why do we have guns coming in 
[to Austin] but not jobs.”596   
Finding 3:  Dominance of An Electoral Strategy  
Members also differ about GAIPO’s immediate action plan.  Several of the most active 
and vocal members intend to 1) build electoral power and 2) pressure public officials to change 
their positions on policy, through a variety of community organizing and public actions.  Others 
 
595 Ibid. 
596 Facebook post, 6/29/16; 2/27/17. 
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are attracted to non-electoral forms of collective action, such as community service and building 
block clubs.  However, more than any faction to debates over problem definition, proponents of 
the electoral and pressure strategies control the organization’s agenda.  This control is reflected 
in GAIPO’s recent activity, and their public statements in social and the local media.  It is also 
apparent in the dominance of discussion about actions by proponents of these strategies.  It is 
not clear if proponents of the electoral and pressure strategy have led other members to 
understand or share their vision. 
Evidence from GAIPO’s Actions and Meetings 
Emma Tai described diversity in members’ views on GAIPO’s strategy and priorities for 
action.  For some, such as Mrs. and Mr. Frazier, the distinction between electoral work and 
other forms of collective action is familiar, and electoral work valorized.  Others seemed not to 
distinguish electoral work from community service or building networks, and tend to gravitate 
toward the latter.  These members have continued to suggest, and support suggestions for, 
block clean-ups, neighborhood watches, and other forms of community service and self-help.597  
I also observed members discussing collective self-help and social capital-building activities.598 
Withal this ideological diversity, GAIPO’s actions have been consistently oriented toward 
electoral power and public pressure strategies.  As of the Spring of 2017, GAIPO was taking 
regular actions designed to pressure elected officials to change policies, and to build GAIPO’s 
electoral potential.  There were no community-service or non-electorally oriented network-
building actions on GAIPO’s agenda (with the possible exception of the monthly canvasses, 
which could serve electoral and social capital strategies equally well).  Recent and upcoming 
 
597 Interview with Tai, 3/8/17. 
598 Field Notes, 3/16/17; Field Notes, 3/11/17.. 
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actions included attendance at an anti-charter school rally, a confrontation with Ald. Mitts about 
charter expansion at her “ward night,” plans to attend the Chicago Police Department’s (CPD) 
precinct and Community Alternative Policy Strategy (CAPS) meetings, and plans to develop 
strategic alliances with other community organizations in Austin. 
The discussion of these actions at the 3/16 General Body Meeting revealed several 
members who understood these actions, quite intricately, in terms of electoral and pressure 
strategies, and were very enthusiastic about implementing them.  I observed the following 
comments: 
• Mr. Frazier explained the importance of GAIPO representatives attending CPD precinct and 
CAPS meetings, armed with relevant data (and he distributed information about crime 
statistics).  He described these actions as a way of building GAIPO’s reputation locally, and to 
influence local policy debates. 
• Ms. Bailey Donaldson discussed building a coalition with other organizations in the 
community in terms of the goal of building electoral power.  Bailey also suggested 
demographic analysis of the neighboring 29th ward (which everyone agreed was very 
demographically complex) in order to plan strategic outreach in the ward.   
• Nickie commented on GAIPO members’ recent attendance at the anti-charter rally and Ald. 
Mitts’ ward night.  She described Ald. Mitts’ evasion of a confrontation with GAIPO’s, and 
recent shift in her position on charter schools as proof that pressure can influence 
politicians.  Mrs. Frazier agreed, observing that Ald. Mitts likely took note of who had 
attended her ward night, and even “noted your faces.”  Both speakers also alluded to the 
actions’ ability to raise GAIPO’s profile locally. 
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For all the commentary at the March 11th debriefing and March 16th General Body Meeting 
about the importance of social norms and networks, neither meeting featured any discussion 
about concrete actions aimed at these goals.  Conversations about action were dominated by 
the Mr. and Mrs. Frazier, Nickie, and Bailey.  A handful of other members responded with vague 
but supportive comments.599 
The extent to which other attendees understand, or agree with, the electoral and 
pressure strategies is not clear.  Talking informally before meetings, I observed several 
members—in addition to the cadre committed to the electoral and pressure strategies—echo 
one of the cadre’s frequent points:  harsh criticism of current elected officials, especially Emma 
Mitts and Rahm Emanuel.  And during GAIPO’s 3/16 discussion about actions, I did not observe 
any non-verbal expressions of discontent with the strategic agenda.  However, I also did not find 
any evidence contrary to Emma Tai’s observation that many GAIPO members, though not 
hostile to electoral strategies, do not fully understand their distinction from other forms of 
collective action, or are open to either. 
Evidence from Official Statements  
The institutionalization of an electoral and pressure strategies is also evident in GAIPO’s 
official statements.  GAIPO codified an electoral mission into its official mission and vision 
statements, which were adopted at a meeting of the Organizing Committee on February 25th, 
2017.  The mission statement was adopted unanimously, and the vision statement with a vote 
of 10 in favor, 0 opposed, one abstaining.  The mission statement describes GAIPO explicitly as a 
“political organization” and describes its mission as “to organize for political power…”  The 
 
599 Field Notes, 3/16/17. 
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vision statement also describes a future in which “elected officials are held accountable for 
providing public services to all.”600 
Ms. Bailey Donaldson articulated a focus on politician accountability through electoral 
power and public pressure in an interview with the Chicago Reader.  She argued that a lack of 
transparency and accountability of elected officials is implicated in the persistence of Austin’s 
problems.  She implied that political pressure, enabled by organizing and mobilization, is 
required to change officials’ behavior.601    
I found the same themes in 5 flyers produced by GAIPO to advertise their events to 
audiences in the neighborhood.602  These flyers were handed out on canvasses, posted on 
GAIPO’s Facebook page, and placed in event advertising spaces at community institutions, 
including the North Austin Library, LaFollette Park, among other locations.  4 of the 5 construct 
the meeting’s purposes in terms of electoral political empowerment.  The content of each flyers 
follows this sequence: 
• A list community of problems (which always includes violent crime, and some combination 
of youth unemployment, schools, and lack of political voice) 
• The assertion that the community can solve its problems by organizing to build power.  In 
three of the four cases, the concept of “building power” is explicitly defined in electoral 
terms; in the fourth, organizing is simply defined as “building power” 
 
600 The statements read, respectively:  “The mission of the Greater Austin Independent Political Organization, an all-volunteer 
political organization, is to organize for political power needed to make bold, sustainable solutions possible;” “The vision of the 
Greater Austin IPO is to create a community in which all people can achieve their full potential. We look forward to a safe thriving 
community where people are accountable to each other and elected officials are held accountable for providing public services to 
ALL.” 
601 "There's not much transparency, and it's hard to know who's in control and if things are going where they need to go...We're 
unimpressed with the movement of our officials. We have to organize and demand the changes that we need." (Hinton, Rachel:  
“Solutions for violence in Austin face slow implementation, money troubles” in Chicago Reader, 3/15/17) 
602 Of course, my interpretations of texts are limited by my lack of information about their production and reception.  I take the texts 
as evidence of one voice within GAIPO; we don’t know if this is a consensus, majority, minority, or single voice; or if it’s more or less 
prominent among any particular segments.  We can also take these as observations of discursive events—the propagation of 
discursive constructions to audiences.  I know that the texts were publicized on GAIPO’s Facebook page, and in community fora 
around Austin (e.g., bulletin boards at the North Austin Library). 
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• Most of the flyers also mention some recently proposed or enacted policy, implying that a 
disliked policy is the result of the community’s political disempowerment. 
The flyer for a November 17th GAIPO forum emphasizes both electoral empowerment and 
building collective capacity through strengthening social networks.  The flyer lists four “agenda” 
items:  1) “How to build a strong community network”; 2) “Strength in numbers.  We can 
accomplish all our goals when we work together”; 3) “Strengthening the community with voting 
power”; and 4) “Building a block club with your neighbors and using it to change your 
neighborhood.”  Three of these items clearly echo the themes of the social network and norms 
discourse (described above).  Yet even this expression of the social capital focus makes a 
concession to the electoral strategy. 
Finding 4:  Consensus Against Charter School Expansion 
I witnessed a brief conversation about charter schools at the March 16th General Body 
Meeting.  There were differing views about the nature of charter schools, but universal 
opposition to their expansion in Austin.  Mrs. Frazier argued that charters are not inherently 
good or bad, but indicted “the way they have come into the neighborhood.”  Nickie said that 
charters had proven untrustworthy in her experience.  Two other meeting attendees argued 
that charter expansion would sap resources from the already resource-starved community 
schools.  One of these speakers also suggested that the standards used by CPS to determine 
school overcrowding were arbitrary, and used speciously whenever CPS wanted to create a new 
charter.  All participants in this conversation juxtaposed charter schools to “community 
schools,” implying that charters were not exactly of the community.603 
 
603 Field Notes 3/16/17. 
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Finding 5:  GAIPO’s Management of Ideological Diversity  
I observed three patterns in the interaction of these three discourses, in institutional 
contexts.  At the organizational level—i.e., when making statements or plans on behalf of the 
organization as a whole—members either hewed to only one of the discourses, or aggregated 
the concerns of all of them; they did not attempt to synthesize, or adjudicate among conflicting 
visions.  A few individual members, however, did synthesize discourses.  In particular, members 
who espoused the primacy of social norms and behaviors readily synthesized these foci with the 
theory of a long-term, large-scale anti-black plan.  Finally, coalition organizers occasionally 
intervened to downplay the anti-black project discourse.  
Aggregation or Separation at the Organizational Level 
In some cases, GAIPO aggregates participants’ concerns, creating a list of priorities or 
goals drawn from all three discourses.  For example, at a Community Forum in July of 2016, 
attended by approximately 50 Austin residents and regular GAIPO members, the meeting 
facilitators compiled a list of policy priorities including “job training programs, parenting 
workshops, mental health and trauma resources, and better-funded schools.”604  A similar 
hodgepodge was compiled at the a forum in November 2015, including “improving education 
and employment opportunities, strengthening spiritual connections, better training and 
increased presence for Chicago police officers, and youth mentorship programs.”605 
But when an individual or sub-group of GAIPO members has articulated the 
organization’s priorities, they tend hew to one or another discourse.  GAIPO’s flyers and 
informational handouts, for instance, primarily emphasize either jobs and education, or social 
 
604 Hutson, 2016. 
605 Kremer, 2015b. 
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networks and norms.  The flyer associated with the March 16th meeting listed high rates of gun 
violence, “schools under siege,” youth unemployment, and the proliferation of guns.  It later 
repeated the invitation to discuss “issues like education, violence, jobs and much more.”606  The 
flyers for a November, 2016 organizer training and the July, 2016 community forum similarly 
mention Austin’s employment rates and schools.607  By contrast, a flyer for a November, 2016 
community forum emphasized social networks.  The flyer called attendees to “help us to build a 
strong community,” and to “network and create new friendships.”  The flyer listed four agenda 
items for the meeting, including “how to build a strong community network” and “Building a 
block club with your neighbors and using it to change your neighborhood.”608 
Similarly, when GAIPO members speak on behalf of the organization to the press, they 
appear to draw from their preferred discourse, not to attempt an aggregation or synthesis.  Ms. 
Bailey Donaldson and Ms. Constance Daniels’ remarks to the Chicago Reporter (see above) dealt 
primarily with employment.  And Mrs. Frazier’s editorial focused primarily on black-owned 
businesses.609 
Synthesis at the Individual Level 
Some individual GAIPO members synthesized the discourses.  The most pronounced 
instance was the rearticulation of the argument about social norms and behavior as a strategic 
response to the anti-black project.  It was not clear if all proponents of the behavioralist 
discourse were amenable to this rearticulation.  It was also not clear if proponents of an 
employment focus were amenable to a similar rearticulation.   
 
606 This and previous quote from Flyer, posted on Facebook, 3/11/17.  
607 Flyer posted on Facebook, 11/6/16, 7/7/16. 
608 This and previous quote:  flyer, posted on Facebook, 11/19/16. 




Notwithstanding Tai’s intention to allow the bottom-up determination of the 
organizaton’s orientation, coalition organizers have intervened to promote the employment 
discourse, and to marginalize elements of the anti-black project discourse.  For example, Jason 
Lee led a discussion on parenting, in which he articulated the connections between family 
break-down and employment, with the latter rooted in the city and nation’s economic policies.   
This intervention was intended to shift GAIPO members’ focus from behaviors and norms to 
structurally rooted economic phenomena. 
Tai mentioned her censorship of an editorial written by one organizing committee 
member.  Tai omitted paragraphs in which the member espoused “hard-core black nationalism,” 
prioritizing black-owned businesses in Austin.  Tai excised these paragraphs due to their 
ideological misalignment with the coalition.  And Tai told the editorial’s author the omission was 
made due to the newspaper’s space constraints.610 
2.3 GAIPO’s Recruiting Procedures 
Finally, it is important to note that GAIPO’s recruitment methods cannot fully explain 
the findings about GAIPO’s members.  Recruitment methods likely contributed to the middle-
class skew in GAIPO’s membership; they may have indirectly contributed to the number of 
members affiliated with local civic organizations.  But they cannot explain the ideological 
currents among GAIPO members. 
GAIPO recruited primarily through canvassing and placing literature in public places.  At 
least since the summer of 2016, GAIPO has held two canvasses per month (with a hiatus from 
 
610 Conversation with Tai, 3/11/17. 
250 
 
November, 2016 through early March, 2017).611  Any local residents contacted through 
canvasses are invited to an “intake meeting” to learn more about the organization and its goals.  
GAIPO members also distribute flyers for their upcoming meetings at local churches, libraries, 
parks, and restaurants, and on the organization’s Facebook page.612  To a lesser extent, GAIPO 
used outreach via social media (i.e., “tagging” individuals in Facebook posts about upcoming 
meetings), and outreach to personal contacts.  But these have produced few members.613  In the 
Summer of 2017, GAIPO experimented with service-based outreach, conducted block clean-ups, 
and attempting to leverage them as means of recruitment.  GAIPO successfully launched only 
two such events. 
These techniques are reflected in members’ reports of what drew them to GAIPO:   Of 
the 12 Organizing Committee members for whom I can account,  
• 6 were recruited via canvasses 
• 3 saw flyers in public places 
• 2 were brought in by friends 
• 1 was recruited by an announcement at church 614 
All the UWF personnel and organizing committee members reported that less regular 
members were mostly recruited via canvasses and flyers.  The ongoing canvassing creates a 
 
611 Facebook posts.  These canvasses use typical organizing tactics—using voting records and party affiliation data to target 
households, and typical conversational scripts (eliciting primary concerns, and suggesting their systemic and political roots through a 
series of leading questions).  All people contacted through a canvass are contacted again by GAIPO members, and invited to an 
upcoming meeting.  This can be one of the organization’s General Body Meeting.  New attendees at these meetings are encouraged 
to attend an organizer training session, and then to join the team of canvassers.   
612 Field notes, 3/16/17. 
613 Interview with Tai, 3/10/17. 
614 Field notes, 3/16/17. 
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trickle of new recruits, with the usual attrition at each stage of organizational commitment:  Tai 
estimates that, for 40 attendees at an intake meeting, she would expect 7 or 8 at the training.615  
In this reliance on canvassing and flyering, GAIPO’s organizers did not tap the 
organizational networks of the non-profit organizations or neighborhood associations in Austin.  
Tai and Lee report that they did not perceive any opportunities to organize a viable constituency 
through such networks.  I found only two examples in which GAIPO’s organizers recruited via 
existing organizational networks, each of which produced only one regular member:  1) during 
the Stamps campaign, the Chicago Teachers Union provided organizers with lists of its members 
in the ward; one regular member was recruited in this way.  2)A second member reported that 
his pastor, at a local Baptist church, had made an announcement promoting GAIPO in the 
announcements portion of a weekly service. 
It is possible that GIAPO indirectly selected for people affiliated with local civic 
organizations by targeting canvasses to registered voters.  This ensured that GAIPO canvassed 
households with the characteristics correlated with voter registration, including middle-class 
socioeconomic status and political attention.  These characteristics are themselves correlated 
with participation in non-profit and civic institutions. 
 GAIPO’s initial middle-class skew was also reinforced by their decision to canvass in the 
precincts where existing members lived.  Given the correlation of residential geography with 
socioeconomic status, this targeting ensured that the initial middle-class members would reach 
out primarily to other residents of predominantly middle-class precincts. 
 
615 Interview with Emma Tai, 3/8/17.  The Organizing Committee has discussed ways to increase the effectiveness of recruitment 
efforts and retention, and most recently developed new recruitment materials, an “information card” to collect recruits’ contact 
information, and deliver GAIPO’s contact information and mission in an easily digestible way (Personal communication with Ms. 
Nickie Abraham, 6/22/17. 
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When recruiting, GAIPO’s organizers have intentionally refrained from filtering by 
ideology.  They attempted to elicit resident interest in joining the organization, and to build 
relationships, based on shared concerns and experiences with local problems—not by sharing 
UWF’s analysis of social problems.  And organizers presented an open-ended and general vision 
of “change” through collective action—not UWF’s policy agenda.  GAIPO’s organizers do frame 
the neighborhood’s problems in one minimal sense:  they encourage residents to see problems 
as rooted in politics, and that building and exercising political power is necessary to solve 
problems.  But beyond this politicization, GAIPO’s organizers intentionally refrain from 
constructing problems in a particular way. 
This approach was reflected in GAIPO’s canvassing methods and scripts, and the 
programs for GAIPO’s new recruit intake meetings.  Tai says that GAIPO’s canvassers “engage 
residents around problems, not around issues, with a definition and solution already built-in.”  
Canvassing with GAIPO in the Spring of 2017, I observed GAIPO members sticking closely to this 
approach:  canvassers tended to discuss the possibility of addressing problems in very general 
terms, tended to raise the failings of existing political leadership.  Organizers also followed this 
approach at “intake meetings.”  Conversations and organizers’ presentations focused on the 
problems with which residents have expressed concerns, but mostly eschewed ideologically-
informed political education. 
This approach to organizing was informed by well-developed theories.616  For present 
purposes, these recruitment methods matter because they ensure that GAIPO members were 
 
616 Two beliefs lead Tai and Lee to deemphasize political education, or “consciousness-raising.”  First, pedagogical models of 
organizing often fail to take target populations’ existing views seriously, and thus fail to generate sustained commitment.  Even 
forms of political education which claim to elicit residents’ concerns, and build a critique of larger systems from there, ignore 
complex and deeply rooted belief systems.  Hence, as Lee recounts, the frequent experience of initial resident interest, (giving 
organizers a false sense of resident buy-in), followed by dissipation (Interview with Lee, 3/3/17).  Tai suggested that a more 
thoroughgoing education process, which truly engages with residents’ beliefs, is, while possible, so resource- and skill-intensive that 
it cannot be the focus of a replicable community organizing model.  It requires consistent pedagogical interventions over a long 
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not filtered by ideology.   As UWF organizing director Kate Barthelme explains, “organizing by 
issues tends to filter according to ideology—it draws people who share your perspective on 
problems, and are interested in your proposed solutions.”  By contrast, organizing around broad 
problems, without defining solutions, draws a much wider swath of residents.  In effect, GAIPO’s 
recruitment methods ensured that the sample of Austin residents studied was not “selected on 
the dependent variable.” 
2.4.  GAIPO Members’ Links to Austin’s Non-Profits 
A majority of GAIPO members, including the most vocal proponents of those discursive 
tendencies, had direct or indirect links to the neighborhood-based institutions and social 
networks described in the last chapter.  I obtained data on nine regular GAIPO members’ 
political and civic affiliations and backgrounds.  Seven of the nine were affiliated with the 
aforementioned institutions, or with similar institutions, and 4 were affiliated with multiple 
institutions. 
Table 5.4. Affiliations by type of organization 
Type of Organization Number of GAIPO members affiliated  
Community based non-profit  4 
Block club  4 
Church-based service program 2 
Business association 2 
 I also found evidence that seven GAIPO members had pursued projects related to black 
economic empowerment or social fabric in similar institutional contexts.  Most simply, four 
GAIPO members who espoused the “social fabric” discourse mentioned being members of block 
 
period, informed by thorough knowledge of the coalition’s positions, great sensitivity to the audience’s pre-existing beliefs, and 
exceptional pedagogical skill.  As Tai summarizes, an organizing model isn’t replicable if it depends on large investment in organizing 
personnel, or requires “someone as smart as Jason” (Interview with Tai, 3/9/17). 
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clubs.  All four reported participating in self-help activities typically associated with block clubs, 
including patrolling the neighborhood for illicit or disorderly activity, and cleaning up trash.617   
Mr. Floyd, who called for GAIPO to focus on “unity,” social networks, and economic 
development, has worked on related projects in local groups.  Social media records indicate that 
Mr. Floyd, perhaps GAIPO’s most connected member, has links with WHA, ACT, and St. John’s 
Bible Church.618  These links may have been fostered by Mr. Floyd’s work at a local high school 
which regularly hosts community meetings convened by WHA, local churches, and the Chicago 
Police Department, among others.  Mr. Floyd has also taken courses in non-profit management 
at a local church, and supports the Rainbow Covenant Economic Development Center, a new 
Austin-based development group, networked with WHA.  In these contexts, Mr. Floyd has 
worked on network-building and economic development projects:  In 2018, he helped publicize 
a campaign to “build a network of unity between neighbors,” involving another Austin church 
and the 100 Blocks 100 Churches campaign (led by several local pastors and supported by 
WHA).619   
Mr. Robert Davis, a proponent of the “social fabric” perspective within GAIPO, is 
connected to multiple religious institutions whose service-based programs embody that 
perspective.  Mr. Davis has worked on these programs since at least 2014, co-founding a 
mentoring program at a local church, and leading a block clean-ups as an elder at New Life 
Community Church.620  
Mr. and Mrs. Frazier, leading exponents of the anti-black plan discourse and proponents 
of black-owned business, have long been active in nationalist-oriented racial justice movements 
 
617 Field Notes, 3/16/17. 
618 He shared ACT’s job postings and other events; commented on and shared WHA’s events.   
619 Social media records (fb posts on wall of 100 Blocks 100 Churches) 
620 Johnson, 2014. 
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and political organizations.  Mr. Frazier was an active member of the 37th Ward Independent 
Political Organization, formed in 1985 to support Harold Washington and his ward-level allies.621   
While I have not yet obtained find additional biographical information, Emma Tai mentioned 
that Mr. and Mrs. Frazier have remained “very plugged in” to organizations sustaining the black 
nationalist approach to racial justice.  Tai mentioned Mrs. Frazier’s close attention to political 
programming on WVON, an African-American oriented talk-radio station, with a long history of 
civil rights and black nationalist-oriented political activism.622   
Discussion 
UWF’s attempt to organize a base for a progressive-left project in Austin were 
unsuccessful.  They were undermined by Austin residents’ preexisting commitments to self-help 
and community development.  These commitments were based in common sense about the 
causes of social problems and the nature of racial interests.  These Austin residents rejected 
UWF’s program, tried to street the nascent Greater Austin Independent Political Organization 
toward self-help and development work.  UWF organizers found it possible to work with a few 
recruits on electoral campaigns in which UWF’s left agenda contingently converged with the 
recruits’ Black Nationalist perspective.  Most of the recruits, however, lost interest when UWF 
organizers resisted the turn toward development and self-help. 
There is suggestive evidence that the milieu of neighborhood institutions, forming in 
Austin since the 1960s, helped diffuse these perspectives on social problems and racial interest 
among Austin’s residents.  Non-profits, business associations, elected officials, and other actors 
reproduced neoliberal-compatible versions of long-running activist traditions focused on 
 
621 Among other activities, Mr. Frazier was the appellant in a lawsuit accusing the machine candidate for Democratic 
committeeperson, Thomas Simmons, of fraud, and seeking his removal from the ballot. 
622 Searcy, 2012; Squires, 2000. 
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business development and strengthening social fabric.  Austin’s community development groups 
also articulated distinctively neoliberal renditions of these discourses, synthesizing Black 
Capitalist and racial uplift themes with neoliberal ideas about competing for private investment 
and redeveloping local real estate.  The institutions diffuse these discourses to a wide swath of 
politically active and attentive neighborhood residents, via social and organizational networks, 
and high-profile projects. 
I do not claim that the current milieu of neighborhood institutions was the only 
important source of GAIPO members’ commitments.  These are clearly long-running ideological 
traditions which neighborhood residents have likely encountered in many contexts.  For 
example, at least two members drew their ideas about Black empowerment from experiences in 
the mass mobilizations and ward-level politicking associated with Harold Washington’s 
mayoralty.  However, I found suggestive evidence that neighborhood institutions shaped the 
development of GAIPO in two ways.  First, I presented suggestive evidence that GAIPO members 
had, if not acquired, reaffirmed their commitments to self-help and development projects in 
these neighborhood institutions.  Two GAIPO members had recently enacted the same 
discourses they espoused in GAIPO in multiple non-profits, and several others were members of 
block clubs and neighborhood associations (although I could not determine if these were among 
the block clubs affiliated with the non-profits discussed in this chapter).  This suggests 
neighborhood institutions and their programs help reproduce people’s social visions. 
Second, even if they don’t directly shape neighborhoods residents’ ideologies, local 
institutions and their projects function as “condensing devices,” attracting people with diverse 
but compatible ideologies to a set of concrete practices.  For example, the two aforementioned 
veterans of the Washington campaigns appeared not to have internalized neoliberal doctrines 
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of economic development (as other GAIPO members had), instead espousing an older version of 
Black Capitalism, seeing Black entrepreneurship as a crucial mode of racial empowerment.  They 
nonetheless found Austin African American Business Network Association’s neoliberal 
community development work attractive, and appeared to be building a relationship between 
GAIPO and AAABNA. 
These organizations have themselves been shaped by the institutional developments 
described in Chapter 1.  Since at least the 1980s, government and philanthropic funding streams 
have supported the self-help and business development work.  More recently, the neoliberal 
regime has facilitated the participation of local activists in Chicago’s vibrant real estate 
redevelopment industry.  And organizations focused on grassroots mobilization were 
systematically eliminated from the neighborhood since the early 1970s, by state repression, 
grassroots pressures to provide immediate economic relief, and lucrative opportunities to 
provide social services. 
Some competing explanations for GAIPO’s failure can be ruled out.  GAIPO’s failure 
cannot be fully attributed to inadequate resources, given UWF’s significant personnel and 
financial investments in the organization.  I found no evidence that Austin residents recruited to 
GAIPO rejected left programs on the basis of rational calculations about the viability of UWF’s 
project.  It’s possible that GAIPO members, several of whom were homeowners, recognized 
their potential material interest in rising property values, associated with redevelopment.  
However, my observation and interviews suggested that GAIPO recruits made decisions on the 
basis of deeply held ideologies:  at least in public, they discussed GAIPO’s mission in terms of 




Past work argues that neoliberal ideas about individual responsibility, 
entrepreneurialism, and market superiority suffice public rhetoric in the political, economic, and 
social spheres.  While I observed particular ideas about racial interest and social problems most 
directly affecting GAIPO recruits’ decision-making, I could not rule out the possibility that these 
other neoliberal ideologies underpinned residents’ attraction to self-help and development, and 
their aversion to some UWF’s programs.  I make the more modest claim that the discourses on 
social problems and racial interest reproduced by neighborhood institutions were one important 
influence on organizing processes and outcomes, perhaps alongside other material and 
ideological influences.  
It’s possible that commitments to self-help and development are most prevalent among 
middle-class neighborhood residents.  GAIPO’s membership was almost entirely middle-class, as 
indexed by educational attainment and profession.  Simply put, I was not able to observe the 
views and commitments of working-class and lower-income residents of Austin.  Their absence 
from GAIPO was explained partly by GAIPO’s recruitment procedures, as discussed above.  It 
may also reflect the many material and psychological barriers to participation facing low-income 
people. 
The first case study thus suggests that the institutional developments in Chapter 1 do 
shape the terrain for organizing around economic issues, likely in concert with other forces.  
Those developments produced a set of institutions, which help reproduce a population 
committed to modes of practice compatible with or incorporated into the neoliberal regime.  On 
the basis of these commitments, residents reject left programs, leaving UWF organizers with 
greatly restricted possibilities for organizing. 
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The case also illustrates one challenge to UWF’s strategy of building a class-conscious, 
progressive-left politics of race.  As explained in Chapter 3, UWF is trying to articulate state-led 
reinvestment, mostly via public services, as a racial justice program.  This chapter suggests that 
UWF organizers must take seriously the extent to which decades of political practice have 
propagated neoliberal and neoliberal-compatible constructions of racial interest and racial 
justice.  In Austin, developments since the 1960s have removed from public currency 
articulations of racial justice other than Black Capitalism and self-help (and, though not 
discussed in this chapter, community control and political empowerment more generally).  
While those concepts have historically been attached to a wide range of programs, 
neighborhood institutions have propagated the neoliberal or at least neoliberal-compatible 
definitions discussed above.  These definitions are embedded in quotidian economic practices 
and publicly visible developments.  And GAIPO recruits appeared to hold these understandings 
of racial interest and racial justice as common sense.   UWF organizers are tasked with 
rearticulating concepts whose meanings are deeply engrained.  The difficulty of this task raises 
the question of whether UWF should attempt to organize a class-focused movement in racial 




Chapter 6:  Organizing in Albany Park and the 33rd Ward 
Introduction 
On May 20th, 2019, Rosanna Rodriguez-Sanchez, an avowed “life-long socialist,” was 
sworn in as the new alderman of Chicago’s 33rd ward—a swath of racially and economically 
diverse, but rapidly gentrifying neighborhoods on Chicago’s near North Side.623  Rodriguez-
Sanchez narrowly defeated two-term incumbent Deb Mell, a close ally of Rahm Emanuel, who 
had supported most of the neoliberal regime’s economic, immigration, and public safety 
policies.624  Rodrgiuez-Sanchez’s victory incrementally advances the project of United Working 
Families—the coalition of left-leaning unions, NGOs, and mass membership organizations 
described in Chapter 4—to win control of Chicago’s City Council and enact comprehensive social 
democratic reforms:  she joins a block of 5 members of the Democratic Socialists of America and 
10 close allies of UWF on the City Council.625  
The key actor behind Rodriguez-Sanchez’s election was not United Working Families, 
however, but a smaller, grassroots formation:  the group of approximately 40 volunteers, all of 
whom live in the ward, Working Families of the 33rd Ward (WF33).  WF33 developed Rodrigeuz-
Sanchez’s platform, recruited and mobilized over one hundred volunteers, and deployed them 
in large GOTV and outreach efforts.  Over the previous four years, WF33 had launched 
 
623 Smith, 2018:  “Is a Puerto Rican native running for Chicago alderman the next Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez?” (Chicago Reader). 
624 Mell voted with Mayor Emanuel on 81% of contested votes in her first term (Simpson et al, 2016:  “A More Active City Council 
Chicago City Council Report #8 June 17, 2015 – April 13, 2016”).  She sided with Emanuel on high salience issues such as funding the 
construction of a new police academy, and opposing a moratorium on charter construction.  In the ward, she worked closely with 
real estate developers to launch several rent-intensifying real estate developments.   
625 The other five DSA members are Daniel La Spata (1st ward), Jeanette Taylor (20th ward), Dawson Vasquez (40th), Byron Sigcho 
Lopez (25th ward), and Carlos Ramirez-Rosa (35th).  The other alderman who were recruited, trained, and backed by UWF are Matt 
Martin (47th ward), Mike Rodriguez (22nd ward), Maria Hadden (49th ward), and Sue Sadlowski-Garza (10th ward).  This is in 
addition to six other members of the City Council’s Progressive Reform Caucus who have received funding and endorsements from 
UWF:  Sophia King (4th ward), Leslie Hairston (5th ward), Ald. Roderick T. Sawyer (6th ward), David Moore (17th ward), Antonio 
Taliaferro (29th ward), Scott Waguespack (32nd ward). 
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organizing, advocacy, and service-provision projects, connecting with ward residents, spreading 
progressive and left discourses about displacement and other issues, and building a foundation 
for the 2019 aldermanic campaign by dramatizing Ald. Mell’s unpopular positions on salient 
issues. 
Like the Greater Austin Independent Political Organization (Chapter 6), WF33 was 
launched in 2015, by veterans of a failed 2015 aldermanic campaign.  But WF33’s development 
differed starkly from GAIPO’s.  The two organizations adopted very different goals:  whereas 
GAIPO focused on apolitical service work and business development, WF33 has prioritized base-
building and electoral work, to advance a policy agenda focused on economic redistribution and 
protection of undocumented people.  And while GAIPO has declined since 2018 (and was a non-
factor in the 37th ward’s 2019 aldermanic election), WF33 has grown into a large and effective 
ward-level formation. 
WF33’s form, agenda, and modes of practice also contrast sharply with most other 
community-based activism, in Chicago and nationally.  Ideologically, WF33’s commitment to 
socialism contrasts with most Alinskyite groups’ eschewal of ideological programs, and 
foundation-funded NGOs’s liberal reformism.  Few community-based organizations invest in 
persistent grassroots organizing, and even fewer integrate this base-building with partisan 
electoral projects.626 
Instead, WF33 has become exactly the type of formation that UWF, and other left 
practitioners around the U.S., have talked about creating:  a grassroots group ideologically 
committed to a left agenda (encompassing commitments to economic, racial, and immigrant 
justice, which they understand as overlapping) and capable of strategic action.  Moreover, it is 
 
626 I describe the ideologies common among community-based organizations in the following section.  I described the national trend 
of community-based organizations toward liberal reformism in detail in a dissertation chapter submitted in the Summer of 2017.  
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embedded in a high-poverty neighborhood, where it can serve as a vehicle for grassroots 
organizing of lower-class populations.  Practitioners at UWF, the Occupy movement, and other 
left outlets have noted the importance of such organizations in their conversations about 
movement building strategy. 
This chapter tries to account for WF33’s development.  What explains the emergence of 
a grassroots group ideologically committed to a broad socialist agenda and possessing 
sophisticated power-building strategies?  Why was it possible for a handful of volunteer activists 
to quickly build a relatively large and effective organization?  What explains the divergent 
outcomes of WF33 and GAIPO?  
I will argue, firstly, that WF33’s outcomes were caused by the ideologies of WF33 
members.  Through interviews, participant observation, and analysis of members’ writings, I 
show that most of WF33’s membership is ideologically committed to socialist agendas, and to a 
class conflict-centered analysis of the current political conjuncture and social problems.  They 
also have elaborate theories of political strategy, which emphasize building power through 
grassroots organizing, and winning control of governing institutions.  I present evidence that 
these ideas—not interventions by UWF, or WF33 members’ attempts to attain influence or 
resources—have determined the organization’s form, agenda, and strategy. 
What then explains the existence of a population of activists with these ideologies?  In 
brief, three processes have produced a population of activists with these particular ideologies at 
a city-wide scale: 
• First, many of WF33’s members developed their ideologies during the waves of 
economically-focused, class-conscious mobilizations in Chicago since the early 2010s.  
Chapter 4 described these mobilizations, and the production and diffusion through 
263 
 
Chicago’s progressive-left milieu of common critiques of neoliberalization, visions of 
social change, and ideas about strategy.  Using interviews, news articles, and other 
primary documents, I show that several WF33 members (and most of the key leaders) 
gained their ideas through experiences in these mobilizations, as grassroots activists, 
academics, journalists, or union members. 
• Second, some WF33 members adopted their ideas as a result of UWF’s leadership 
within Chicago’s left.  Since its founding in 2013 (and as a result of the financial backing 
of the Chicago Teachers Union and Service Employees International Union, Healthcare 
Illinois and Indiana), UWF has launched increasingly viable electoral campaigns and 
other projects.  Activists with diverse views have embraced these projects, and the 
agendas and strategies they embody, seeing them as best available opportunity for 
advancing a progressive-left agenda. 
• Third, WF33 has also benefited from the national wave of interest in social democratic 
programs since 2016.  Many WF33 members became active and interested in socialism 
at this time.  Most of these individuals joined the Chicago chapter of Democratic 
Socialists of America, where they were exposed to ideologies similar—if less radical and 
less expansive—to those of UWF and Chicago’s left milieu.  Several WF33 members 
came to the organization via DSA. 
These activists’ presence in Albany Park also appeared to be a systematically determined 
outcome.  I found that these activists sorted into the 33rd ward as consumers of residential 
space, seeking the affordability, diversity, and amenities characteristic of neighborhoods in early 
stages of gentrification.   
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These findings address the dissertation’s main theoretical questions about the 
determinants of neighborhood-level terrain for grassroots organizing.  Whereas the Austin case 
suggested that neoliberalization has shaped the terrain for organizing, this case suggests that 
the development of the left at the city and national scales, can also shape that terrain.  By 
producing a cohort of activists, who sorted into particular neighborhoods, the expansion of the 
left has created possibilities for left base-building in those neighborhoods. 
This chapter will first describe the current state of WF33, including its size, structure, 
agenda, strategy, and political alignments.  I will then document the ideas of its leading 
members, based on in-depth interviews, participant observation, and analysis of members’ 
writings.  And I will demonstrate that these ideas caused WF33’s agenda and strategy.  I will 
then trace the key processes which produced populations of activists with these ideologies.  
1. Reviewing Outcomes:  The Size, Form, and Orientation of WF33 
This section reviews the outcomes of activists’ attempts to build a new formation in the 
Thirty-Third Ward.  What has 33rd Ward Working Families become since its creation in 2015?  
Pursuant the central questions of the dissertation, I assess two aspects of WF33’s development:  
1) the extent to which it has become an effective political actor, and 2) the extent to which it 
has taken a particular alignment in Chicago’s conflict over neoliberalization.  To these ends, I 
analyze organizational properties associated with political effectiveness (including size, 
structure, and strategy) and its policy agenda and vision for social change. 
In brief, I found the following: 
• With 42 formal members as of January 2019, WF33 has already attained a large 
membership, relative to other neighborhood-level UWF satellites, and relative to other 
place-based, grassroots political organizations. 
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• WF33 has a formal leadership structure, with official decision-making processes.  This can be 
seen as an achievement, enabling organizational survival and effective action.  It can also be 
seen as a potential threat to the organization’s internal democracy. 
• Relatedly, WF33 has repeatedly demonstrated a capacity for effective political action, 
carrying out issue campaigns, electoral campaigns, and service work in the ward. 
• WF33 has a consistent policy agenda, focused on progressive economic redistribution, 
protection of undocumented immigrants, non-punitive approaches to public safety, and 
democratization of ward- and city-level governance.   Especially on economic issues, their 
agenda is closely in line with that of the United Working Family coalition. 
• WF33 has a clear strategy, emphasizing grassroots base-building and winning control of 
formal political institutions, as a member of the citywide UWF coalition. 
WF33’s Membership 
WF33’s formal membership and broader network of informal supporters are large by 
the standards of UWF’s ward-level satellites.  WF33’s 42 formal members (defined as members 
who pay monthly dues and have attended at least two monthly meetings in the previous 6 
months) is comparable in size to the largest of the ward-level political organizations in UWF’s 
network, Network 49 and United Neighbors of the 35th Ward, who each report 40-50 
members.627  WF33 has grown without the benefit of a closely-allied alderman, unlike UN35.  
This size contrasts sharply with the Greater Austin Independent Political Organization, whose 
membership has dwindled to approximately 6 regular participants as of 2019. 
 
627 Interview with Natalie Crary, 11/2017.  
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WF33 has built an extended network of contacts and informal supporters in the ward.  
Members estimate a network of 10-20 more occasional participants in WF33 events, depending 
on the issue.  Through various forms of outreach (described at length in the next chapter), WF33 
has grown a contact list of approximately 100 ward residents—people who have signed a WF33 
petition, expressed interest in WF33’s work, or attended a WF33 event and added themselves to 
a mailing list.628  I could not obtain comparable data for other organizations in Chicago.  WF33 
has developed relationships with ideologically aligned organizations in the ward.  WF33 
collaborates on issue campaigns—and has many common members with—the Northside Branch 
of the Chicago Chapter of Democratic Socialists of America.  It collaborates on anti-eviction work 
and has built a taskforce to protect undocumented immigrants with two grassroots 
organizations rooted in working- and lower-class immigrant populations.  WF33 has friendly 
relations with two progressive non-profits in the ward, and is exploring the possibility of 
collaboration.629  Finally, WF33 has developed relationships with prominent institutional actors 
in the ward, including a principal of a local public school and a local pastor.630 
Structure of WF33 
WF33 initially had no formal structure.  Antonio reports that, after Tim Meegan’s 2015 
aldermanic campaign, the campaign leadership functioned as the de facto leadership of WF33, 
and members took organizational roles on an ad hoc basis.  In the Spring of 2016, frustrated by 
what they viewed as inefficiencies (such as “unnecessarily long, 3-hour, irrelevant meetings”), 
 
628 These participants have, for example, signed one of WF33’s petition or mailing list, attended at least one WF33 event, or 
expressed interest in WF33 and its work during a WF33 canvass or flyering. 
629 The non-profits are Centro Autonomo and Albany Park Theatre Project.  The grassroots organizations are Autonomous Tenants 
Union and Communities Organized Against Deportation.  These groups and their relationships with WF33 are one of the primary 
topics of the next chapter. 
630 These include Scott Ahlman, the principal of Hibbard Elementary School, who has spoken out about the displacement of working 
families from the neighborhood.  As of May 2018, Antonio was planning to invite him to speak at a WF33 meeting about 




WF33 members formalized roles and procedures.  They created committees on membership, 
organizing, media and communications—each tasked with planning, decision-making, and 
implementing activities—and formalized leadership in a Steering Committee.631  WF33 also 
defined criteria for membership, with members required to pay monthly dues. 
  Two founding members observed that WF33 has functioned more effectively since the 
restructuring.  WF33’s monthly meetings have become more efficient.  Antonio observed that 
the clarification of organizational roles has made members more productive.632  I found no 
evidence of concern about the formal structures undermining democracy within WF33.  One 
member did offer, without solicitation, that while the Steering Committee sets the agenda for 
monthly meetings, they do not monopolize control over the agenda:  other members and 
attendees still frequently raise additional topics, and that these topics are given full attention.633 
This formal structure exists alongside informal social structures.  Most of WF33’s core 
members are also close personal friends of each other’s.  Many are part of a larger social milieu 
of progressive and leftist activists in the ward, who socialize regularly.634 
Capacity for Effective Action 
WF33 has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to formulate, plan, and implement issue 
and electoral campaigns and service programs.  WF33’s campaigns have had an impressive 
scale, in terms of the number of volunteer participants, and the numbers of local residents 
contacted in outreach efforts.  Most have accomplished their short-term goals.  The campaigns 
and service programs are also carefully integrated with WF33’s larger strategic vision.   
 
631 This and previous sentence, interview with Antonio, 5/24/18.  I use pseudonyms to refer to informants, unless the informant 
consented to being identifies and either ran for public office, or was speaking in a professional capacity.  
632 Ibid. 
633 Interview with anonymous member, 5/30/18. 
634 Interview with Dawn, 12/7/18. 
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WF33 has initiated or participated in issue advocacy campaigns in the areas of 
education, public safety, and housing since 2015.  The following are the largest campaigns: 
• In 2016, WF33 conducted voter education and GOTV campaigns in support of a ballot 
referendum to create a moratorium on creation of charter schools.  Over 9,900 ward 
residents (about 60% of those voting) voted in favor of the moratorium.635 
• in 2017, WF33 canvassed sections of the ward to raise awareness about pending zoning 
changes and rent-intensifying development projects.  This included 4 canvasses, 
reaching approximately 120 ward residents.636 
• In 2018, WF33 conducted outreach on behalf of referendum to formally call on the state 
to lift its ban on municipal rent control.  WF33 solicited signatures to place the 
referendum on the ballot in the ward, and conducted voter education and GOTV work 
to support the referendum.  WF33 succeeded in getting the referendum on the ballot in 
all 6 precincts it attempted.  The referendum won with over 65% support in all 6.637 
• In 2017, WF33 organized a series of protests at the alderman’s office to protest her 
support of the use of public funds to build a new police academy.  A WF33 member 
estimated that each protest turned out 15-20 people. 
WF33 has also joined or initiated service programs related to the protection of 
undocumented immigrants.  With two other grassroots organizations, WF33 formed the Albany 
Park Defense Network, to provide a “rapid response”—including legal defense and civil 
disobedience—to deportation raids or deportation proceedings in the ward.  WF33 has also 
provided legal and logistical support to resident aliens facing deportation.638 
 
635 Chicago Board of Election Commissioners. 
636 Interview with Dawn, 4/23/18. 
637 Chicago Board of Election Commissioners. 
638 This work is discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
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From 2015 to 2019, WF33 made consistent efforts to publicly criticize alderman Deb 
Mell’s record.  These included WF33’s “Mell Watch,” an effort to track and publicize Mell’s 
voting on city council and relationships with real estate developers.  Members also attended the 
alderman’s “ward nights” (monthly meetings with ward residents) engaging the alderman about 
issues—a practice which, WF33 members proudly speculate, may have caused Mell’s decisions 
to indefinitely suspend monthly ward meetings in the Fall of 2018.639  
All of these actions were designed to advance WF33’s larger projects of base-building 
and winning institutional power through elections.  As discussed extensively in the following 
chapter, WF33 designed its issue and service work on housing and immigration to build a record 
of issue positions contrasting with Ald. Mell’s, and to maximize contact with segments of the 
ward deemed potential constituencies.  
In the summer of 2018, WF33 officially launched a campaign to elect one of its 
members, Rossana Rodriguez-Sanchez, as the 33rd Ward alderman.  WF33 members served as 
campaign staff and base of volunteers for the election.  The campaign built on the previous 
years of work, mobilizing supporters and using contact lists generated through issue and service 
work, and running on the platform of issues dramatized through earlier campaigns.  Rodriguez-
Sanchez won the election in a run-off, by 13 votes.  Previously, WF33 also recruited and ran a 
slate of candidates for Local School Councils (governance bodies associated with each public 
school in Chicago) in 2015 and 2017. 
 




WF33’s Agenda  
To reconstruct WF33’s agenda, I analyzed the content of WF33’s official platform, the 6 
issue campaigns launched since 2015, the official platforms of WF33’s aldermanic candidates in 
2015 and 2019, and public statements by candidates and WF33 spokespersons.  I found that 
WF33 most consistently advocates progressive economic redistribution, through expansion of 
public services, financed by progressive revenue policies, and use of economic regulation to limit 
housing costs.  They also consistently call for policies to protect undocumented people, and to 
allow non-citizen immigrants to participate in civic and political life.  They also seek 
democratization of citywide and local governance, and alternatives to punitive criminal justice 
polices.  These commitments were consistent from the organization’s origin in 2015 through the 
present, and have been consistent across different types of campaigns (although within some of 
these basic issue areas, particular demands have evolved).  More specifically, WF33’s has 
consistently sought the following changes:640 
• Expansion or enhancement of public services, and especially measures to provide high 
quality public services in low-income and working-class communities (such as provision 
of mental health care, social work, and other forms of counseling in in schools and after-
school programs; reinstatement of curricular and extracurricular options cut from public 
schools; and reopening closed health care clinics). 
 
640 Sources used include WF33’s official platform (http://workingfamilies33.org/platform); Rodriguez-Sanchez’s official platform 
(https://www.rossanafor33.org/issues); Uetricht and Rodriguez Sanchez, 2018:  “We Have a Right to the Resources That We Create” 
(Jacobin); Smith, 2018; James, 2014: “RUNNING AGAINST THE MACHINE, Interview with Tim Meegan” (Socialist Worker); Kunichoff, 
2014:  “Meet the High School Social Studies Teacher Taking On Chicago’s Right-Wing Democrats” (In These Times); Schmidt, 2015:  
“ALDERMANIC RACES: 33rd Ward race heating up...” (Substance News); Progress Illinois, 2014:  “33rd Ward Candidate Tim Meegan 
Talks Housing Issues”; Aldertrack, 2014:  “Tim Meegan, 33rd Ward”; “2015 Aldermanic Forum, 33rd Ward” (available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmHvxpjriNo&t=828s); Avondale Neighborhood Association, 2018:  “Rossana Rodriguez-
Sanchez for 33rd Ward”; Midwest Socialist, 2019:  “LIVE with Rossana Rodriguez”; Field Notes, 5/30/18. 
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• Economic regulations and other programs designed to expand the stock of housing 
affordable to working-class and lower-income consumers.  Initially, WF33 supported a 
range of policies to create and preserve affordable housing, such as land trusts, housing 
coops, and larger minimum affordable housing set-asides in new developments.  More 
recently, WF33 has prioritized rent control. 
• Progressive revenue policies, including a graduated income tax, a financial transactions 
tax, and elimination of public subsidies to corporations and real estate developers; 
along with opposition to the use of Tax Increment Financing accounts to fund real estate 
development and expansion of large corporations, the excessive imposition of fines 
(such as parking and traffic violation tickets), and decry the city’s “reliance” on property 
taxes. 
• Moratoria or bans on privatization of public services, especially the use of public funds 
for charter schools. 
• Reorientation of the city’s approach to public safety, including the reallocation of public 
resources from criminal justice institutions to education and social services; measures to 
increase police accountability (such as a civilian-controlled board to review alleged cases 
of police misconduct); measures to reduce racial profile (for instance by eliminating 
Chicago’s gang database641); and the elimination of forms of school discipline linked to 
the criminal justice system. 
• Policies addressing the economic interests of public sector and low-wage workers, 
including a $15 minimum wage, establishment or protection of workers’ rights to 
 
641 Chicago Police Department keeps a database of suspected gang-involved individuals.  Since 2016, CPD has shared information 
about undocumented immigrants on the database with Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  Racial justice advocates in Chicago 
criticize the database for including many innocent people and for exacerbating racial profiling. 
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unionize (in any sector or industry in which these are disputed)642, maintenance of 
public funding for public sector workers’ pensions. 
• Protections for undocumented people against deportation, both through Sanctuary City 
legislation and through forms of legal and logistical support at the neighborhood-level. 
• Measures to democratize governance in the city, such as the institution of “elected, 
representative boards of city agencies,” including primary and secondary schools, city 
colleges, and the public housing authority. 
• And, most recently, measures to address environmental problems, ranging from highly 
specific concerns with particular polluters in Chicago, to citywide programs to remove 
lead pipes from housing and public facilities. 
A few members affirm the preceding ideas, but have a vision of deeper social 
transformation.  Antonio, who describes himself as “a revolutionary socialist,” envisions large-
scale redistribution of resources, the transfer of some economic functions to “worker or public 
control,” and increase in the government’s capacity for regulation.  He did not explain this vision 
in detail (and may not have a detailed vision on these counts), but did specify that he believes 
these changes will ultimately “require a revolutionary break.”643   
WF33’s Strategy 
I examined WF33’s strategy, based on a review of the organization’s activities since 
2015.  I found a consistent strategy, focused on building a grassroots constituency in the ward, 
and winning control of ward-level political institutions through elections.  Members see this 
 
642 Currently, Rodriguez-Sanchez and WF33 have favored unionization for fast food workers and charter school teachers. 
643 Interview with Antonio, 5/24/18 
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ward-level work as part of the UWF coalition’s citywide project.  Specifically, WF33 has enacted 
the following strategies: 
• The primary focus on WF33’s work has been on winning institutional powers through 
elections.  Much of their activity has been directly or indirectly preparing for the 2019 
aldermanic election.  WF33 has also recruited and ran candidates for Local School 
Council. 
• WF33 has tried to build a grassroots base in the ward through issue campaigns (i.e., 
campaigns to change policies or practices of public or private entities) and service work 
(i.e., the provision of discrete benefits to particular recipients).  As discussed in detail in 
the next chapter, WF33 designs every aspect of these campaigns to build relationships 
with target constituencies, and to embarrass former Ald. Mell.  
• WF33 formally affiliated with UWF in 2016, gaining a set on UWF’s executive council.  
The WF33-backed alderman elect, Rosanna Rodriguez-Sanchez, will likely caucus with 
other UWF-allied members of the City Council.  
• WF33 has participated in citywide campaigns launched by the coalition.  It led grassroots 
organizing in the ward to support a referendum calling on state legislation to place a 
moratorium on creating charter schools in 2017, and a referendum to lift the state ban 
on rent control in 2018. 
WF33 faces a new set of strategic challenges since Rodriguez-Sanchez’s election as 
alderman in April 2019.  Among other questions, they must decide how to allocate limited 
personnel resources between governance and continued base-building; whether people who 
work in the aldermanic office can maintain leadership roles in WF33; how the organization 
should publicly and privately relate to Ald. Rodriguez-Sanchez (for example, when, if ever, it’s 
274 
 
wise to publicly criticize Ald. Rodriguez-Sanchez); and how exactly to use elected office as 
platform for building constituencies and raising consciousness.644  WF33’s leading members 
have been discussing these and other questions since Spring 2018.  
Discussion 
Though United Working Families was not directly involved in building WF33 (the exact 
nature of their relationship will be explained below), WF33 has grown into exactly the type of 
neighborhood-level formation UWF hoped to create—and what other left practitioners around 
the U.S. have talked about creating:  a formation ideologically committed to a redistributive 
class agenda and to racial and immigrant justice, capable of strategically sophisticated action, 
and embedded in a high-poverty neighborhood (such neighborhoods being seen as politically 
important terrain).  WF33 has quickly become an effective launch-pad for electoral and issue 
campaigns, and for the larger project of building a popular base among the neighborhood’s 
working- and lower-class residents (the form and results of that base-building project is the 
main topic of the next chapter). 
WF33’s development is even more striking since its form, modes of practice, and 
agenda, depart from common forms of neighborhood-based activism.  Its socialist agenda and 
stridently class-conscious discourse resemble Occupy and other recent social movements and 
left-leaning labor unions.  But they differ sharply from most community-based activist 
organizations, which since the 1970s have mostly pursued incremental or small-scale changes, 
and framed problems in technical, “solution-oriented” terms, rather than as results of class 
 
644 For example, one of WF33’s founding members and most important leaders, Antonio, will serve as Rodriguez-Sanchez’s chief-of-
staff.  It is unclear if it would be logistically possible for Antonio (who is also an adjunct instructor and PhD student in sociology) to 
maintain a leading role in WF33.  His doing so would also compromise the independence of WF33 from Rodriguez-Sanchez’s office.  I 
have not yet been able to learn how WF33 members view this situation.  
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conflicts (as described in Chapter 1).  WF33’s combination of organizing, issue campaigns, and 
elections also departs from the common paradigms of community practice.  Most Alinskyite 
organizations eschew electoral politics and (usually) broad ideological programs, while most 
foundation-funded non-profits advocate for policy changes on behalf of local residents, but 
invest little in grassroots organizing.  The latter also try to change policy through consensus-
oriented strategies, underpinned by close relationships with elected officials.  In their function 
as delivering a ward for a citywide project, WF33 resembles the classic ward-based 
organizations of Chicago’s old machine.  But WF33 organizes around a clear class-based 
program, rather than more particularistic benefits. 
In short, WF33’s developmental outcomes are important and puzzling.  WF33 has a 
moderate political importance in the context of the ongoing conflict between the UWF coalition 
and the neoliberal regime in Chicago.  It has a broader significance insofar as many left 
practitioners hope to build similar formations but do not yet know how.  WF33’s development is 
especially puzzling given its difference from common forms of community activism.  The rest of 
this chapter will attempt to account for WF33’s developmental outcomes. 
2. First-Order Causal Factor:  WF33 Member’s Ideas 
Like the members of the Greater Austin Independent Political Organization, WF33 
members possess elaborate understandings of social problems and the political conjuncture, 
visions of social change, and beliefs about strategy.  This section documents WF33 members’ 
ideas in three ways.  First, as a rough indicator of members’ ideas, I present members’ past 
organizational affiliations.  I show that almost all members (for whom data was available) had 
been affiliated with socialist and/or left-leaning progressive organizations, prior to joining WF33.  
Only a few participated in centrist or apolitical volunteer organizations only. 
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Second, I perform an in-depth analysis of members’ ideologies, based on interviews, 
participant observation, and analyses of members published writings.  Members had a spectrum 
of leftist analyses of the current political moment and visions of social change:  a few envision 
radical restructuring of the political economy, through revolution; most envision major policy 
changes to redistribute wealth and political power.  Members also share common ideas: 
• They share an analysis of the current political conjuncture, highlighting the conflict 
between economic elites and the working- and lower-classes as the most important 
aspect of contemporary politics.  Some members embed this in sophisticated analyses 
of capitalist political economy, while others have a vaguer sense of class conflict and of 
upper-class domination of the economy and politics. 
• Members understand social problems and policy conflicts as manifestations of this class 
conflict. 
• Members understand themselves as fighting on behalf of the working- and lower-
classes, and with organized labor. 
• Several members also have elaborate theories of political strategy.  They understand 
power as the ability to mobilize a grassroots base, and as control of governing 
institutions.  They have sophisticated ideas about base-building tactics, derived partly 
from Alinskyite concepts of organizing through issue campaigns. 
• Several members use the concepts and categories from their social analyses when 
thinking or talking about everyday phenomena. 
Third, I found that members communicate about the aforementioned ideas through a 
shared set of short-hand terms.  Members regularly use terms which connote larger ideas about 
the current conjuncture or particular policy issues, and other members immediately grasp these 
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connotations, without explanation.  Speakers take for granted that their audience will 
understand these connotations. 
I will compare WF33 members’ ideas to those of other important political formations.  
WF33 members’ ideas and discourse are quite similar to those of the mainstream of the UWF 
coalition, reviewed in Chapter 4.  WF33’s members social analysis and vision closely resemble 
those in the texts of UWF and its leading member organizations.  Their theories on strategy also 
mirror practices of the Chicago Teachers Union and UWF.  WF33’s ideas differ sharply from 
those espoused by the neoliberal regime (described in Chapter 2), and those common among 
neighborhood-based organizations affiliated with the regime. 
In addition to this description, I will argue that members’ ideas have caused WF33’s 
distinctive agenda and strategy.  The similarity between members’ ideas and WF33’s actual 
positions and behavior suggests that members’ ideas are a possible cause.  I will review an 
episode of decision-making within WF33 to show that these ideas have powerfully informed 
choices.  I will also rule out the most plausible competing explanation, intervention in WF33’s 
decision-making by UWF or other outside actors. 
Members prior affiliations as a proxy for ideology 
Antonio recounted a “running joke” during Tim Meegan’s 2015 aldermanic campaign, 
“that everyone involved was part of a socialist organization and had been arrested once.”645  At 
least the first half of this joke remains an accurate description of WF33’s membership, with 
most members previously affiliated with a leftist movement or organization prior to joining 
WF33. 
 
645 Interview with Antonio, 5/24/18. 
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These affiliations can be taken as a rough proxy for members’ ideology.  While 
membership in an organization does not imply acceptance of all of its demands or principles, I 
will interpret it as implying at least minimal ideological alignment of the member with that 
organization. 
I categorized groups as “socialist,” “socialist and progressive,” “progressive,” and 
“centrist” (there were no conservative groups in the sample).  I defined organizations and 
movements as “socialist” if they support decommodification of goods and services and/or 
collective ownership or democratic control of the economy.  I defined organizations and 
movements as “progressive” if they call for downward redistribution of resources, regulation of 
the economy with the goal of reducing poverty or inequality, and/or measures to limit the 
political power of corporations and wealthy citizens.  I made a category for organizations which 
combine or vacillate between socialist and progressive goals.  I defined organizations as centrist 
if they espouse non-partisan or moderate policy positions.  I also include in the “centrist 
category” groups which focus on activities outside the realm of partisan politics and organizing, 
such as culture and arts, community-building, mentoring, or other volunteer service work 
without a direct link to politics or organizing.  I classify all organizations of which WF33 members 
are affiliated into these four categories in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1.  Ideological position of organizations with which WF33 members are affiliated 
Socialist  Democratic Socialists of America, International 
Socialist Organization, Northeastern Illinois 
University Socialists, Occupy Chicago, 
Communities Organized Against Eviction and 
Foreclosure, Autonomous Tenants Union, 
Chicago Anti-Eviction Coalition, Borricua 
United, Chicago’s movement against closure of 
mental health clinics, and a Puerto Rican 
movement against austerity 
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Socialist and progressive  United Working Families, Chicago Teachers 
Union, Service Workers International Union 
Health Care Illinois and Indiana, Midwest 
Academy, Raise the Floor Alliance  
Progressive Northside Democracy for America, Progressive 
Democrats for America, Raise Your Hand, 
Parents 4 Teachers, Communities Organized 
for Democracy in Education, Save Chicago 
Neighborhood News, No Games Chicago, Salud 
Sin Papeles 
Centrist/civic US Students Association, Fringe Festival, 
Generation Citizen, Albany Park Neighbors, 
Chicago Cares 
 
I listed members’ organizational affiliations in Table 6.2.  I found that 25 members were 
previously involved in at least one socialist or socialist/progressive organization, 7 were involved 
in at least one progressive organization, and only 3 were involved exclusively in centrist 
organizations only.  I could not obtain information about prior activism of 7 members.  By far the 
most common affiliation was Democratic Socialists of America, with 14 WF33 members 
affiliated. 
 
Table 6.2:  Activist Experience of WF33 Members 
Color code: 
Red = Socialist political or advocacy organization or movement 
Purple = Socialist/progressive organization or movement 
Blue = progressive political or advocacy organization or movement  
Green = centrist political or advocacy organization or movement; civic or charitable organization  
Antonio:  Communities Organized Against Eviction and Foreclosure, Chicago Anti-Eviction 
League, Metropolitan Tenant’s Organization, Communities United 
Ernie:  Occupy Chicago, “Mental Health Movement,” International Socialist Organization 




Todd:  Democratic Socialists of America, No Games Chicago 
Rosanna:  Democratic Socialists of America, Borricua United, organizing against austerity in Puerto 
Rico, Albany Park Theatre Project 
Barret:  International Socialist Organization, Northeastern Illinois College Socialists 
Dawn:  Untied Working Families, Midwest Academy, Planned Parenthood 
Bill:  Progressive Democrats for America, Democratic Socialists of America  
Mike:  Pilsen Alliance 
Brig:  Autonomous Tenants Union  
Rich:  SEIU HCII 
Sean:  Democratic Socialists of America, Illinois Single Payer Coalition, Jobs with Justice, 
Project Read 
Juliana:  Parents 4 Teachers, Communities Organized for Democracy in Education 
Sophia:  Raise the Floor Alliance; U.S. Students Association 
Denny:  Salud Sin Papeles  
Ben:  Northside Democracy for America  
Kelly:  Jane Addams Senior Caucus 
Katheryn:  Grey Panthers 
Rob:  Save Chicago Neighborhood News 
Samay:  Raise Your Hand; Fringe Festival 
Mary:  Generation Citizen, Rhode Island Kids Count  
Laura:  Albany Park Neighbors  
Jackie:  Chicago Cares  
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3 other members:  Chicago Teachers Union 
9 other members:  Democratic Socialists of America  
 
A majority of WF33 members have participated in either socialist, or a combination of 
socialist and progressive causes in the past.  25 have been a part of socialist or hybrid socialist-
progressive groups.  An additional 8 have participated in progressive groups (with 14 members 
of Democratic Socialists of America).  33 of the 35 members for whom I obtained data had 
previously participated in progressive or leftist causes.  Assuming that organizational affiliation 
indicates ideology, we can conclude the bulk of the WF33 membership is committed to left-
leaning goals, and was even prior to their affiliation with WF33. 
Detailed description of members’ ideology  
To gain a textured analysis of WF33 members’ ideas, I used in-depth interviews, 
participant observation and analyzed members’ published writings and speeches.  Member 
ranged from “revolutionary socialists,” intent on large-scale restructuring of the economy, to 
Sanders-style social democrats, looking to increase public provision through progressive 
taxation. However, members shared a common set of ideas about the salience of class conflict, 
class-focused analyses of particular issues (especially housing), identification with the lower-
classes, and a commitment to grassroots base-building and elections. 
WF33 members’ social analysis, vision, and strategy is strikingly in line with the praxis of 
the UWF coalition, taking shape since the early 2010s.   These views also depart markedly 
from—and some members explicitly reject—the forms of practice most common among 
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neighborhood-based organizations.  WF33’s and UWF’s similarity is particularly striking given 
their difference from this common paradigm. 
Strategy 
Five interviewees explained their views about strategy, discussing how WF33, and the 
left generally, should pursue their goals.  I found four recurring themes:  1)they see grassroots 
organizing as a crucial method of building power; 2)they engage in partisan electoral work, 
linking it to their issue campaigns and base-building; 3)at a more abstract level, they see 
conflicts in the workplace, neighborhood, and legislative and electoral spheres, as sites in a 
larger class struggle; 4)they are concerned with maintaining organizational independence of 
elected officials. 
Investment in grassroots organizing 
All interviewees see grassroots base-building as an effective way to build power, and 
view this as one of WF33’s reasons for existence.  Indeed, members appeared to understand 
“power” as, first and foremost, the ability to deploy a mass grassroots base.  This confers power 
insofar as it enables electoral success, and thus control of institutions (according to Dawn), or 
more direct exercises of popular pressure (according to Antonio and Joycelyn).  When my 
interviewees referred to “building power,” they invariably meant grassroots organizing and 
base-building. 
Relatedly, members criticized the strategy of attempting to influence policy through 
collaborative relationships with power-holders.  In Antonio words, this strategy is based on “the 
fallacy that access [to politicians] means influence [over them].”646  Another member (who 
preferred anonymity) agreed that such relationships “usually mean giving political support, 
 
646 Interview with Antonio, 5/24/18.  
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while maybe getting a few small concessions.  But you’re giving up your ability to apply 
pressure.”647  
WF33’s conception of power and corresponding investment in base-building mirror the 
praxis of the UWF coalition.  As described at length in Chapter 4, the Chicago Teachers Union 
revamped its grassroots organizing since 2010, creating several new institutional mechanisms 
for outreach and leadership development.  Some of these mechanisms were subsequently 
transferred to UWF.  As my interview data, newspaper accounts, and book-length accounts of 
the CTU demonstrate, organizational leaders increasingly spoke of the need to build power 
through grassroots organizing beginning in the early 2010s.648   
Interestingly, this emphasis on grassroots base-building has been one of the most 
innovative elements of UWF coalition’s praxis.  Chapter 3 also describes Chicago labor unions’ 
lack of interest in grassroots organizing from the 1970s through the 2010s.  Nationally, as labor 
retrenched since the 1970s, unions invested less in workplace organizing.649  For an array of 
reasons (described in Chapter 1), most community-based organizations transferred resources 
from organizing toward service provision, development, and advocacy since the 1970s.  A 
strategic praxis of building power through grassroots base-building was one of the UWF 
coalition’s marked departures from contemporary trends. 
Community organizing integrated with a partisan electoral project 
WF33 integrates their grassroots base-building with a partisan electoral project.  
Members explained that much of their base-building work since late 2016 was intentionally 
designed to advance their electoral goals (in addition to more generally building a grassroots 
 
647 Interview with anonymous member, 5/30/18. 
648 This was discussed in Chapter 4; Bradbury et al, 2015. 
649 Domhoff, 2005.  
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base).  And since September 2018, most of the organization’s activities were devoted to running 
an election campaign.  Dawn, Antonio, and others explained that winning elections would 
incrementally increase the institutional power of the citywide left coalition (interestingly, they 
usually referred it to it generically as a left coalition, without mentioning UWF by name).  
Ultimately, taking control of city council and other institutions would allow the coalition to 
implement its policy agenda. 
This explicit partisanship and emphasis on elections is also a marked departure from 
even left-leaning community practice in Chicago.  As one UWF board member and SEIU officer 
observed, “the shapes that political base-building has taken in Chicago in the last few years, 
none of them have made that connection between mass neighborhood action around issues 
and political [i.e., electoral] action.”650  In this strategic orientation, WF33 has more in common 
with ward-based entities associated with urban political machines than with the advocacy or 
Alinsky-style groups (although they do use Alinsky’s ideas at the level of base-building tactics651). 
However, WF33’s use of base-building and issue campaigns to advance an electoral 
project does resemble a mode of practice revived by the UWF coalition in recent years.  Since 
the early 2010s, the CTU in particular has tried to synthesize grassroots issue-based work and 
partisan electoral projects, for example linking campaigns around school closings and funding 
for public education with large scale, grassroots voter registration and mobilization efforts.  SEIU 
HCII has also linked grassroots outreach around a living wage campaign with aldermanic 
 
650 Interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17. 
651 WF33 members have elaborate views on base-building tactics.  In short, they view issue campaigns (grassroots organizing around 
issues, pressure campaigns for issues) and service work (providing discrete benefits to particular people or groups) as the most 
effective vehicles for outreach and organizing.  They echo classic Alinskyite theories that issue campaigns raise political 
consciousness, by awakening expectations and dramatizing power relationships.  Dawn also has sophisticated theories about how to 
use issue campaigns to build a record of contrasts with an incumbent, in preparation for an election. WF33’s approach to base-
building is discussed at length in the following chapter. 
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elections.  Once again, the only recent precedent in Chicago for WF33’s modes of practice is the 
recent work of UWF coalition members. 
Unity of Workplace, Neighborhood, Electoral and Legislative Spheres  
At a more abstract level, all interviewees shared the sense that neighborhood base-
building, electoral and legislative campaigns, and workplace struggles are parts of a larger class 
struggle.  While Antonio made an elaborate argument for linking workplace and neighborhood 
politics,652 most members appeared to simply assume the unity of these practices, referring 
variously to Chicago’s class conflict in these different spheres.  Some members implied the unity 
of these struggles when they argued that a series of political events, including high-profile labor 
struggles, grassroots movements, and policy campaigns, had paved the way for UWF. 
Ambivalence about political Independence  
Dawn and Antonio talked at length about the need to maintain WF33’s independence 
from any candidates or elected officials.  They repeatedly expressed concern about candidates 
winning elections with WF33’s backing, only to pursue a different agenda once in office.  To 
prevent this, WF33 leaders want the organization to remain independent enough of candidates 
and officials it supports to break with and punish them for any such defections. 
To this end, leaders have tried to build the organization such that members’ primary 
loyalty is to the organization, and/or to the issue positions, rather than to the candidate.  They 
mentioned efforts to define WF33’s own identity in terms of issue positions, and not to subsume 
 
652 In a 2015 article, Antonio more explicitly called for the extension of work-place struggles into local politics. According to Antonio, 
Tim Meegan’s 2015 aldermanic campaign “represents exactly what needs to happen in electoral politics in Chicago:  rank-and-file 
union activists using their organizing skills and networks to run independent campaigns.  Tim was about putting the ‘social 
movement unionism’ model of organizing to work in [electoral] politics.” 
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its brand entirely into its candidate’s during the election campaign.  Most importantly, they have 
attempted to recruit their core membership on the basis of issues, rather than candidates. 
WF33 leaders appeared to be less concerned about their independence from the 
citywide coalition.  In Antonio’ recounting, WF33’s affiliation with UWF was not subject to much 
debate, and “was just seen as making sense.”653  This seeming unconcern contrasted sharply 
with members’ repeated, unprompted expressions of concern with independence from 
candidates.  WF33 members’ appear to be more concerned with fidelity to issue positions than 
with independence per se, and may view UWF as reliably committed to left-leaning issue 
positions. 
Socio-political Analysis 
Members of WF33 have a similar social analysis to that of the leaders of UWF described 
in Chapter 3.  They have a class-focused critique of capitalism and of the contemporary political 
economy, and affirm the exceptional experiences under capitalism of racial minorities.  They see 
the situation of immigrants as ultimately rooted in global imperialism.  They also recognize 
concerns of immigrants and racial minorities which do not reduce to class conflicts.  While some 
members have elaborate understandings of these points (as shown in writings and speeches), I 
mostly observed these ideas expressed in colloquial, short-hand forms in everyday conversation.   
Ideas about class conflict and the unity or racial and class justice struggles appeared to be 
shared common sense among members, reflexively employed in informal social analysis, and 
assumed to be widely understood. 
In analyzing social, economic, and political problems, most members foreground class 
conflict and exploitative capitalist processes.  Some members possess sophisticated analyses, 
 
653 Interview with Antonio, 5/23/18. 
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tracing upper-class domination and exploitation to particular, complex economic processes.  For 
example, Antonio, whose doctoral research examines neoliberal political economy and urban 
finance, traces affordable housing crises to the influence of local, national, and global investors 
over public policy and the use of city planning powers to inflate real estate markets.654  Other 
writings, closely resembling the analysis of the Chicago Teachers Union and Grassroots 
Collaborative examined in Chapter 3, juxtapose the city’s cuts to public services and education 
with expanding public subsidies for corporations, developers and wealthy land-owners, framing 
these policies as manifestations of corporate and upper-class dominance of the government.655  
Members extend a similar analysis to other particular policy issues, including education656 and 
healthcare.657 
Race is also central to members’ social analysis.  First, WF33 members recognize 
ongoing forms of racial discrimination and oppression which do not reduce to capitalist 
exploitation and expropriation, particularly in the spheres of policing and criminal punishment.  
They are committed to combatting these forms of injustice.  Secondly, they see capitalism as 
racialized such that people of color have been and continue to be disproportionately confined to 
the lowest classes, and are subjected to special forms of hyper-exploitation and expropriation, 
on the basis of racial discrimination and subjugation.  For example, in a pair of articles analyzing 
the foreclosure crisis, one member observes that people of color were both disproportionately 
 
654 This article traces the collaboration of global financial firms and Chicago’s business elite to pressure the city to privatize particular 
infrastructures, and support rent-intensifying redevelopment of land adjacent to those infrastructures.  This and other articles 
demonstrating a sophisticated class analysis will not be cited, to protect the identity of interviewees. 
655 In a 2018 article, Ernie contrasts Emanuel’s support for business subsidies with his decision to close publicly funded mental health 
clinics in 2012.  
656 In a 2013 article, Antonio argued that the use of property taxes in low-income neighborhoods to fund selective enrollment 
schools in other neighborhoods—a common practice of the Daley and Emanuel administration—systematically siphoned resources 
from lower-income and mostly black populations to wealthier ones.  A similar article from 2017 demonstrates that Chicago’s charter 
school policies reduce resources available for classroom instruction and support services in public schools. 
657 Ernie’s aforementioned 2018.  
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targeted by predatory lenders, and most likely to be financially ruined by foreclosure, given their 
historical inability to accrue wealth and resulting reliance on home equity.658 
It is not clear what, if any, implications WF33 members intend to draw from this analysis 
of racialized capitalism.  As noted, WF33’s policy agenda focuses on redistribution along class, 
not racial lines—as of the time of writing, they did not advocate reparations or other race-based 
redistributive policies.  WF33’s frequent mention of race in addition to class may be an 
acknowledgement of the exceptional form of racialized capitalist oppression which lower-class 
minorities have faced—part of a symbolic politics of recognition intended to appeal to minority 
communities.  Some texts used race or class interchangeably, switching among references to 
race, class, or hybrid subjects, and forms of racial or class oppression, in ways that implied 
continuity among these terms.   For example, some texts mentioned racism as a powerful factor 
affecting residents’ lives, only to conflate it entirely with economic injustice, with the exact same 
stakes and antagonists.  One of Rodriguez-Sanchez’s speeches referred to “vulnerable and at-
risk populations… [affected by] systematic poverty, racism and exclusion...the families who are 
most afflicted by a system designed to benefit the rich and powerful,” and went on to advocate 
WF33’s vision of class-based redistribution of resources.  She thus asserts that racism matters 
profoundly, but then suggests that racism is driven by the actions of economic elites, and is best 
addressed through an economic program. 
Other texts verge on eliding non-minority lower-classes as oppressed groups.  
Whenever members fully elaborated their analysis, they clearly located racialized hyper-
exploitation within a system exploiting on the basis of class.  However, short-hand references 
racial capitalism sometimes substituted race for lower-class.  For example, one text analyzing 
 
658 Norman wrote articles in 2013 and 2015 about the causes of the foreclosure and affordable housing crises. 
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the foreclosure crisis labeled it as part of a “legacy of racist appropriation.”659  While this could 
be harmless device, it may reflect a tendency to slip from a recognition of minority particularity 
to erasure of non-minority working-classes.  I consider this possibility further in the next 
chapter, when discussing WF33’s targeting of grassroots outreach in the neighborhood. 
While they recognize the particularity of immigrants (discussed below), I did not observe 
WF33 members distinguish among Latinx people of different nationalities, or between Latinx 
people and other people of color (except for one member’s references to her experiences in 
Puerto Rico).  Latinx and “people of color” were often used interchangeably, suggesting that 
WF33 members thought about Latinx identity as a part of a broader category of people who are 
treated as a racial “other.” 
WF33 members view immigrants as having particular concerns and needs, beyond those 
which address economic inequality and poverty.  At least some members also see immigration 
through an anti-colonial framework which foregrounds U.S. economic exploitation of developing 
countries.  At a forum in 2019, Rossana described immigration as driven by poverty which is 
rooted in U.S. imperialism:  “I left Puerto Rico because of an economic situation...Puerto Rico 
has a very similar history…with a lot of other countries that have been victims of U.S. 
imperialism.”660  It appears that Rossana and others may understand the solidarity between 
immigrants and working-classes more generally on this basis. 
Most often, I observed ideas about class conflict, and the interconnection of race and 
class, expressed in short-hand references to WF33’s identity and that of its adversaries.  
Members usually defined WF33’s identity in racial and class terms, and usually addend solidarity 
with immigrant populations.  I heard WF33 members frequently invoke a political subject 
 
659 Norman’s 2015 article. 
660 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCamcVUeKAs.  Accessed 11/15/19. 
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defined by race and class, “working-classes and people of color,” or “working families and 
especially people of color,” followed by a reference to immigrant populations.661  They also 
frequently defined WF33’s identity in populist terms (as in the Rodriguez-Sanchez’s campaign 
slogan “Neighborhoods for the many”).  
While defining their own identity in hybrid terms, members almost always referred to 
their antagonists in economic terms.  I observed innumerable written and spoken references to 
“economic elites,” “the 1%,” “the ultra-wealthy,” “billionaires,” etc., and to specific economic 
actors, especially “developers,” and “the banks.”  These actors were always associated with 
domination of politics, or with a particular exploitative economic process.662  Interestingly, I 
observed no mention of the middle-classes as an adversary, although members recognized the 
strong affiliation of segments of the ward’s middle-class whites with the Mell administration.  
Members did occasionally reference “gentrifiers,” constructing them in racial, class, and 
communitarian terms, for instance as “affluent white people moving into the neighborhood.”663  
Such mentions were rare, however, perhaps given the status of many WF33 members as white, 
middle-class newcomers to the neighborhood.   
Spending time with WF33, I observed multiple instances in which class concepts 
functioned as a shared common sense.  Members appeared to spontaneously use these 
concepts to analyze social phenomena.  They could also invoke these concepts in short-hand 
ways, and their audience reflexively grasped the connotations, without explanation or 
argument.  For example, any mention of an economic entity or segment like “working families” 
 
661 In a speech at her campaign launch event, for example, Rodriguez-Sanchez commented that “Our alderman represents 
developers and the mayor.  The mayor represents the rich and well-connected.  We represent something different.  We are working 
families, people of color, and it’s time for us to build a political movement…” (Field Notes, 5/29/18). 
662 Ernie wrote an article in 2013 describing the exploitative labor practices and political corruption of the Hyett hotel chain, implying 
that they exemplify the aggressive and self-interested behavior of large corporations and the affluent.  The article depicts the 
Emanuel administration (and to a lesser extent, the Obama administration) as the agent of such economic elites.  
663 Field notes, 5/19/18. 
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or “corporate interests” was immediately understood as a party in the ongoing class conflict 
over resources playing out in the city’s politics.  Any mention of a salient issue like “TIFs” or 
“school closures” was immediately understood to be a front in this class conflict.  Moreover, 
speakers clearly anticipated that their audience would grasp the larger meaning of these terms. 
This is exemplified by a casual conversation at Rodriguez-Sanchez’s candidate launch 
party.  One current and one perspective member (both members of DSA) analyzed a nearby 
neighborhood, Lincoln Square, and its residents in terms of class categories. 
Devon: “It’s not even gentrification so much as aristocratization” 
Betty: “Lincoln Square was never really that hip, it never went through that arty phase.  
Just rich families.” 
Devon: “It went from a regular people neighborhood to million dollar shitty new 
construction...Before you would see your average working class people.” 
Betty: “It’s mostly yuppies.  Families who probably work in finance or whatever.”664 
 
The speakers appeared to adopt this lens spontaneously—there was no identifiable prompt, by 
either speaker or another party, to consider the topic in these terms.  Up until this sequence, 
members had not been discussing gentrification or other class-related issues.  This sequence 
suggests that they view these class categories as relevant and important, or that they reflexively 
revert to them. 
In another example, the Master of Ceremonies at Rodriguez-Sanchez’s launch party, 
CTU organizer Kenzo Shibata, roused the crowd (which included most of WF33’s membership, 
members of allied organizations, and a few people affiliated with UWF and its member 
organizations) with a series of leading questions about the political economy of the Thirty-Third 
Ward: 
Mr. Shibata: “Do you feel like right now our neighborhoods are being led in the interests of the 
many?” 
(Members of the crowd booed and answered in the negative) 
Mr. Shibata: “Whose interests are being served?” 
 
664 Field notes, 5/30/18. 
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(Several people in the crowd yelled “the rich,” “the 1%,” or “developers.”) 
Mr. Shibata: “Anyone in particular you want to call out?” 
(A smaller handful of people shouted the names of the ward’s most infamous local developers, 
or the names of their firms, and others repeated “rich people” or “the 1%.”)665 
 
As telling as the content of this exchange is the reflexivity of the crowd’s answers to Mr. 
Shibata’s question.  Members of the crowd knew, without reflection or explanation, to whom 
Mr. Shibata referred by “the many,” and that the status quo was injurious to those people.  They 
also reflexively knew which entities were opposed to “the many:” upper-class economic 
segments or actors.  Finally, it is telling that Mr. Shibata clearly expected to receive these (or 
similar) answers to his question.  Per standard sociological definitions, understandings of a class 
antagonism between “the few” and “the many” were common knowledge:  not only did each 
party know the significance of this term, Mr. Shibata could take it for granted that his audience 
knew. 
A conversation at a fundraiser for Carlos Rosa (the socialist alderman of the 35th ward 
and close UWF ally) displayed a similar common discourse.  During the event, the present 
author wondered aloud “how this party compares to Rahm Emanuel’s fundraisers.”  An WF33 
member responded, “I think they have more expensive drinks at the Commercial Club of 
Chicago.”  Members laughed at the second comment, and assented verbally or by nodding.  It is 
revealing that the WF33 members immediately understood the reference:  that Emanuel would 
be holding a fundraiser at an organization strongly associated with corporate elites required no 
explanation, and could function as the premise for a joke.  This suggests that Mayor Emanuel’s 
association with the wealthy and corporate elites is also common sense for WF33 members, and 
 
665 Field Notes, 5/30/18.  Specifically, people mentioned “Abrams,” referring to Ron Abrams, a local developer, or his firm, “Silver 
Properties.”  Abrams has purchased several multi-family buildings in Albany Park and evicted the long-time residents.   
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that a short-hand reference to this association is immediately understood, without 
explanation.666 
Class conflict playing out in particular issues 
Just like UWF, WF33 members understand particular, salient social problems and policy 
conflicts in terms of the aforementioned class conflict.  Whether in academic analyses or 
everyday language, members frame affordable housing shortages and displacement, 
inadequately resourced schools, intensified policing, in terms of the same conflict between 
classes. 
While none of my informants said so explicitly, I developed the impression that leading 
WF33 members reflexively conceptualize the population of the ward in terms of issue-specific 
class conflicts.  That is, they conceptualize the population as segments afflicted by the 
affordable housing crisis and benefiting from it, segments afflicted by the underfunding of public 
services, segments of the population afflicted by immigration law enforcement, and so on.  
Almost every reference to the working- and lower-class residents of the neighborhood 
mentioned their relationship to one of these salient issues.  This may reflect the extent to which 
their social and political analysis, highlighting class conflict and connecting it to particular 
problems, shapes their basic perception of the social world.  
I did find that WF33 members emphasized different issues than UWF, placing relatively 
more emphasis on affordable housing and protection of undocumented immigrants.  These 
patterns of emphasis likely reflect WF33’s decision to prioritize these issues in their service and 
advocacy work in 2017, a decision discussed below.  
 
666 Field Notes, 5/19/18. 
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Identification with organized labor  
Antonio shared an anecdote which illustrates WF33’s members identification of WF33 
as an organization aligned with organized labor.  Early in 2016, as the organization began to 
grow, members debated WF33’s political alignment.  One contingent of members—whom a 
current WF33 leader referred to (with irritation but not malice) as “pedantic, process-obsessed 
liberals”—wanted WF33 to remain strictly non-partisan, eschewing alignment with “special 
interests,” including big business and organized labor.  Antonio, Ernie, Dawn, and other 
members countered that labor and business were not morally equivalent sectoral interests, but 
that labor represents the empowerment and emancipation of oppressed classes, and big 
business their continued exploitation.  The pro-labor members prevailed in this dispute (without 
resorting to a violent purge):  Antonio politely suggested that the liberal faction form their own 
group, which they proceeded to do.667 
Members’ Ideologies Have Determined WF33’s Orientation 
To demonstrate the importance of members’ ideologies toward the other outcomes of 
interest (WF33’s orientation and political alignment), I examined decision-making within the 
group.  I wanted to assess if WF33 adopted its agenda, strategy, and alliance with Chicago’s left 
due to members’ ideas; to perceived opportunities for funding, influence, or other rewards; to 
the interventions of UWF or other actors; or to other factors.   I will present testimony of WF33 
and UWF members that, while UWF supports WF33 materially, it has not exerted any direct 
influence on the organization’s orientation. 
 
667 Interview with Antonio, 5/24/18. 
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Ideology and strategy in the design of WF33’s issue campaign 
I found that members’ foundational social analysis has been a premise in WF33’s design 
of base-building campaigns.  I will demonstrate this by reconstructing WF33’s decision-making 
about which issues to prioritize in outreach campaigns in 2017 and 2018.  Members choose 
issues strategically, based on grounded analysis of political conditions and opportunities in the 
ward; but this analysis took WF33’s affinity with lower-class and immigrant populations as a 
premise.  The strategic analysis may also have been guided, if not predetermined, by WF33 
members’ reflexive tendency to conceptualize the population in terms of issue-specific class 
conflicts.   
Leading members began discussing new issue-based projects at a retreat late in 2016.  
Per the strategic and tactical ideas reviewed in the previous section, leading members saw issue-
based work as a way to build a record for the 2019 election and build relationships with target 
population segments.  At the retreat, “people who had taken leadership roles” in the 
organization discussed how to use issue-based work to these ends.  In particular, they 
considered which issues to work on.  These conversations were the organization’s most 
deliberate attempts to choose a set of issues to prioritize to date.668 
In these conversations, members reportedly considered which issues were most salient 
among working-class Latinx populations, whom they perceived as their key constituency (this 
 
668 Since WF33’s inception, most of its issue-based work had focused on education.  Projects included canvassing for a referendum 
opposing charter schools, organizing high school students to protest budget cuts, pressuring Ald. Mell to support an elected school 
board, and running candidates for local school council.  According to Dawn, this focus reflected the influence of Tim Meegan, and 
the network of educators and public school students and parents whom Meegan attracted to the group.668  Meegan and his 
networks brought an acute concern with education-related issues, already developed positions on those issues, and mechanisms for 
action (such as opportunities for school-based actions) to the organization.  Thus, even without a deliberate decision to prioritize 
education, WF33 found it easy to engage in actions related to education. 
By late 2016, this relatively education-focused contingent within WF33 had diminished.  As noted, Meegan moved out-of-state in 
2016.  Antonio also observed that participation rates for the people drawn to WF33 by their relationship to Meegan dropped off 
more rapidly than those of other participants, even prior to Meegan’s departure.  The most prominent policy question on 
educational governance was also settled in 2016 by the state legislature’s passage of legislation creating an elected school board in 
Chicago.  A stable cadre had also emerged by late 2016, and was ready to make more deliberate, strategic decisions about issue-
based work.   
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perception is analyzed in the following chapter).  According to Dawn, “were very intentional 
about taking on housing and immigration.  We know that housing and immigration are major 
concerns.   Gentrification is pushing up from Logan Square…displacement is becoming a major 
problem.”  Joycelyn made a similar point about immigration:  members recognized growing fear 
and anger about ICE raids and the abuse of undocumented immigrants, with the uptick in 
enforcement after Trump’s election.669  Members believed that conducting outreach on these 
issues would be an opportunity to “meet people, to make our case, on the most salient 
issues.”670 
 Second, members reported weighing Ald. Mell’s political vulnerabilities.  Interviewees 
reported that housing was seen as an issue that could be embarrassing for Mell, highlighting her 
close ties to developers, and failure to push for strong affordable housing legislation as 
alderman. An anonymous member noted that “it’s strategic, because [Mell] doesn’t really have 
a strong leg to stand on there.”671     
Members’ ideology appears to have provided some basic premises for this grounded 
analysis of ward conditions.  First, members appeared to take as an unquestioned premise that 
lower-classes and immigrants are WF33’s potential constituencies.  Certainly, this belief was not 
itself a matter of analysis or debate during the retreat and conversations in late 2016 and early 
2017.  When I asked members how they determined which parts of the ward to target, they 
mentioned two points: measuring which census tracts had the highest number of not-yet-
mobilized working-class Latinx people, and debates about the extent to which WF33 needs to 
make inroads among middle-class and working-class white residents.672  No one mentioned any 
 
669 Interview with Joycelyn, 5/20/18. 
670 Interview with Dawn, 1/11/18. 
671 Interview with anonymous member, 5/30/18. 
672 They targeted census tracts with relatively low voter turn-out, in which most of the non-voting eligible voters were Latinx people. 
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debate, conversation, or analysis about whether lower-class Latinx people where WF33’s main 
constituency.  In short, this appears to have been an unproblematic and unquestioned 
assumption during these conversations. 
Second, WF33’s choice to organize via issue campaigns, and its selection of particular 
issues, may also have been guided by ideology.  As noted above, members seemed to reflexively 
conceptualize the lower-classes in terms of issue-specific manifestations of class conflicts.  That 
is, they understood lower-classes not in the abstract, but as populations afflicted by particular 
problems rooted in class conflict, such as displacement, inadequate public services, over-
policing, etc.  Thus when members considered opportunities for base-building, their social 
analysis would have specified not just that “the lower-classes were their likely constituency,” 
but that “the lower classes, who are afflicted by inadequate services, displacement, and other 
specific issues, were their likely constituency.”   
This would have made it natural for WF33 members to think of issue-based work as a 
tool for connecting with target constituencies.   Members conceptualize their relationship to 
constituencies as an alignment on concrete issues.  Even if those relationships are not yet 
realized, they see potential relationships in terms of these issue-specific alignments.  As such, 
working on these issues would be an obvious way to build this relationship 
We can also reinterpret WF33 members’ reports that they analyzed which issues were 
salient to target populations.  They began with the assumption that lower-classes, and especially 
lower-class Latinx people, are afflicted by several issues.  Their grounded analysis of ward 
conditions indicated that, of the several afflicting issues, displacement and immigration 
enforcement, rather than inadequate public services, over-policing, or others, were currently 
the most salient. 
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In short, members developed issue campaigns based on strategic analysis of ward 
conditions.  But their ideas about class conflict provided a blue-print for base-building, 
specifying their potential constituencies, and the particular issues on which WF33 could build a 
relationship with them.  
Relationship with UWF 
United Working Families provided various forms of financial support and opportunities 
for political influence to WF33.  However, WF33 members point out that UWF only funds 
election campaigns, leaving WF33 to finance and run almost all of its work since 2015.  WF33 
members assert that UWF has not influenced WF33’s orientation or alignment, and UWF 
personnel confirm that they decided to work with WF33 only after the latter had emerged as a 
coherent group, committed to left politics.  I could find no instance in which WF33 members 
made decisions out of concern for funding, or in response to threats or blandishments of UWF 
or other elites beyond the neighborhood. 
UWF and its member organizations provide some logistical support for WF33, and 
finance its election campaigns.  Tim Meegan’s 2015 aldermanic campaign (out of which WF33 
grew) Committee received about $79,000 in cash and in-kind contributions, about 73% of which 
came from UWF and its affiliated unions.673  Rossana Rodriguez-Sanchez raised $200,500 for her 
2019 aldermanic campaign, about 62% came from UWF and three of its affiliated unions (Service 
Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois and Indiana, Chicago Teachers Union, and 
Cook County Teacher’s Union).674  These amounts were comparable to UWF’s and affiliated 
 
673 Data on campaign contributions downloaded from IllinoisSunshine.org.  Summed donations to the Citizens for Tim Meegan 
Political Action Committee 
674 SEIU HCII contributed $56,000; Chicago Teacher's Union PAC contributed $40,000; United Working Families PAC contributed 
$20,000; Cook County College Teacher's Union-COPE contributed $7,500.  The Rodriguez-Sanchez campaign received more than the 




unions’ contributions to other candidates in these respective years.  UWF and its unions 
“provided staffers and directed volunteers to [Meegan’s] campaign.”675   
UWF has provided various other supports.  In 2018, Rodriguez-Sanchez participated in 
UWF’s “movement fellows” training program, receiving training in building and running 
grassroots campaigns.  WF33 also shares UWF’s subscription to Minivan, the smartphone 
application used to plan canvasses and other outreach—a service for which they would 
otherwise have to pay. 
WF33 leaders also gained a measure of influence within the UWF coalition through their 
affiliation with UWF.  All formal organizational affiliates of UWF are entitled to send one 
representative to UWF’s Executive Board.  This board has been a key site of conversations and 
debates about agenda and strategy for the UWF coalition.676  As WF33’s representative, Antonio 
has enjoyed the opportunity to participate in these discussions. 
WF33 leaders readily acknowledge these relationships.  But they are quick to point out 
the limits of UWF’s involvement in WF33.  Both election campaigns were managed and mostly 
run by WF33 volunteers, not union or UWF staff.677  And UWF and its affiliates have had almost 
no role in building the organization between elections—the planning and implementation were 
entirely carried out by WF33’s volunteer members.678   
Even more pointedly, WF33 assert that they have not made decisions out of a desire to 
obtain UWF backing, or influence within the organization.  Antonio dismissed the notion, saying 
that affiliation with UWF “just made sense.  They represent the self-organization of the working 
class, and we’re trying to do the exact same thing.”  Dawn allowed that WF33’s activists might 
 
675 Uetricht, 2015. 
676 Interview with Matt Luskin, 3/x/17; Interview with Matt Luskin and Marc Meinster, 3/17/17; Interview with Jackson Potter, 
3/10/17; interview with Alex Han, 3/17/17.  The role of the board is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
677 Interview with Antonio, 5/24/18. 
678 Interviews with Dawn, Antonio, Joycelyn, and anonymous member. 
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be encouraged by the existence of “a powerful left formation” (i.e., the UWF coalition), but not 
that WF33 has altered its goals or positions to take advantage of opportunities. 
UWF leaders have the same view of the relationship.  Multiple interviewees report that, 
in contrast to its active participation in GAIPO, UWF has not sought to influence the 
development of WF33.   CTU organizer and UWF Executive Board member Matt Luskin recalls 
that WF33 “popped up totally independent of all of us…it was a surprise to us that they became 
a pretty coherent group pretty quickly and became affiliated with UWF.679”  Alex Han, a SEIU 
staffer and UWF executive board member, similarly commented that UWF engaged with WF33 
only after the latter had emerged as a coherent formation, committed to a left agenda:  “UWF 
shouldn’t be in the business of forming and launching IPOs [i.e., ward-based, independent 
political groups].  Those IPOs that have a leadership that wants to participate in the kind of 
politics that we’re interested in, such as in 33, then we can have that conversation.” 
These findings suggest that the key factor determining WF33’s orientation and political 
alignment was the ideology of its members.  These ideas provided a set of premises for strategic 
decision-making.  They account for WF33’s emphasis on organizing the ward’s lower-class 
populations, their reliance on issue-based projects, and their affiliation with UWF.  Desire to 
secure resources or influence do not appear to have driven WF33’s decisions.  The rest of this 
chapter will attempt to explain how it is that a critical mass of activists with this particular set of 
ideas came to join WF33. 
3. Explaining Members Ideologies 
The preceding section demonstrated that the proximate cause of key developmental 
outcomes (WF33’s social democratic agenda; its focus on base-building and winning institutional 
 
679 Interview with Matt Luskin, 3/9/17. 
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power; its affiliation with the UWF coalition) was the ideas of WF33 members.  These ideas, not 
any intervention by UWF or other outside actors, determined WF33’s agenda and strategy.  To 
understand WF33’s development, we must explain how a large population of activists with 
those ideas about politics, social change, and strategy came to exist, and to live in the 33rd 
ward. 
The growth of a population of activists with these ideas can be traced to three 
processes.  First, as recounted in Chapter 4, Chicago’s progressive-left milieu—networks of left-
leaning and/or progressive labor unions, community organizations, academic institutions, media 
outlets, social movements, and social networks—expanded in the early 2010s, through a series 
of mobilizations, catalyzed by neoliberalization and related economic crises.  As this milieu grew, 
key organizations and institutions produced shared discourses, including critiques of 
neoliberalism and capitalism, visions of change, and concrete policy agendas. 
In this chapter, I argue that these developments produced a population of activists, 
possessing those synthetic discourses.  Individuals, driven to left or progressive activism by any 
number of stimuli, joined the organizations or movements comprising this milieu.  Many of 
these individuals helped to create the new analyses and visions emerging at this time.  And 
many were exposed to the emerging discourses in the context of their activism, academic 
careers, or journalism.  I will present evidence that WF33 members adopted elements of their 
current ideology through their experiences in this wave of mobilizations. 
A second key factor is the national wave of interest in socialism since 2016.  An 
additional wave of individuals mobilized at this time, many of them joining the mass 
membership organization Democratic Socialists of America, whose membership has exploded 
since 2016.  I present evidence that several WF33 members, with no previous activist 
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experience, and with diverse and inchoate political outlooks, but proclivities to democratic 
socialism, joined DSA after 2016.  As members of DSA, these individuals have absorbed elements 
of DSA’s particular discourse and agenda.   These members joined WF33 after this socialization 
in DSA.  DSA Chicago has shaped the outlook of more WF33 members than any other single 
organization. 
The third factor is the ideological leadership, within Chicago’s progressive-left milieu, of 
Chicago Teachers Union, and since 2013, the United Working Families organization.  Whereas 
multiple, independent formations mutually influenced each other in the early 2010s, more 
recently, the CTU and UWF have established viable political projects, embodying particular 
views on agenda and strategy, and progressives and leftists, with diverse views, have embraced 
those projects as the best available opportunities for change.  I will present evidence that 
several WF33 members embraced an electoral strategy because UWF had launched viable 
electoral campaigns.   Other WF33 members may similarly have joined WF33 not because of a 
perfect ideological alignment, but because it appeared to be the most politically viable of all 
existing progressive-left projects. 
 Finally, I will also show how these activists came to reside in the 33rd ward.  I present 
evidence that most WF33 members sorted into the ward recently, as consumers of residential 
space, seeking neighborhood features characteristic of early-stage gentrification. 
Exposure to Ideologies in the post-Great Recession Mobilizations  
Using biographical data through interviews and newspaper records, I will show that 
several WF33 members (including many of the key leaders) came to hold the aforementioned 
social analysis and agenda through the experiences in political mobilizations in the early 2010s.   
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I recount members’ experiences in these mobilizations, and present suggestive evidence that 
members’ outlooks changed during these experiences.  Specifically, they focused increasingly on 
economic issues; they adopted critical, class-focused analyses of capitalism; and some adopted 
more specific narratives about class conflicts playing out through public policy.  I cannot 
determine the extent to which members adopted these ideas as a result of exposure to them 
during their activism, or as a more organic reaction to economic crises.680   I will document 
ideologically formative experiences in four institutional contexts:  grassroots movements and 
organizations, left-leaning media outlets, academic institutions with concentrations of politically 
active and leftist scholars, and left-leaning labor unions. 
Grassroots Political Organizations 
From around 2010, there was an increase in left and progressive, economically-focused, 
grassroots political activity in Chicago.  This included grassroots organizing around the post-2007 
foreclosure and eviction crisis, protest waves in response to neoliberal austerity programs, and 
broader grassroots opposition to poverty and economic inequality.  Communicating, and 
occasionally collaborating with academics, journalists, and future members of the UWF 
coalition, these grassroots actors co-authored a citywide conversation about capitalism, the 
neoliberal regime and political economy, social and racial justice, and political strategy.  This 
history is recounted in more detail in Chapter 4. 
Through interviews and searches of newspaper archives and organizational documents, 
I found that 12 WF33 members participated in these grassroots movements, either directly or as 
journalists covering the activities.  Five participated in at least two of these movements. 
 
680 This seemed to be quite opaque to the participants themselves. 
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• At least four members participated in the wave of protest and organizing over foreclosures, 
evictions, and homelessness, peaking between 2010 and 2013.  Antonio, Norman and Brig 
were organizers at groups focused on grassroots organizing, with explicitly socialist demands 
and analyses of the housing crisis.  Bill collaborated with these organizations in his capacity 
as head of the Chicago chapter of Progressive Democrats for America. 
• Todd founded and led a campaign to demonstrate popular opposition to Chicago’s bid to 
host the 2016 Olympics, peaking in 2010 and 2011.  This campaign targeted the class-biased 
spending of the Daley and Emanuel regimes, demanding the reallocation of funds from 
business and real estate development subsidies to public services. 
• At least five members participated in Occupy Chicago in 2011, which made the same 
militant, if vague, critiques of economic inequality as most other Occupy chapters.  Ernie 
was a leading contributor of Occupy Chicago’s newspaper, the Occupied Chicago Tribune.  
Brig, Norman, and one other anonymous members also participated in Occupy events.  An 
additional anonymous member covered Occupy Chicago extensively for multiple local media 
outlets.  
• At least two members participated in a wave of protests against the closure of six public 
mental health clinics beginning in 2012.  These protests also critiqued the regime’s spending 
policies.  Ernie attended multiple protests, and an anonymous member covered them for 
local news outlets. 
• At least 7 members participated in protests over school closures, following the 
announcement of closure of 53 schools in 2013.  Most of these protests linked school 
closures to a larger critique of the city’s class-biased resource allocation.  Tim, Johanna, and 
Cindy participated in protests and rallies held by the CTU.  Dawn and Juliana were also 
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involved in actions related to school-closings.  Ernie launched an investigation into the firing 
of a CPS principal who criticized the city’s school funding policies.  And an anonymous 
member covered the protests (and more generally the politics of education in Chicago) for 
local news outlets. 
This list likely undercounts WF33 members’ participation in these causes.681 
WF33 members who participated in these movements appear to have adopted new 
ideas during these years.  They became more focused on economic issues (and especially on 
public services and housing), having previously focused on civil liberties, foreign policy, and 
other issues.  They adopted class-focused analyses of political economy and the current political 
conjuncture.  And they adopted particular critiques of the Daley and Emanuel administrations, 
alleging upper-class and corporate biases, and focusing on the distribution of resources.  I have 
not yet determined whether it was members’ participation in these movements (and resulting 
exposure to new ideas), underlying economic stressors (such as increasing precarity and 
economic hardship), or other factors which caused these shifts.  For now, I document that 
ideological shifts occurred, coincident with this participation.  I offer this as suggestive evidence 
that WF33 members adopted these ideas as part of the larger upsurge in progressive and left, 
economically focused, activism in the city.  I will illustrate this pattern with two examples 
(Antonio and Ernie), and briefly argue that other participants’ outlooks shifted in a similar 
fashion.  
By the time he graduated from Northeastern Illinois University (NEIU), Antonio was 
already experienced in militant activism.  From what Antonio mentioned in interviews, and from 
a review of newspaper archives and NEIU documents, Antonio’ collegiate activism focused on 
 
681I was not able to interview everyone.  I collected information through searches of newspaper articles covering movements and 
organizational documents, which are unlikely to mention non-leading participants. 
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free speech, immigrant rights, and US foreign policy.  Antonio was president of Students Against 
War, which protested U.S. involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and U.S. support for the Israeli 
occupation of Palestine.682  In this capacity, Antonio also collaborated with immigrant rights 
groups.683  As a member of Student Activists for Free Speech, Antonio led protests against the 
University’s disciplining of students who disrupted a CIA recruitment event on campus.684  I 
could find no record of activism focused on economic issues during Antonio’ college career.  I 
could find no evidence that Antonio participated in NEIU’s Socialist Club, with links to the 
International Socialist Organization (led in 2009 by Ken Barrios, another future WF33 member). 
Within a year of graduating, Antonio worked as an organizer in the bourgeoning 
movement around Chicago’s foreclosure and eviction crisis.  From 2010-11, Antonio worked 
with the Chicago Anti-Eviction Campaign (CAEC), a group founded in 2009 to organize renters 
and homeowners, and move homeless families into abandoned, bank-owned houses (with or 
without the banks’ consent).  In 2012, Antonio was a leader of Communities United Against 
Foreclosure and Eviction, a group spun off Occupy Chicago, which worked with CAEC and other 
grassroots groups and advocacy-oriented NGOs on organizing, direct actions, and policy 
advocacy.  In 2013, Antonio was a volunteer organizer at the Metropolitan Tenants Association, 
a similar group focused on tenant organizing and policy advocacy. 
CAEC, CUAFE, and MTA alternately traced the housing crisis to corporate greed—
indicting banks’ predatory lending practices and speculators’ reckless investing—and to the 
fundamentally exploitative and anti-social nature of capitalist housing markets.685  They 
 
682 Jacobson, 2009. 
683 O’Shaughnessy, 2009. 
684 NEIU Coalition United for Free Speech, 2010. 
685 This member articulated the perspective in an article in 2012. 
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advanced short-term demands (e.g., for moratoria on foreclosures) and presented a larger 
vision of decommodified housing, such as through land trusts or coops. 
Antonio’ participation in these organizations marks a shift toward economically-focused 
activism.  And published documents show him using the class-conscious and anti-capitalist 
rhetoric of these organizations.  While I have not yet confirmed that Antonio’ political analysis 
was affected by these experiences, his use of these discourses at this time, and the lack of 
evidence of his ever having used them previously, suggests a shift. 
As a member of CAEC, Antonio articulated a Marxian critique of capitalist housing 
markets as fundamentally hostile to use values and indifferent to human suffering: 
When housing is treated as something to be bought and sold, something that people 
can make money off of, you end up not caring what happens to the people actually 
living in the house…The house [isn’t] a roof over your head, it doesn’t keep you warm in 
the winter, it’s not a dignified place to live.  It becomes an exchange value.  And that’s 
how these loan companies see it, that’s how the banks see it, and that’s all they care 
about.686 
 
By 2012, speaking as a representative of CUAEF, Antonio criticized the upper-class bias in the 
city government’s spending patterns—then a mainstay of Chicago’s more institutionalized left 
(including the Grassroots Collaborative, Stand Up Chicago!, and the newly radical Chicago 
Teachers Union), with whom CUAEF collaborated:  “Chicago is spending millions and millions of 
dollars on setting up and securing NATO, while people are getting kicked out of their homes and 
six mental health clinics have closed.  It only costs two million to keep a health clinic open. The 
funding and policy priorities are out of whack.”687  These quotes may be taken as suggestive 
evidence that, as Antonio shifted his focus to economic issues, he assimilated elements of these 
movements’ discourses. 
 
686 The source of this interview will not be cited, to protect the member’s identity. 
687 Tadalan, 2012. 
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A few other members appear to have adopted new foci or analyses at this time, as they 
engaged with the growing movements.  Through 2012, Dawn’s professional and volunteer 
activism focused on reproductive rights and gender justice.  Since 2012, she worked on a wider 
range of issues, including economic inequality and expanded public services.688  Norman enacted 
a long-standing concern with class inequality and capitalist exploitation in the movement 
around foreclosures and evictions in 2011.689 
Left-leaning Media Outlets 
Ernie’s outlook also appears to have shifted during these years, coinciding with his 
participation in and journalistic coverage of Occupy Chicago and protests against the closure of 
public mental health clinics and schools.  I have not been able to confirm that these episodes 
were the beginning of Ernie’s involvement with socialist activism.  However, Ernie’s free-lance 
journalism suggests a marked shift toward class-conscious, critical analyses of capitalism, 
neoliberalism, and current political formations. 
In 2006, Ernie co-wrote an article with a very different analysis of the national political 
parties than that in Ernie’s more recent work.  The article describes the recent expansion of the 
party’s Progressive Caucus.  In marked contrast to Ernie’s more recent dismissals of the 
Democratic party as dominated by economic elites, Ernie describes the Democrats as a viable 
vehicle for a progressive policy agenda.  More generally, the article implies that the conflict 
between the major political parties has important implications for social and economic justice. 
Through early 2010, Ernie’s main critiques of local and federal government focused on 
corruption—defined narrowly as malfeasance—and on the Bush administration’s homeland 
security and foreign policies.  In a 2006 article, Ernie attacks the Bush administration’s 
 
688 Interview with Dawn, 12/4/18. 
689 This was articulated in a 2015 article. 
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“cronyism,” in awarding government jobs and contracts to parties with preexisting ties to 
government officials.  In a 2010 article, Ernie attacked the Cook County Prosecutor for a 
retaliatory investigations of a pro bono legal team, and for a lack of transparency.  Another 2006 
article criticizes the PATRIOT Act and the Bush administration’s support for “enhanced 
interrogation methods” and indefinite detention of “enemy combatants” in the War on Terror.  
Notably, these articles do not attend to upper-class and corporate influence over public policy, 
economic inequality, or other focal points of his more recent writing. 
By 2011, writing for the Occupied Chicago Tribune (the official news outlet of Occupy 
Chicago) Ernie had adopted a class analysis and economic focus.  Subsequent work in the 
Occupied Chicago Tribune, In These Times, and The Socialist Worker contained scathing critiques 
of upper-class domination of the urban government and demands to redistribute resources, as 
described in the previous section on WF33 members’ ideology.  The timing of this shift suggests 
that Ernie also adopted a new set of ideas amidst the upsurge in left activism in Chicago.  One 
other anonymous member, who works as a political journalist, began covering economic issues 
and amplifying the voices of left actors during this time.690  
Academic Institutions 
Chapter 4 showed that left-leaning academic institutions in Chicago helped produce the 
analyses and agendas shared by Chicago’s progressive-left milieu.  Local scholars, mostly 
concentrated in a handful of academic departments, developed analyses of Chicago’s political 
economy, and of particular neoliberal reforms.  Many worked with labor unions and community-
based activists, synthesizing practitioners’ grounded knowledge with sophisticated analyses of 
economic structures and long-term political and economic developments.  Others have taken 
 
690 I promised not to cite this member’s articles, given their desire for anonymity. 
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Chicago’s left formation as an object of study, offering practitioners insights on strategy (and 
building a cottage industry of Chicago Teachers Union hagiography). 
These academic institutions have had a second political function:  they have produced 
activists committed to the particular analysis and agenda discussed above.  Through interviews 
and analyses of newspaper archives, organizational documents, and social media, I found 
suggestive evidence that at least 4 WF33 members adopted important ideas during their 
education at academic institutions associated with the left milieu.  I will illustrate this pattern by 
reviewing the ideological shifts of one WF33 member, Juliana, coincident with her graduate 
education at University of Illinois at Chicago’s College of Education, and employment at UIC’s 
Collaborative for Equity and Justice in Education.  I will briefly argue that three other WF33 
members experienced similar shifts during graduate work in other departments. 
Department of Education Policy, University of Illinois at Chicago  
Scholars at the College of Education at University of Illinois at Chicago—most notably 
Pauline Lipman and Rico Gutstein—helped develop a critical analysis of neoliberal education 
reform, used by leftist practitioners in Chicago (and elsewhere).  Lipman and Gutstein co-
founded the Collaborative for Equity and Justice in Education, whose mission is to synthesize the 
grounded knowledge of community-based activists with scholarly analysis.  Since 2005, Lipman, 
Gutstein, and other academics worked with activists from the Pilsen Alliance, Kenwood Oakland 
Community Organization, Southsiders Together Organizing for Power, and the Chicago Teachers 
Union (four core members of the UWF Coalition), developing an analysis of neoliberal education 
reform as part of a larger project of upper-class interests to privatize public functions and 
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redevelop neighborhoods, and as reproducing racial apartheid.691  This analysis has informed the 
agenda and discourse of the CTU and community-based organizations.692 
Lipman, Gutstein, and other critical, left-leaning scholars at the College of Education, 
offer graduate training in the College of Education’s Social Foundations of Education Program.  
The curriculum focuses on the impact of public policy and economic structure on urban 
education.  Several UWF-affiliated activists received graduate degrees from this program, 
including former Executive Director of the Pilsen Alliance and UWF Executive Board member, 
and recently elected alderman, Byron Sigcho. 
Juliana 
Juliana had long been an activist for immigrant rights, women’s rights, and anti-
colonialist causes, as a college student at University of Illinois at Champagne-Urbana in the 
1990s, and as a staff member (and frequent media spokesperson) at the Illinois Coalition for 
Immigrant and Refugee Rights.693  Her college activism focused on Asian American rights and 
representation (such as pushing UICU to create an Asian American studies program and cultural 
center) and on U.S. colonialism and militarism in the Philippines.  After college, Juliana was a 
leading member of GABRIELA Network Chicago, part of a Philippine-US women’s solidarity 
network focused on human trafficking, migrant workers’ rights, and the Philippine women’s 
movement.694 
 
691 E.g.:  Horn, Lopez, Lipman and Sigcho, 2011; Lipman and Persons in collaboration with Kenwood Oakland Community 
Organization, 2007;  
692 Bradbury et al, 2015. 
693 Her college activism focused on Asian American rights and representation (such as pushing UICU to create an Asian American 
studies program and cultural center) and on US colonialism and militarism in the Philippines.  After college, this member was a 
leader of an international solidarity network focused on human trafficking, migrant workers’ rights, and women’s rights in Asian 
Pacific countries. 
694 This member was featured as a national leader at a national forum for women’s rights in Asian Pacific countries in 2004. 
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Juliana enrolled in the Social Foundations of Education PhD program in the late 2000s, 
and worked closely with Pauline Lipman.695  Since at least 2012, Juliana has been the Program 
Coordinator at the Collaborative for Equity and Justice in Education.  By 2012, Juliana’s activism 
and research reflected the analysis of Lipman and her practitioner collaborators:  presentations 
in 2011 and 2013 focused on race and class inequality in education, and on the political 
economy of education, respectively.696  Around this time, Juliana also became active in two 
grassroots organizations backing progressive education reform, and supporting the Chicago 
Teachers Union in its labor disputes, Parents 4 Teachers and Communities Organized for 
Democracy in Education. 
I have not been able to confirm that Juliana’s training at UIC’s Department of Education 
caused her to adopt this orientation.  Clearly, Juliana’s interest in education must have preceded 
her pursuit of a doctorate in education policy.  However, the close resemblance between 
Juliana’s priorities and discourse and those of UIC’s left-leaning scholars and their collaborators, 
after Juliana’s association with UIC, suggest the program’s influence.  Juliana appears to have 
gone from a CPS parent concerned about public education, and with history of political activism, 
to a scholar-activist with a particular analysis of neoliberal education reform, a particular set of 
progressive policy priorities, and a particular set of political alliances. 
At least three other WF33 members appear to have developed their analyses in left-
leaning academic institutions 
• A review of Antonio’ scholarship suggests his continuing exploration of leftist politics and 
neoliberal political economy during a Master’s program in Sociology at Roosevelt University, 
 
695 This member presented a conference paper on the politics of neoliberal education reform in 2013.  They also presented on a 
panel on social justice in education, alongside Pauline Lipman in 2011. 
696 This member articulated this perspective in a socialist news outlet in 2015. 
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and a PhD in Sociology at University of Illinois at Chicago.697  Though already working at 
leftist, grassroots, housing rights organizations, these experiences may have helped refine 
Antonio’ analysis. 
• Emily, who had previously worked at a labor center in Arkansas, was drawn to Chicago by 
UIC’s doctoral program in sociology.  She may have been recruited to WF33 by her colleague 
in the doctoral program, Antonio, although I have not been able to confirm this conjecture. 
• Though far from Chicago, a recent WF33 member, Mary, recently received a master’s 
focused on education policy and the political economy of education from Brown University.  
While I have no data on the content of this member’s studies, it is possible she was exposed 
to similar ideas there. 
Labor Unions 
To varying degrees, the unions affiliated with United Working Families (the Chicago 
Teachers Union, SEIU Healthcare Illinois and Indiana, Amalgamated Transit Union, and Cook 
County College Teachers Union, and United Electrical Workers) have invested in political 
education and mobilization of their members.  Per one element of the “social movement 
unionism” paradigm, these unions intended to radicalize their members, and deploy them in 
electoral and neighborhood politics.  In practice, UWF-affiliated unions have usually settled for 
turning out members to volunteer in electoral campaigns.  But the Chicago Teachers Union, and 
to a lesser extent SEIU HCII, have generated political activists, especially since the 2010 takeover 
of the CTU by a progressive-left caucus, and their subsequent investment in political education. 
Through interviews, newspaper accounts and union documents, I found evidence that 
four WF33 members gained their current outlook at least partly through the political education 
in their labor union.  I will recount the most important example:  Tim Meegan, a co-founder of 
 
697 As a master’s student, Antonio researched socialist movements in other historical periods. 
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WF33 and one of its leaders through 2016 (when Meegan moved out of state for work).  Though 
Meegan likely held leftist ideas previously, his ideology was shaped during participation in intra-
union politics and in the CTU’s struggles over policy, beginning in 2009/2010.  I will briefly 
describe two other WF33 members mobilized by the CTU, and one by SEIU Health Care Illinois 
and Indiana. 
Meegan became active in the CTU in 2009, holding a series of leadership positions, and 
participating regularly in the CTU’s political work.  He was an early member of the Caucus of 
Rank and File Educators (CORE), the progressive and leftist caucus which began organizing 
support for assertive political strategies and a broad anti-neoliberal policy agenda in 2009.698  In 
2012, he was elected to the CTU’s Executive Board on CORE’s slate, and as his school’s delegate 
to the CTU Assembly.  He was also an official speaker at several of CTU’s political rallies 
(including at Board of Education meeting in 2011, from which Meegan was forcibly removed).699  
Meegan also participated in the CTU’s formal political education programs, taking part in the 
CTU’s organizer training and candidate program in 2013.700  In 2014, Meegan launched a 
campaign for alderman, funded by the CTU. 
In previous interviews, Meegan reports being driven by the same events which 
catalyzed other members of CORE (especially school closures, disinvestment from public 
education coupled with public subsidies for corporations, charterization, lay-offs of tenured 
teachers, and elected officials’ seeming unconcern to popular opposition to these moves).701  
 
698 James, 2014. 
699 Schmidt, 2015; E.g., Meegan gave a speech at a rally against ALEC, 8/8/13, co-hosted by the CTU. 
700 Kunichoff, 2014 
701 James, 2014.  In 2014, Meegan recounted his path to activism in an interview with The Socialist Worker.  The resemblance 
between his “origin story” and that typically told by CTU activists may reflect real common experiences of being catalyzed by 
neoliberal reforms, or the assimilation of a party line.  Meegan reports that he was galvanized by “a huge round of budget cuts and 
layoffs in the Chicago Public Schools (CPS). We lost about 17 teachers at my school, Roosevelt High, at the end of that year…I 
became politically active then.  I went to political protests and demonstrations in the run-up to the CTU strike.”  Like so many others 
in Chicago, Meegan also cites the 2012 teachers’ strike as a moment inspiring his activism. 
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Over the course of his activism, Meegan clearly assimilated (and may have helped create) 
CORE’s analysis of neoliberal education reform, its redistributive agenda, and its strategic 
emphasis on grassroots activism and electoral work.  By the time of his aldermanic campaign, 
Meegan’s agenda and discourse closely mirrored those of the CTU and the budding UWF 
coalition.702 
 Three other WF33 members were mobilized within their unions.  Johana is a delegate to 
the CTU Assembly, and Cindy was a long-time CTU member, prior to her retirement.703  In an 
interview, Dawn confirmed that both were encouraged by the CTU to volunteer in Meegan’s 
campaign, and have remained as active members of WF33.704  Rich is a long-time SEIU HCII 
member, who connected with WF33 through the union.705 
Post-2016 Election Wave of Mobilization  
Another set of WF33 members developed their commitment to socialism as part of a 
more recent, national wave of interest in socialism, driven by Bernie Sanders’ presidential 
campaigns and anxiety over the Trump administration.  Most of these members were channeled 
through the Chicago chapter of Democratic Socialists of America.  They joined DSA after 2016, as 
a their first form of participation in left politics.  And DSA appears to have deeply shaped their 
ideology:  they joined DSA with vague and inchoate political views, but have since adopted some 
DSA’s particular discourses and agenda.  These members joined WF33 after these ideologically 
formative experiences at DSA. 
 
702 Meegan’s campaign platform and discourse were described in the first section of this chapter.  For his views on strategy, see 
Kunichoff, 2014.  
703 Perez Jr., 2016; Dussault, 2019.  
704 Interview with Dawn, 1/11/18. 
705 Interview with Antonio, 3/24/18. 
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DSA is a national mass membership organization, formed in 1982 through the merger of 
a student-based New Left organization and a group which had previously split from the Socialist 
Party.706  DSA has a national leadership and 200 chapters around the United States, each 
responsible for setting its own agenda and strategy.  Since the early 2010s, the Chicago chapter 
has been committed to a policy agenda similar to that of the rest of Chicago’s left milieu:  a 
redistributive program, including Medicare for all, tuition-free college education, and an 
increased minimum wage.707  
Like other chapters, DSA Chicago grew dramatically since the election of 2016.  Its 
membership increased almost ten-fold, from 184 members in October 2016 to 1,340 in April 
2018.708  And like the members pouring into other chapters, most of the joiners in Chicago’s 
were inspired by Bernie Sanders’ 2016 presidential campaign, and/or galvanized by Trump’s 
2016 election.  The enlarged membership also recruited increasing numbers through their social 
networks.709 
It’s not clear why the wave of individuals activated by the 2016 elections gravitated to 
DSA in particular.  (One theory holds that individuals learned the term “democratic socialism” 
from the Sanders campaign, googled it, and found DSA.)  Whatever its initial attraction, DSA has 
played a critical educative function for this wave of participants, according to my interviews.  I 
will illustrate this phenomenon with a detailed account of one WF33 by way of DSA member, 
and briefly argue that several others had a similar ideological development. 
 
706 Henwood, 2019. 
707 I have not yet found any evidence that DSA Chicago participated in the forms of collaboration and mutual influence which defined 
the rest of Chicago’s left milieu from the early 2010s.  Commentators writing about the rise of DSA nationally observe many DSA 
chapters’ positions developed in response to the same economic developments which catalyzed the growth of that that milieu—
growing inequality; the Great Recession of 2007; the resulting crises for lower-class workers, rents and homeowners; and the abject 
failure of neoliberal governments to respond equitably to these crises (Henwood, 2019). 
708 This parallels the growth of the national membership, from around 6,000 in 2015 to 56,000 in May, 2019 (Henwood, 2019).  
709 Interview with Katie, 5/30/18. 
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One of the post-2016 joiners is Devon, a former city employee in his late 20s, originally 
from Mount Greenwood, a working-class neighborhood in the southwestern corner of Chicago.  
At the time of our interview, Devon had not yet joined WF33, but repeatedly stated his intention 
to do so as soon as he finished moving into the ward later that week. 
In our interview, Devon suggested that he had had only a vague sense of working-class 
identity and concern with Chicago’s severe poverty, but not a consistent or coherent orientation 
to politics, prior to joining DSA.  Devon absorbed a working-class identity from his “straight-up 
blue collar” family and community.710  He was aware of Chicago’s deep poverty from his 
experiences at Chicago’s Troubled Buildings Initiative (a program to repossess and refurbish 
privately owned properties, turning them into affordable housing).  Devon observed “the 
seriously messed up housing situations, particularly on the West Side,” and described graphic 
scenes of acute overcrowding and almost unspeakably harmful conditions.  He expressed 
frustration with the government’s failure to address the housing crisis.711  And he expressed 
disgust at the racist and white supremacist rallies he had heard about in the neighborhood 
adjacent his family’s.   
But Devon does not appear to have had any developed or consistent political outlook, 
other than the discourses of DSA.  He mentioned that “I was never that political, usually vote 
Democrat, but not super active in politics.”  And he had engaged in political activism only 
episodically:  his work with DSA on the rent control referendum campaign in winter of 2017 to 
 
710 Kevin implied that he absorbed both a blue-collar identity and critiques of the Democratic party as elitist and radical (typical of 
what historians call the “white backlash” of the 1960s).  The combination is captured by Kevin’s  anecdote of his great uncle’s vote in 
the 1972 presidential election:  “He said, ‘no way I’m voting for McGovern, this guy’s way too liberal.  But I’ll be damned if I vote 
Republican,’ cuz that’s the party of the bosses.  So he wond up writing-in Richard J. Daley for President.” 
711 “The federal government isn’t giving us any money to do it, the city isn’t giving us any money [to build housing]” 
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spring of 2018 was his first time participating in politics in any sustained way, and his first time 
canvassing.712 
Despite this varied background, Devon had enough of a proclivity for socialism to be 
interested when, through “a complete fluke,” he encountered DSA literature while house-sitting 
for a hospitalized friend.  He “looked up DSA later and thought ‘OK I could do this,’” and asked 
his friend, “Hey, when you get out of the hospital, take me to meeting.” 
Since then, Devon appears to have embraced much of the agenda of DSA.  Over our 
conversation, Devon repeatedly mentioned a $15 minimum wage and free higher education as 
both desirable and as programs that could appeal to working-class voters who currently vote 
Republican.  Devon’s unprompted use of class categories when describing neighborhood 
demographics was mentioned in Section 2. 
Six other WF33 members were previously DSA Chicago members, but do not appear to 
have had any prior ties to Chicago’s left milieu, or to other left-leaning political institutions. 
• Betty was inspired to join DSA by the 2016 elections, previously a mostly inactive 
progressive Democrat.  Since that time, she has come to reflexively view social issues 
through the lens of class (as documented in her conversation with Devon, reported in 
Section 2), and to affirm DSA’s and WF33’s policy agenda.  This ideological development was 
likely driven by her experiences at both DSA and WF33. 
• Joycelyn also had her first activist experiences as a member of DSA.  She expressed intense 
anger over economic inequality, rooted in her childhood in a depressed post-industrial city 
in eastern Massachusetts.  She joined DSA after College, and with no prior activist 
 
712 Interview with Kevin, 5/30/18. 
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experience.  By the time she joined WF33, she already supported policies including a $15 
minimum wage and rent control. 
• Three other WF33 members—Joe, Patrick, and Jesse—were previously members of DSA and 
do not appear to have any other prior experience with left politics, or with political activism 
of any sort.   
• One member (Sean) was previously a member of DSA, and two other social democratic 
organizations, and had previously only volunteered in charitable causes. 
Attraction to the pole of UWF  
As chapter 4 recounts, the UWF coalition grew rapidly into a powerful formation.  The 
Chicago Teachers Union’s embrace of left-leaning politics after 2011 greatly increased the 
coalition’s capacity for electoral and legislative action.  By 2015, the UWF coalition regularly 
deployed institutional and financial resources on electoral and lobbying projects at a significant 
scale.  And the coalition expressed a consensus on policy and strategy worked out among 
leaders of Chicago’s most powerful left and progressive organizations. 
As it grew, the UWF coalition increasingly exercised leadership in Chicago’s broader, 
progressive-left milieu.  In a fragmented milieu, UWF increasingly offered well-resourced and 
seemingly viable progressive-left projects.  Individuals and groups with affinities for progressive 
and left causes, but previously without ties (or with only weak, indirect ties) to the coalition, 
gravitated toward these projects. 
UWF leadership helps explain the ideological development of WF33 members.  Some 
members embraced the particular agenda and strategy described in Section 2 because the 
Meegan campaign, or WF33 itself, appeared to be best available options for pursuing left 
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politics.  UWF leadership has been particularly important in shaping members political strategy.  
I found that WF33 members who had previously focused on grassroots base-building and 
mobilization first embraced electoral struggle by joining UWF-backed campaigns. 
UWF leadership helped cause a shift in the strategy of WF33’s founding members (and 
leading cadre).  For example, from 2010 to 2013, Antonio focused almost exclusively on 
grassroots organizing, direct action, and policy advocacy in his work at Chicago Anti-Eviction 
Campaign, Communities United Against Foreclosure and Eviction, and Metropolitan Tenants 
Organization.  In 2014, Tim Meegan’s well-financed and stridently left-wing aldermanic 
campaigns presented a compelling model of political action, just as Antonio began to appreciate 
the limits of issue-based work absent institutional power.  As Antonio told another interviewer 
in 2017, “I felt burned out by housing organizing at the time.  So this initiative was when I saw 
that electoral politics was where it’s at.”713 
The rest of WF33’s founding cadre likely embraced electoral politics for the same 
reason.  These members (including Dawn, Ernie, Todd, and Rossana) were experienced in left-
leaning issue campaigns, but had no experience with electoral politics prior to the Meegan 
campaign.714  Their embrace of electoral politics is hard to imagine without the presence of a 
well-resourced and ideologically amenable campaign in their neighborhood. 
I found suggestive evidence that two other WF33 members, committed to left or 
progressive causes but not to the particular agenda of the UWF coalition, embraced WF33 as 
the best available political project: 
• Ken had been a socialist at least since his undergraduate career at Northeastern Illinois 
University, and a member of International Socialist Organization.  I could find no links 
 
713 Budovitch, 2017:  54. 
714 Antonio and Dawn both mentioned that Meegan’s campaign staff, who became the leadership of WF33, had no prior experience 
in electoral work (Interview with Antonio, 3/24/18; Interview with Dawn, 1/11/18) 
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between Ken and any of the other organizations or movements comprising the UWF 
coalition or the larger left milieu.  However, Ken joined WF33 in 2017, perhaps seeing it as a 
way viable way to pursue some of the economic goals espoused by ISO (withal the 
differences between WF33 and ISO on strategic and policy goals). 
• Mary had previously worked at an NGO advocating equitable funding formulas for public 
schools.  While she appears to have had no ties to social democratic politics, she may have 
seen WF33 as a the best available option for advancing her goal of increasing funding for 
public schools.  
4. Geographic Sorting of Chicago’s Progressive/Left Activists 
The preceding factors produced activists at a city-wide scale.  Many of these activists 
sorted into the 33rd ward as consumers of residential space:  they located on the basis of typical 
consumer criteria such as housing costs, demographics, and cultural characteristics.  The 
features of Albany Park which attracted WF33 members are typical of neighborhoods in the 
early stages of gentrification.715 
To date, I have spoken with six WF33 members about their decision to live in the 33rd 
ward.  All six individuals rented or owned homes in the Albany Park neighborhood.  All six cited 
the affordable cost of living, and in particular of housing, as a key reason for their decision.  All 
six also mentioned liking the demographic mix in Albany Park—four explicitly noted the 
neighborhood’s “diversity,” and two implicitly contrasted Albany Park’s demographic mix with 
that in other, nearby neighborhoods.  Three hinted that Albany Park also offered desirable 
commercial or recreational establishments. 
 
715 That members sorted into the neighborhood as residential consumers speaks to their geographic mobility, which is itself a 




Betty, a member of DSA North Side and WF33, exemplified these sentiments.  Relating 
her decision to move to Albany Park, she cited the affordability of housing, enabling her to have 
her own apartment, and she compared the neighborhood’s mix of residents favorably to her 
previous neighborhood of Lincoln Square:  “When I was looking for my own place...I liked Albany 
Park, I knew it was affordable, I wanted to live somewhere different than Lincoln Square, which 
is very yuppy.  So I’ve been in Albany Park for six and half years.  Lincoln Square, when I moved 
there it was pretty yuppie, but now it’s like, completely.” 
Devon, a current member of DSA North Side and prospective member of WF33, 
expressed the same take on Albany Park.716  He painted Albany Park as the opposite of his 
previous neighborhood, Logan Square, which was prohibitively expensive: “I lived in the Logan 
Square area for most of the last 10 years.  It is turning into Lincoln Park basically.  The only 
reason I could afford to live there is because I had two roommates and because my house was 
the [expletive] house on the block.  In Albany Park, could actually afford to live in a nice place.” 
We can see the WF33 activists’ residence in the ward as a function of the current state 
of citywide gentrification processes—the self-reinforcing cycle of investor speculation and 
private real estate development, supported by city government and consumption of affluent, 
newly arriving individuals and families (described in Chapter 2).  The neighborhood 
characteristics which drew WF33 members are systematically determined by the redevelopment 
process.  Albany Park’s mix of racial diversity, affordability, and amenities desirable to upwardly 
mobile consumers, are characteristic of neighborhoods in the early stages of gentrification.717 
 
716 He had started the process of moving to Albany Park the day we spoke, and mentioned his intention to join WF33, now that he 
lived in the ward. 




Carl Rosen, president of a local union and member of UWF’s Executive Board, reflected 
on the unlikely growth of the Little Village Independent Political Organization, a neighborhood-
based political action group formed in 1982.  While most of its contemporaries organized 
around racial identities and sought particularistic benefits from the city, Little Village IPO 
organized a multi-racial, working-class coalition around a broad progressive policy agenda.  This 
orientation, Rosen recalled, reflected the ideology of leading members:  “There happened to be 
a number of people who had a big picture outlook on the world, people like Rudy Lozano, Munel 
Mustin, who was the key African American leader, who had the big picture outlook, and who 
therefore could see how to unite people across racial lines, et cetera.718 
Like that of Little Village IPO, the distinctive orientation of Working Families of the 33rd 
Ward is a direct consequence of the ideas of its leading activists.  WF33’s founders and leading 
members shared deep commitments to socialist transformation, and had developed elaborate 
views on political strategy through years of political experience.  It was these views, not 
opportunities for influence or funding, which explain WF33’s class-conscious social vision, its 
socialist policy agenda, and—most distinctive from its contemporaries—its strategic focus on 
winning institutional power through base-building and electoral mobilization. 
The main argument of this chapter is that the existence of activists with these particular 
ideas, and their presence in particular neighborhoods, are systematically determined features of 
the political context.    The existence of these activists should be understood as an effect of the 
expansion of Chicago’s left milieu—the dense network of grassroots movements, left-leaning 
unions, academic institutions, and media outlets—and its convergence on shared ideologies, 
 
718 Interview with Carl Rosen, 3/15/17. 
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since the early 2010s.  Chapter 3 recounted this expansion and convergence:  since the Great 
Recession, diverse actors mobilized to challenge neoliberalism and related economic crises; 
through collaboration and mutual influence, these actors synthesized and converged on a set of 
discourses about neoliberalism, social change, and political strategy.    In this chapter, I showed 
that WF33’s leading activists developed their social visions and views on strategy through 
experiences in this milieu.  Using biographical data, I demonstrated that key WF33 members 
adopted elements of the discourses spreading through the milieu, including critiques of 
neoliberalism, a political analysis foregrounding the conflict between corporate and financial 
elites and the lower-classes, and redistributive policy agendas, as graduate students in left-
leaning academic departments, members of Occupy Chicago and spin-off movements, as 
members of the Chicago Teachers Union, and as journalists covering these movements and 
actors.  Also, as the United Working Families coalition emerged as the leading force within 
Chicago’s left, it exerted ideological leadership, encouraging Chicago’s diverse leftists to adopt 
UWF’s electorally focused strategy.   A secondary layer of WF33’s members developed a vaguer 
interest in socialism and activism as a result of national political developments since 2016. 
My interview data showed that WF33’s activists moved into Albany Park as consumers 
of residential space drawn by the neighborhood’s combination of affordability, racial and 
cultural diversity, and relatively upscale amenities.  While I have only observed the residential 
location choices of a handful of left activists in one neighborhood, their choices seem to indicate 
that the sorting of left activists in city space is governed by the gentrification dynamic.  Racial 
and cultural diversity and the combination of affordability with scattered amenities catering to 
upscale consumers are characteristic features of neighborhoods in the early stages of 
redevelopment.  Insofar as these preferences are common among the activists populating 
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resurgent left formations in the U.S., we could expect such activists would tend to reside in 
neighborhood in the early stages of redevelopment. 
These findings have implications for this dissertation’s theoretical questions about the 
construction of the terrain for neighborhood organizing.  As in Austin, I found that political 
developments at scales beyond the neighborhood are crucial in creating terrain for 
neighborhood organizing.  This chapter suggests that we should consider not just 
neoliberalization, but also expansions of left formations at city and national scales as 
developments shaping neighborhood terrain.  Specifically, this chapter suggests that the growth 
of left movements, organizations, and milieus entails the production of left activists.  Insofar as 
these activists reside in a particular neighborhood, they can be an important element of the 
terrain for organizing, creating possibilities for a left base-building project.  This chapter further 
suggests that the sorting of left activists in urban space is governed by the gentrification 
dynamic.  The rapid growth of WF33 into an effective vehicle for base-building around a socialist 
agenda must be understood as a manifestation of these prior city- and national level political 
developments and sorting dynamics—in addition to the extraordinary leadership of Antonio, 




Chapter 7.  Organizing in Albany park and the 33rd Ward Part 2 
Introduction 
The previous chapter described the rapid growth of the grassroots political organization 
33rd Ward Working Families.  Since 2017, WF33 deployed its membership in a series of carefully 
planned outreach campaigns, attempting to build popular support for a left-leaning agenda, to 
be mobilized in elections and other political actions.  This chapter examines these organizing 
efforts, and the factors which shaped their effectiveness.  Per the theoretical foci of the 
dissertation, I am primarily interested in how historically emergent structures at the 
neighborhood-level mediate the process of grassroots organizing, creating impediments and 
opportunities.  
As in the 27th Ward [i.e., Austin the case study in an earlier chapter], I found that non-
governmental organizations in the neighborhood played a critical role in diffusing 
understandings of social problems.  In this case, a cluster of NGOs, ideologically opposed to 
neoliberalism, and relatively financially independent of the neoliberal regime and its foundation 
allies, diffused leftist perspectives on housing, immigration, and other social problems.  WF33 
drew supporters from the bases organized by these NGOs.  This mitigated one of the barriers to 
WF33’s organizing, the social distance between its membership and its target populations.  I 
could not find any NGOs diffusing neoliberal perspectives on these issues to politically contested 
populations (working-class and low-income Latinx), as I did in the 27th Ward. 
Previous chapters recount the national trends away from leftist community organizing 
by neighborhood-based NGOs.  What explains the presence of such groups in the 33rd Ward?   
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I argue that the ward’s distinctive organizational field was a product of the ward’s development 
as a “point of entry” neighborhood for immigrants.  Largely arriving in the last few decades, the 
neighborhood’s activists are not steeped in the political culture which developed in most black 
neighborhoods since the late 1960s.  As such, they are not as committed to community 
development as a form of racial empowerment.  Instead, many of the 33rd Ward’s activists are 
steeped in transnational networks of radical anti-colonial activists, from which they derive 
radical critiques of neoliberalism and militant organizing strategies. 
I discuss the implications of the interaction between WF33 and these NGOs for ongoing 
debates about the political function of NGOs.  I argue that progressive NGOs, rightly criticized as 
politically ineffectual or counter-productive on their own, can complement the work of an 
explicitly partisan neighborhood organization like WF33.  I explore the conditions in which such 
collaboration is possible. 
I argue that the rapid redevelopment occurring in parts of the ward, and resulting acute 
affordable housing shortages, created an opportunity for WF33’s to organize effectively around 
affordable housing.   Residents who experienced immediate, concrete harms, such as housing 
and financial insecurity, were highly receptive to WF33’s outreach around rent-control and 
other progressive housing programs.  In the final section of the chapter, I will argue that 
gentrifying neighborhoods are more amenable to organizing around progressive and left 
agendas than chronically disinvested neighborhoods like Austin. 
 
In the first section of this chapter, I will describe the neighborhoods in which WF33 is 
attempting to organize, reviewing the demographics, salient issues, and civic and political 
organizations.  In the second section, I review WF33’s base-building goals, and the populations 
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they view as their most likely and natural base.   I find that, despite consistently talking about 
their base in class and racial terms, WF33 has chosen to primarily target the ward’s Latinx 
population.  I speculate that WF33 members, though committed to a class analysis, have 
nonetheless internalized race and racial oppression as foundational analytical categories, 
leading to slippage in their conceptualization of their base. 
 In the third section, I review WF33’s organizing strategies and projects.  I show that they 
attempted to organize around what they viewed as the most salient issues among their target 
populations.  I show how they partnered with the ward’s left-leaning NGOs, tapping the NGOs’ 
already organized bases, and reaching out to ward residents who had for years been exposed to 
the NGO’s leftist accounts of issues.  WF33 also used its issue-based work to gain access to civic 
institutions which they would not otherwise have had. 
1. The context for WF33’s organizing project 
Demographic composition of the ward  
I will briefly review the demography of the ward.  First, I will sketch the size, racial 
composition, and geographic distribution of the working- and lower-class populations WF33 
intends to organize.  I find that the ward has a large working- and lower-class populations, 
including significant numbers living below the poverty line, and unemployment rates well above 
the city and national averages.  The Latinx working- and lower-class populations are 
concentrated in a handful of census tracts.719  With the exception of two high-poverty, 
 
719 I will refer to populations with ancestry in South and Central America as “Latinx,” a category eliding the many differences among 
these populations.  It is common for political and journalistic discourse, in the 33rd Ward and in Chicago generally, to use the 
category Latinx, and to address people of these origins as Latinx.  Jaime Sanchez (forthcoming) shows the origins of a discourse of 
pan-Latinx identity in the efforts of the Harold Washington administration to consolidate a Latinx constituency).  Almost all of the 
interactions I observed between these populations and WF33 were conducted in these terms, and I observed very few instances in 
which WF33 members distinguished populations within the Latinx category.  Since I am primarily analyzing the interactions between 
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predominantly white tracts, the white working- and lower-class residents are dispersed among 
many census tracts.  Second, I examine the ward’s large immigrant populations.  I review the 
demographics of this population, and distinctive forms of civic institutions rooted in it. 
Class and race 
The 33rd ward is home to just under 70,000 people, distributed in 16 census tracts.  A 
significant portion are in the working- and lower-classes, as measured by income and poverty 
rates and the types of jobs residents hold. 
First, we can examine the number of people living in poverty in the neighborhood.  The 
federal government provides official poverty thresholds, based on the costs of basic goods.  
Although these thresholds have been criticized as unrealistically low (i.e., that people with 
incomes above the official thresholds may still be quite poor), they provide a rough 
approximation of the incidence of poverty.720  In 2017, the poverty lines were defined as 
household income below $24,600 for a family of 4, and $12,600 for a single person without 
dependents.721  On these measures, approximately 15% of households in the ward are below 
the poverty line.  The rate is higher in parts of the ward, with rates above 20% in three census 
tracts.  While the ward’s poverty rate is higher than the national rate of 12.3%, it is relatively 
low for Chicago, which has 7 out of 77 official “community areas” with poverty rates over 40% 
and 22 community areas with poverty rates over 30%.722 
We can see the size of the ward’s working- and lower-classes by looking at the 
distribution of households across income brackets.  Graph 1 below depicts the number of 
households in each income bracket.  Perhaps propitiously for WF33’s hopes of organizing the 
 
WF33 and ward residents, I chose to use the same construct to conceptualize the ward’s populations, while remaining open to any 
evidence that WF33’s use of this construct, and erasure of differences among Latinx people, was politically important. 
720 See Desmond, 2016; Harding, 2010. 
721 U.S. Census Bureau, 2017.  They calculate thresholds for households of 1-8 people. 
722 Farooqui, 2015. 
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lower classes, the ward contains a relatively large population of relatively low-income, but not 
deeply impoverished households.  Approximately 10,900 households—almost 25% of the 
ward—are below the median income for the city ($52,000), but not living below the federally 
defined poverty line (less than $24,600 for a family of four).  Such households roughly 
correspond to what theorists and practitioners see as, ceteris paribus, the population segment 
most likely to support economic reform or revolution:  their relatively poor position creates an 
incentive for change, but they may not experience incapacitating levels of deprivation.723 
Graph 1.  Income distribution, 33rd Ward 
 
Data source:  The Demographic Statistical Atlas of the United States724 
 
The impression of a significant population experiencing economic hardship is reinforced 
by the ward’s relatively high unemployment and joblessness rates.  The unemployment rate for 
Latinx and white ward residents (the ward’s two largest racial groups) are 10.2% and 7.4%, 
respectively—significantly higher than the 3.8% rate in Chicago.  The joblessness rate (which 
indicate people currently unemployed as well as people who have ceased seeking employment) 
for whites aged 16-64 is 22.6%.  For Latinx people in the same age group, it is 30.6%.  Like 
 
723 McAdam, 1982; Schaff, 1973, for a summary of the Marxian perspective.  Interview with Emma Tai, 3/7/17. 
724 Values calculated from data published by the Demographic Statistical Atlas of the Untied States, 2017. 
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poverty rates, unemployment and jobless rates are significantly higher in certain areas, with 7 
tracts having an overall unemployment rate above 15%.725 
We can also understand the economic position of ward residents by examining their 
occupations.  70.8% of Latinx people in the ward’s labor force work in relatively low-skilled 
occupations, such as non-managerial positions in retail and food services, construction, and 
transportation.726  24% of whites in the ward’s labor force work in these occupations. 
As the aforementioned data on employment and occupation suggest, there is some 
association between class and race in the ward.  However, there is also a large Latinx middle- 
and upper-class, with approximately 1,742 Latinx households making over $100,000 per year, or 
about 12% of all Latinx households in the ward.727  And many whites are in the lower-classes, 
with just under 7,500 white households with incomes $50,000 or lower.  The racial composition 
of income brackets in Albany Park is captured in Graph 2, below.  The distributions are very 
similar in Avondale and Irving Park. 
Graph 2.  Racial composition of income brackets, Albany Park, 2017 
 
725 Values calculated from data published by U.S. Census, 2012 American Community Survey. 
726 Occupational categories in the U.S. Census categorize workers within industries based on the type of work done.  I included the 
categories “service” (which includes non-managerial retail, food-service, security, and other occupations); “natural resources, 
construction, and maintenance” (which includes landscaping, janitorial occupations, mining, and farming, among other occupations); 
and “production, transportation” (which includes non-managerial and non-foreman manufacturing jobs, truck driving, and livery 
services, among other occupations).  I attempted to include occupations which tend not to require secondary education, and which 
tend to have lower wages and benefits.  For a full explanation of the Census’ occupational categories, see “Industry and Occupation 
indexes,” available at https://www.census.gov/topics/employment/industry-occupation/guidance/indexes.html.  Accessed 6/14/19. 




Source:  Demographic Statistical Atlas of the United States728 
 
Lower-class Latinx people are geographically concentrated in a about 5 of the ward’s 16 
census tracts.  According to commentators, most of the ward’s low-income Latinx people live in 
high-poverty tracts in northern Albany Park and Southern Avondale.729  One census tract in 
northern Albany Park has a 25.7% poverty rate, and joblessness rate of 41%.  This tract is almost 
70% Latinx.  An adjacent, predominantly Latinx tract in the northeastern tip of the ward has a 
36.4% poverty rate and joblessness rate of 39%. 
The ward also contains pockets of concentrated white poverty, located in three 
majority-Latinx census tracts.  In parts of west Irving Park, white households had a median 
income around $35,000, significantly lower than the ward’s median.  These tracts had the 
highest percentages of whites in low-skill occupations, with 48% and 42%, respectively.  In a 
predominantly Latinx tract in the south of Avondale, white households had a median income of 
$42,000, and the white unemployment rate was 16%. 
 
728 Graph created by the Demographic Statistical Atlas of the United States, 2017. 
729 Stewart, 2018.  McGhee and Newman, 2018. 
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Aside from these three concentrations, the white working- and lower-class households 
were dispersed throughout the ward.  In the remaining 12 census tracts, median income for 
white households was near or above $50,000, suggesting that none had a large enough low-
income white population to move the median income near the poverty line.  And no other 
census tract had more than 1/3 of its white workforce in low-skilled occupations. 
Immigration 
The 33rd Ward has a large immigrant population, including thousands of undocumented 
immigrants.  Foreign-born people began to move into the neighborhoods of the 33rd Ward at a 
large-scale in the mid-1970s, attracted by housing prices driven down by years of out-migration 
and divestment.  “Immigrant entrepreneurship” created self-sustaining commercial districts 
catering to immigrant populations, and communities developed dense civic cultures, semi-
autonomous of the citywide institutions.730 New migration leveled off, and the foreign-born 
population of the ward begin to dip in the late 2000s, as nascent gentrification drove up housing 
costs (as discussed at length below).  As of 2018, 44.1% of Albany Park’s population was foreign-
born, along with 29.5% of Irving Park’s, and 31.9% of Avondale’s.731 
The ward’s neighborhoods have functioned as “point of entry” neighborhoods—i.e., 
gateways for newly arriving immigrants.  For instance, the 2000 census found that one third of 
Albany Park’s foreign born residents had arrived in the United States in the previous 5 years.732  
A 2015 study of Albany Park finds that it has continued to function as a point of entry for 
immigrants.733 
 
730 This and previous sentence, Theodore and Martin, 2007:  276-8. 
731 Demographic Statistical Atlas of the United States, 2017. 
732 Theodore and Martin, 2007:  274. 
733 Huq, 2016.  See, e.g., resettlement of recently arrived refuges (page 25). 
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The ward’s immigrants are mostly Latinx.  Latin American countries account for 65% of 
Albany Park’s foreign born population, 57% of Irving Park’s, and 72% of Avondale’s.  Therein, by 
far the most common country of origin is Mexico, accounting for almost half of all immigrants in 
Albany Park and Avondale, and over one quarter of Irving Park’s.  15-25% of the neighborhood’s 
immigrants are from Asian countries.  Albany Park is known as exceptionally diverse, with large 
enclaves of immigrants “from India and Pakistan, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, 
and Eastern Europe.”734  As all three 2019 aldermanic candidates were fond of pointing out, 
students in Albany Park schools speak over forty different languages. 
Recent research shows that the ward’s neighborhoods, and especially Albany Park, have 
types of civic and social institutions characteristic of “point of entry neighborhoods.”  First, the 
neighborhood’s 501c3 non-profit service providers tend to tailor their programs to the 
distinctive needs of immigrant populations.  Reviewing Albany Park’s non-profits, Theodore and 
Martin (2007) observe a focus on “citizenship and naturalization, redressing workplace abuses 
suffered by undocumented migrants, and restoring the social safety net for noncitizens.”735  
These supplement (and given limited resources, supplant) more typical concerns of non-profit 
service providers, such as job training, youth mentoring, and community engagement 
programs.736 
Instead, NGOs embedded in immigrant neighborhoods of the ward are part of 
“transnational communities,” linked “socially, politically, economically, and culturally to other 
places across national borders.”737  In non-immigrant urban neighborhoods, institutions are 
typically linked to other neighborhood institutions, and to funders and political patrons beyond 
 
734 Centro Autonomo website.  http://www.mexicosolidarity.org/centroaut%C3%B3nomo/albanyparkneighborhood/en0.  Accessed 
9/17/18. 





the neighborhood.738  In Albany Park, neighborhood institutions have close relationships to 
institutions and activists in other countries, sharing money and ideas, and drawing personnel 
through these relationships.  Some such institutions are discussed at length below. 
Salient issues among target populations  
As later sections show, WF33 has tried to organize residents by engaging them around 
salient social issues.  To help contextualize WF33’s organizing, I will briefly describe the two 
most salient issues among WF33’s target constituencies, according to interviewees and 
commentators:  deportation of undocumented people and affordable housing. 
Rights and treatment of undocumented people  
An estimated 183,000 undocumented immigrants live in Chicago.  Albany Park is 
thought to have one of the city’s largest undocumented populations, with an estimated 10,000 
as of 2017.739  Irving Park and Avondale are estimated to have a few thousand undocumented 
residents each.740  In recent years, intensified enforcement of federal immigration laws by the 
Obama and Trump administrations has catalyzed grassroots organizing and heightened public 
concern with deportations and the rights of undocumented people. 
Since 2017, Chicago has officially been a “sanctuary city.”741  Nonetheless, ICE raids in 
Chicago, and detentions and deportations of former Chicago residents, have increased each 
year, since 2015, in line with national trends.742  Albany Park’s large undocumented population 
has made it an epicenter of both immigration enforcement and anti-deportation struggles.  
 
738 See Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
739 Chicago Tribune, Tribune Graphics:  “Estimating the Chicago area's undocumented immigrant population.”  
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-met-undocumented-immigrants-gfx-20170103-htmlstory.html.  Accessed 6/27/19. 
740 Ibid.  
741 I.e., city law prohibits city employees from communicating city residents’ undocumented status to federal agents.  In June of 
2019, recently elected mayor expanded this prohibition, barring Chicago police from aiding Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) raids in any way.  On Lightfoot’s recent rule, Ehrlich, 2019.  
742 Nunez, 2017; Mueller, 2018; Aleaziz, 2018.  Nationally, the number of ICE raids on workplaces increased almost 10-fold between 
2017 and 2018, while the number of deportations increased by over 1/3 from 2016 to 2017. 
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Several Albany Park residents were among the 800 undocumented people arrested in a 
largescale raid of a Bakery outside Chicago in the summer of 2017.  A six-day sweep of several 
Chicago neighborhoods in May of 2018, resulting in 156 arrests citywide, included several in 
Albany Park and Avondale.743  Several of these arrests garnered attention of local and citywide 
media, for reports of violence by ICE agents, as well as the deportation itself.744 
This enforcement has catalyzed grassroots organizing and political activity.  
Contradicting past findings that undocumented people are reluctant to engage in politics, the 
anti-deportation work in Chicago, and in the 33rd ward, engages and is led by undocumented 
people.  Albany Park’s immigrant-serving NGOs, some of which include undocumented people 
among their staff, have been leading participants in the citywide coalitions conducting protests 
since 2015.745  The citywide group Organized Communities Against Deportation, which has 
helped create “defense networks” (communication networks to spread information about 
pending raids and share best practices for protecting undocumented people and holding ICE 
agents accountable during raids), is also led by undocumented people.746  One of OCAD’s key 
leaders active in the 33rd Ward is an undocumented immigrant (who is also active in Centro 
Autonomo, discussed below).747 
 
743 Mueller, 2018. 
744 Three high profile cases include those of Ms. Genoveva Ramirez-Laguna, a member of SEIU and OCAD, who was facing 
deportation; the “Bring Seven Home” campaign on behalf of Seven, a Nigerian immigrant and (perhaps surpr isingly) a member of 
the Latino Union of Chicago, with whom OCAD is closely connected.  APDN worked the case of Wilmar Catalan Ramirez, who became 
a rallying point because of his violent treatment by ICE, and because he was targeted by ICE because of his inclusion in Chicago 
Police Department’s controversial database of gang members—an institution frequently criticized by Chicago’s progressives. 
745 Huq, 2016:  Centro Autonomo (described at length below) has participated in several actions to protest deportations and abuse 
of undocumented people since 2016.   Albany Park Theatre Project (also described below) has produced plays about deportation. 
746 Ramos, 2016; Hernandez, 2017.  OCAD’s website describes the organization as “an undocumented-led group that organizes 
against deportations, detention, criminalization, and incarceration, of Black, brown, and immigrant communities in Chicago and 
surrounding areas.”  http://organizedcommunities.org/about/.  Accessed 6/27/19. 
747 This individual won’t be named given his vulnerability to deportation. 
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Gentrification and Affordable Housing 
In the last 10 years, real estate developers, consumers, and speculators have invested in 
the redevelopment of real estate in parts of the 33rd ward.  As elsewhere, redevelopment has 
created an acute affordable housing shortage, increased the rate of evictions, and pushed long-
time residents out of the neighborhood.  The linked issues of redevelopment, affordable 
housing, and displacement have become highly salient, the focus of grassroots organizing, 
media coverage, and engagement by politicians and civic leaders. 
Parts of the ward are among Chicago’s “hottest” housing markets.  In recent years, 
abutting neighborhoods—Logan Square to the South and West, Buck Town to the South, Rogers 
Park to the East—have been saturated with new development, increasing investor and 
consumer interest in Avondale, Irving Park, and Albany Park, with their relatively low property 
values, and aged housing stock amenable to upgrading.748  Crain’s Business (a weekly newspaper 
covering business, real estate, and politics) listed Irving Park as one of the city’s five hottest 
markets for single-family homes, and Avondale as the one of the five hottest markets for 
condos.  Graph 4 shows the steep upward trend in median housing prices for the three 
neighborhoods in the ward since 2012.749 
Graph 4.  Median sale price for houses in Albany Park, Avondale and Irving Park 
 
748 E.g., multi-family buildings—i.e., buildings currently subdivided into 2 or more separate households, which can be easily 
converted into larger condos. 
749 Available at Redfin’s Data Center, https://www.redfin.com/blog/data-center (values for locales must be entered on the page, and 
do not have an independent URL).  Accessed July 2018. 
Redfin also defines these neighborhoods as “highly competitive”—i.e. on average, housing put up for sale is sold quickly, and a large 




Source:  Redfin 
 
As in other gentrifying neighborhoods, developers have purchased many of the ward’s 
multi-family buildings which had provided relatively inexpensive housing, demolishing them or 
converting them into more expensive condominiums.  According to analysis by one of Albany 
Park’s NGOs, over one quarter of property transactions in Albany Park in 2015 involved the 
purchase of a multi-unit building by a corporation or bank.  Most of these properties were 
subsequently converted into more expensive housing.750 
These trends are posing the usual problems for low-income residents.  This is apparent, 
first in the large share of ward residents who are currently “rent-burdened,” defined by the 
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development as spending more than 30% of 
household income on rent.  In over half of the ward, the median renting household spent at 
least 30% of their income on housing.  In parts, the median renting household spent almost 40% 
of their income.751 
Parts of the ward have seen persistently high eviction rates.  Evictions peaked in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis and recession of 2007, but have remained high compared to 
 
750 This and previous sentence, Huq, 2016. 
751 Desmond, 2016; As a rough indicator of the number of rent-burdened households, the U.S. Census compares the median rent to 
the median income for all renting households in a given area. 
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national and city averages through 2016 (the time of their last measurement).  There were a 
total of 240 evictions in the 33rd Ward in 2016.  In parts of the ward, about 3% of renting 
households are evicted each year.752 
Lower-income populations have also experienced “forced displacement” in the form of 
foreclosures.  Like other neighborhoods with large populations of low-income homeowners, 
Albany Park and Avondale had high rates of foreclosures after the 2007 financial crisis.  
According to a database compiled by a local non-profit organization, 216 homes were foreclosed 
upon in Albany Park alone, between 2007 and 2013.753 
Affordable housing and displacement have become the most salient issue in local 
politics in recent years.  Mass evictions have become high-profile events, garnering sustained 
protest, coverage by neighborhood and citywide, and comments from institutional actors such 
as former Ald. Mell and a principle at a local school.754  All of the ward’s NGOs serving low-
income people have made affordable housing a priority, whether focused on policy research and 
advocacy, or grassroots organizing to resist foreclosures and evictions.755  Affordable housing 
and displacement have been highly salient issues in the 2015 and 2019 aldermanic elections:  all 
 
752 In a census tract on the northeast tip of the ward, in Albany Park, 2.57% of renting households were evicted in 2016.  A tract on 
the eastern part of Irving Park had an eviction rate of nearly 2% in 2016.  Though their eviction rates dipped in 2016, a tract in 
northwest Albany Park and one in Irving Park had eviction rates above 3% from 2011 through 2014 and 2015 respectively.   
753 Centro Autonomo, 2016:  “Displacement in Albay Park:  Housing Hardships for Low-Income Tenants.” 
754 For example, in 2017, approximately 60 people were evicted from a 24-unit apartment building in Albany Park, after its purchase 
by the ward’s largest developer, Silver Properties LLC.  With the help of a local NGO, the residents formed a tenants’ union, and held 
direct actions in the neighborhood, calling for a delay on the eviction and relocation assistance. The tenants elicited the sympathy of 
nearby homeowners and the principal of a local elementary school (who ultimately mediated a negotiation between the developer 
and tenants), and their direct actions were covered by local media.  Wetli (2017) quotes one neighbor saying "This is not a problem 
building, and these are not problem tenants”; ATU, 2017.  https://medium.com/autonomous-tenants-union/three-buildings-one-
struggle-against-displacement-cb466c50e086). In her last two years in office, Mell spoke frequently about problem. 
755 Communities United (advocacy and research around foreclosures and affordable housing); Centro Autonomo: advocacy and 




candidates have had elaborate positions on these issues, and affordable housing was the first 
issue raised at several candidate fora, debates, and events.756 
Other Left-Leaning Organizations in the Ward 
This section reviews another aspect of neighborhood context, the leading civic and 
political organizations in the ward.  I found an organizational field quite different from that in 
Austin.  The ward contains NGOs ideologically committed to leftist programs and relatively 
independent of city government and foundations.  These groups (as well as one foundation-
funded arts organization) directly and indirectly contributed to WF33’s base-building work, 
diffusing left ideas about issues to attentive residents and organizing small bases of their own, 
which WF33 subsequently tapped.  The ward also contains centrist NGOs, aligned with the 
neoliberal regime.  However, I could find no such organizations which are both rooted in racial 
minority populations and involved in real estate development, in contrast to the bourgeoning 
race-conscious development formation in Austin. 
Centro Autonomo 
Centro Autonomo (CA) is a non-profit organization in the northwest of Albany Park, 
dedicated to organizing and mobilizing, and providing services to, the Latinx immigrant 
population.  CA describes its mission as “building power from below” to challenge neoliberalism.  
CA’s leaders’ and organizers’ ideology, explained at length in published documents, 
centers class conflict.  They describe neoliberalization as a project of “transnational 
corporations” to organize the global economy to ensure supplies of cheap labor and natural 
 
756 James, 2014: “RUNNING AGAINST THE MACHINE, Interview with Tim Meegan” (Socialist Worker); Kunichoff, 2014:  “Meet the 
High School Social Studies Teacher Taking On Chicago’s Right-Wing Democrats” (In These Times); Schmidt, 2015:  “ALDERMANIC 
RACES: 33rd Ward race heating up...” (Substance News);  Progress Illinois, 2014:  “33rd Ward Candidate Tim Meegan Talks Housing 
Issues”; Aldertrack, 2014:  “Tim Meegan, 33rd Ward”; “2015 Aldermanic Forum, 33rd Ward” (available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmHvxpjriNo&t=828s); Avondale Neighborhood Association, 2018:  “Rossana Rodriguez-
Sanchez for 33rd Ward”; Midwest Socialist, 2019:  “LIVE with Rossana Rodriguez”; Field Notes, 5/30/18. 
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resources, generating corporate profits “but declining standards of living for the Mexican and 
the US working classes, and an environmental disaster that affects both sides of the border.”757  
This macro analysis is the basis for positions on immigration, housing, workers’ rights, and other 
issues.758  For example, a 2016 report on housing in Albany Park defines displacement of renters 
“as a systematic displacement of propertyless tenants by rentier capitalists...a continuation of 
class warfare by other means...part and parcel of capitalist domination.”759  I have not found a 
detailed analysis of race per se, although CA does speak of its own identity, and that of its 
clientele, in terms of race, class, and immigrant status. 
CA operates a range of political education programs, based on the “popular education” 
model of Paoli Freire and other post-colonial theorists:  they encourage participants to 
understand social issues as related to larger structures of oppression, to become aware of their 
shared interests in challenging those structures, through dialogue and critical reflection.  This 
political education is embedded in CA’s most popular services, its English as a second language 
and “Adult High School” classes, which teach language through conversation about social 
issues.760  CA mobilizes its base in issue campaigns around housing, workers’ rights, and 
immigration. 
 
757 A statement on the MSN website, entitled “Social and Political Analysis:  The Impact of Neoliberalism and Responses from Below”  
758 For example, a CA document explains that, since Latinx immigrants were driven to the US by the poverty and environmental 
degradation wrought by neoliberalization, they have legitimate claims on the United States, and its capitalist class, which have 
instituted neoliberalism and captured the wealth generated by it.  This analysis also links  immigrants’ struggles for rights in the 
United States to their position in workplace conflicts in the United States.  CA’s website mentions, for example, that “the wealthy 
systematically benefit from immigrant labor, and especially that of undocumented workers.  At the same time, the US government 
creates policies such as NAFTA that undermine Latin American economies and force mass northward migration.” 
759 Centro Autonomo, 2016:  “Displacement in Albany Park.  Housing Hardships for Low-Income Tenants” 
760 Centro Autonomo’s most popular services are its adult education classes, and particularly its English as a Second Language class.  
The ESL class (requested by residents when CA opened in 2006) has grown from an enrollment of five in 2006 to.  CA also offers 
continuing education courses, taught by volunteer instructors, in “Education and Methodology, Health, Work, Community and 
Housing, Immigration and Citizenship, Computers, Math, and English.”  CA’s ESL classes focus on “immigrant, worker’s, women’s , 
and human rights” as the substance of courses (e.g., teaching language skills through conversation and assignments focused on 
these issues), and designs classes to encourage dialogue and critical reflection.  CA encourages students and alumni to act on 
insights.  ESL classes, for example, have produced working groups attempting to form domestic worker and construction worker 
cooperatives.  However, at least two former CA organizers commented that CA’s political education is better characterized as 




CA has built an ingenuous revenue stream, allowing it to fund community organizing 
and service provision at a significant scale, while remaining independent of city government and 
major philanthropic foundations.  CA generates most of its revenues from a “study abroad” 
program for American college students, the Autonomous University of Social Movements.  
AUSM runs programs in Mexico, Cuba, and Albany Park, with classroom instruction focused on 
post-colonial social theory and field work in progressive or radical social movements, alongside 
practitioners.761  Autonomous University of Social Movements also runs a Master’s Program in 
Community Organizing, based in Albany Park.   
In 2016, CA made $785,659 from tuition and fees from its study abroad and master’s 
program, or 93.8% of its total revenues for the year.  With a three-person staff handling 
classroom instruction and administration, and leveraging CA staff’s personal connections to 
movement practitioners to create rich field work opportunities, AUSM has relatively low 
overhead, costing $413,241 in 2016.  The $372,408 in profit funded most of CA’s community 
organizing work, including the programs of Centro Autonomo.762  CA received only $42,822 from 
grants in 2016. 
CA is steeped in international networks of activists committed to global, mass struggle 
against capitalism.  CA was founded in 2006 by Tom Hansen, long-time leader of an anti-colonial 
civil disobedience group Pastors for Peace, and a militant activist associated with the Zapitista 
movement in Mexicao.  Most of the CA’s leading staff are activists drawn from grassroots social 
 
761 The classroom curriculum for the Mexican program appears to focus on the psychological and cultural effects of colonization, and 
to emphasize the need for colonized groups to regain political subjectivity and develop a counter-hegemonic consciousness.  The 
reading list includes Paolo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Bonfil Batalla’s Mexico Profundo, bell hooks’ Teaching to Transgress, 
and a critique of the paternalism inherent in international service and aid programs.  The field work component of the program 
appears to focus on social movements oriented toward political and economic autonomy.  The program includes sessions working 
with Zapatista groups in Chiapas, a large collective of small farmers in Tlaxcala, and a housing cooperative in Mexico City. 
The program is currently accredited by Hampshire College, the SUNY system, and the Univesidad Autonoma Metropolitana in 
Mexico City.   
762 MUSN spent $382,138 on staff salaries, facilities, and programming associated with its community organizing in 2016.  All data on 
MUSN’s financial information taken from their 2016 Form 990, available at:  
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/364/364435604/364435604_201612_990.pdf (accessed 9/14/18). 
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movements in Mexico or the United States, or Albany Park residents, trained and educated by 
CA.  Two of CA’s community organizers are also on staff at a Unite Here local.  At least three 
members of CA’s small staff are Latinx immigrant Albany Park residents, trained through CA’s 
programs.763  CA’s personnel thus differ markedly in background and training from the type of 
professional non-profit administrator increasingly common since the 1970s (see Chapter 1).   
CA is informed by the ideas flowing through this international network.  CA has official 
connections with community organizations in Mexico, and brings activists from radical 
movements in Latin America to Albany Park to meet residents and give lectures on social issues, 
as part of CA’s “speaking tours.”764  In 2017, for instance, CA hosted activists from a socialist 
housing rights organization in Mexico City, individuals from the Zapatista movement and 
National Indigenous Congress, among others.  CA coordinates ten speaking tours per year.  CA 
staff have appeared jointly with activists from those movements at various international 
conferences and events.765  CA cites these activists, and especially the Zapatistas; an indigenous 
separatist movement in Chiapas, Mexico; and a militant housing cooperative in Mexico City as 
ideological influences.766  
Autonomous Tenants Union 
In 2015, four organizers from Centro Autonomo started a new organization, 
Autonomous Tenants Union (ATU), dedicated to organizing tenant unions and protesting 
evictions in Albany Park and nearby neighborhoods.  To date, ATU has organized tenant union in 
 
763 https://centro.community/the-team/.  Accessed 12/14/18. 
764 https://ausm.community/speaking-tours/.  Accessed 12/14/18. 
765 Former CA organizer (and current staff of Rossana Rodriguez-Sanchez’s aldermanic administration), for example, wrote and 
delivered a joint presentation with human rights activists in Chiapas, perhaps contributing to a synthesis of ideas. 
766 Centro Autonomo website, 2009:  “A critical and a strategic review of the MSN's History.”  Accessed 12/12/18.  
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ten buildings in the 33rd Ward, and eight in other neighborhoods.767  ATU has helped these 
unions wage anti-eviction and other pressure campaigns, and has also organized protests on 
behalf of non-unionized tenants at other buildings.   
ATU is funded by a mix of small grants from progressive philanthropic foundations, and 
by the contributions of its volunteer organizers and members.768  ATU has low overhead, run 
entirely by volunteers, and using meeting space donated by Centro Autonomo, local churches, 
and other activists.  ATU is thus mostly independent of foundations and other sources of funding 
which could compromise its political independence. 
ATU’s campaigns are designed to compel small concessions from landlords, such as 
moratoria on evictions and financial assistance for relocation for evicted residents.  ATU’s public 
arguments often focus on landlords’ illegal, unethical, or cruel behaviors.769  However, its 
leaders see their work as part of a long-term project to build an anti-neoliberal movement.  They 
intend tenant organizing and anti-eviction campaigns to, in addition to generating short-term 
concessions from landlords, encourage tenants to understand their situation as a form of 
oppression, rooted in capitalist system, and to build solidarity as a class. 770  ATU has eschewed 
electoral politics, seeing it as more likely to lead to cooptation than significant social change 
(although one of these leaders recently accepted employment in Rodrguez-Sanchez’s 
administration).  ATU articulates a broader vision of housing, and critique of the capitalist 
housing system.  Leaders have formulated these ideas in public statements, and appear to share 
 
767 This includes five multi-unit buildings owned by large developers or LLCs:  the Sunnyside Manor Tenants Union in Ravenswood 
Park; Antoniotiana Tenants Union and the Kimbal Tenants Union in Albany Park.  It also includes multi-unit buildings owned by small 
landlords (families or individuals):   
768 ATU received grants from Crossroads Foundation in 2017 and 2018.  
769 Wetli, 2017.  For example, one ATU write-up accused a landlord of unethical behavior:  “Rather than give the tenants a warning of 
what was to come, Abrams elected to blindside them, pressuring them to leave in the middle of winter and the school year.” 
770 Galeano, Gutierrez, Monzan, 2015. 
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them, if in colloquial terms, with tenant unions at rallies and meetings.771  Like CA, ATU argues 
that evictions, displacements, and unaffordable housing, are forms of economic exploitation of 
low-income people by developers, investors, and landlords.772  Most often, ATU leaders and 
members express this idea by juxtaposing the profits of landlords and developers with the 
suffering of evicted residents, and arguing that this is a recurring phenomenon (without 
explaining its roots in a capitalist system).  While I could not find a specific, coherent, platform, 
ATU statements sketch a vision of guaranteed housing for low-income people, and a right to 
remain in the neighborhood in which they have social ties and an affective attachment.773  At 
times, they articulate a form of community redevelopment and reinvestment without 
displacement or substantial in-migration of new, affluent residents.774 
In ATU’s thought, while displacement is driven by an economic dynamic, it plays out as 
cultural erasure and replacement of Latinx people by white.  Many ATU statements describe 
populations in terms of race and class, observing that “low-income Latinx” or “low-income 
immigrant” populations are replaced by “upper-class whites,” and indicting developers or 
speculators.  An ATU leader’s speech at a 2017 rally captured this combination of discursive 
elements: “Silver Property Group and Ron Abrams have made clear their vision of Albany Park: 
One in which low-income immigrants are edged out to make way for hypothetical white tenants 
that may not even materialize.”  
Less frequently, ATU add that gentrification erases the history and culture of longtime 
residents.  A comment from a founding member of ATU reflects this addition:   
 
771 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Dkoht6fDn8, accessed 12/29/18.  Budovitch, 2017.  
772 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uvZGWv-ouEU.  Accessed 12/29/18. 
773 Wetli, 2017.  Galeano, Gutierrez, Monzan, 2015.  Huq, 2016. 
774 Huq, 2016.  E.g., ATU organizer Barbara Suarez Galeano argued that “Investment doesn't have to mean just bringing in wealthy 
white people. Investment could be for and by the community and that’s the kind of conversation that we’re trying to push forward” 
(quoted in Huq, 2016:  30). 
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They've already kicked out many families; most of them are brown families, Latinxs. 
They are lower income folks and they're [i.e. the corporation] bringing in higher income 
people without thinking about the history of this neighborhood, without thinking about 
the history of these families...There's a lot of cultural history. There are a lot of roots 
here. 
 
I found only one instance in which ATU organized tenants for action against a non-white 
landlord, though this was landlord was Southeast Asian, not Latinx.  The ATU used aggressive 
tactics, picketing outside the landlord’s home and canvassing neighboring houses.  Based on 
flyers for ATU’s events and pictures of these events, it appears that ATU used discourses 
emphasizing the dignity of tenants.  This may indicate a hesitancy to invoke racial discourses 
when organizing against POC landlords. 
Interestingly, ATU appears to be the only group in the ward (including WF33) who 
openly criticizes and organizes against small landlords.  During a 2016 rent strike in a family-
owned property, ATU argued that small landlords were fundamentally on the same side of 
housing conflicts as large developers, corporate landlords, and banks which purchase and 
foreclose affordable properties:  they have systemic incentives to exploit tenants, and can be 
stopped only be tenant power and government regulation.775 
Albany Park Theatre Project 
Albany Park Theater Project is a foundation-funded, non-profit youth theater troupe. 
APTP write, produce, and perform plays about contemporary “sociopolitical issues,” based on 
ethnographic research with local families and activists.776  In recent years, APTP has staged plays 
with strong political messages about salient issues, such as foreclosure and eviction, 
immigration and deportation, and the state of public schools, as well as less political plays. 
 
775 ATU, 2018. https://medium.com/autonomous-tenants-union/ralph-cielocha-one-slumlord-among-many-the-horner-park-
tenants-unions-ongoing-struggle-ce3769409588.  “Like so many landlords, they’d rather contribute to and benefit from 
gentrification than take responsibility for their property, harming not only their tenants but the whole neighborhood. As long as we 
grant property owners this amount of entitlement over other people’s living conditions, landlords in gentrifying neighborhoods will 
neglect their buildings and disrespect their tenants, setting the stage for larger developers to displace them down the road.” 
776 https://aptpchicago.org/blog/.  Accessed 9/14/18. 
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Unlike CA and ATU, APTP receives most of its revenue from philanthropic foundations, 
who fund APTP handsomely.777  APTP’s funders include foundations with strong links to 
Chicago’s neoliberal regime, including the Chicago Community Trust and the MacArthur 
Foundation.778  However, in its day-to-day operations, APTP’s closest collaborators include left-
leaning activist housing and immigrant rights activists.  For example, APTP worked extensively 
with activists from Centro Autonomo, and two radical, grassroots housing rights groups, Chicago 
Anti-Eviction Campaign, and Communities United Against Foreclosures and Evictions, to produce 
a play about eviction and foreclosure in 2015, I Would Kiss These Walls.779  APTP writers 
consulted with activists to develop the script, and the groups co-staged the play at foreclosed 
homes, illegally occupied by CUAFE.  For a 2016 production about deportation, APTP worked 
with activists from militant immigrant rights groups and Centro Autonomo.780 
Most of APTP’s plays explore social problems in ways not noticeably aligned with any 
particular partisan perspective.781  But plays co-produced with the aforementioned activists 
import those activists’ radical political vision.  For example, characters in I Would Kiss These 
Walls call for occupying vacant, foreclosed homes—the tactic used by CUAFE and Chicago Anti-
Eviction Campaign.  While the characters don’t explicitly assert a right to housing, they suggest 
these “liberations” are morally just, and could be part of a new system of housing provision.  
Pointing to a vacant, foreclosed house, one character asks 
 
777 E.g., APTP received a $100,000 grant from Impact100 in 2015, and a $400,000 grant from the MacArthur Foundation in 2016.  
778 APTP received a $10,000 grant from Chicago Community Trust, which participated in several programs initiated by the Emanuel 
administration.  MacArthur Foundation collaborated with the Daley Administration on New Communities Program, and Daley’s 
initiative to expand access to broadband internet. 
779 One CA organizer recalled that APTP “walked with us during bank protests, came to our meetings, and participated in our other 
efforts” to gather material for the play.  As noted in the previous chapter, three WF33 members (Antonio, Norman, and Jake) 
participated in CUAFE in the early 2010s. 
780 “they joined Chicago’s immigrant justice movement in its meetings, marches and vigils, visited the deportation center in 
Broadview and conducted countless interviews with nuns, priests and immigrant families.” (Serrano, 2016) 
781 In Rodriguez-Sanchez’s account, the plays “…tell the painful stories of losing their homes, or telling us they were moving to the 
suburbs or beyond because their families could no longer afford to live in our beloved neighborhood.”  
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Who says we can’t live here?  Who says we can’t create better laws and ways of 
thinking?  You’d be surprised how angry people are, how ready they are to do 
something that is right and just.  There are 100,000 vacant homes in Chicago…Maybe 
we can help [another character] liberate a home, maybe her kids can feel the warmth 
those walls provide.782 
 
Another character suggests that “liberating” foreclosed homes is empowering, and an act of 
solidarity with neighbors.  When a family liberates a home, that whole family becomes part of 
the movement…Wait until you meet my mom, she has become the most powerful woman.” 783 
APTP appears to choose issues as the subject of plays because they are salient among 
the program’s youth participants and their families.  Rodriguez-Sanchez, speaking as the director 
of APTP, mentioned youth’s experiences as the inspiration for Kiss These Walls and Home/Land: 
“A lot of our company members are part of a family in which one of the members is 
undocumented or sometimes they are undocumented themselves. And we thought it was really 
important that we started talking about it.”784 
And what explains APTP’s choice to adopt the radical perspective of local activists on 
these issues?  This choice appears to be a function of 1) the presence in the neighborhood of 
vibrant radical housing and immigration movements, and 2) the ideology of APTP’s leadership. 
The presence of a vibrant, radical movements around housing and immigration is likely 
related to other neighborhood characteristics.  The amount of organizing around housing 
appears to be higher in neighborhoods experiencing consecutive or simultaneous waves of 
displacement associated with the post-2007 foreclosure crises and ongoing real estate 
redevelopment.  Whereas in Austin, organizing around housing issues subsided after the post-
2007 foreclosure crisis, it has continued to thrive in Albany Park, driven by persistently high 
rates of eviction and cost-burdened households. 
 
782 Rada, 2015.   
783 Rada, 2015. 
784 Lee, 2016. 
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In this context, APTP choose to work left-leaning and militant activists like those at CA, 
CUAFE, and OCAD.  They could have worked with any of Albany Park’s several moderate, 
regime-affiliated NGOs, who also work on housing and immigration, and who are larger and 
better-funded than the radical groups.  Yet, while newspaper and other records show repeated 
collaboration with radical groups, I found no record of collaboration between APTP and centrist 
NGOs.785  This choice to collaborate with radical groups may be explained by the ideology of 
APTP’s leadership.  At the time of the collaborations, APTP’s director was Rossana Rodriguez-
Sanchez, long a socialist committed to militant direct action (then devoting her free time to the 
fledging WF33). 
2. WF33’s Base-Building Goals 
In this context, WF33 is attempting to build a popular base.  They intend to go beyond 
the current core of left-leaning activists from Chicago’s left milieu and DSA, building support 
among the populations they view as potential, even natural, constituencies for a left project.   
This section will unpack WF33’s thinking about exactly who their potential base is, and the types 
of relationships they intend to build with this base.  I present the following findings: 
• WF33 is building a range of relationship with residents, from training residents to lead 
WF33, to gaining formal members, to building weaker relationships with wider swaths 
of the ward. 
• WF33 continues to debate the worth of attempting to organize the ward’s middle-class 
populations. 
 
785 I could find no record of collaboration between APTP and Communities United, Albany Park Center, North River Commission, 
three of the neighborhood’s most prominent NGOs. 
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• WF33 members consistently refer to a base defined by class; but they have targeted 
their outreach on the basis of race, focusing on Latinx sections of the ward.  I discuss 
possible explanations for this contradiction. 
• Even as they target Latinx constituencies, they consistently organize around economic 
issues, and conflate racial and class interests (perhaps incoherently). 
• These goals are impeded by the social distance between WF33’s current membership 
(which is largely white, college-educated, and recent transplants to the neighborhood) 
and the populations they are trying to organize.  
Building a multi-leveled base 
WF33 leaders envision a base with varying levels of commitment, and varying types of 
relationship with the organization.  First, WF33 wants to incorporate as many residents as 
possible as formal members of WF33, into leadership positions (such as committee members 
and leaders), and into its informal cadre of leaders.  WF33 encourages all contacts in the ward to 
engage with the organization, contacting them repeatedly with invitations to WF33 meetings 
and events, in which they could learn more about the organization and develop personal 
relationships with its members.  WF33 also builds leadership training into its canvassing and 
other events, in part to encourage participants to take on larger roles in the organization.  Dawn 
mentions that WF33 has successfully cultivated active participants in this way, including “some 
of our best precinct captains.”786  
While they recognize the value of greater levels of participation in the organization, they 
are open to, and recognize the likelihood of, lower-levels of commitment.  WF33 leaders 
 
786 A “precinct captain” runs a canvass in the precinct in which they reside. 
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envision a broader networks of ward residents who, though not formally affiliated as WF33 
members, have a relationship with WF33 that encompasses more than merely voting for its 
candidates.  This may involve occasional participation in WF33 activities.  Or it may involve the 
resident being aware of WF33 and its positions, and believing that WF33 represents them and 
their interests.  This may or may not be underpinned by ongoing contact between WF33 and the 
resident. 
Finally, WF33 is open to growing what could be called an “electorate”—a swath of 
residents whom they reach only episodically, during election or issue campaigns.  Such people 
might have only a vague sense of WF33’s identity and positions, or tune in only during elections.  
The value of such supporters is purely in advancing WF33’s goal of winning institutional power.  
As Antonio commented, “ideally we want people to join, but we also just want them vote for 
Rossana.” 
Perceived constituencies in the ward  
WF33 has a detailed sense of their potential constituencies in the ward, based on 1) 
grounded analysis, including analysis of past political behavior and relationships between 
population segments and former alderman Mell; and 2) perceptions of populations’ material 
interests, drawn from WF33’s foundational, class-focused social analysis. 
Debating the potential of the middle-class  
WF33 leaders recognize large segments of Eastern Irving Park (known as Ravenswood 
Manor and Horner Park) as unlikely to support WF33’s agenda or candidates, for (at least) two 
reasons.  These are the most affluent segments of the ward, with a predominantly upper-middle 
class population.  WF33 members perceive this population’s material interests as opposed to 
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WF33’s project.  Second, these communities have especially strong ties to Ald. Deb Mell.  They 
were the political base of Alderman Dick Mell (who served from 1973 to 2013).  Multiple 
commentators have observed these loyalties were transferred to Deb Mell.787  Mell has 
solidified this relationship by working closely with the block clubs and homeowner associations 
in this area, who, in WF33’s Dawn’s words, “appreciate the access.” In 2019, all 13 of the 
precincts which Mell won were in this section of the ward.788 
More generally, WF33 members appear to have contradictory views on the middle-
classes.  On the one hand, they consider middle-class voters less likely to support WF33’s 
project, given the former’s material interests.  Even when middle-class populations supported 
Tim Meegan’s 2015 aldermanic campaign and the rent control referendum, WF33 members 
remained skeptical of the reasons for this support, and of its durability.789 
On the other hand, as explained further below, WF33 has targeted much of its outreach 
on the basis of race, rather than class, apparently assuming that Latinx middle classes were in 
play, particularly in the 2019 aldermanic election.  It’s possible that WF33 members, consciously 
or not, have in mind a particular white sub-section of the middle-class when they talk about the 
difficulty of organizing the ward’s “middle-class” residents. 
Perceived base 
As discussed in the previous chapter, WF33 and the Rodriguez-Sanchez campaign most 
often construct a hybrid class-race-immigrant subject.  Members usually define their identity 
 
787 Stewart, 2018. 
788 Ibid.  
789 Dawn suggested that middle-class support for Meegan was driven by anger over Deb Mell’s appointment, by Rahm Emanuel, to 
succeed her father, Dick Mell as alderman.  The appointment and dynasty recalled the nepotism and corruption of the old Chicago 
machine, and Meegan’s campaign had made these central themes.  One long-time commentator on politics in Chicago’s Northside 
shared this impression (Stewart, 2019).  Similarly, WF33 members speculated that middle-class homeowners’ concerns with 
gentrification were primarily aesthetic.  While they may oppose rapid and chaotic redevelopment, such residents could not be 
expected to back rent control and other left-leaning remedies, particularly as pro-development politicians crafted moderate 
proposals to address aesthetic concerns within a pro-development framework. 
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and constituency in terms of class, race, and immigrant status.  Most of their statements 
construct a subject either in economic terms only, for example referencing “the many,” 
“working families,” “working people,” or in terms of class and race, often referring to “working 
people and people of color,” and noting solidarity with immigrants.  This is also reflected in 
WF33’s policy agenda, which focuses on redistribution along class, not racial lines, while 
addresses additional concerns of undocumented people and racial minorities.  This identity and 
agenda is underpinned by a social analysis foregrounding capitalist exploitation and class 
conflict, but also acknowledging the unique exploitation and expropriation of people of color, 
and the unique needs of immigrants and racial minorities. 
Yet, when planning their outreach, WF33 has mostly focused on Latinx populations, 
eliding class distinctions with that population, and relegating the ward’s white working classes.  
As described in detail below, WF33 conducted outreach around pending zoning changes, 
associated with major, rent-intensifying redevelopment projects in 2017 and 2018.  As Dawn 
noted, these canvasses were intended to build relationships with target constituencies with 
whom WF33 had not previously connected.790  While rent-intensifying redevelopment occurred 
in many parts of the ward, WF33 choose to canvass around 3 developments in predominantly 
Latinx sections.  These choices appear to prioritize outreach to Latinx populations, even as they 
built a constituency around an economic problem. 
WF33 explicitly targeted Latinx populations for voter registration in the run-up to the 
2019 aldermanic election.   In the Summer of 2018, Antonio, Betty, and others created a 
document “to act as a guide and point us to potential precincts to target for voter 
 
790 Interview with Dawn, 1/11/18 
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registration.”791  In short, the guide calculated which precincts had the largest numbers of voter-
eligible but currently unregistered Latinx people, and labeled these “prime for canvassing.”792  
The document did not explain why specifically Latinx unregistered voters were the target.  The 
authors appear to have assumed that Latinx voters were the priority target.  The guide did not 
attempt to distinguish within the Latinx population on the basis of class, or to identify majority 
working- and lower-class neighborhoods.  Dawn reported that WF33 did not make a comparable 
documents determining the location of working-class voters. 
Emphasizing economic issues in outreach to Latinx populations 
As WF33 and the Rodriguez-Sanchez campaign canvassed Latinx populations, they 
attempted to appeal to them on the basis of economic issues, and a discourse stressing class 
conflict.  They rarely invoked the constructions of racial justice common in U.S. politics—and 
certainly Chicago politics—since the 1970s, as community control, descriptive representation, a 
share of city jobs and contracts, and cultural authenticity.  Most often they highlighted the 
issues of affordable housing, displacement, and public services.  They did also mention 
immigration and the protection of undocumented people.  And in this outreach, they continued 
to describe their antagonists in class terms, as “economic elites,” “the few,” “the wealthy,” 
“elites,” “developers,” and “banks.”  Such references pervade any text from the Rodriguez-
Sanchez campaign, including those delivered to predominantly Latinx audiences.793 
 
791 “Latinx voter registration map tutorial,” created by WF33 in the summer of 2018.  Available upon request.  
792 Ibid. 
793 Most obviously, this economic focus was expressed in the Rodriguez-Sanchez’s campaign slogan, “Neighborhood for the Many, 
not the Few.”  Both this class antagonism and focus on the distribution of resources are exemplified by one of Rodriguez-Sanchez’s 
rhetorical mainstays, a story likening Chicago’s regressive revenue policies to the U.S. military’s monopolization of basic resources in 
Rodriguez-Sanchez’s native Puerto Rico:  Rodriguez-Sanchez’s town depended on a nearby river for potable water; the U.S. military 
dammed the river, diverting its flow to a nearby military base, and creating a draught in Rodriguez-Sanchez’s town.  Residents of the 
town collective undammed the river, recovering their water supply.   
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I did find a few instances in which Rodriguez-Sanchez articulated Latinx empowerment 
as descriptive representation and elite-level inclusion.  In such instances, she argued that her 
candidacy and election challenge the exclusion of Latinx people from institutions and positions 
of power.  Speaking on behalf of a collective Latinx subject, she called for “asserting our right to 
be in the spaces we’ve been told don’t belong to us.”794  In an interview in the Summer of 2018, 
Rodriguez-Sanchez linked this empowerment narrative with an argument that descriptive 
representation enhances substantive representation:  “I live in a ward that is 52 percent Latino, 
and we have had Dick Mell and Deb Mell running that ward, and clearly our needs are not being 
met by the Democrats.  I feel like it's time for us to be able to step up and take leadership roles 
and spaces not meant for us.” 
 Even in contexts when we would most expect the campaign to appeal to voters on the 
basis of racial identity, they continued to foreground economic issues.  For example, the 
campaign appeared to have had incentives to make race-based appeals at a February 2019 
meeting with potential voters:  occurring less than two weeks before the election, the 
campaign’s goal was surely short-term mobilization, rather than consciousness-raising in service 
of the long-term movement-building project; all meeting attendees were Latinx (and the 
meeting was conducted largely in Spanish).  Furthermore, the event was co-facilitated by a 
staffer whose previous statements suggest a commitment to inclusion of racial minorities in 
capitalist institutions as the crux of racial empowerment.795 
Yet, throughout the event, campaign staff focused on Rodriguez-Sanchez’s positions on 
economic issues.  They posed a series of questions to the attendees, asking “do you feel like the 
city spends its money in a good way,” “do you feel like you can afford to live, stay, and grow, in 
 
794 Smith, 2018. 
795 Interview with anonymous member, 3/30/19. 
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your neighborhood,” and other issue-specific questions, highlighting economic issues.796  The 
ensuing conversation focused on housing affordability, priorities in public spending, and other 
economic issues.797 
Explaining the contradictions in WF33’s conception of its base 
I have not yet determined why WF33 choose to target outreach on the basis of race, 
despite usually describing its base in terms of class and race.  I will briefly discuss three 
possibilities.  First, WF33 leaders may simply have used Latinx population as a proxy for low-
income and working class residents.  As mentioned in the previous section, majority Latinx tracts 
contain the bulk of the ward’s poor and working-class white and Latinx residents.  WF33 
residents may be aware of this correlation, and thus used racial composition (which data is more 
readily available than class composition) to target outreach. 
Second, WF33 leaders may have made a strategic choice to target outreach on the basis 
of race.  Given that Rodriguez-Sanchez is a Latina and was running against a white woman, 
campaign staff may have reasoned that, the campaign could supplement their issue-based 
appeals with identity-based appeals to attract Latinx voters, but not white voters.  Perceiving an 
easier pathway to winning support among Latinx populations, they may have targeted their 
outreach accordingly.  Thus, even if WF33 members envision an inter-racial working- and lower-
class base as their ultimate goal, they may have perceived a short-term opportunity to create a 
majority coalition on the basis of racial identity, in addition to issues of economic justice and 
protection of undocumented people. 
 
796 Photos posted on Rodrigeuz-Sanchez campaign’s official Facebook page; webpage no longer available. 
797 Interview with anonymous member, 3/30/19. 
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Finally, WF33’s decision to organize Latinx residents may reflect more subtle and even 
unconscious aspects of their thinking about race and class.  The last chapter noted that most 
members affirm the particularity of minority exploitation within capitalism, and that they 
sometimes express this particularity in a way that elides the status of non-minority working 
classes as oppressed groups. 
It’s possible that targeting Latinx people is a conscious decision, informed by the 
recognition of minority’s distinctively negative experiences under capitalism.  Members’ analysis 
clearly shows exploitation of lower classes in general, and especially extreme effects on groups 
historically subjugated on the basis of race and currently discriminated against on the basis of 
race.  But, when referring to this in passing, members sometimes substituted race for the more 
complex class and race hybrid.  A discussion of the economic dynamics driving the foreclosure 
crisis, for example, issued in a condemnation of “racist appropriation.”798  Or, the tendency to 
elide the white working class when talking about exploitation may make it easier to slip from a 
class subject to a Latinx working-class subject without noticing the slippage.  The previous 
chapter also noted that some members simply use race and class interchangeably, referring to a 
hybrid race and class subject in one moment, a class subject the next, and a racial one the 
following.  It’s possible that this tendency allowed members to substitute Latinx for working-
class when thinking about their base in the ward, without noticing the slippage. 
Social Distance of WF33 and Target Populations 
A review of the background and demographic characteristics of WF33’s current 
membership shows that WF33 has not yet recruited members from the working-class or Latinx 
populations of the ward.  As noted in the previous chapter, WF33’s members are drawn from 
 
798 Swartzman, 2015. 
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city-wide networks of left-leaning activists and from Democratic Socialists of America’s Chicago 
Chapter.  Like Chicago’s left milieu and DSA, WF33 members are predominantly white, middle-
class, and more educated than the populations they are hoping to organize.799  In part because 
most moved into the ward within the last five years, WF33 members also have few preexisting 
social ties with the ward’s working-class and Latinx populations.  Given the oft-noted utility of 
personal relationships in grassroots organizing, this social distance between WF33’s current 
membership and their intended base is an important challenge for WF33’s organizing. 
Race and age 
WF33’s membership is overwhelmingly white.  Of the 41 members, three identify as 
Latinx, and three as South Asian.  All 41 were United States citizens.  A large majority is also 
relatively young.  Of the 26 members for whom I could obtain data, 7 were over 40, and three 
over 60.  The other 19 were in their 20s and 30s.   
Education 
Of the 36 members for whom I could obtain information, eleven have or are currently 
pursuing graduate degrees.  The other 25 have bachelor’s degrees.  Members were equally 
distributed among public colleges and private schools (including highly prestigious ones).  It 
should be noted that at least 4 of these individuals were the first in their families to attend 
college, and either attended community colleges and affordable public colleges, or amassed 
student loans to attend private college. 
The undergraduate institutions were:  Dayton College, Indiana-Bloomington, Knox 
College (2), New York University, Northern Illinois, University of Puerto Rico-Rio Padres, 
 
799 Peterson, 2018; Interview with Matt Luskin, 3/16/17. 
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Northwestern, and Yale.  The institutions granting graduate degrees were University of Illinois at 
Chicago (3), Depaul, and Notre Dame. 
Employment 
WF33 members mostly work in skilled, knowledge-intensive jobs.  No members are 
currently unemployed, and only one is contingently employed.  Table 7.1 lists the profession of 
31 members for whom I could obtain employment data. 
Table 7.1.  Professions of WF33 Members 
Profession Number of Members 
Academic (full-time graduate student, researcher, or instructor 3 
Primary or secondary education teacher 3 
Attorney 3 
Web developer 3 
Policy analysis 3 
Community organizing 2 
Non-profit (administration) 2 
Journalist 2 
Nurse 2 
Non-profit (staff) 2 
Architect 1 
Education administration 1 
Corporate research 1 
Mortgage broker 1 
Video production 1 
Paralegal  1 
Length of tenure in ward 
Most members are somewhat recent transplants to the ward, having moved there as 
adults, from other parts of Chicago, the region, or the country.  Of the 20 people for whom I 
could obtain data, only two members had lived in the ward prior to 2013.  Of the remaining 18: 
• 9 of 18 were from other states. 
• 5 of 18 had grown up in Chicago and had moved to Albany Park from other parts of the 
city. 
• 4 of 18 were from Illinois, near Chicago. 
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• 1 of 18 was from Puerto Rico. 
Social distance from target populations 
WF33 members are geographically concentrated in parts of the ward with 
concentrations of Latinx people.  However, Interview data and patterns in WF33 members’ 
employment, indicate significant social distance between WF33’s members and the ward’s 
working- and lower-class and Latinx communities. 
As displayed in Map 7.1 below, most WF33 members live in a small cluster in Albany 
Park, in predominantly Latinx census tracts.  The blue and white pointers on the map indicate 
the residential location of the 35 WF33 members for whom I could obtain such data.  The areas 
shaded dark purple are majority Latinx census tracts, according to the 2015 American 
Community Survey.  This geographic proximity could enable social interactions. 





However, interviewees reported having few regular social or professional interactions 
with these populations.  Only two WF33 members have had regular contact with members of 
local Latinx populations in professional contexts.  One member worked with Latinx and other 
immigrant youth as the director of the Albany park Theatre Project, non-profit involving 
neighborhood youth in theatre arts.  The other (who left WF33 upon moving out of state in 
2019) worked with Latinx populations as a leader of Salud Sin Papeles, a non-profit providing 
health care to undocumented immigrants. 
To the extent that WF33 members socialize with members of the local Latinx 
population, it is with a small handful of leftist activists rooted in the local Latinx population.  
These activists are affiliated with Autonomous Tenants Union and Centro Autonomo.  According 
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to five people interviewed on this subject, all reported that they do not socialize other members 
of the Latinx population. 
3. Organizing Strategy:  Building a Base Through Issue Campaigns  
This section reviews WF33’s organizing strategies, their chief organizing campaigns, and 
their results.  I will emphasize four findings: 
• WF33 embedded its organizing in advocacy campaigns (i.e., campaigns to change policy 
or the practices of public or private entities) and service projects (i.e., providing discrete 
benefits to particular recipients).  WF33 carefully designed these campaigns to maximize 
their utility as organizing tools.800 
• Ward residents responded very favorably to WF33’s outreach around issues, indicating 
the high salience of those issues among ward residents and the resonance of WF33’s 
proposals and discourse. 
• WF33 also used its issue-based work to build relationships with the ward’s left-leaning 
organizations.  WF33 drew supporters from the bases organized by those NGOs and 
likely benefited from those NGOs’ years of work diffusing progressive and left ideas 
about the issues among ward residents. 
• WF33 also leveraged its issue-based work to gain access to institutional venues it would 
not otherwise have had, as a partisan organization. 
 
800 It should be noted that these campaigns had two more political purposes, in addition to grassroots base-building:  they were 
intended to build a record on salient issues, and (at least through the 2019 election) to demonstrate and dramatize Ald. Mell’s 
contrasting record; and they were a trains their own membership through these activities. 
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Issue-Based Organizing Campaigns 
In 2017, WF33 launched a series of advocacy and service projects around housing and 
immigration.  In 2017 and 2018, it tried to prevent pending zoning changes associated with 
major real estate redevelopments.  In 2018, it organized around a citywide campaign to pass a 
referendum favoring rent control.  From 2017 through the present, it has worked with local 
tenants unions to prevent mass evictions.  And Since the 2017, it has worked with local NGOs to 
assist undocumented people threatened with deportation.  WF33 designed each of these 
projects to function as effective base-building tools. 801  In each case, they choose the issue on 
which to work based on perceptions of the issue’s salience among WF33’s target populations.  
They locate their issue campaigns geographically to maximize contact with target populations.  
And they built opportunities for outreach and relationship-building into the campaigns.  
Organizing around zoning changes  
Starting in the winter of 2017, WF33 conducted outreach around a series of pending 
zoning changes in rapidly gentrifying parts of Avondale and Albany Park.  As recounted in the 
last chapter, WF33 choose to work on redevelopment because they recognized the salience of 
affordable housing and displacement among the ward’s working-class Latinx populations, having 
observed the number of evictions and cost-burdened households, and the popular concern with 
them. 
WF33 members explained that these campaigns were deliberately located in areas with 
the potential to organize this population.  Dawn explained: “There’s redevelopment in a lot of 
places, but these pending developments where in areas where we wanted to connect with 
 
801 These campaigns had a second component, focused on building a record of contrasts with Ald. Mell.  After the canvassing, WF33 
members confronted Ald. Mell with signed petitions or other evidence of residents’ concerns, and demanded a delay in the zoning 
change, and greater consideration of public input.  When Mell inevitably refuse these demands, WF33 publicized accounts of the 
interaction through social media (e.g., open letter to Mell 2/9/18). 
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people but hadn’t yet, parts of South Avondale, parts of Albany Park.  We knew there was a lot 
of concern with displacement there, as gentrification was pushing up from Logan Square.” 
WF33 led a series of canvasses in the areas surrounding the pending rezoning, going 
door-to-door on blocks near the proposed development.  A WF33 canvasser described the 
canvassing script: “We asked what changes [they] have seen in the neighborhood, and what 
[they] think about these changes.  They were pretty forthcoming about their concerns about 
gentrification.”802  Another member added: “You could say we were doing political education, in 
that we linked their concerns to the zoning question.  They would talk about gentrification, and 
we would say ‘well, did you know that the alderman has power over that?  And we would tell 
them about the zoning change.”803  In some cases, WF33 collected signatures for a petition to 
Ald. Mell to delay the zoning change and consider public concerns, or asked residents to join 
WF33 in protest at Mell’s “ward nights” (monthly public meetings between residents and the 
alderman.  WF33 conducted such outreach for several pending developments in 2017 and 
2018.804 
Canvassing around rent control 
This strategic design of issue campaigns as vehicles for outreach to target populations is 
also illustrated by WF33’s work as part of citywide coalition advocating rent control.  In 2017 
 
802 Interview with Dawn, 1/11/18. 
803 Interview with anonymous WF33 member, 5/27/18. 
804 For example, one WF33 campaign targeted a proposed zoning change associated with the construction of a three story building, 
including condos and a commercial property, by Barrett Homes, a developer of luxury condos.  The building (under construction as 
of the Summer of 2018) replaced a set of smaller single-family homes on the lot 
(http://workingfamilies33.org/blog/2017/4/1/working-families-reaches-neighbors-to-talk-belmont-ave-development; accessed 
12/19/18).  The property is in the Southern part of the Avondale neighborhood, on a commercial corridor (the 3000’s blocks of 
Belmont Ave.), in which several properties have recently been built or significantly renovated (this is based on my observation 
during a field visit, and confirmed by people in the area).  The property also falls within a precinct targeted by WF33 for its high 
levels of working-class Latinx eligible voters.  Similarly, WF33 targeted a proposed zoning change associated with the development 
of a 27-unit condo building, replacing a closed storage facility and “general merchandise” store,  in the winter of 2018.  This 
development was in the rapidly redeveloping southern edge of Albany Park, one of several recent redevelopment projects on the 
3000s blocks of Lawrence Ave., a popular commercial corridor (http://workingfamilies33.org/blog/2018/2/9/we-need-more-than-
bare-minimums-open-letter-regarding-3215-w-lawrence; accessed 12/19/18). 
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and 2018, the Lift the Ban Coalition launched a non-binding referendum declaring support for 
the repeal of Illinois’ ban on rent control in municipalities.805  The coalition’s member 
organizations each conducted outreach on behalf of the referendum in their respective 
geographic areas, with WF33 and the Northside Chapter of Democratic Socialists of America 
leading the effort in the 33rd ward.806   
According to Antonio and Dawn, WF33 saw the Lift the Ban referendum campaign as 
another opportunity for outreach among targeted populations (while advancing a valued policy 
goal).  WF33 chose to campaign in precincts in the legislative district of a target state 
legislator.807  But therein, they selected precincts where they perceived untapped potential 
constituencies.  Most of the precincts were in parts of Albany park experiencing rapid 
redevelopment, and attendant housing cost pressures.  According to Dawn, these precincts 
were also places “we wanted to meet more people.”808 
As in the zoning campaigns, WF33 did extensive outreach for the rent control 
referendum.  They canvassed in high-traffic public spaces, such as train stations, and later door-
to-door, targeting households based on voting history and any opinions on issues expressed in 
previous contacts.809  Dawn described the conversational script: “We would ask, ‘have you 
 
805 intended to signal the bill’s popularity to legislators. As of the Fall of 2018, the Lift the Ban coalition included 20 groups 
(neighborhood based service, development, and advocacy non-profits; citywide housing advocacy groups; progressive labor unions), 
including UWF, and UWF members (Northside Action for Justice; Action Now; Metropolitan Tenants Organization; Northwest Side 
Housing Center; Lawyers Committee for Better Housing; DSA Chicago; Pilsen Alliance; WF33; KOCO; Lugenia Burns Hope Community 
Center) 
806 For example, the Pilsen Alliance and DSA led the campaign in Pilsen.  KOCO, DSA, the Lugenia Hope Burns Center led the 
campaign on the South Side.  The campaign was not intended to be a citywide campaign right away; they intentionally picked 9 orgs 
who could lead the effort in their own wards.  From the spring of 2017 through the spring of 2018, coalition members led petition 
drives, ultimately placing the referendum on the ballot in 76 precincts in 9 wards.  They collected signatures for a petition to get the 
referendum on the April, 2018 electoral ballot, and having accomplished this, they mobilized voter support for the referendum. 
807 This was Representative John Cullerton, of the 6th District. 
808 Canvassers also targeted households based on voter registration and past voting behavior, and targeted people who signed the 
petition on zoning changes and/or mentioned that they were supportive or undecided on rent control. 
809 Interview with Dawn, 4/22/18. 
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noticed rising rents?  Would you be interested in something that made rents rise less?  We’re 
campaign for something called rent control.’  And we would explain the policy.”810 
WF33 has attempted to continue developing relationships with people contacted 
through the rent control canvasses.  They invited contacts to a series of follow-up events, aimed 
at continuing education about affordable housing.  In April of 2018, WF33 held a forum on rent 
control in April, featuring speeches by Rossana and representatives of allied groups about the 
need for and politics of rent control.  In subsequent months, WF33 invited contacts to 
participate in grassroots lobbying events.811 
WF33 leveraged the campaigns as a chance to build the organization in other ways.  
They used the campaign as an opportunity to deepen their relationship with the Northside 
Chapter of DSA Chicago.  At the start of the campaign, they had only a few overlapping 
members.812  Several of the DSA members who canvassed alongside WF33 subsequently joined 
WF33.  Experienced organizers within WF33 trained relative newcomers how to plan and 
implement canvasses in their respective precincts (and thus, in organizing parlance, to serve as 
“precinct captains”).813 
Results of outreach 
The campaigns accomplished some of their immediate goals:  the rent control 
referendum passed by 40-60 percentage points in all six of the precincts in which it was on the 
ballot, contributing to the issue’s momentum in the state legislature.  The zoning campaigns 
 
810 Ibid. 
811 These included a “lobbying day” in May (in which attendees wrote and called their city and state representatives to demand they 
support removal of the state ban) and a “Call-in Day” in June (in which participants called Illinois Senate President John Cullerton to 
demand rent control). 
812 Interview with Dawn, 4/22/18. 
813 Participants learned canvassing skills including how to “cut turf” (i.e., divide up geographic territory among canvassers) and use 
an app to target households based on past political participation and other criteria. 
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caused Ald. Mell to delay one rezoning decision, and forced her into a defensive posture on 
redevelopment (at least according to observers in WF33). 
The campaigns also produced new contacts.  One interviewee estimated that WF33 had 
collected contact information and from “a few dozen” people interested in learning more about 
WF33 or the issues in question.  WF33 has continued developing relationships with some of 
these, although I have not been able to determine how many.  Dawn observed with satisfaction 
that several “new faces, including Latinx ones” were at the rent control forum WF33 held after 
the rent control canvasses.814  Underlying the campaigns’ success as organizing tools appears to 
be acute popular concern with gentrification and the associated problems of rising housing costs 
and displacement.  Several members I spoke with were struck by residents’ concern with 
unaffordability and displacement and receptivity to WF33’s proposals.  Dawn reported, “we all 
felt it was the easiest canvassing we had ever done.”   
 Residents were focused on the material aspects of displacement.  One canvasser 
observed “I would start to ask about changes in the neighborhood and they would go off about 
rising rents and displacement.”  May residents quickly responded that they were having 
difficulties affording housing, or had friends or family who had had to move due to rising rent, or 
the purchase and demolition of their building by developers. 
In some cases, residents seemed to be familiar with left positions on redevelopment, 
repeating mainstays of progressive discourses, such as derogatory references to “big 
developers,” or “a right to housing.”  One canvasser recounted that “some were clearly familiar, 
not just with the problem, but had clearly heard some of the arguments.”815  Antonio recalled 
 
814 Interview with Dawn, 4/22/18. 
815 Interview with Kaitlin, 5/27/18; Interview with Antonio, 5/23/18. 
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that “people were literally completing my sentences” as he attempted to articulate WF33’s 
positions. 
Interaction with Advocacy and Service NGOs 
As noted, the 33rd Ward contains a cluster of left-leaning NGOs, conducting advocacy 
and grassroots organizing around issues.  Autonomous Tenants Union has organized a large 
grassroots base, mostly contained in its several building-specific tenant unions.  Organized 
Communities Against Deportation has large networks in the neighborhood, especially in 
immigrant populations.  Both of these organizations, as well as Centro Autonomo and Albany 
Park Theatre Project, have diffused progressive and left discourses about housing, immigration, 
and other issues through the ward for several years. 
A second element of WF33’s strategy has been collaboration with these NGOs, in the 
context of issue projects.  WF33 worked with Autonomous Tenants Union to protest mass 
evictions and advocate tenants’ rights.  Along with ATU and Organized Communities Against 
Deportation, WF33 formed the Albany park Defense Network, an organization dedicated to 
protecting undocumented people from deportation.  Though not the primary purpose of these 
collaborations, through them, WF33 gained access to the grassroots issue constituencies built 
over the years by those NGOs.816  WF33’s other issue-based outreach may also have been 
facilitated by those NGOs’ years of discursive work. 
These findings clarify how neighborhood-based NGOs may contribute to social change.  
The ward’s progressive-left NGOs were engaged in modes of practice that are, on their own, 
widely considered incapable of producing policy change.  However, this chapter suggests there 
 
816 Dawn argued that, like the zoning and rent control canvasses, the primary purpose of the campaign was to generate a record of 
WF33’s work on salient issues, and a record of Mell’s positions, to use in the aldermanic election.  And indeed, Rossana and WF33 
repeatedly highlighted these actions, contrasting them with Mell’s inaction, during the campaign. 
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may be complementarity between the electoral and movement-building projects of a group like 
WF33 and the issue-based service and advocacy work of NGOs like the Albany Park Theatre 
Project and Centro Autonomo.  These hypotheses are discussed in the final section of the 
chapter. 
Tapping the grassroots bases of local NGOs 
As described in Section 1, these NGOs have built their own bases in the ward’s working-
class Latinx population—populations which WF33 hopes to organize, but with whom it lacks 
preexisting connections.  Centro Autonomo has organized dozens of residents, as demonstrated 
by the mobilization of large contingents in local and citywide protests around immigration, 
foreclosures, and other issues.  Autonomous Tenants Union has organized tenant unions at 12 
buildings, comprising approximately 90 ward residents.  And Albany Park Theatre Project has 
produced a large network of young alumni, who have passed through the theatre program.  In 
their regular programming, each of these groups educates their members, exposing them to 
critical, progressive or left discourses about issues, and especially affordable housing and 
displacement. 
WF33 has tried to integrate these already organized people as participants in or 
supporters of WF33.  It has also been able to expose NGOs’ bases to WF33’s distinctive 
discourses, which are aligned with NGOs’ construction of the issues, but which more pointedly 
link these issue positions to attacks on Ald. Mell and demands for policy change (and regime 
change).  Insofar as NGOs work closely with families on urgent issues such as housing and 
protection from deportation, they may become the object of intense affection or loyalty of 
residents.  Some of the NGOs base appear to have transferred these affections onto Rodriguez-




Since 2017, WF33 has worked with Autonomous Tenants Union to pressure landlords, 
banks, and then Ald. Mell to halt mass evictions and negotiate with tenants.  In these 
campaigns, WF33 took an opportunity to work with the base of low-income tenants already 
organized by ATU around issues of affordable housing and displacement.  WF33 drew some 
contacts and participants from ATU’s members.  And WF33 had an opportunity to raise its own 
profile, and propagate criticism of Mell’s record on affordable housing, among this already 
organized constituency.  WF33 has also deepened its relationships with ATU’s core activists (as 
opposed to the grassroots base, the members of ATU’s tenant unions).817  The collaboration was 
arranged through a common member, Brig, a leader in ATU, and may also have been facilitated 
by WF33’s previous work with Centro Autonomo, with whom ATU is closely connected.818   
WF33 worked with ATU and its building-specific tenant unions on campaigns to protest 
mass evictions.  For example, working with ATU and the Sunnyside Tenants Union in the 
Summer and Fall of 2017, WF33 helped conduct a series of press conferences, marches, and 
protests, and publicized the stories of tenants in local media and social media.819  WF33 and ATU 
conducted similar activities around two other mass evictions in the ward.820  In these campaigns, 
WF33 worked directly with ATU’s tenant unions, including the Sunnyside Tenants Union, with 
approximately 24 members; the Autonomous Tenants Union, with approximately 12 members; 
 
817 Dawn, 12/07/18.  Dawn reports WF33 members have developed increasingly close personal ties with these activists, “going to the 
same house parties” and otherwise socializing together. 
818 This may have endeared WF33 to some ATU leaders with backgrounds at ATU.  WF33 held monthly meetings at CA’s space 2015 
and 2016, and the two groups cohosted a reading group on building a left political party in 2017.  
http://workingfamilies33.org/upcoming/2017/3/8/reading-group-the-party-we-need 
819 They protested outside the alderman’s and mayor’s office, and outside the bank financing the developer evicting residents loans 
with which Silver purchased buildings held a march through Albany Park, trying to raise awareness about the practices of Silver 
Properties http://workingfamilies33.org/blog/2017/8/22/working-families-urges-silver-properties-to-negotiate-with-tenants; 
http://workingfamilies33.org/blog/2017/9/21/as-developer-issues-notice-renters-organize-to-stay 
820 See posting on WF33 Facebook page, 7/9/18.    One campaign in the summer of 2018 targeted Starck Holdings LLC, an entity who 
purchased an Albany Park building and promptly evicted tenants.  WF33 and ATU held a call-in day (i.e., asking supporters to call 




and the Kimball Tenants Union, with approximately 13 members.  The unions were highly active 
in the campaigns, helping to plan the actions, and turning out most members. 
WF33 leveraged these collaborations to build relationships with union members.    For 
example, WF33 collaborated directly with some members of 4500 N. Albany tenants union on a 
project to publicize tenants’ stories.  WF33 members worked with at least four tenants to write 
accounts of their attempt to resist eviction, and distributed the written accounts via social 
media.  One of these documents, co-created by a tenant union member and WF33 members, is 
reproduced below. 
An anonymous WF33 member mentioned that WF33 has added some tenant union 
members to WF33’s list of supporters, to be contacted for support in issue or election 
campaigns.  I have not yet been able to determine the number of tenant union members with 
whom WF33 sustained relationships after the campaigns. 
Picture 7.1: “Juan’s Story” (flyer produced by WF33, during a collaboration with Autonomous 
Tenants Union) 
 
This is a flyer produced by WF33 members, in collaboration with Juan, a member of the 4500 N. Albany 
Ave. Tenants Union.  WF33 members worked closely with Juan over the course of a campaign to 
pressure Silver Properties to make concessions to tenants.  Juan was one of a handful of tenants who 




It is plausible that, in addition to building relationships with specific tenants, WF33 built 
its own reputation as an entity fighting for tenants among a larger swath of ATU’s building 
unions.  WF33 appears to have kept its own brand visible during the campaigns:  some, though 
not all, of ATU’s social media posts describing events specifically mention WF33, billing events as 
collaborations between ATU and WF33, and WF33 publicized its work via its own social media 
posts and press releases, prominently featuring its own name.  However, it is not clear if ATU 
union members were privy to such messages.  
Finally, WF33 may have had the opportunity to reach tenants with WF33’s distinctive 
discourse, linking the issues of affordable housing, eviction, and displacement with attacks on 
Ald. Mell.  As noted, ATU rejects electoral politics as an avenue for social change, and thus never 
endorsed, or even mentioned, Rodriguez-Sanchez (although they did repeatedly criticize Ald. 
Mell).  In their work with ATU, WF33 consistently framed housing issues in ways that highlight 
Mell’s developer-friendly positions and actions, and unwillingness to support tenants. For 
example, a press release from the campaign on behalf of the Kimball Tenant Union stated that: 
“[our] concern…is not just the housing conditions and the evictions, but also the tenants' 
interactions with Deb Mell. We've asked her for help to protect tenants and residents of the 
ward, and she's expressed [instead] that her priority is to have a good relationship with the 
developer.”  I cannot determine the extent to which tenants were exposed to this framing.  But 
to the extent they were, the would have been encouraged to link their housing struggle, to 
which they already were deeply committed, to Ald. Mell and to electoral politics. 
Albany Park Defense Network 
WF33 has had similar opportunities as a participant in the Albany Park Defense Network 
(APDN), a network of organizations and individuals protecting undocumented people from 
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deportation through a variety of legal methods.  APDN has built close relationships with local 
residents, becoming part of a social and organizational networks which form and express a 
community of undocumented people and their supporters.  Via her visible participation in 
APDN, Rodriguez-Sanchez helped establish herself as a member of that broader community, 
rather than as a partisan politician.   
WF33 launched APDN with ATU and Organized Communities Against Deportation 
(OCAD, an immigrant rights organization formed in 2010 and active in several neighborhoods of 
Chicago) in February of 2017.  It is one of several similar “defense networks” organized by OCAD 
around Chicago.  The impetus for APDN was the intensified threat of “raids” by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, associated with the Trump administration’s immigration policies.821  
Founders envision APDN as “a rapid-response network against raids and deportations,” 
organizing and educating ward residents to protect undocumented people in the event of raids. 
To date, APDN has recruited ward residents to attend a series of “Know Your Rights 
trainings,” workshops on citizens and undocumented people’s legal rights.822  APDN has been 
“developing community infrastructure” to enable effective responses to raids, such as phone 
trees and protocols to spread information.  APDN has canvassed Albany Park, distributing 
information about legal rights, best practices, and ongoing legal disputes over individual 
deportations, and integrating people into alert networks.  They also held a series of block parties 
in the summer of 2018 “to build community and [let people] learn about our work resisting 
 
821 Raids in which ICE officials arrest undocumented people at their homes or workplaces, often without warning and with 
considerable force. 
822 Hernandez, 2017.  One workshop shared best practices for interacting with ICE agents during raids, for instance encouraging 
“neighbors born in the U.S. to approach ICE agents entering their community to ask why they're there…or to record ICE's 
interactions with neighbors on a cell phone.”  Other workshops explained undocumented immigrants’ rights in the workplace, 
landlord-tenant relationships, and health care system, training both undocumented people and U.S. citizens who interact with 
undocumented people in the aforementioned contexts.  
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deportations and displacement right here in the ward.”823  APDN has also assisted individuals 
and families in legal proceedings related to deportation, detention, and citizenship.824 
Through this outreach, and building its member organizations’ existing ties, APDN has 
developed a large network in Albany Park.  APDN’s events typically draw around 30 attendees, a 
mix of undocumented people and U.S. citizens—the family members and friends of 
undocumented, people who work professionally with undocumented people or on immigrant 
rights, and people sympathetic to the cause of undocumented immigrants.825  An anonymous 
WF33 member, who works with APDN, suggests this network is partly drawn from the existing 
networks of OCAD and ATU, but that APDN’s outreach efforts have successfully brought in 
additional residents. 
ADPN has at least three characteristics which have been found to produce strong 
affective ties among participants, and between an organization’s service providers and 
recipients.  First, APDN works with people under threat of deportation.  As documented, 
imminent threat tends to enhance feelings of solidarity in an organization dedicated to 
protecting threatened actors.826   Second, APDN works not just with individuals, but with already 
close-knit collectivities, such as families, and intense networks of neighbors and friends.827  
Third, as an all-volunteer operation, APDN’s volunteer organizers are likely driven by values and 
feelings of solidarity with undocumented people and their families.828 
 
823 https://www.facebook.com/pg/albanyparkdefense/posts/.  Accessed 6/12/19. 
824 They publicized cases, provided legal counseling, supported families (and attended court proceedings in shows of solidarity).  
Some of these were individuals affiliated with organizations networked with APDN.   
825 Hernandez, 2017.  https://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/archives/2017/03/30/little-village-and-other-neighborhoods-are-
setting-up-defense-networks-for-undocumented-immigrants 
826 Jasper, 1998; Farias, 2017.  
827 According to anonymous WF33 member, families and small groups of friends and neighbors attend APDN events together 
(interview, 5/30/18).  According to Mann (1986, 228) this linkage of a collective action organization with participants’ most 
affectively intense relations strengthens participants’ identification and emotional bond with the organization.  
828 Han (2014) found these value-driven sacrifices can elicit reciprocal feelings of solidarity and commitment from other volunteers. 
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 APDN conducted several activities which conduce to building a community out of its 
diverse supporters.  First, APDN episodically activates its “rapid response” networks, requiring 
its members to collaborate on spreading information and taking various defensive actions.  
APDN also holds social events, including multiple block parties in the summers of 2017 and 
2018, which appeared to convene a multi-racial network of neighborhood residents.  The 
combination of periodic collaboration and social ties, may help build and express a community 
of undocumented people and their supporters in the neighborhood.   
Like ATU, APDN never officially endorsed Rodriguez-Sanchez.  However, APDN may have 
contributed to WF33’s electoral goals in several ways (in addition to giving WF33 and Rodriguez-
Sanchez a record to run on).  Like ATU, APDN organized and consolidated a constituency around 
particular issues, creating an opportunity for WF33 to appeal to an already established 
constituency in their outreach.   
As in its work with ATU, WF33 may have developed a reputation as a pro-immigrant rights 
group, among APDN’s participants and audience.  I have not been able to determine the extent 
to which WF33 itself was visible in APDN’s spaces.  However, in its own social media, WF33 
proudly proclaimed its role as a co-founder of APDN.  WF33 also publicizes APDN’s events, 
implying its own involvement with them.  Though boundaries between the organizations blurred 
(and no one involved in either organization was concerned to distinguish the boundaries), WF33 
members did participate qua WF33, alongside APDN, in some anti-deportation events. 829  This 
may have helped establish WF33’s identity as aligned and allied with APDN, to APDN’s 
participants and clientele, and to any attentive audience. 
 
829 WF33 Facebook Post, 2/7/18.  Accessed 6/1/19.  For example, a WF33 contingent attended immigration court hearings for some 
Albany Park residents facing eviction, and supported a campaign to release another resident from an ICE detention center.  And they 




Rodriguez-Sanchez has participated extensively in APDN events, which may have helped 
establish her as a member of a larger community, organized in part around APDN.  At least since 
the summer of 2018, Rodriguez-Sanchez participated regularly in ADPN events.  For example, 
she was part of the APDN delegation to immigration court to witness proceedings on behalf of 
an asylum seeker facing deportation in June 2018, and attended APDN’s rallies and block parties 
in the summer of 2018.  She frequently mentioned her work in APDN in campaign statements.830 
Picture 7.2.  Rossana Rodriguez Sanchez participates at a rally of the Albany Park Defense Network 
 
Rossana Rodriguez-Sanchez (front row, third from left, close to the “S” in “Stop”) at an Albany Park 
Defense Network rally in June, 2018.  Rodriguez-Sanchez was a prominent presence at APDN events.   
 
While APDN did not formally endorse Rodriguez-Sanchez, organizational representatives 
did appear, and help publicize, at least one of Rodriguez-Sanchez’s campaign events.  In June 
2018, APDN had a designated table “Rossapolooza,” a block party explicitly dedicated to 
promoting Rodriguez-Sanchez’s campaign.  APDN may have advertised the event to its 
members.  And the joint appearance may have strengthened the association between APDN and 
Rodriguez-Sanchez in the eyes of APDN participants and clientele—and by extension, 
 
830 Field Notes, 5/30/17; Chicago Sun-Times Editorial Board, 2019; Smith, 2018. 
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established Rodriguez-Sanchez as a member of this valued community.  The photo below shows 
two young Latinx attendees of Rossapolooza holding an APDN sign. 
 
Picture 7.3.  Children holding an APDN sign at Rossapolooza, a campaign event for Rodriguez-Sanchez 
 
Two young, Latinx Albany Park residents hold an Albany Park Defense Network Sign at Rossapolooza, a 
campaign event for Rossana Rodriguez-Sanchez in June, 2018.   
 
Finally, as WF33 and Rodriguez-Sanchez worked in parallel to APDN, they framed 
deportations and undocumented people’s rights in ways that highlighted institutional politics, 
and especially former Ald. Mell’s failures.  For example, when WF33 followed-up on an APDN 
event with a press release, they highlighted Mell’s refusal to join a coalition of Chicago-area 
politicians calling for the abolition of ICE.  Like ATU, APDN refrained from such references to 
partisan politics.  To whatever extent WF33 and Rodriguez-Sanchez had APDN’s participants and 




Albany Park Theatre Project 
The Rodriguez-Sanchez campaign has drawn volunteers from the alumni network of the 
youth arts non-profit, Albany Park Theatre Project.  These volunteers were particularly valuable 
for their extensive social networks among Albany Park’s immigrant families, via which they 
recruited additional people to the campaign.  These volunteers appear to have been drawn to 
the campaign by their personal relationships with Rodriguez-Sanchez, who worked as a youth 
organizer and administrator at APTP for several years.  Even more so than the previous groups, 
this base of volunteers appears to have incomplete ideological alignment with WF33’s core 
goals, a problem discussed at length in Section 4 of this chapter.  Whereas the campaign 
accessed affordable housing and immigrant rights constituencies through collaborative issue-
based projects, it tapped APTP’s networks on the basis of the strong personal ties between that 
network and one individual, Rodriguez-Sanchez. 
The network of APTP alumni has been an important source of campaign volunteers.831  
The campaign has slated Rodriguez-Sanchez’s former students as speakers at official campaign 
events.832  And some APTP alumni took important staff positions in the campaign, for example 
helping to run a campaign office and facilitating meetings with local residents.833  APTP alumni 
also comprise most of Youth For Rossana (YFR), a group of youths organizing a variety of forms 
of youth support for the campaign.  The leadership of this group—approximately 8 recent APTP 
alumni from Albany Park— “plann[ed] outreach and voter registration for the ward’s young 
people,” and participated in the campaign’s decision-making about its platform and messages.  
 
831 This is in addition to other ways that the campaign has drawn on Rodriguez-Sanchez’s experiences at APTP.  Rodriguez-Sanchez’s 
history as an arts educator and youth organizer has been a prominent theme in any discussions about her biography and character. 
832 For example, APTP alumna (and as of April 2019, staff member in Rodriguez-Sanchez’s administration) Lilia was one of three 
official speaks at Rodriguez-Sanchez’s Campaign Launch party.  
833 For example, Lilia and one other helped run an office and facilitate events, such as a brainstorming session on how to reach the 
ward’s young voters. 
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And the group furnished significant numbers of volunteers for canvasses and GOTV events.834  
Not surprisingly, at least one leader from Youth for Rossana has joined Rodriguez-Sanchez’s 
aldermanic staff. 
In their organizing work, YFR members appear to have conducted outreach via their own 
social networks in the neighborhood.  In February 2019, YFR helped recruit several Albany Park 
families to attend a brainstorming session about how to improve the neighborhood’s schools.835  
According to an anonymous interviewee, YFR organizers had been acquainted with these 
families from APTP or other experiences in the neighborhood.  While I cannot determine how 
many local residents YFR members accessed in this way, they appear to have had a reach into 
the neighborhood population which WF33 members lacked. 
Tapping NGOs’ participants and audiences 
In years of organizing and activism around displacement and deportation, Albany Park’s 
NGOs appear to have diffused ideas about these issues among ward residents, perhaps affecting 
the terrain for WF33’s project.  These NGOs shaped conceptions of issues of the relatively small 
numbers of people with whom they worked directly, and wider audiences for their public 
statements, direct actions, and artistic productions.  WF33 members were aware that this 
history of activism may have left ward residents more receptive than they would otherwise have 
been to WF33’s campaigns.  Past association with or exposure to the NGOs discourses is one 
possible explanation for ward residents’ familiarity with progressive and left positions on 
housing, observed by WF33 members during canvassing for the rent control referendum. 
 
834 the 1st day of Rossana’s candidate petition drive were APTP alumni. 






There has been sustained activism around displacement in Chicago since the Great 
Recession.  In addition to parts of the South Side, neighborhoods in the North and Near West 
Side, in and around the 33rd ward, have seen most of this activity.  From 2012 through 2016, 
much of the militant direct action against foreclosures took place in Rogers Park, just east of the 
33rd ward.836  A wave of activism around gentrification and rising housing costs in Logan Square, 
just southwest of the ward, crescendoed in 2016, with a series of marches and rallies.837 
There was extensive activism in the 33rd Ward itself.  From 2010, Centro Autonomo, 
Chicago Anti-Eviction Campaign, and Communities United Against Foreclosure and Eviction 
organized households facing foreclosure, offering a range of services and attempting to mobilize 
people in direct actions.838  CA, for example, recruited local residents facing foreclosures to 
participate in a “housing group,” dedicated to consciousness-raising and grassroots lobbying for 
a foreclosure moratorium.839  I have not been able to obtain information on the size of the 
organizations’ constituencies in the ward.  As a rough illustration of the level of activism around 
housing in Albany Park, I counted the direct actions of CA, CAEC, CUAFE, and ATU in Albany Park 
between 2012 and 2017, as reported in organizational documents and local media, finding an 
average of four actions per year during this period.840  CAEC, CUAFE, and CA helped organize 
several “occupations” of foreclosed homes (i.e., helping residents “squat” in the home).  In the 
 
836 Mata, 2012. 
837 Bloom, 2018. 
838 CA co-founded Resistance Legal Clinic; CA, CAUFE and CAEC helped residents illegally occupy homes and sometimes carried out 
civil disobedience campaigns to physically obstruct foreclosure proceedings. 
839 https://centro.community/casas-del-pueblo/ accessed 12/14/18. 
840 I included direct actions to resist a foreclosure or eviction, occupations of houses, rallies, and marches.  I did not count regularly 
scheduled organizational meetings, even if open to the public. 
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time studied, there was at least one illegally occupied home in Albany Park, which residents 
used as a residence and a community center.841 
As noted in the previous section, Albany Park’s progressive and left-leaning housing 
activists diffused their discourses through a play produced by Albany Park Theatre Project.  As 
explained, APTP’s 2013 play on displacement, I Would Kiss These Walls, incorporated CAEC’s, 
CUAFE’s, and CA’s discourses on the causes and solutions to housing crisis.  Walls ran for two 
months at APTP’s theatre in 2013, selling out many nights, and was performed again in 2015, at 
a foreclosed home illegally occupied with the help of CUAFE in Rogers Park, on the edge of the 
ward.842   There is anecdotal evidence that participants in APTP and collaborating groups drew 
their friends, relatives, and peers to these plays.843   
At least some of the participants in these activities appear to have adopted the NGO’s 
discourses about housing and displacement.  A cast member in Walls recounted that “I’ve 
invited friends [to watch the play]… and they they’re like ‘Wow, this is nothing we knew 
about…Maybe they won’t take that step to do anything at first, but at least they’re exposed to 
what there is out there.”844  An organizer at Centro Autonomo recalls a similar effect on 
participants in CA’s housing program.845 
That NGOs’ activism shaped local residents’ perspective on housing is displayed most 
clearly by residents’ statements at a June 2013 forum on a foreclosure moratorium.  14 people, 
facing foreclosure and participating in the NGOs’ support programs, gave testimony at the 
 
841 Galeano, Gutierrez, Monzon, 2015:  CA did “an occupation of a house that was vacant in our neighborhood. After much 
discussion, we came to the realization that no one was willing to live there for fear of facing legal repercussions. Therefore, although 
no one actually ever stayed in the property, it was used as a communal space for community meetings and gatherings.”  
842 APTP blog 
843 Rada, 2015. 
844 Rada, 2015. 
845 Coleman, 2013.  This article quotes Roberto De la Riva, an organizer at CA:  “First of all, these people have gone from never telling 
their stories to owning their stories…It has changed the conscience of the center.  It changes many people’s minds about being poor 
because they move from a place of shame…because they see that we can win and fight for justice.” 
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forum.  11 of 14 speakers stated their intention to defy the law and remain in their homes 
despite their pending foreclosure or eviction, reflecting the NGO’s support for illegal 
occupations.  Several argued that they, as residents, and not the banks which formally owned 
the deeds, were entitled to the house in question—implying a claim to housing which 
transcends or is unrelated to legal ownership.846 
I have not adduced any direct evidence that people exposed to these discourses by the 
NGO’s work were more receptive to WF33’s outreach.  However, WF33 members are aware of 
the possibility that years of activism (some of which they participated in) around housing and 
immigration in and around the neighborhood have created receptive audiences for WF33’s 
campaigns.  As one informant said, “it’s hard to say how much, but it definitely helps that 
people have been talking about this for almost a decade now.”847  Such exposure is one 
plausible explanation for residents’ apparent familiarity with progressive and left discourses 
about displacement and affordable housing, which WF33 members observed during their rent 
control canvassing (described above).   
Accessing strategic institutions via issue-based work 
WF33 also used a strategy of changing public conversations about issues from the 
vantage of important civic institutions.  They gained access to these institutions by joining the 
Albany Park Defense Network, positioning themselves as an issue-focused, community-based 
civic group.  They likely would not have had access to these institutions as a partisan political 
 
846 For example, one speaker asserted that “this is my house, and I’m going to stay in my house”.  Another asked, referring to the 
banks, “[w]hy do they have the right?.”  Several others pointedly referred to the houses in question as “mine” or “ours,” suggesting 
continued possession, withal legal dispossession.  
847 Interview with Dawn, 12/5/18.  
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group.  There is suggestive evidence that, in this context, WF33 advanced its perspective on 
issues in important public conversations.   
WF33 has used this strategy in attempting to elect a slate of candidates to the 
neighborhood’s Local School Councils (LSCs).  LSCs are part of the official governance structures 
of each school in the Chicago Public Schools system, created by state law.848  Among other 
functions, LSCs serve as important deliberate bodies, and activists have found them useful sites 
at which to spread ideas, particularly on issues related to education.849  WF33 members also see 
LSCs as an important place to articulate their own constructions of issues, their vision of 
expanded economic rights, and other important ideas.  By electing allies to LSCs in the 
neighborhood, they hope to influence other LSC members, who they recognize as some of the 
neighborhood’s leading activists, and to gain an institutional platform from which to participate 
with other public conversations about education. 
Albany Park Defense Network has provided an additional pathway for WF33 to 
participate in conversations at Local School Councils.  APDN engages with LSC’s as an expert 
witness and potential programmatic collaborator on programs for undocumented students.  As 
representatives of APDN, WF33 members have spoken during at least two LSC meetings at two 
neighborhood schools.  The representatives appear to have used the opportunity to raise the 
salience of one policy issue on APDN and WF33’s agenda, the Chicago Police Department’s Gang 
 
848 The LSC is comprised by three parents of students at the school,  three teachers at the school, and three residents from the 
school’s neighborhood, each elected annually by several residents.  LSC’s have the power to shape schools budgets, administrative 
hiring, and other policies. 
849 The Chicago Teachers Union views the LSCs as an important site for organizing, and reportedly used them to build community 
support for the 2012 teachers strike.  Bradbury et al, 2015;  CTU Chief of Staff Jackson Potter reports that the CTU organized against 
the Emanuel administration’s attempt to impose a longer school day (Interview with Jackson Potter, 3/10/17).  As of 2017, CTU 




Database.850  In May, an anonymous WF33 member, who participates in APDN, asked a question 
about how the gang database affects Roosevelt students.  In June, a representative noted an 
upcoming event about the gang database being held by ADPN.851 
In a variant of this strategy, WF33 is considering how to work with prominent civic 
actors who have taken positions on displacement and deportation similar to WF33’s.  For 
example, they are currently exploring ways of working with the principal at an elementary 
school in the ward.  This principal has previously called for progressive policies to mitigate 
affordable housing and displacement, having witnessed many Hibbard students leaving the 
school after their families’ evictions.  For his institutional position, he enjoyed media access and 
may have been perceived by public audiences as a credible and compelling witness on the 
problem of eviction.  Given the principal’s stance on issues, WF33 leaders have been considering 
how to incorporate him into WF33’s issue-based work, to leverage his ability to intervene in 
public conversations about issues for WF33’s ends.852  Antonio sees some potential to contribute 
to WF33’s struggle to construct issues in a favorable way, even without taking any partisan 
positions. 
I have not been able to obtain any evidence about the effects of these strategies.  
WF33’s access to LSCs via APDN likely complements the work of WF33 members elected to LSCs 
in advancing left perspectives on issues in these venues.  Having won the aldermanic election, 
WF33 will now have additional institutional platforms from which to intervene in public 
conversations. 
 




851 LSC minutes, 6/12/18. 
852 Interview with Antonio.  As of May 2018, Antonio was planning to invite the principal to a WF33 monthly meeting, to speak about 





By 2017, WF33 was a cohesive organization of about 30 activists, skilled and capacious 
enough to design and carry out strategic organizing projects.  Through a series of projects in 
2017 and 2018, WF33 cultivated supporters for a progressive housing and immigration 
agenda—and a broader class-focused political narrative—primarily among Latinx working-class 
and lower-class ward residents.  Like UWF’s efforts to organize in the 27th Ward, WF33’s efforts 
are an opportunity to observe how neighborhood-level structures and processes mediate 
grassroots organizing, and interact with organizing strategies. 
First, this chapter reinforces the findings of previous chapters that local NGOs critically 
mediate organizing projects.  In this case, WF33 tapped constituencies already organized and 
educated by the ward’s left-leaning organizations.  The 33rd Ward’s NGOs thus played a similar 
role as the 27th’s:  they cultivated a population of local activists and politically attentive 
residents committed to certain understandings of local problems.  In this case, the left-leaning 
NGOs created a population of activists who saw real estate developers and investors as 
adversaries, and committed to government intervention on behalf of low-income renters and 
homeowners. 
Given the national trends toward incorporation of neighborhood-based NGOs into 
neoliberal regimes and real estate development coalitions, why did there exist a vital network of 
relatively independent, left-leaning NGOs in the 33rd ward?  The ward’s distinctive 
organizational field appears to be a product of three factors.   
First, the ward’s NGOs reflected the ideologies and political strategies of the 
transnational activist networks in which they were steeped.  Most notably, Centro Autonomo 
drew its own personnel from an international networks of radical revolutionary activists, and 
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maintained close ties with this network.  Its programming reflected this networks’ commitment 
to building power through grassroots organizing (through particular methods of anti-colonial 
“popular education”).   Some of these ideas have passed onto Autonomous Tenants Union, 
three of whose key leaders were trained at CA, and to Albany Park Theatre Project, who worked 
with CA’s activists (among others) to develop its content. 
Second, some the ward’s left NGOs grew out of the same expansion of Chicago’s left 
milieu which produced most of the activists in WF33 (see previous chapter).  The radical, 
grassroots housing organizations which grew in the early 2010s, Communities Organized Against 
Foreclosure and Eviction and Chicago Anti-Eviction Campaign were active in the neighborhoods 
of the ward, likely helping to diffuse left analyses of the affordable housing problem.  These 
organizations also collaborated with APTP, and some their members co-founded ATU. 
Third, Centro Autonomo’s almost complete financial independence of city government 
and philanthropic foundations allowed it sustain a much larger investment in grassroots 
organizing and militant advocacy than typical regime- and foundation-funded NGOs.  CA has 
achieved financial independence through its ingenious study abroad program, Autonomous 
University of Social Movements.  Placing American college students with CA’s practitioner allies 
in Latin America, CA generates hundreds of thousands of dollars a year, more than enough to 
fund its community organizing.  
The effective interaction between left NGOs and WF33 raises questions about the 
political function of neighborhood-based NGOs.  NGOs have been roundly criticized as 
undermining progressive and left politics.  Even those ideologically committed to left projects 
are seen as irrelevant:  groups like Albany Park Theatre Project do cultural or discursive work, at 
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best distantly link to political change; the relatively few NGOs which invest in grassroots 
organizing, like CA and ATU, fail to connect to a broader project to build and use political power. 
This chapter suggests that such discursive work and grassroots organizing may in fact 
create a foundation for the explicitly partisan electoral and movement-building work of a group 
like WF33.  CA’s and APTP’s years of spreading ideas about displacement, educating youth about 
issues, and organizing local families, appear to have created a population receptive to WF33’s 
arguments, and networks of activists with whom WF33 could collaborate.  This suggests that 
typical NGO strategies of culture change and grassroots organizing are not inherently flawed so 
much as incomplete:  they can be potentiated by an actor like WF33 capable of integrating 
grassroots constituencies and audiences into a well-financed and strategically sophisticated 
project. 
The interaction between WF33 and APTP raises the question of what kinds of discourses 
can support a progressive or left agenda.  Does theatre, for instance, have to be intensely 
partisan agit-prop to advance a base-building project?  Or can non-partisan, humanistic 
treatments of issues, like those in APTP’s plays, facilitate a partisan project like WF33’s?  This 
chapter suggests that the political impact of a cultural product is far less a function of the 
discursive content of the product than of the presence of political actors capable of linking their 
agenda to the resonance of the cultural product.  An audience moved by APTP’s plays about 
eviction or deportation would likely be open to a range of political actions.  It is up to partisan 
actors to turn this audience, sensitized to the issue, toward their agenda.  If a powerful 
progressive or left organization is present in the environment, an institution which produces 
non-partisan, humanistic discourses about issues may contribute to their base-building work.  
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Past work clarifies the intrinsic challenges of organizing around gentrification and 
displacement.  Importantly, displacement itself erodes the base for resistance or alternative 
projects.  But the ease with which WF33 found support for rent control, and for a class-focused 
critique of redevelopment, suggests that redevelopment and its associated problems are also 
particularly fertile for organizing.  Most simply, as scholars of political behavior have long 
pointed out, newly imposed harms are more likely to catalyze political reaction than long-stable 
absences of goods.  Gentrification imposes many such harms, as residents experience rising 
housing costs, resulting financial insecurity and housing stability, and the dissolution of 
communities.  WF33’s canvasser found that residents facing these new, painful, and quite 
concrete problems, needed little convincing to support. 
Second, it appeared to be relatively easy for organizers to link these problems to a 
progressive-left policy agenda, such as rent control, and expanded public investment in 
affordable housing.  WF33’s agenda immediately address the problem experienced by local 
residents, at the point at which they are experiencing it:  people experience rising rents; rent 
control will prevent rent increases.  People cannot afford housing; government programs can 
directly provide affordable units.  In this case, organizing involved the relatively simple task of 
presenting residents a clear, concrete prospective benefit.  It did not depend on any prior 
ideological agreement, or require any political education. 
The contrast with organizers’ experience in Austin is instructive.  Like WF33, UWF’s 
organizers tried to organize around the neighborhood’s most salient problem, violent crime.  
But they struggled to convince Austin’s resident that a public jobs program and expanded public 
investment in schools would address the forms of social breakdown which, residents believed, 
caused violent crime.  UWF organizers’ argument depended on abstract, ultimately unverifiable 
389 
 
claims about complex social conditions and their relationship to behavior.  In other words, 
making this argument required deep consciousness-raising.  Jason and Emma’s painstaking 
efforts at pedagogy contrast sharply with WF33’s canvassing script in the rent control 
referendum canvassing: “Have you noticed the rising rents?  Would you be interested in 
something that made the rents rise less?  We’re supporting something called ‘rent control’…”  
In other neighborhoods, activists have articulated redevelopment as racial 
empowerment and constructed displacement as a problem of cultural expression and 
representation rather than as a struggle for material benefits.  The propagation of such 
constructions among the ward would surely complicate WF33’s attempts to organize around a 
class-conscious, economically focused vision of housing and development.  But the 33rd ward 
does not have a vital race-conscious pro-development formation, as other gentrifying 
neighborhoods do.  The main regime-aligned NGOs which serve low-income and Latinx 
populations focus on policy advocacy, not on commercial and residential real estate planning 
and development.  I did not find any public actor embedded in low-income and/or Latinx 
populations articulating development as the interest of those groups. 
This absence may also be rooted in the neighborhoods’ histories as “points of entry” for 
immigrants.  As described in the introductory chapter, the discourse and practice of race-
conscious community development grew out of a particular sequence of institutional 
development.  In late 1960s and 1970s, racial justice activists, interacting with federal and local 
governments and corporate and foundation philanthropists, invented commercial and real 
estate development, managed by neighborhood activists, as a form of racial empowerment.  
Subsequent interactions between neighborhood activists, the local state, and a growing real 
estate development industry, reinforced this vision.  In other words, race-conscious community 
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development is part of a political culture specific to black and Latinx communities developing in 
urban neighborhoods since the late 1960s.  Recently arrived immigrant populations—and in 
2007, 1/3 of Albany Park’s population had arrived in the previous 5 years—are not steeped in 
this political culture.  Certainly race-conscious community development could be imported to 
Albany Park (and we might expect pro-development forces to import it soon).  But forces 
committed to race-conscious development are not a long-developing part of the neighborhood’s 




Chapter 8.  Conclusions and Implications 
Introduction 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, federal policy, foundation programs, and economic 
restructuring drove a series of related institutional changes in U.S. cities.  These factors 
transformed the field of neighborhood-based activism, eliminating militant and radical groups, 
and causing the proliferation of non-profit service and development institutions, operating 
within a framework of public retrenchment, market-based development, and self-help.  Similar 
factors produced neoliberal urban regimes, pursuing corporate-led economic growth, and 
defining commitments to racial and economic justice in ways compatible with their neoliberal 
growth strategies.  Past work shows that these institutions helped construct and promulgate a 
neoliberal racial justice praxis, erasing questions of structural economic inequality and poverty, 
and defining an urban racial justice agenda of authentic political representation, opposition to 
discrimination, racial redistribution of municipal patronage, and participation in the neoliberal 
real estate redevelopment economy. 
This dissertation suggests that these institutional and cultural developments have 
shaped the terrain for neighborhood organizing around economic issues, creating possibilities 
for some kinds of political agency, and foreclosing others.  In particular, the findings suggest that 
commitments to community development as a form of racial justice practice may be 
widespread.  These commitments, along with ideological and material investments in a “racial 
uplift” practice, may make neighborhood residents uninterested in progressive or left economic 
projects, impeding left-leaning formations’ attempts to organize. 
392 
 
The dissertation also suggests that, under certain conditions, racial justice activism may 
be unaffected by these institutional and cultural developments.  Specifically, the Albany Park 
case study suggested that recently arrived immigrant activists may not be subjected to 
channeling pressures which eliminated militant and radical racial justice activism from, and 
promulgated neoliberal or neoliberal-compatible modes of racial justice praxis in, most Black 
neighborhoods.  Recently arrived immigrant activists may also have access to radical critiques of 
capitalism ideas largely eliminated from mainstream political culture in the U.S., and be less 
exposed to neoliberal discourses.  Such activists help produce a neighborhood-level political 
culture much more amenable to progressive and left organizing projects. 
The Albany Park case study also suggests that the expansion of the left at the city- and 
national scales may also affect the terrain for neighborhood organizing, mediated by activists 
residential location choices.  I found that city-level developments and the increasing interest in 
social democratic politics nationally produced a growing population of left-leaning activists in 
Chicago.  These activists enabled successful leftist grassroots organizing in the neighborhoods 
where they live.  The case study also suggested that these activist sorted into neighborhoods as 
residential consumers, and tended to choose neighborhoods in the early stages of gentrification. 
The dissertation thus suggests a series of hypotheses about the possibilities for 
grassroots organizing around economic issues in contemporary urban neighborhoods.  If these 
hypotheses were true, they would have implications for the political conflicts between left 
formations and neoliberal regimes, sharpening in some cities and nationally in recent years.  
Insofar as left formations face significant barriers to grassroots outreach in many 
neighborhoods, neoliberal regimes could be expected to be politically resilient.  However, left 
formations may have opportunities to build bases in neighborhoods with significant numbers of 
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immigrant activist and domestic left activists, suggesting opportunities for the growth of left 
formations. 
This concluding chapter will review the central findings of the Austin and Albany Park 
case studies.  I will first review descriptive findings about the contemporary neighborhood-level 
terrain for organizing, examining how neighborhood-level civic, social, political, and economic 
institutions shape neighborhood residents’ material and ideological commitments to particular 
projects.  These institutions can also be important resources and collaborators for left 
organizers.  I will then review the historical development of these neighborhood-level 
institutions, showing that the institutions in Austin were shaped by the post-1960s institutional 
developments referenced above, while the institutions in Albany Park were relatively unaffected 
by those developments.   
This dissertation also attempted to elucidate left actors’ thinking about the relationship 
between racial and class justice.  Previous chapters recounted the visions of leaders of the 
United Working Families coalition, of organizers in Austin and Albany Park.  This chapter will 
review some unresolved disagreements within the coalition, and possible contradictions in some 
actors’ own thinking.  Though these were not a central focus of the dissertation, I will also 
briefly review additional coalition strategies for developing a class-conscious racial justice 
politics. 
I will consider two additional theoretical implications of the dissertation’s suggestive 
findings.  First, echoing arguments of Ira Katznelson (1982, 1994), I argue that urban 
neighborhoods are a key site at which people acquire their ideologies and material 
commitments.  Neighborhood institutions and activist milieus may function as mechanisms of 
hegemonic incorporation, or sites for the development of counterhegemony.  I argue that these 
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functions of neighborhoods have been ignored in recent research on racial politics and social 
movements.   Second, I argue that the case study findings support recent work arguing that 
neoliberalization itself has created barriers to challenging neoliberalism and advancing left or 
liberal democratic projects.  The case studies findings clarify which aspects of the neoliberal turn 
create this effect, and how exactly neoliberal reforms shape consciousness and material 
commitments. 
Finally, I will consider four strategic implications of these findings.  First, I argue that, 
contrary to the arguments of some practitioners and commentators, progressive non-
governmental organizations can play an important role in projects to attain institutional power, 
given a specific set of conditions.  Second, I argue that left formations are better positioned to 
organize in rapidly redeveloping than chronically disinvested neighborhoods.  Third, I argue that, 
when planning base-building projects, organizers should consider the local institutions which 
systemically produce activists with particular visions and commitments, in a given locale.  
Finally, I will suggest the organizers should analyze terrain in terms of patterns of incorporation 
into neoliberal regimes. 
1. Clarifying the factors which shape the terrain for organizing  
First, this dissertation elucidates the mechanisms shaping the terrain for neighborhood 
organizing around anti-neoliberal and related economic projects.  The primary finding of the 
case studies is that neighborhood-level civic and social institutions, embedded in local 
populations can profoundly shape the terrain for organizing by influencing neighborhood 
residents’ material commitments and ideologies.  They can also provide crucial institutional 
resources to organizers, as collaborators. 
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In Austin, local non-profits, block clubs, and other institutions were critical in crafting, 
reproducing and propagating visions of racial interest centered on market-oriented 
development and self-help.  They organized residents into projects embodying these visions, 
and some projected these discourses via dense social networks and highly visible public 
projects.  These organizations helped residents form material investments in real estate 
development, and in relationships with the neoliberal regime and philanthropic foundations.  
When organizers affiliated with the socialist United Working Families group tried to recruit in 
Austin, they found residents ideologically and materially invested in community development 
and self-help, These residents either rejected the left organizers, or tried to steer the nascent 
organization toward community development and self-help projects.   
In Albany Park, grassroots organizations and non-profits organized residents around 
critical understandings of neoliberal political economy and assertions of rights to affordable 
housing and protection from deportation and state harassment.  A non-profit arts organization, 
linked with grassroots groups, may have diffused these ideas more broadly in the neighborhood.  
UWF-affiliated organizers found neighborhood residents receptive to progressive and left 
agendas, due in part to residents’ prior exposure to left analyses of social problems by 
prominent local organizations.  The left-leaning neighborhood organizations in Albany Park also 
provided UWF organizers’ access to already organized grassroots bases, the ability to identify 
with respected local groups, and access to public institutions in the neighborhood. 
While local institutions are critical in shaping subjectivities and commitments of 
neighborhood residents, many people arrive in neighborhoods with formed subjectivities and 
commitments.  Later sections of the chapter will explain how activists with left ideologies are 
systematically produced and sorted into certain types of neighborhoods.  For now, I will just 
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note the almost tautological finding that the presence of clusters of activists with particular 
ideologies shapes the terrain for organizing.  I will briefly recount how a population of leftist 
activists was one key characteristic of the terrain in Albany Park. 
Austin 
Austin contains a network of actors collaborating on community development, closely 
resembling the formations described by other scholars in other neighborhoods (e.g., Boyd, 
2007).  A cluster of non-profits and business associations, most notably the Austin African 
American Business Networking Association, the Austin Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Westside Health Authority have spearheaded commercial real estate development projects in 
recent years.  These groups work closely with the neighborhood’s elected officials, and receive 
funding, special taxing designations, and other support, from city government.  Each of these 
actors articulates their development work, in discourses traceable through the Nationalist wing 
of the 1960s mobilizations, as a form of racial empowerment and expression of an authentic 
racial culture.  
These groups appear to project their discourses widely in the neighborhood, via highly 
visible projects, public events, and through their wide social networks in the neighborhood.  
AAABNA and WHA in particular have close ties with many civic and social institutions, including 
some of the neighborhood’s largest church congregations.  I presented anecdotal evidence that 
leading individuals in these organizations propound their visions of development as racial 
empowerment for large audiences of neighborhood residents, in churches and public events.  
The organizations’ development projects also serve as powerful embodiments of these 
discourses, symbols which neighborhood residents may encounter in daily life.  The redeveloped 
“Soul City Corridor,” for example, with its many physical references to cultural nationalism, 
397 
 
embodied the vision of community development as racial empowerment and authenticity.  
Residents who patronize businesses in this corridor, or simply pass through, encounter this 
vision. 
Another cluster of institutions organizes local residents to improve public spaces, build 
social networks, and various other volunteer projects.  This includes Austin’s two largest non-
profits, Westside Health Authority and Austin Coming Together, and an array of smaller 
organizations, including many block clubs.  These institutions are also linked to local elected 
officials, and receive grants from the city government and foundations.  Most of these groups 
construct their work in a discourse about the importance of social fabric and social norms to 
collective well-being, and trace the neighborhood’s challenges to cultural decline, in much the 
same terms as Austin’s leading non-profits. 
In 2015, organizers associated with United Working Families recruited about two dozen 
Austin residents, forming the Greater Austin Independent Political Organization (GAIPO).  
However, as recounted in Chapter 4, these residents brought visions of business and property 
development and self-help to GAIPO.  Many recruits attributed Austin’s problems (such as crime 
and low educational attainment) to the deterioration of the neighborhood’s social fabric and 
culture and wanted GAIPO to focus its energies on restoring the social fabric through voluntarist 
projects (such as block clean-ups).  Other recruits wanted GAIPO to prioritize the economic 
development (and in some cases, specifically the development of black-owned businesses), 
seeing it as a crucial form of racial empowerment, in much the same terms as the 
neighborhood’s community development network.  Few recruits had any interest in the 
progressive and socialist economic policies at the core of UWF’s agenda.  The ideological 
tensions undermined GAIPO, with many of its members dropping out, frustrated by UWF 
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organizers’ unwillingness to focus on self-help and business development.  By 2019, GAIPO had 
dwindled to a few members, and had ceased to provide UWF with significant grassroots 
support. 
Nor could UWF-affiliated organizers find existing organizations or networks of activists 
in Austin with whom to collaborate.  Organizers perceived no basis for collaboration with the 
neighborhood’s many community development and self-help groups, given their rejection of 
electoral politics, indifference or hostility to most of UWF’s policy agenda, and close 
relationships to UWF’s political enemies (otherwise, they seemed like a great fit).  In 2018, UWF 
organizers and GAIPO briefly worked with the citywide group #NoCopAcademy.  Although they 
formed to oppose a new police training facility in Austin, and had a grassroots following in other 
neighborhoods, #NoCopAcademy did not have a grassroots base in Austin, and thus could not 
provide UWF with a base, or even with access to local populations.  UWF’s organizers did recruit 
some members of Chicago Teachers Union who resided in Austin.  Aside from these exceptions, 
UWF organizers could neither ally with existing organizations nor recruit via existing networks.  
Instead, they had to rely on door-to-door canvassing and flyering public spaces to recruit 
individual residents. 
One unresolved puzzle was the absence of working-class or lower-class residents from 
GAIPO.  Chapter 4 explained that GAIPO’s membership was almost entirely middle-class.  This 
may be an artifact of the canvassing strategy of GAIPO’s organizers, which filtered according to 
political engagement (which is correlated with class), and focused on segments of the 
neighborhood in which existing GAIPO members lived (reproducing an initial middle-class bias).  
I was not able to ascertain if, as hypothesized, lower-classes have been influenced by their 
experiences in service provider non-profits, or if other factors impeded lower-class participation.  
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It’s not clear if the ideological and material commitments observed among Austin residents 
would have been similar and similarly common among working- and lower-class residents. 
Albany Park 
Diverging from national trends, Albany Park contains several groups committed to 
militant strategies and radical policy agendas, and mostly financially independent of the 
neoliberal regime and philanthropic foundations.  Most of these organizations focus on 
affordable housing and the protection of undocumented people.  Centro Autonomo, an NGO 
which has achieved financial self-sufficiency through an ingenious funding scheme, has 
integrated service provision with grassroots organizing and consciousness-raising.  It conducts 
grassroots outreach to low-income homeowners and tenants, and has mobilized them in 
grassroots lobbying, and militant resistance to evictions and foreclosures.  The Autonomous 
Tenants Union, a group that sustains financial independence mostly by keeping low costs, has 
organized tenant unions in several buildings around Albany Park.  Although their presence in the 
neighborhood is more episodic, the citywide grassroots groups Chicago Anti-Eviction Campaign 
and Communities Organized Against Foreclosure and Eviction have been active in Albany Park, 
organizing residents and leading direct actions against foreclosures and evictions.  The citywide 
organization, Organized Communities Against Deportation, along with the aforementioned ATU 
and Central Autonomo, organize Albany Park residents to assist undocumented people in 
evading Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  A theatre arts organization (which, unlike the 
other groups listed, is financially dependent on foundation grants) has worked with all of the 




Just as striking was the absence of market-oriented community development 
organizations rooted in Latinx immigrant populations.  While there were two community 
development groups in the neighborhood, they appeared to have few ties to local immigrant 
populations.  I found no actors in the neighborhood who articulated market-oriented 
development as a form of racial empowerment or expression of authentic racial culture.  This is 
particularly puzzling given that Albany Park’s Latinx community contains many middle-class 
homeowners, the demographic which furnishes most community development activists in other 
neighborhoods (including Austin). 
A group of predominantly white, college educated, left-leaning activists also resided in 
Albany Park, recent transplants to the neighborhood.  I will discuss where these activists came 
from and how they sorted into the neighborhood in a subsequent section.  For now, I will just 
note that the presence of these activists enabled a highly successful grassroots organizing 
project in the neighborhood.  These activists formed Working Families of the 33rd Ward (WF33) 
group in 2015.  WF33 functioned as a highly effective cadre, launching strategically sophisticated 
outreach campaigns in the neighborhood, and building relationships with other local activists. 
WF33’s attempts to organize a popular base for a socialist electoral project were greatly 
facilitated by the aforementioned groups in Albany Park, especially Autonomous Tenants Union, 
Centro Autonomo, the Albany Park Theatre Project, and Organized Communities Against 
Deportation.  As WF33 launched its 2019 election campaign, it ran on precisely the issues which 
local groups had been working on, using discourses similar to those which local groups had been 
disseminating for years.  More abstractly, WF33 may have associated its own identity with that 
of the local groups, who appear to have had strong affective bonds with their memberships and 
bases.  I was not able to determine the level of impact of these strategies, but there is 
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suggestive evidence that WF33 organizers found it easier to appeal to local residents because 
the latter’s perspectives had been shaped by the local organizations. 
WF33 also collaborated directly with these local groups, with benefits for their 
organizing project.  WF33 collaborated with these organizations in the latter’s issue-based work 
on affordable housing and protection of undocumented people.  To an extent I was not able to 
precisely determine, WF33 accessed the already constituted grassroots bases and networks of 
those local groups, developing relationships with them, mobilizing many of them as volunteers 
(especially during the election campaign).   WF33 also gained access to important public 
institutions in the ward as members of issue-focused coalitions with the ward’s other grassroots 
groups. 
2. The creation of neighborhood-level factors 
As past work (reviewed in Chapter 1) suggests, neoliberal federal policies, rising 
influence of neoliberal ideas on foundation programming, and economic restructuring, directly 
and indirectly produced the neighborhood-level institutions described above.  In Austin, the 
field of neighborhood-level institutions was shaped by opportunities and pressures to provide 
services, generated by devolutionary federal policy and immiseration associated with economic 
restructuring, respectively, and opportunities to participate in the real estate redevelopment 
market, coordinated by Chicago’s neoliberal regime (which was itself constitutively shaped by 
federal neoliberal policies and economic restructuring).  Austin’s organizations were also shaped 
by longer-running trends in philanthropy, encouraging self-help activism and a “racial uplift” 
perspective.  The Austin case thus concurs with past work that the policy changes and 
institutional developments associated with neoliberalization (along with other factors) have 
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profoundly shaped fields of neighborhood-level activism, which mediate possibilities for 
organizing. 
The Albany Park case shows how neighborhood institutions and activists can be 
unaffected by those national developments.  The case suggests (perhaps tautologically) that 
organizations who have been less subjected to the channeling pressures of opportunity 
structures, and who have had greater access to radical visions and critiques of capitalism or 
neoliberalism, may maintain the militant strategies and radical goals which have been 
eliminated from most neighborhoods by the aforementioned national developments. 
Specifically, I argue that recently arrived immigrant activists may be “outside” these 
structures.   First, these activists have not been subjected to the aforementioned channeling 
pressures for as long as activists in other neighborhoods.  The opportunity structures created by 
devolutionary federal policy, foundation programs, and the real estate development industry, 
shape activists’ decision-making over time.  Activists who have arrived in the United States 
recently may not yet have been pressured to tailor their work to these opportunities.  Second, 
recently arrived activists may have developed ideologies in contexts outside U.S. political 
culture.  I found suggestive evidence that the activists in Albany Park developed radical, anti-
neoliberal ideas in experiences in their countries of origin and in transnational activist networks.  
I argue that this insulation from channeling and access to radical ideas help explain the 
independence, militancy, and radical goals, of Albany Park’s neighborhood organizations. 
I also found that radical, anti-neoliberal neighborhood activism can be produced by the 
expansion of the left at the city and national scales.  Left-leaning political groups, unions, 
academic institutions, and other nodes produce people with left ideas.  As a citywide milieu of 
such institutions has expanded and condensed around certain ideas in Chicago since the early 
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2010s, it has produced a growing population of activists committed to those ideas.  These 
activists appear to sort into neighborhoods as residential consumers, perhaps tending toward 
neighborhoods in the early stages of gentrification.  In the Albany Park Case, activists produced 
in this case formed WF33.  This can be seen as another in which the terrain for neighborhood 
organizing depends on developments at higher scales of the polity:  just as barriers to 
neighborhood organizing are created by supra-neighborhood factors, so opportunities for 
neighborhood organizing are created by developments at the scale of the city and nation. 
The independence of activists from distributive relationships with neoliberal regimes 
and neoliberal modes of accumulation can also be function of contingent factors.  In some 
neighborhoods of Chicago, political elites have proactively incorporated recently arrived 
populations into community development programs, and articulated community development 
as racial or immigrant empowerment.  This has not occurred in Albany Park, seemingly due to 
the strategic choices of Albany Park’s regime-aligned aldermen.  The financial independence of 
Centro Autonomo should also be seen as a contingent, rather than systematic factor.  CA’s 
ingenuous “study abroad” program has allowed them to fund grassroots organizing and service 
provision at a significant scale without relying on foundation or government grants.   
Austin 
Reviewing secondary literature, I show that the same factors which caused the decline 
of militant neighborhood organizing since the early 1970s generally eliminated Austin’s militant 
groups.  In Austin, as in other neighborhoods, federal policy, economic restructuring, and the 
interventions of urban governments gradually narrowed what had been a diverse field of 
activism.  A wave of Alinskyite groups, formed in the 1960s and 1970s, converted to service 
provision in the 1970s and 1980s, pulled by opportunities to run federal service programs, and 
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pushed by the mounting service demands from a population increasingly impoverished by 
deindustrialization.  A set of racial justice organizations formed by street gangs on Chicago’s 
West Side, combining entrepreneurship with welfare recipient and tenant organizing were 
destroyed by state repression.  
I also suggested that the prevalence of self-help activism in contemporary Austin is 
explained by white philanthropists’ and conservative civil rights organizations’ attempts to 
cultivate such activism since at least the Reconstruction era.  I briefly reviewed secondary 
literature on the long history of “racial uplift” initiatives, which defined Black Americans’ 
problems as the result of maladaptive cultures, and attempted to inculcate middle-class values 
via self-help projects.  I noted the attempts of the Urban League and others to organize block 
clubs, embodying this uplift vision, in Black neighborhoods following the Great Migration.  I 
noted the close resemblance of the discourses, practices, and organizational forms of 
contemporary self-help activists with these historical initiatives.  This resemblance suggests that 
contemporary activists are steeped in this long-running tradition. 
I could not obtain detailed information about the history of community development in 
Austin.  However, I presented suggestive evidence that Austin’s activists took up community 
development in response to development opportunities, presented by city programs and by the 
thriving neighborhood redevelopment industry.  The two leading community development 
groups (AAABNA and WHA) did not begin as community development organizations, but as 
service groups (providing technical assistance to businesses and social services, respectively).  It 
appears that they engaged in community development by way of the Emanuel administration’s 
Retail Thrive program—a program providing grants to businesses in target areas.  A key activist 
at AAABNA orchestrated inclusion of a commercial corridor in Austin in the Thrive program in 
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2017.  Now, most of AAABNA’s and WHA’s development work is in this corridor, which is now 
covered by two city development programs.  At the least, whether or not these opportunities 
inspired activists’ interest in development, they helped to crystalize and organize that interest. 
More generally, I showed that the self-help and development organizations are well-
funded by foundations and city government.  Whether or not they created these forms of 
activism, foundations and Chicago’s neoliberal regime have sustained them.  In this, Austin’s 
neighborhood activism resembles that evolving since the late 1960s in other neighborhoods. 
Albany Park 
Albany Park’s institutions and political culture have been shaped by its position as a 
“point of entry” neighborhood for immigrants.  As of 2018, 44% of Albany Park’s population was 
foreign born, and an additional 40% were the first generation of their families to be born in the 
U.S.  In the other neighborhoods comprising the 33rd Ward, just under one third of residents are 
foreign-born. 
This fact has at least two consequences for the development of Albany Park’s activist 
milieu.  First, recently arriving immigrants have brought radical ideas from the relatively robust 
radical milieus in their countries of origin, and through their networks with radical activists and 
movements in those countries.  The founders of Centro Autonomo, for example, include an 
activist with roots in the Zapatista movement, and in a radical, transnational, anti-colonial 
organization from the 1960s.  Albany Park’s activists continue to participate in transnational 
networks, exchanging ideas with anti-capitalist housing organizers in Mexico City, the Zapatista 
movement.  Just as European immigrants brought radical critiques of capitalism and ideas and 
strategies to the U.S. labor movement in the 1930s, Albany Park’s Latinx immigrants have 
incorporated these radical ideas into local community organizations. 
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Albany Park’s organizations have succeeded in creating financial niches independent of 
city government and philanthropic foundations.  Most notably, Centro Autonomo has achieved 
financial independence, while operating at a large scale (relative to other neighborhood-based 
non-profits), through its study abroad program.  This could be seen as a contingent factor, 
enabled by CA leaders’ extraordinary ingenuity and transnational networks.  It should also be 
noted that this program may not be expandable or replicable.  It requires accreditation by 
mainstream universities (and may stretch the limits of 501c3’s disbarment from partisan 
politics), making it vulnerable to political attacks.853  And if such programs were replicated to the 
point that significant numbers of community-based organizations obtained independence from 
foundations and governments, or if CA expanded to the point that it was politically potent, 
political attacks would seem likely. 
In Chapter 6, I speculated that the relatively recent arrival of activists may be one 
explanation for the lack of grassroots pro-development activism.  For some Black activists, the 
articulation of development as a form of racial empowerment, defense, and uplift was based on 
a longer-developing set of ideas that Black entrepreneurship more generally represented such 
collective racial goals.  Some commentators argue that this latter tradition evolved through 
interactions between upwardly mobile and usually middle-class Black Americans and White 
elites since at least Emancipation, and others argue that this tradition was influenced by a 
hegemonic capitalist culture in the U.S.854  It is possible that recently arrived immigrant 
populations, such as those in Albany Park, have not the types of experiences and interactions 
 
853 Mainstream universities (who provide the students capable of paying 5 figure tuition) are likely more susceptible to political 
pressure, and could be pressured not to accredit an organization seen as radical and militant. 
The radical political curriculum of CA’s study abroad program, and direct links with militant movements,  might violate the 
prohibition against 501c3’s involvement in partisan politics.  However, loss of 501c3 status might not matter to CA, given their non-
reliance on grants and charitable contributions.  
854 Hill and Rabig, 2012:  16-19; Dawson (2001:  29-31) describes this as among the “dynamics of interracial discourse” shaping racial 
ideologies in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
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which would organically produce a doctrine of racial empowerment focused on capitalist 
entrepreneurship. 
The absence of grassroots pro-development racial justice activism in Albany Park is also 
explained by contingent ward-level political factors.  In some neighborhoods of Chicago, political 
elites have proactively fostered race-conscious, pro-development, grassroots activism (perhaps 
jumpstarting such an activist tradition).  The recent political leadership in Albany Park—Dick and 
Deb Mell (aldermen from 1976-2013 and 2013 to 2019, respectively)—appears not to have 
perceived a need to do so.  The Mells recognized a need to incorporate the growing Latinx 
population into their electoral coalition.  But they did so by providing public jobs and contracts, 
and giving local leaders prominent positions in the administration.  They did not attempt to 
articulate the ward’s redevelopment as a form of racial or ethnic empowerment or expression 
of authentic cultures, or cultivate grassroots Latinx involvement in redevelopment, who could so 
articulate it.  Moreover, the Emanuel administration’s targeted community development 
programs, which have solidified pro-development constituencies in Austin and other West- and 
South Side neighborhoods, have not included Albany Park. 
Expansion of Chicago’s left milieu and the terrain for organizing 
Finally, I found that the terrain for grassroots organizing has been shaped by the city-
wide and national growth of populations committed to left ideas, interacting with the dynamics 
of gentrification.  The expansion of Chicago’s left milieu since the early 2010s produced a 
population of left-leaning activists, committed to the particular set of left discourses elaborated 
within that milieu.  National political developments since 2015 generated additional interest in 
socialist politics and activism in Chicago, as they did elsewhere.  Many of these two populations 
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of activists sorted into Albany Park as consumers of residential space, pursuing neighborhood 
features typical of neighborhoods in the early stages of gentrification. 
In Chapter 3, I traced the gradual expansion of Chicago’s progressive-left milieu—
networks of left-leaning and/or progressive labor unions, community organizations, academic 
institutions, media outlets, social movements, and social networks—since the early 2010s.  
Through a series of mobilizations, catalyzed by economic crises, and by successful episodes of 
resistance, the milieu expanded and produced shared discourses, including critiques of 
neoliberalism and capitalism, visions of change, and concrete policy agendas. 
In Chapter 5, I show that almost all of the core members of Albany Park’s radical 
electoral organization, Working Families of the 33rd Ward, have ties to this milieu.  They worked 
as journalists or academics in left-leaning institutions, were members of the Chicago Teachers 
Union or Service Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois and Indiana, or had 
participated in leftist movements.  Chapter 5 argues that these experiences were formative for 
the activists, profoundly shaping their views on strategy and their social visions. 
The expansion of WF33’s formal membership since 2017 has mostly been driven by 
incorporation of members of the nearby branch of the Chicago chapter of Democratic Socialists 
of America.  Chapter 5 presented interview data that these DSA and WF33 members were part 
of the national wave of popular interest in socialism since 2016.  Like the relatively politically 
inexperienced people who flowed into DSA chapters elsewhere, these DSA and WF33 members 
were interested in socialism by the 2016 presidential campaign of Bernie Sanders and the 2018 
Congressional campaign of Alexandria Orcasio-Cortez, and were galvanized by the campaign and 
presidency of Donald Trump. 
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Albany Park’s status as a gentrifying neighborhood also explains the presence of these 
leftist activists in Albany Park.  In Chapter 5, I reported interview data that WF33’s activists 
moved into Albany Park as consumers of residential space, drawn by the neighborhood’s 
combination of affordability, racial and cultural diversity, and relatively upscale amenities.  This 
combination of features is typical of neighborhoods in early stages of reinvestment. 
This may reflects a generalizable fact about the spatial distribution of a particular kind of 
left-leaning activists, geographically mobile by virtue of their education and class, and what 
might be called “cosmopolitanism” (i.e., a lack of deep social ties to a particular neighborhood in 
their city of residence).  These activists may tend to have a particular consumer profile, valuing 
diversity, relative affordability, and attractive options for entertainment and consumption.  If so, 
they will tend to sort into gentrifying neighborhoods. 
Other influences on the terrain for neighborhood organizing  
In Chapter 1, I discussed the possibility that the primary explanatory factors in this 
study—the aforementioned changes in urban and neighborhood institutions, and corresponding 
development and diffusion of neoliberal racial justice praxis—shape the possibilities for 
neighborhood organizing alongside other ideological and material factors.  The Austin case study 
suggests that the primary factors of interest do act concurrently with longer-running cultural 
beliefs about racial uplift and self-help.  These beliefs powerfully shaped Austin residents’ 
conceptions of collective interest and political possibility.  These factors are complementary, not 
competing explanations, jointly producing the terrain for organizing.  It is possible that 
possibilities for grassroots organizing are overdetermined by the complex, multifaceted 
neoliberal turn, and the neoliberal ideologies diffused by this turn, and by earlier, compatible 
cultural and institutional structures. 
410 
 
Of course, such beliefs long predate neoliberalization, traceable through a “politics of 
respectability” in the Reconstruction era.  While these ideas are not integral to neoliberalism, 
they have been integrated into it.  In their assignment of responsibility for neighborhood 
conditions to residents rather than the state or corporations, these beliefs are readily 
compatible with neoliberal policies of state retrenchment.  Moreover, these beliefs were 
historically cultivated by pro-capitalist actors, and more recently have been reproduced by 
programs of neoliberal governments and neoliberal philanthropic foundations.  The articulation 
of neoliberal programs of state withdrawal from troubled neighborhoods and market-oriented 
community development with older praxes of collective self-help typify the historically specific 
syntheses of neoliberal and other praxes which characterize all “actually existing 
neoliberalisms.”855 
Racial and class politics in Chicago’s left 
The Austin and Albany Park case studies, and the examination of the citywide United 
Working Families coalition in Chapter 3, illustrate the complex relationship of racial and class 
politics for contemporary left formations.  The case studies clarify the barriers to a strategy of 
articulating a class program within racial justice discourses.  They also indicate potential tensions 
with left formations, including divergent understandings of the relationship between racial and 
class justice, and tensions between foregrounding racial justice and organizing White working- 
and lower-classes  
Chapter 3 described UWF’s strategy of articulating a class justice program in widely 
resonant discourses on racial justice.  The experiences of organizing in Austin indicate the 
barriers to this strategy.  Definitions of racial interest and justice as community development, 
 
855 Brenner and Theodore, 2002:  349. 
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unity, and a strong social fabric are embedded in local institutions and quotidian practices, and 
appear to be common sense for many residents.  For many these understandings of racial 
interest and justice are reinforced (or were encouraged) by material investments in self-help 
and development projects.  It’s possible that these material commitments and understandings 
are more common among middle-classes, and lower-class minority populations would be more 
receptive to UWF’s articulation of racial justice. 
UWF appears to be more successful in developing a leadership cadre who views class 
justice as integral to racial justice.  Multiple UWF leaders described UWF’s training programs as 
having this function.  The programs draw activists rooted in neighborhood-based social 
movements and projects, some of whom are steeped in Black and Latinx Nationalist traditions.  
And the training programs include instruction in which trainees learn UWF’s critical analysis of 
neoliberal political economy.  Trainees participate in UWF’s well-funded electoral and lobbying 
projects, deepening their relationship to the left formation.  While I do not have data needed to 
assess impacts on participants’ outlooks, these training programs may have the potential to 
produce at a significant scale racial justice activists committed to a left class analysis. 
  I also found divergent, and perhaps internally contradictory, ways of thinking about race 
within the UWF formations.  In UWF, I observed two different understandings of racial justice, 
although the stakes of this difference appeared to be small.  One tendency sees a redistributive 
economic program as the core of racial justice.  For proponents of this tendency, political 
leadership of people of color and the articulation of the coalition’s project in racial justice 
discourses indigenous to minority communities are strategic necessities, not integral parts of an 
emancipatory project.  Another tendency sees economic justice and political self-determination 
as essential to a racial justice.  Proponents of this tendency see an ethical imperative for the 
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aforementioned political practices, and advocate policies to enhance democratic control of 
institutions.  Given that the two camps share an economic justice agenda, and differ only in 
whether they see a set of race-conscious political practices and policies as politically expedient 
or substantively important, this difference appears not to cause significant conflicts within the 
coalition.  Both tendencies faced the strategic problem of building a movement to advance 
economic justice demands among minority populations committed to different understandings 
of racial justice which erase class inequality. 
The coalition’s thinking and practice on racial justice may have more significant 
consequence for the coalition’s relationship to the White working- and lower-classes.  First, the 
coalition’s articulation of class programs in racial justice language could make it more difficult to 
appeal to white working-classes.  Some in the coalition would vehemently assert that an ethical 
commitment to racial justice practices should outweigh any concern with alienating Whites, and 
that any such alienation would be driven by racism.  One informant also reported that the 
coalition could form a winning majority with relatively little support from the White working-
class, which is a relatively small percentage of Chicago’s electorate.  Unlike left formations in 
other locales, UWF does need to win both minority populations committed to race-conscious 
programs and White populations alienated by them. 
I found suggestive evidence that members’ thinking about the relationship of race and 
class shapes their own propensity to organize the White working- and lower-classes.  I could not 
obtain any evidence about UWF members’ thinking with respect to organizing the white- 
working-classes, although 4 of the 5 grassroots base-building projects launched by UWF in 2018 
(as opposed to the post-2015 wave which were launched independently and supported by UWF) 
were in predominantly Black and Latinx neighborhoods. 
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However, I did find that WF33 chose to target Latinx populations, directing almost all of 
their canvassing and issue-based outreach to Latinx sections of the ward, despite the presence 
of a thousands of White working-class residents.  This choice may have been caused by a 
perceived opportunity to appeal to Latinx populations on the basis of identity as well as on a 
substantive program.   It also may have been caused by some WF33 members’ tendency to elide 
the White working-classes in their analysis of capitalism.  Most members critique capitalist 
exploitation and neoliberal political economy in ways that would support an inter-racial 
working- and lower class movement.  They also perceive distinctive experiences of Black and 
Latinx lower-classes under capitalism.  At times, they talk about Black and Latinx particularity in 
ways that erases the exploitation of White working- and lower-classes, substituting the former’s 
particular experiences for exploitation in general.  I could not obtain enough data to determine 
if this tendency is an unintentional conceptual slippage, or reflects a belief (like that of the UWF 
leaders mentioned above) that racial minority segments of the working- and lower-classes ought 
to have a distinctive status as the subject or leadership of an emancipatory project.  
3. Theoretical Implications 
Ideological formation, hegemony, and counter-hegemony at the neighborhood 
level 
This section builds on the case studies to argue two related theoretical points.  First, I 
argue that neighborhoods, and specifically the activist milieus in neighborhoods, are key sites at 
which people acquire ideologies and political commitments.  Second, I argue that neighborhood 
institutions can be key mechanisms through which people are incorporated into dominant 
cultures and regimes, or key mechanisms for building counter-hegemonic movements. 
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The neighborhood as a key site of ideological formation 
The dissertation suggests that the urban neighborhood is one key site at which people 
form ideologies and political commitments.  In Austin and Albany Park, institutionalized 
collective action at the neighborhood-level reproduces and elaborates perspectives on social 
issues, collective interests, and other political questions, and facilitates residents’ adoption of 
particular economic practices.  I found that people in both neighborhoods developed ideologies 
through participation in or exposure to this neighborhood activism, and acquired material 
investments in distributive regimes and modes of accumulation via these nodes. 
The high level of activity at the neighborhood-level can be explained by four factors.  
First, in Chicago, ward-level governing institutions can deploy institutional and financial 
resources to support ward-level collective action (as in Ald. Mitts’ support for Austin’s block 
clubs and community development organizations).856  Second, especially since the 1990s, and 
the ascendance of the Comprehensive Community Initiative paradigm (see Chapter 1), 
philanthropic foundations have prioritized projects at the neighborhood-scale.857  These factors 
help ensure resources are available for actors willing to work at the ward- or neighborhood 
scale.  Third, activist groups crystalize at the neighborhood-level as people attempt to address 
problems where they experience them.  Block clubs formed in Austin to improve deteriorated 
public spaces, and a “defense network” formed in Albany Park to protect the neighborhood’s 
undocumented people from ICE raids, for example.  Finally, the neighborhood is a common 
sense idea, continually referenced, implicitly and explicitly, in public policy, media, and everyday 
discourse.  People reflexively understand their own identity as neighborhood residents.  
 
856 Although Chicago’s wards cut across official neighborhood boundaries, they are similarly scaled spatial units, and both connote 
residential contexts.  
857 The CCI paradigm seeks to coordinate stakeholders to and generate and implement a neighborhood-wide plan for integrated 
service provision and economic development (Stoutland, 1999; Betancur et al, 2015).  Betancur et al (2015) note that CCIs were the 
dominant paradigm in foundation-funded community development by the late 1990s. 
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I found that these neighborhood-level civic, political, and economic activist 
organizations are important nodes of ideological reproduction.  These organizations engage in 
collective action on salient social issues, and in the course of their action they construct 
accounts of those issues, defining their causes, meaning, importance, and solutions.  The 
activists also identify themselves, their organizations, and their work, within discourses about 
community, race, and class, in which the activists are steeped.  In so doing, they elaborate 
definitions collective interest, racial interest and racial justice, and other constructs. 
While these organizations are clearly not the only influence on people’s ideologies, I 
found that they are importance influences, in part because of their embeddedness in local social 
contexts.  An earlier section of this chapter enumerated the many ways that neighborhood 
organizations diffuse ideologies among residents: 
• Many have built large grassroots bases and followings in the neighborhood, with whom 
they communicate regularly, in the context of the organization’s programs and events.   
• Many have participatory projects, in which neighborhood residents can personally enact 
the organization’s vision.   
• Activists’ projects are powerful symbols of organization’s ideologies, which 
neighborhood residents may encounter in daily life. 
• Some neighborhood organizations have broad and deep social networks in the 
neighborhood, including ties to churches and other institutions with large grassroots 
memberships, and diffuse their discourses via these networks. 
• Some organizations interact with people in affectively-laden aspects of life, and thus 
become deeply trusted entities. 
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The neighborhood as a site of incorporation into dominant formations and organization of 
counter-hegemony 
In a passage of his Prison Notebooks, Antonio Gramsci describes the political function of 
the “intellectuals” of subordinate classes—the politicians, civic leaders, and functionaries 
embedded in the social life of the working-classes, who discursively construct the class’s 
identity, interests, possibilities, and other meanings.858  Gramsci observes that the working-class 
intellectuals in his contemporary Italy had been incorporated into the dominant political 
coalition.  The working-class intellectuals’ discursive production had become “a subordinate 
moment of the vaster directive function” of the intellectuals of the dominant group.859  That is, 
while they continued to articulate working-class interests and identity, they did so within the 
ideological frameworks of the dominant group.  
Neighborhood-based organizations can be seen as performing the same articulatory 
functions for neighborhood residents.  This dissertation shows that the programs and discourses 
of many neighborhood-based groups (such as those of Austin) have been profoundly shaped by 
dominant neoliberal formations, at the federal and urban levels, and the neoliberal real estate 
development economy.  Inasmuch, their work constructing social problems, collective interests, 
and other elements must be seen as “a moment in the vaster directive function” of a dominant 
formation, committed to neoliberalization:  they function to reproduce and diffuse (and perhaps 
innovate and elaborate) the dominant group’s discourses and practices. 
Because neighborhood institutions are effective at reproducing and diffusing ideas and 
incorporating residents into modes of practice, they are a key site of the construction of 
hegemony.  For example, in Austin, the field of community development activism was a key site 
of the construction of neoliberal subjects.  The programs of neighborhood-based institutions 
 
858 Gramsci, 1977:  1.  In Gramsci’s words, the intellectuals give the class “homogeneity and an awareness of its own function .” 
859 Ibid, 99. 
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(built around city and foundation programs) facilitate neighborhood residents’ entry into the 
neoliberal economy, as property owners conscious of rising values; as stewards of public spaces 
preparing the ground for investment; as investors, participating in “investment clubs” or sell-offs 
of city property; or as entrepreneurs, hoping to serve a revitalizing market.  It is from these 
vantage points, constituted within the neoliberal real estate redevelopment system, that 
neighborhood residents understand economics and politics. 
Neighborhood organizations may be influenced by political formations and actors 
opposed to the dominant formation.  In Albany Park, for example, organizations were relatively 
independent of the neoliberal regime, and drew radical, anti-neoliberal ideas from transnational 
activist networks.  As Austin’s organizations were effective mechanisms of hegemonic 
incorporation, Albany Park’s were effective at counter-hegemonic organizing.  Embedded in a 
local social networks and affectively bonded with local populations, Albany Park’s NGOs 
effectively disseminated critical perspectives on the affordable housing crisis, and left-leaning 
notions of neighborhood residents’ economic and social rights. 
The study of the political functions of neighborhoods in political science  
These arguments—that neighborhoods are key sites of ideological formation, and thus 
key sites of incorporation into dominant formations, or key sites of counterhegemonic 
mobilization—differ from most recent empirical work on neighborhoods in political science.  
Recent work in racial politics considers different aspects of neighborhoods, and studies 
psychological rather than ideological mechanisms of influence.  Research on social movements 
recognizes neighborhoods as a site of ideological formation, but has not considered the 
possibility of neighborhoods as a site of hegemonic incorporation.  The perspective advanced in 
this dissertation is similar to one advanced most recently by Ira Katznelson, in his studies of class 
formation in 19th Century English and American cities. 
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   Ira Katznelson (1982, 1994) argues that 1) the urban neighborhood is a crucial site of 
class formation, and 2)the substance of class identities depends on the degree to which 
neighborhood-level cultures and institutions are independent of dominant political formations.  
In the U.S., urban machines (part of the national Democratic party) were “enmeshed in the 
organizational life of neighborhoods—their gangs, firehouses, secret societies, 
saloons…genuinely working-class institutions, rooted deeply in the local institutions and cultural 
life.”860  These neighborhood-level formations organized populations around demands for 
patronage and symbolic representation, on the basis of ethnic, territorial and religious 
identities.   In England, class-based franchise restrictions left no dominant formations no 
incentive to organize working-class support, and raised the salience of class identities for the 
excluded classes.   A class-conscious political culture thus developed in working-class 
neighborhoods.  Neighborhood spaces, and their rich organizational milieus, were important 
sites for the development of critiques and visions which informed the Chartist movement.861 
Neighborhoods and racial politics 
Recent work in racial politics asks what seems like a similar question to this 
dissertation’s:  “how [do] different neighborhoods produce political environments, which, in 
turn, structure African American [and Latinx] political choice”?862  But, according to my literature 
review, none of this work studies how local institutions (or any other factors) shape 
neighborhood residents’ ideologies, or otherwise considers the effects of neighborhood 
contexts on positions on neoliberalism and associated economic issues. 
 
860 Katznelson, 1982:  56. 
861 Katznelson, 1994:  151.  In Katznelson’s words, movements thrived due to “the concentration of workers in autonomous working-
class communities, where, free from the direct supervision of their employers or the state, they could create such institutions as 
reading rooms, and working men's clubs and societies.  The organized working-class movement utilized the semi-free space of the 
neighbourhoods to meet (in the pubs, friendly societies, and other venues), to proselytize, to organize.” 
862 Cohen and Dawson, 1993. 
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Examining recent studies on neighborhoods in three top journals of racial politics, I find 
recent work differs from this dissertation in three respects.  First, recent studies do not consider 
the embedding of discourses in quotidian life and the incorporation into distributive 
relationships with regimes and neoliberal modes of accumulation.  Rather, the studies take as 
explanatory variables aspects of neighborhood structure such as poverty rates, “family 
contexts” (i.e., number of single and married households, single- and dual-parent households, 
etc., educational attainment, segregation, and social isolation.863  Relatedly, they see as key 
mechanisms perceptions of collective efficacy, perceptions of inter- or intra-group 
competition.864  Second, these studies do not consider political views or behavior with respect to 
contemporary economic conflict, or any other particular issue or conflict.  Nor does it consider 
particular modes of activism.  Rather, it seeks to explain propensity toward political behavior in 
general, measuring political interest, electoral participation, and organizational participation.865 
Neighborhoods in the study of social movements 
Within social movement studies, much work analyzes how locally embedded institutions 
and social networks facilitate mobilization; and other studies examine mechanisms of elite 
influence over movements.  But I could find no work which consider the ways that elites 
continually shape local institutions and cultures, with effects on movement strategies and goals. 
Recent work clarifies the ways that local structures enable mobilization.   In a widely 
cited chapter, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1988) argue that social and organizational networks 
embedded among within subordinate populations, which they refer to as a “micro-mobilization 
context,” enable collective action by disseminating information and aggregating resources.866   
 
863 Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh, 2001; Shaw, Foster, Combs, 2019; O’Brien, Bareto, Sanchez, 2019 
864 Carey Jr. et al, 2013; O’Brien, Bareto, Sanchez, 2019 
865 Newman, Velez, Pearson-Merkowitz, 2016; Nesbit, Paarlberg, and Compton, 2019 
866 McAdam, McCarthy, Zald, 1988; McAdam, 1982, talked about local networks in similar terms. 
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Later studies, referring to these locally embedded structures as “social movement 
communities,” stress their role in nurturing “oppositional consciousness,” understandings of 
extent social arrangements, identities, and other elements which inspire mobilization.867  Taylor 
and Whittier (1992) argue that social movement communities, defined as institutions and 
spaces relatively insulated from dominant cultures, enable the “withdrawal from the values…of 
the dominant, oppressive society and the creation of new self-affirming values.”868 
The argument that activists must develop institutions and spaces relatively autonomous 
of dominant groups and culture, in order to elaborate a critique and oppositional identity, 
implicitly acknowledges that, in general, people are immersed in a dominant culture.  However, 
all of the work on “micro-mobilization contexts,” “social movement communities,” and cognate 
concepts focuses on their potential to facilitate mobilization and/or counterhegemony, and 
examines historical cases in which they performed this function.  I could find no 
acknowledgment that, in the words of Gramsci, “the siege is a reciprocal one.”869  That is, within 
the research program on the relationship of social movements and local environments, there 
appears to be no interest in understanding elites’ proactive efforts to colonize relatively 
autonomous spaces and domesticate oppositional cultures. 
Studies of elite influence on social movements don’t consider the ongoing diffusion of 
dominant cultures and incorporation of subordinate groups in via locally embedded institutions. 
Scholars working in the “political process” framework argue that elites shape movements by 
selectively opening the political system to certain types of claims.  These opportunity structures 
determine movement impact, and may determine movement orientation, insofar as activists 
 
867 Staggenborg, 1998.  Taylor and Whittier, 1992. 
868 Taylor and Whittier, 1992:  111.  While they do not explicitly reference Nancy Fraser’s concept of counter-publics Taylor and 
Whittier accord social movement communities a very similar function to counter-publics, and state they are organized around 
“counter-institutions.”  
869 Gramsci, 1977:  239. 
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tailor their demands to these opportunities.  The “resource mobilization” perspective suggests 
that elites enable movement formation by providing marginalized groups the resources needed 
to sustain mobilization.  Other studies examine elite cooptation and channeling of movements, 
but see them either as the effects of fixed structures, or as short-term responses during 
episodes of contention (and register only the short-term effects of such interventions).  I could 
find no studies which examine long-term processes through which elites and dominant 
formations shape local institutions and cultures, indirectly influencing or negating movements. 
As originally formulated, Charles Tilly’s concept of “repertoires of contention” does 
address the concerns of this dissertation.  Tilly (1977) recognized that elements of dominant 
discourses, for example about political legitimacy and possibility, come to be embedded in the 
scripts which inform subordinate groups’ demands and strategies.  However, more recent work 
using the “repertoire” concept does not elucidate elite influence on movements’ substantive 
goals, focusing almost entirely on movements’ selection of tactics.  Moreover, work on the 
evolution of repertoires examines sees short-term episodes of contention as the key drivers of 
change, and does not consider long-term processes of incorporation and domestication which, 
although initiated during moments of contention, continue long afterwards. 
Neoliberalization and the negation of resistance 
This dissertation showed that institutional developments associated with the neoliberal 
turn have created institutions and patterns of activism in urban neighborhoods which impede 
organizing against neoliberalization.  This finding illustrates the long-running argument in 
political theory that ascendant political projects may shape popular consciousness and 
reconstitute material interests in ways that generate popular consent to that project.  The 
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finding also supports and extends a more recent body of scholarship on the ways that 
neoliberalization constrains and negates political contention. 
Chapter 1 reviewed Antonio Gramsci’s account of how policy and institutional reforms 
can insert a ascendant political formation’s ideas and concepts into the discourses and practices 
comprising daily life.  Almost by definition, an ascendant formation enacts its social vision in 
public policies and institutional reforms.  These reforms beget concrete programs and 
institutional practices, carried out in quotidian social, economic, and political life.  In a more 
complex line of thought, Gramsci also argues that the dominant formation’s ideas will tend to be 
absorbed into the doctrines and concrete programs and practices of important institutions in 
civil society, independent of the state, but steeped in the same ideological currents. 
As people encounter the dominant group’s ideas, embedded in discourses and 
practices, they internalize those ideas.  As explained in Chapter 1, Gramsci argues that 
discourses embodying the dominant group’s core concepts and ideas come to saturate everyday 
life.  People who are steeped in this social context inevitably absorb those ideas and concepts, 
especially those hidden in the discourse as implicit premises.  While Althusser has a different 
conception of ideological change, which cannot easily account for the ideological effects of a 
reform project within a capitalist system, his conception of the internalization of ideology 
usefully complements Gramsci’s account.870  In his account, people internalize ideology by 
enacting the institutionalized practices in which the ideology is embodied.  In this enactment, 
they come to recognize themselves, their actions, and other elements, as these are described in 
the ideology.  Similarly, when people encounter discourses which address them as a particular 
kind of entity, people recognize themselves as such.  As people come to think their relationship 
 
870 Althusser defines ideology as the beliefs of the dominant class, which performs the function of reproducing docile labor.  In this 
functionalist account, it’s not clear how ideologies can change substantially within a capitalist system, as I’ve argued occurred with 
the neoliberal turn. 
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to the world from the subject positions constituted within the ascendant formation’s ideology, 
that formation’s arrangements come to seem normal and legitimate. 
The same changes may also reconstitute people’s material interests, creating 
constituencies invested in particular arrangements.  As reforms create new modes of economic 
practice and new distributive regimes, people begin to produce their own material existence 
through these avenues.  Of course, actors who profit in the new modes of practice would 
defend those modes, and associated politics and political formations.  And actors who do not 
benefit from these modes of activity, but who have merely invested in their ability to participate 
in them, may also have developed a stake in their maintenance. 
Wendy Brown (2003, 2005) and Stuart Hall (1988a, 1988b, 2011) described 
neoliberalism in this way, as shaping popular consciousness in ways that negate the potential for 
resistance and alternative projects.  Both begin with the observation that neoliberal ideas have 
been applied to policy and institutional reform projects in public and private institutions in 
“every domain of social life.”  As these policies are implemented, neoliberal ideas are 
“concretely materialized through the practices of state regulation…in education, in schooling, in 
family policy, in the administrative apparatuses of local and central government,” and in 
corporate, university, and other practices.871  These quotidian institutionalized practices 
encourage or require people to think of themselves, their relations, their goals, and other 
objects in economistic terms, as problems of maximizing return on investment.  Similarly, the 
rhetoric of political elites and functionaries continually addresses people as “human capital,” as 
entrepreneurs, consumers, or “the self-reliant, self-interested, self-sufficient tax-payer.”872 
 
871 Hall, 1988:  46. 
872 Brown, 2005: 36-7; Hall, 1988:  49.   
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The neoliberal project also has a negative dimension.  Neoliberalization removes 
alternative values and concepts from public life as institutions and practices which had been 
organized around non-market values such as democratic empowerment, solidarity, and human 
need are reoriented to neoliberal criteria.  The result is the removal from social life of the values 
and concepts on which “political, moral, or subjective claims located outside capitalist 
rationality” had historically been founded.873  Hall summarizes: 
Where previously social need had begun to establish its own imperatives against the 
laws of market forces, now questions of “value for money,” the private right to dispose 
of one’s own wealth, the equation between freedom and the free market, have become 
terms of trade, not just of political debate in parliament, the press, the journals’, and 
policy circles, but in the thought and language of everyday calculation.874 
 
Hall and Brown find that these changes negate the possibility for alternative projects, 
largely by shaping people’s consciousness.875  Relentlessly hailed as neoliberal subjects, people 
come to “spontaneously think their relation to the world,” and to politics from the perspectives 
of entrepreneurs, taxpayers, “human capitals,” and other figures within neoliberal discourse, 
and on the basis of neoliberal values.  They are incapable of conceptualizing claims against the 
market, or democratic empowerment.876  Even if people do not completely internalize these 
understandings, they lack access to alternative values and ideas, which have been removed 
from public life.877 
Aside from Brown’s analysis of the neoliberalization of higher education and law, 
neither she nor Hall attempt to specify key institutional or policy changes and their impact on 
 
873 Brown, 2005:  45. 
874 Hall, 1988:  40. 
Brown focuses specifically on the displacement and disarticulation of liberal democratic values and concepts, while Hall emphasizes  
875 Brown notes that neoliberalization also constrains political contention by eliminating political venues, exacerbating resource 
inequalities, and through other mechanisms (2005:  40). 
876 In Brown’s words, the neoliberal subject “approaches everything as a market and can only think market conduct; cannot think 
public purposes or common problems in a distinctly political way” (2005:  39) 
877 Brown ask “from what platform would more ambitious democratic projects be launched?  How would the desire for more or 
better democracy be kindled from the ash heap of its bourgeois form?  Why would peoples want or seek democracy in the absence 
of even its vaporous liberal democratic instantiation?  And what in democratized subjects and subjectivities would yearn for this 
political regime, a yearning that is neither primordial or cultured by this historical condition?” (2005:  17) 
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political contention, via subjectification or other mechanisms.  Other recent work has more 
concrete analyzed particular developments and their political impacts, contributing important 
insights about the barriers to resistance. 
Krinsky and Simonet (2012)’s case study of the New York City parks department shows 
that neoliberal governance has fragmented the urban labor force, rendering labor organizing 
and collective action difficult.  Attempting to cut costs, control the labor process, and realize the 
perceived efficiencies of private management, the city government privatized the 
administration of some city parks, and used contingent labor in others, including people 
sentenced to community service, workfare participants, municipal job training program 
participants, and volunteers, alongside traditional municipal employees.  The reforms produced 
a menagerie workers, performing similar tasks, but “[r]egulated under vastly different systems, 
and with different “conditions of employment—or deployment.”878  Labor unions were unable 
to organize workers, despite widespread discontent, because of the practical impediments and 
difficulty in bridging the interests of differently exploited workers.879 
As Krinsky and Simonet analyzed the terrain for labor organizing, this dissertation was 
intended to elucidate how neoliberalization has shaped the terrain for neighborhood organizing.  
In so doing, the dissertation helps to specify which aspects of the neoliberal turn negate 
resistance, through what mechanisms.  The case studies identify important barriers to 
neighborhood organizing, in the incorporation of neighborhood residents into relationships with 
the neoliberal regime, and into the real estate redevelopment economy, and the diffusion of 
understandings of racial empowerment and interest focused on self-help and market-oriented 
development.  The dissertation traced these barriers to the rise of the Black neoliberal urban 
 
878 Krinsky and Simonet, 2012:  33. 
879 Ibid, 38-9. 
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regime, the transformation of neighborhood-based racial justice activism since the 1960s, and 
the growth of the real estate redevelopment economy, each rooted in the neoliberal turn since 
the 1970s.  And the Albany Park case elucidated opportunities for organizing, amidst continuing 
neoliberalization. 
4. Implications for Strategy 
Organizers may simply underestimate the barriers to organizing around left and 
progressive projects.  Many of the recent calls to organize resistance to neoliberalization do not 
acknowledge the complex terrain.  They do not appear to recognize that target populations may 
be committed to neoliberal and neoliberal-compatible goals, and that organizers must develop 
strategies for engaging populations with such commitments, or focus their attention elsewhere.  
This section will briefly discuss four possible strategies for organizing, given the complex terrain 
described above. 
Disinvestment vs. Reinvestment  
Chronically disinvested neighborhoods may be less conducive to left organizing than 
rapidly gentrifying neighborhoods for two reasons.  First, the policy demands that working- and 
lower-class populations are likely to make, and left and neoliberal formations’ respective 
abilities to address them, vary between disinvested and gentrifying neighborhoods.  
Disinvestment elides conflicting interests of classes, giving all an apparent interest in 
revitalization.  In these conditions, working- and lower-classes are apt to support market-
oriented development.  Gentrification accentuates conflicting class interests, and is likely to 
generate working- and lower-class demands for protection from market forces, which left 
formations are better able than neoliberal regimes to address (given the latter’s constitutive 
investment in abetting real estate markets).  
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Second, left formations can effectively organize around a certain type of emergent crisis 
which  1)involves a sudden loss of valued goods, such as appears to trigger grassroots militancy, 
as opposed to the chronic absence of those goods, which does not; 2)involves a type of loss that 
is relatively easy to articulate to a left program, such as when the visible cause is a market 
process or market-based actor.  The grassroots militancy produced by such crises can create 
allies on the ground for left organizers.  Crises of eviction and displacement associated with 
gentrification fit these criteria (as do other crises) while crises related to chronic disinvestment 
do not. 
Working- and lower-class demands in disinvested and gentrifying neighborhoods  
Disinvestment temporarily obscures the conflicts of interests between classes with 
respect to redevelopment.  In a state of disinvestment, all experience problems of inadequate 
access to consumer goods and services and deteriorating housing stock (although it’s true that 
middle-classes are disproportionately concerned with a lack of access to capital and low 
property values).  Revitalization appears to promise an improvement in the quality of life to all 
residents.  In this state, there no concrete evidence that redevelopment leads to crises of 
affordability and displacement for lower-class population segments.  Even if residents are aware 
that redevelopment has caused displacement in other neighborhoods, it would be possible for 
people with at best ambiguous relationships to the redevelopment process to imagine 
themselves as beneficiaries. 
This may help explain the valence of community development in Austin, and the ability 
of community development groups to appeal to politically attentive residents across class.  As 
noted, I found anecdotal evidence that even working-class residents of Austin were enthusiastic 
about market-oriented revitalization.  This is likely partly the effect of civic and political leaders’ 
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articulation of community development as universally beneficial, within widely resonant 
discourses on racial justice.  But the absence of concrete evidence of the problems associated 
with redevelopment may have made this articulation more plausible. 
In such conditions, it would be difficult for left formations to appeal to working- and 
lower-classes.  Because conflicts of interest remain latent, there is no material basis for left 
formations to construct a class antagonism, for example portraying the interests of working- and 
lower-classes as fundamentally opposed to those of developers or investors.  Moreover, in the 
initial stages of redevelopment, left formations’ revitalization vision differs from the neoliberal 
vision primarily at the level of the techniques used to spur reinvestment, rather than substantive 
goals—both formations envision a revitalized commercial economy, creating jobs and growing 
businesses in a virtuous cycle.880  Without significant substantive differences between programs, 
political conflicts are likely to be settled in other terms (such as symbolic appeals or patronage 
relationships).  In other words, when revitalization is the salient issue, UWF’s usual strategy of 
organizing around a clear class justice program would be difficult.  
Gentrification, by contrast, accentuates conflicts of interest between classes.  Some 
segments profit from rising values, while others struggle with rising costs, and face the 
possibility of displacement.  The population segments with mixed or negative experiences, 
including those who had previously embraced community development on the basis of 
perceived interests, would have a clear material interest in market regulation.  A left formation 
may well-positioned to offer a coherent anti-displacement program, and to compellingly 
articulate this class conflict.  UWF, for example, has long made rent control and greatly 
 
880 Left actors’ difficulty to distinguish their program of revitalization from the neoliberal one are well illustrated by the attempts of 
UWF-affiliated elected officials on the West Side of Chicago.  For example, Brandon Johnson, elected in 2018 to the Cook County 
Board of Commissioners with UWF backing, has attempted to win support in Austin by promising to expand the Emanuel 
administration’s Retail Thrive program, increasing small businesses’ access to city support (Karbal, 2018). 
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expanded public investment in affordable housing core agenda items.  By contrast, neoliberal 
regimes, with constitutive investments in rent-intensifying redevelopment, have a limited range 
of policy options for dealing with affordability crises, none able to prevent widespread 
displacement.  On the issue of displacement, unlike revitalization, left formations can draw 
clear, substantive contrasts between their program, and its effects on lower-income people, and 
the neoliberal regime’s. 
To maintain a cross-class alliance amidst a crisis of affordability, neoliberal regimes must 
rely on selective incorporation of lower-class actors (e.g., through patronage), and on 
mystifications.  As discussed at length in Chapter 1, neoliberal regimes and their neighborhood-
level allies have often attempted to legitimate redevelopment, amidst displacement, by 
constructing it as a program of racial empowerment and racial authenticity.  But, in gentrifying 
neighborhoods, unlike disinvested neighborhoods, there is a material basis for left formations to 
dispute this construction, highlighting the class contradictions. 
The right kind of crisis  
A crucial aspect of neighborhood terrain is the presence of potential allied groups, 
networks, and movements.  As noted, the left-leaning NGOs and activists In Albany Park greatly 
facilitated WF33’s base-building and electoral work.  The absence of preexisting progressive or 
left formations in Austin was one factor undermining UWF’s organizing efforts there. 
The case studies showed that crises of gentrification-induced displacement and earlier 
foreclosure crises catalyzed militant grassroots mobilizations, with demands assimilable to a left 
program.  Whether they energized and reoriented existing organizations, or produced new 
grassroots formations, these crises generated allies for left organizers.  Chronic disinvestment 
did not appear to have any such generative effects.  Generalizing from these findings, I argue 
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that left formations should look for allies generated by crises which impose a sudden loss, rather 
than a chronic lack, and in which the role of market processes or market actors is highly visible. 
The Albany Park case shows that the displacement crisis catalyzed militant grassroots 
activism.  While Albany Park’s activists already possessed radical, anti-neoliberal ideas, the 
displacement crisis energized them, and encouraged organizations to converge on a common 
set of foci.  Most clearly, mass evictions led directly to the founding of Autonomous Tenants 
Union in 2015.  Widespread evictions also drew the citywide groups Chicago Anti-Eviction 
Campaign and Communities United Against Foreclosure and Eviction to Albany Park.  While 
Centro Autonomo already worked on housing (and had been active in the fight against 
foreclosures), it continued its housing organizing in response to the eviction crisis in the 2010s.  
The crisis also caused Albany Park Theatre Project to engage issues of affordable housing and 
displacement, providing occasion for them to work with activists at the aforementioned radical 
organizations.  As discussed above, the presence of a highly mobilized activist milieu, condensed 
around the housing crisis, was a key factor facilitating WF33’s base-building project. 
While it occurred before the period under study, and was not discussed in Chapter 4, a 
foreclosure crisis in Austin catalyzed a similar form of militant grassroots activism.  In the late 
2000s and early 2010s, Austin had very high rates of foreclosures.  This crisis generated a wave 
of housing activism, similar in form (although not in ideology) to that in Albany Park and other 
neighborhoods:  new groups formed, and existing non-profits (especially the South Austin 
Coalition Community Council) organized local residents to participate in direct actions.881 
Even though there was no left milieu in Austin to channel discontent toward radical 
demands, the movement catalyzed by the foreclosure crisis spontaneously developed a focus 
 
881 These groups generally did not use the anti-capitalist and socialist frames or militant tactics as Albany Park’s housing movement 
has.  This was not covered in Chapter 4. 
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compatible with a left program.  Bearing out Piven and Cloward’s insight that discontent 
crystalizes around the most visible sources of the problem, activists mostly targeted banks who 
initiated foreclosures.  They made demands for banks to refinance loans, and for government 
action to aid households with underwater mortgages.   
Even if these activists did not advance systemic critiques of capitalism or radical 
demands, they may have been assimilable into the UWF coalition.  Their analysis, highlighting 
corporate greed, and asserting claims to housing based on need, fits left formations’ analysis; 
and their demands for corporate and government redress of the foreclosure crisis fits UWF’s 
program of government regulation of corporate activity in housing markets.  The activists’ 
militancy may also have made them inclined to the types of base-building work formations like 
UWF are attempting. 
In gentrifying neighborhoods (including Albany Park), affordable housing movements, 
initially galvanized by the foreclosure crisis, were sustained through the 2010s by eviction and 
displacement crises.  But in Austin, the wave appears to have completely dissipated as the 
foreclosure crisis passed (with hundreds of individuals and families losing their homes).  As 
noted, at the time of my study (2017), Austin had almost no militant grassroots activism.  The 
chronic lack of investment in Austin appears not to generate militant activism the way the 
foreclosure crisis had. 
On the other hand, an eroding base… 
Of course, displacement is the departure from neighborhoods of working- and lower-
class populations.  While displacement creates opportunities for left formations to fracture 
cross-class development coalitions and ally with grassroots mobilizations, it also, by definition, 
erodes the left’s potential base in the neighborhood.  Organizing around displacement is thus 
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necessarily a race against time, an attempt to build a base powerful enough to win institutional 
power, and enact policies to stanch displacement, before the potential base is eliminated.  As 
noted in Chapter 3, UWF leaders recognize this, and see Chicago as nearing a tipping point, at 
which a populist resurgence in the city will be foreclosed by the displacement of the working- 
and lower-classes. 
The role of progressive non-profits in political change 
Progressive non-profits are sometimes criticized as politically ineffectual.  Groups like 
Albany Park Theatre Project diffuse progressive discourses, but have no mechanism to translate 
public concern into power in the policymaking or electoral spheres.  Given elevated public 
concern with an issue, incumbent politicians are likely to have an advantage in any ongoing 
discursive contestation over issue definition and the construction of solutions.882  Even the 
relatively few NGOs who invest in grassroots organizing cannot connect their base-building work 
to a project to build and use political power, due to restrictions on non-profits’ political activity 
in the tax code, and those imposed by funders.  This line of argument suggests that, even if such 
groups influence culture and organize local populations, they cannot enable their constituencies 
attain institutional power, and are rarely able to influence public policy. 
The Albany Park case suggests that NGOs’ discursive work and organizing can play a key 
role in advancing policy and electoral projects—given the presence of an politically and 
electorally focused institution like Working Families of the Thirty-Third Ward.  WF33 built an 
electoral project around the issue-based work that APTP, Centro Autonomo, and Autonomous 
Tenants Union had been doing.  WF33 mobilized as campaign volunteers and voters the 
 




networks and issue publics that the NGOs had built over years.  In this context, the NGOs were 
part of an effective division of labor with a disciplined, electorally focused group. 
As noted in Chapter 6, the interaction between WF33 and APTP raises the question of 
what kinds of discourses can support a project to change policies and win control of institutions.  
Does theatre, for instance, have to be intensely partisan agit-prop to advance a base-building 
project?  Or can non-partisan, humanistic treatments of issues, like those in APTP’s plays, 
facilitate a partisan project like WF33’s?  The Albany Park case study suggests that the political 
impact of a cultural product is less a function of its discursive content than of the institutional 
environment.  An audience moved by APTP’s plays about eviction or deportation would likely be 
open to a range of political actions.  It is up to partisan actors to turn this audience, sensitized to 
the issue, toward their agenda.  When a powerful progressive or left organization is present in 
the environment, they can compete with other actors to attach a program and political identity 
to the emotionally resonant humanistic discourses.  
Neighborhood-based NGOs’ strong ties to local populations is even more important 
given the dynamics of activist production at the city-level.  As noted, there are institutions 
training socialist activists in Chicago, including academic institutions, labor unions, and 
grassroots movements.  But, there appears to be a tendency for these activists to be socially 
distant from the lower-classes they hope to organize.  Certainly in the Albany Park case, the 
activists who formed WF33 were almost all white, college- educated, knowledge workers (even 
if from working-class or precarious middle-class families), and recent transplants to Albany Park, 
with no organic ties to the neighborhood’s working- and lower-classes.  This may be a 
systematic tendency in the left, given the number of activists formed in institutions of higher 
education, to which the relatively affluent have greater access.  In Albany Park, CA, APTP, and 
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ATU were useful partners for WF33 because they had the strong relationships with local 
populations which WF33 lacked. 
The Albany Park case also suggests that left formations can effectively organize in 
neighborhoods by building on organic progressive and anti-capitalist tendencies in the 
neighborhoods, and letting those tendencies shape the agenda of any emergent formation.  
WF33’s cadre brought some of their own policy agenda, including demands related to public 
services and revenue.  But the top priorities in WF33’s issue and electoral campaigns—
affordable housing and protection of undocumented people—were determined by WF33’s 
assessment that these were the issues most salient among the neighborhood’s working- and 
lower-classes, and among the left-leaning groups in the neighborhood.  WF33 also recruited an 
organizer at APTP as their candidate for aldermen.  In effect, WF33 helped the activists 
embedded in Albany Park’s immigrant populations scale up their work, express their demands in 
the electoral sphere, and integrate their projects with a citywide progressive formation. 
Analyzing activist populations  
Finally, when planning a base-building project, organizers should think in terms of 
systematically produced populations of activists.  In any given neighborhood, organizers should 
ask what institutions are condensing or training activists, producing populations with particular 
perspectives on strategy or substantive goals.  For example, organizers could look for left 
institutions, such as left-leaning academic centers, labor unions which invest in political training 
and activation of their rank-and-file, or grassroots movements or mass membership 
organizations.  This could help to identify neighborhoods where potential cadres and allies exist.  
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This case suggested that recently arrived immigrant populations may views politics through 
discourses formed in their country of origin, or in transnational networks. 
Similarly, organizers could consider where institutions produce populations committed 
to neoliberal or neoliberal-compatible modes of activism, such as self-help and market-driven 
redevelopment.  Since we know that community development and self-help organizations are 
critical and reproducing and propagating those commitments, such analysis could consider the 
extent to which these institutions are common and integrated into the life of a given 
neighborhood. 
Further, these findings suggest that organizers can think about organizing in terms of 
producing activists at the city scale, or even building institutions to train and socialize new 
activists.  UWF’s inability to organize a base in Austin can be seen as a mark of the success of 
Chicago’s neoliberal regime in cultivating a community development field.  Where UWF’s 
grassroots base-building projects succeeded, it coalesced the activists produced by UWF’s and 
allies’ educative and socializing institutions.  Left formations could see neighborhood organizing 
as in part a matter of producing left activists at the city scale, who are able to lead organizing 
efforts in their neighborhood of residence. 
The production and distribution of left activists  
Base-building in Albany Park was successfully in part because of the activists produced 
by UWF’s and allies’ educative and socializing institutions who moved into the neighborhood.  
This suggests that left formations could should think about neighborhood organizing as, in part, 
a matter of producing left activists at the scale of the city and distributing them in space.  Left 
formations can approach base-building by producing cadres at the city scale, and distributing 
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them to strategically important neighborhoods.  Even if they are socially distant from the 
populations they intend to organize, they can conduct strategically sophisticated outreach and 
relationship-building, like WF33 did in Albany Park. 
In Chicago, the citywide left milieu grew organically, as difficult economic conditions and 
inspiring episodes of resistance pushed people to mobilize, and a citywide conversation created 
a set of common discourses.  While some institutions (especially the Chicago Teachers Union 
and the United Working Families organization) proactively trained activists, the expansion of the 
citywide population of left activists was spontaneous and gradual, not intentionally caused by 
any particular agents.  Similarly, the distribution of left activists into Albany Park was driven by 
individual consumption choices, not any conscious strategy to place activists in space. 
This suggests that organizers should think in terms of the ongoing organic production of 
activists, and their distribution as residential consumers.  Organizers could identify what 
institutions are producing left activists—such as left-leaning academic centers, labor unions 
which invest in political training and activation of their rank-and-file, or grassroots movements 
or mass membership organizations—and where these people tend to live, in order to identify 
neighborhoods where potential cadres and allies exist.  And organizers could think about 
neighborhood organizing as consolidating the population of existing left activists in a 
neighborhood. 
A more proactive approach would be to attempt to build capacity to train and socialize 
new activists, and to encourage them to move to strategically important neighborhoods.  This 
would be analogous to a labor organizing strategy in which committed leftists take jobs in 
strategically important industries with the intention of organizing workers in that space.   
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Analyzing patterns of incorporation  
Widespread material and ideological commitments to neoliberal or neoliberal-
compatible modes of activism, such as self-help and market-driven redevelopment, can 
undermine left organizing.  Therefore, when planning their organizing, left formations should 
analyze who is and isn’t incorporated into these modes of activity and steeped in these cultures.  
Organizers should seek populations who are outside these formations, steeped in cultures which 
have not absorbed neoliberal ideas to the same extent. 
This study has attempted to show that certain types of neighborhood-level institutions 
are critical in reproducing and propagating those commitments.  The findings suggests that, in 
analyzing the potential receptivity of populations to left projects, we should consider 
participation in neighborhood institutions oriented toward neoliberal modes of activism.  For 
example, we could expect that populations organized into block clubs, working on self-help 
projects, and networked with community development organizations, would be difficult to 
interest in a left project. 
In addition to these analytical principles, the second case study suggests particular 
populations who may be likely to be steeped in political cultures relatively amenable to left 
projects.  This case suggested that recently arrived immigrant populations may views politics 
through discourses formed in their country of origin, or in transnational networks.  However, the 
case study also suggests that the incorporation of such populations into distributive 
relationships with neoliberal regimes and organized around neoliberal projects is in part a 
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